Charles Kendall Adams

514. Situation in the West.—At the opening of the year 1863, it was evident that in the West the most important military operations would center about Vicksburg, on the Mississippi River, and Chattanooga, in eastern Tennessee. Vicksburg was a strongly fortified city, and until it should be taken the Mississippi River could not be controlled by the Union forces. The importance of the place lay not only in the fact that it prevented the Federals from making use of the river, but also in the fact that it furnished the Confederates with easy passage for troops and supplies from Texas and Mexico. In strategic importance, it was scarcely inferior to Richmond itself; for it now held the only remaining railroad which extended from the far West into the Eastern states of the Confederacy. Chattanooga was also important, since it was so situated as to control, not only Eastern Tennessee, but also the most easy and natural passage from Virginia to the Southwest. Soon after Halleck was placed in command at Washington, in July, 1862, Grant was left in charge of the territory about Vicksburg, and Rosecrans about Chattanooga.

515. First Efforts against Vicksburg.—Vicksburg is situated on a high bluff on the eastern side of the Mississippi. Just above the town, the river turns sharply to the northeast, and then, winding into a loop on which Vicksburg is built, flows again toward the southwest. The regions west and south being so low as often to be flooded, and the territory being intersected by numerous streams, military movements were rendered extremely difficult. In November and December, 1862, and again in January, 1863, unsuccessful attempts were made against the city, by Grant and Sherman. As the spring of 1863 advanced, efforts were renewed. Grant cut a new channel for the river, across the neck, hoping to leave Vicksburg high and dry inland. In this endeavor he was not successful.

516. Johnston and Pemberton.—The Confederate forces in the West were commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, who had now recovered from his wound (§ 495), General Pemberton being second in command. Johnston desired to meet Grant in the field, thinking that thus Vicksburg could best be held, and ordered Pemberton to conduct operations on this line; but Pemberton, encouraged by some recent successes, and not recognizing Johnston’s right to command him, chose to fight behind the fortifications of the city. This difference of policy divided their forces, so that, while Pemberton remained at Vicksburg, Johnston, with headquarters at Jackson, held himself in readiness to attack the lines of Grant as opportunity might offer.

517. Capture of Vicksburg.—Grant’s next strategic move was one of the most daringly planned and brilliantly executed of the whole war. It was to pass with his army through the Louisiana swamps west of the city, and, cutting himself free from his base of supplies, to obtain a foothold on the river below, while Admiral Porter should force a passage in the night with his gunboats loaded with supplies. The movement, in spite of determined resistance on the part of the Confederates, was completely successful. After several minor engagements, Grant took possession of the country as far as eighty miles south and west of Vicksburg. Without waiting to establish a base of supplies, and disregarding the earnest protest of Sherman, he advanced, May 7, from Grand Gulf northeast toward Jackson. Here, on May 14th, he defeated Johnston, and later joined with Sherman on the east side of Vicksburg, thus separating the Confederate armies. He then defeated Pemberton in the open field, and finally, by May 18, drove him behind his fortifications.^[232] After weeks of fruitless effort, Pemberton was obliged, July 4, to surrender with over twenty-nine thousand prisoners of war.^[233] This was by far the greatest Union victory yet achieved, and the number of prisoners was the largest ever surrendered in America. His success made Grant the foremost of the Federal generals. Four days later, Port Hudson also surrendered, and the Mississippi River throughout its course was opened to the Union army. The Confederacy was thus cut into two parts, and no reËnforcements or supplies in any considerable amount could thereafter reach the Southern armies from the west side of the river.

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN

The Vicksburg Campaign

518. Eastern Tennessee: Chickamauga.—While Grant was occupied about Vicksburg, important events were taking place in the eastern part of Tennessee. In June, Rosecrans, who had been much criticised for inactivity after the battle of Stone River, broke up his encampment in the vicinity of Murfreesborough. Bragg was a few miles to the south, at Shelbyville, but was soon forced to fall back on Chattanooga. Rosecrans then moved so far around Bragg’s army to the south that the Confederate commander deemed it prudent to evacuate Chattanooga and withdraw some twelve miles into Georgia. Rosecrans hastened to pursue; but Bragg, after receiving reËnforcements under Longstreet from Virginia, turned upon his pursuers. Rosecrans drew back toward Chattanooga, and at Chickamauga was vigorously attacked by Bragg. The battle raged furiously for two days, September 19 and 20, and was one of the most sanguinary of the war. The Union forces were finally driven from the field.^[234] General George H. Thomas,^[235] who, like Admiral Farragut, was a Southern officer that took the Union side, greatly distinguished himself by withstanding the final assaults on the center, and so delayed the pursuit that the Union army was able to withdraw in fair condition into Chattanooga. For this service, Thomas was afterwards called “The Rock of Chickamauga.”

General George H. Thomas.

519. The Situation at Chattanooga.—East of Chattanooga, at a distance of about three miles, is situated a long, high hill, rising almost to the magnitude of a mountain, known as Missionary Ridge; while south of the city another elevation, known as Lookout Mountain, rises about seventeen hundred feet. On these two heights, overlooking Chattanooga, Bragg established his army. He was also in control of the Tennessee River. The force of Rosecrans, shut up in the city, had only a single road, known by the soldiers as the “cracker trail,” for supplies from the west. Every other approach was commanded by the Confederate guns. Bragg was so sure that the Union army would be forced to surrender, that he sent Longstreet to assist in the siege of Knoxville, which city was then held by General Burnside.

520. Grant at Chattanooga.—Soon after the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans was relieved, and Grant, who had been put at the head of all the armies west of the Alleghanies, assumed command in his place. To reËnforce the Union forces, Hooker was sent with the Twelfth Corps from Virginia, and Sherman, with the Army of the Tennessee, was brought from Vicksburg by way of Memphis. Hooker took a position on the right, Sherman on the left, while Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, commanded the center.

521. Battles of Chattanooga.—Grant’s plan, after opening a line of supplies, was to have the two wings of the army push back the opposing flanks of the enemy until the center would be obliged to retire from Missionary Ridge. Bragg’s left, on Lookout Mountain, was some five miles in front of his main line; and Hooker’s army, in order to dislodge the enemy, was obliged to pass over the shoulder of the mountain. The Twelfth Corps pushed up the mountain side with great gallantry, fought what is sometimes called “The Battle above the Clouds,” November 24, and soon succeeded in driving the enemy from the mountain and back beyond Missionary Ridge. Sherman,^[236] on the left, advanced rapidly, but found a deep ravine in his way. Thomas was directed to engage the enemy in front, in order to keep the Confederate center from attacking Sherman, but not to advance to a general engagement. His troops, however, not to be outdone either by the Army of Virginia or by the Army of the Tennessee, charged up the sides of Missionary Ridge and drove all before them. Bragg’s forces, compelled to withdraw November 25, pushed rapidly south through the field of Chickamauga and took up their winter quarters at Dalton.^[237]

522. Results of the Campaigns in the West.—The battles about Chattanooga closed the campaigns for the year. Kentucky and Tennessee had been secured by the Union forces, who, through the opening of the Mississippi River, were enabled to pass freely to the Gulf of Mexico. The successes of Grant at Vicksburg and Chattanooga raised him to such importance that in November he was called to Washington, and, in February, with the rank of lieutenant general, superseded Halleck as general in chief of all the armies.

EASTERN CAMPAIGNS.

523. Chancellorsville.—In the East, at the close of the Antietam campaign, McClellan, as we have seen, had been superseded by Burnside, and the latter, after Fredericksburg, by Hooker^[238] (§§ 505-506). In April, 1863, the Union army of about ninety thousand advanced southward for the purpose of pushing its way by direct line to Richmond; but a few miles south of Fredericksburg, Hooker was confronted (at Chancellorsville) by a Confederate army of about forty-five thousand under Lee and Jackson. The battle which ensued, May 3, was most disastrous to the Union cause. By superior generalship, Lee and Jackson completely thwarted the strategy of Hooker, and not only repulsed the Federal army, but threw it into confusion and drove it back to the north side of the Rappahannock. The Union loss was about seventeen thousand; the Confederate, about twelve thousand. The loss of the Confederates, however, was not counted by numbers alone; for just before the main battle, General “Stonewall” Jackson, the most successful corps commander that the war produced on either side, was accidentally fired upon and killed by his own men.

524. Second Advance into the North.—Inspired by his remarkable success at Chancellorsville, Lee decided to attempt again a movement into the North. Crossing the Blue Ridge and marching down the Shenandoah Valley, he passed the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and, advancing across Maryland into Pennsylvania, threatened, not only the rear of Washington, but also the cities of Baltimore and Philadelphia. Hooker followed, keeping at the right of Lee, between Harper’s Ferry and Washington, and moving rapidly northward for the protection of the threatened cities. The Union army was reËnforced from every quarter. On the 28th of June, Hooker was superseded by General George G. Meade,^[239] of Pennsylvania, a soldierly officer who, though uniformly successful as a division and corps commander, had as yet occupied only a subordinate position. Meade pushed his force of about ninety-three thousand rapidly forward and concentrated it in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, taking up his position on a crest of hills in a circular line south and east of Gettysburg, on what is known as Cemetery Ridge. The Confederate line of about seventy thousand occupied the hills opposite, on Seminary Ridge.^[240] At the Union right was Culp’s Hill, and at the left were two hills, known as Round Top and Little Round Top. Thus situated, both armies made ready for the most crucial battle of the war. If Meade should be overwhelmed, the cities of the North would be at Lee’s mercy, and the Confederacy would, in all probability be recognized in Europe; while if Lee should be defeated, he could hardly hope to do more than prolong an unsuccessful conflict.

525. Battle of Gettysburg.—During the first and second days’ engagements, July 1 and 2, the Confederates had the advantage. Culp’s Hill was taken, and the Union right was pushed back from its strong defensive line. On the left, however, the Unionists took and held Little Round Top. On the other parts of the field the repeated onsets of the Confederates were not successful. Early on the morning of the third day, the Federals assaulted Culp’s Hill, and, after most desperate fighting, succeeded in retaking it. Lee then made the mistake of deciding to stake everything on a mighty effort to break the Union center. General George E. Pickett’s division of Longstreet’s corps, consisting of about fifteen thousand veterans, was ordered forward for a charge. After a tremendous fire of one hundred and thirty cannon for two hours, for the purpose of throwing the Union line into confusion, this division, made up of the flower of the Confederate army, rushed forward to the assault. For about one mile they were within range of the Federal guns. No men ever fought more bravely, but success was impossible. The dead and the dying strewed the ground along the way. Only a few of the fifteen thousand reached the Union line, and most of these were obliged to give themselves up as prisoners. The effort failed, and the battle was lost. Lee magnanimously took the whole blame of the defeat upon himself, although he might, seemingly, have thrown part of it on subordinates. The Confederate loss was about twenty thousand, while that of Meade was about twenty-three thousand.^[243] Lee conducted a most skillful retreat, and was slowly followed by the tired Unionists across Maryland into Virginia, until the two armies confronted each other on the Rapidan, a branch of the Rappahannock. There they remained more or less inactive until the following spring.

EMBARRASSMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

526. The Conscription of Troops in the North.—As the war dragged along, the novelty of it wore off, and enlistments in the North began to flag. The discouraging outcome of the Peninsula campaign and of the battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville caused a rapid decrease in the number of volunteers. Draft, or conscription, was therefore resorted to by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863. This Act of Conscription, however, allowed exemption on payment of three hundred dollars, an amount deemed sufficient for securing a substitute. As only fifty thousand men were thus obtained, the three hundred dollar clause was repealed, July 4, 1864, and a new act declared that the conscript must serve or provide a substitute. To furnish the means of avoiding such an alternative, insurance companies were sometimes formed, and at times as much as one thousand dollars was paid for a substitute. By this system the service was much demoralized, for the large sums offered attracted great numbers who had little or no interest in the cause. Thousands of this class deserted, and to secure bounty, reËnlisted, in some instances many times over. Thus “bounty jumper” became a term of deserved reproach. To the first of the Conscription Acts there was much resistance, especially in New York City. On July 13, 1863, a mob took possession of the streets and had entire control of the city for several days. The rioters burned about fifty buildings, and hanged negroes to lamp-posts. The colored orphan asylum was burned, and the inmates were with difficulty rescued from the flames. It was not until troops sent from Gettysburg had come to assist the police that order was restored. About twelve hundred of the rioters were killed. Though conscription did not of itself yield very many soldiers to the army, it greatly stimulated volunteering.

527. Conscription in the South.—As early as April, 1862, all able-bodied white men in the South between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were conscripted (§ 454); and in February, 1864, the age limit was extended, so as to include all from seventeen to fifty. Thus, from almost the very beginning of the war, not only agriculture, but all the other industries of the South were thrown into the hands of men beyond fifty, of women, of negroes, and of children. The suffering that ensued may be imagined, but can hardly be described.^[244]

528. The Vallandigham Case.—In 1863 there was not a little excitement over the case of Clement L. Vallandigham, a member of Congress from Ohio, who was the most extreme of Northern sympathizers with the Confederacy. For utterances disloyal to the government he was arrested by General Burnside, and, after trial by a military commission, was imprisoned, and, a little later, banished. He went first within the limits of the Confederacy, and then to Canada. By the Democracy of his state his arrest was regarded as arbitrary and his sentence unlawful, and to show their displeasure, they nominated him for governor. Though he was defeated by about one hundred thousand majority, the size of the vote in his favor was a significant indication of public feeling. The legality of his arrest and banishment was tested by an appeal to the Supreme Court, which decided that under the Constitution it had no power to review the action of a general officer of the army.

529. Financial Conditions.—It was at this time that the enormous cost of the war required the new efforts for raising money which have already been described (§§ 456-458). In the North industries flourished and the bills of the government were promptly paid; but in the South a similar result was impossible. The blockade prevented an income from tariff and from the sale of cotton (§ 455). The bonds payable “six months after the ratification of peace with the United States” sank in value as the success of the South became more and more doubtful, until finally they almost ceased to have any value whatever. A similar fate befell the Confederate bank notes. As these notes were the only currency in circulation, the prices of all articles rose enormously. In 1864 a pair of shoes was worth one hundred and twenty-five dollars in Confederate currency; a barrel of flour, two hundred and twenty-five dollars; a pound of butter, fifteen dollars, and a bushel of potatoes, twenty-five dollars. In one instance, thirty cords of wood were sold for thirty teacupfuls of salt. Prices in general were about fifty times as high as they had been when currency was at par.