CHAPTER XXVIII. the campaigns of 1862. THE WAR IN THE WEST.

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Edwin M. Stanton.

475. Secretary Edwin M. Stanton.—The first very important event of the year 1862 was the substitution of Edwin M. Stanton[207] for Simon Cameron, as Secretary of War, January 13. Cameron, who had been a candidate for the Presidential nomination, had been taken into the Cabinet under the policy already referred to (§ 451), but the duties soon proved too severe for his energy and his years. He was appointed Minister to Russia; and the vacant position was given to Stanton, who, as a War Democrat, had shown his ability and his spirit as Attorney-General in Buchanan’s reorganized Cabinet. Stanton at once put new life into the War Department. He was, at times, exceedingly disagreeable in his methods, but he was the terror of evil doers; and to the end of the war his marvelous energy and remarkable administrative ability made themselves felt in every branch of the service. It is doubtful if there has been any greater Minister of War in modern times.

476. Military Organization in the West.—Activities in the field began with very vigorous movements in the West. The Confederates, under General Albert Sidney Johnston (§ 478), had established a strong line in southern Kentucky, extending from Columbus to Mill Spring. They had also constructed, as already described (§ 461), two strong forts in Tennessee, just south of the Kentucky line,—Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. The organization of the Northern army in the West introduced a change in the spring of 1862. The Department of the Mississippi, which included Missouri, Arkansas, and so much of Kentucky as was west of the Cumberland River, under Major General H. W. Halleck, and the Department of the Ohio, which included the eastern parts of Kentucky and Tennessee, under Major General Don Carlos Buell, were consolidated on the 11th of March, 1862, into one department, and placed under Halleck, who thus received command of all the forces throughout the West, consisting of somewhat more than one hundred thousand men. Ulysses S. Grant,[208] who began his distinguished career in this war as colonel, had been advanced to brigadier general in consequence of a prompt and successful seizure of Cairo, and was now, though under the direction of Halleck, in command of the middle branch of the army, while Buell commanded the eastern section.

Operations in the West, 1862

General Ulysses S. Grant.

477. First Advances.—The first advance in Kentucky was made by one of Buell’s divisions under General George H. Thomas, who, on the 19th of January, defeated a force of about equal numbers under General Zollicoffer at Mill Spring and drove it back into Tennessee. Rear Admiral A. H. Foote, with a fleet of gunboats, in February advanced up the Tennessee River, and, after a severe engagement, took Fort Henry, with the commanding general and a part of the garrison as prisoners. Grant, who arrived with his army at about the same time, marched rapidly across the country and surrounded Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland. After making rapid preparations for a siege, he carried the outer works of the fort by storm, and then refused to accept any terms but “unconditional surrender.” He took some fifteen thousand prisoners (February 16), including two generals, and about twenty thousand stand of arms. This was the first great victory for the North, and the skill and vigor shown attracted the attention of the whole country. The Confederate line was in consequence so broken that the troops of the Confederacy were obliged to draw back into southern Tennessee. The Union forces soon occupied Nashville, and President Lincoln appointed Andrew Johnson, a prominent Tennessee Unionist, as military governor. Grant advanced to Nashville without waiting for orders, or even reporting the nature of his movement to Halleck. The consequence was a formal complaint of Halleck to McClellan, who had now taken the place of Scott as commanding general of all the armies of the United States. McClellan, in reply, authorized Halleck to “arrest Grant and put C. F. Smith in command.” Halleck, however, realizing the immense popularity which the “unconditional surrender” order and the success of Grant had given the latter in the North, decided not to exercise this authority, but ordered Grant back to Fort Henry, and placed C. F. Smith in charge of the expedition up the Tennessee. Grant was offended, and twice asked to be relieved of further duty in that department. But when at length Grant’s reports were received, they were so completely satisfactory that Halleck telegraphed, expressing his confidence, and Grant was satisfied. Grant’s aversion to sending detailed reports of all his movements was such that the Department at Washington sent to his headquarters a special agent, Charles A. Dana, assistant editor of the New York Tribune (afterward editor of the Sun), whose duty it was to send a daily telegraphic report. Thereafter the government was kept fully informed of Grant’s movements.

General Albert Sidney Johnston.

478. Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.—Grant’s army, now reËnforced to about forty thousand men, crossed back to the Tennessee River, and advanced southward as far as Pittsburg Landing, near the border of Mississippi. This point and Corinth, not far below it, were of great strategic importance, because of the facility with which troops and freight could here be exchanged between the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, and because they commanded the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which was one of the Confederacy’s chief means of transportation from the Mississippi River to the Atlantic. To seize and hold these points was to prevent the transfer of troops and supplies. Buell’s army was hurried forward to join Grant, but the general in command of the Confederate force, Albert Sidney Johnston,[209] hastened to strike the army of Grant before Buell could arrive. Grant’s advance extended a little west of Pittsburg Landing, where the attack was first made. Early on the morning of April 6, the Confederates, led by Johnston in person, attacked with great vigor and drove the Union force back upon the river. Sherman, who commanded this part of the army, still held to the old notion that intrenchment in the field made men cowardly, and, consequently, his force came near being utterly routed. The progress of the Confederates, however, was stubbornly resisted, not only by the troops, but by the gunboats, which threw shells over the Union army into the Confederate ranks. In the afternoon of the first day the Confederates met with an irreparable loss in the death of their very able leader, Johnston, who was killed on the field. General Beauregard succeeded to the command. In the evening Buell arrived with strong reËnforcements, and at the dawn of day on the 7th, Grant advanced to the attack. The Confederates made a stout resistance, but were finally driven back and forced to retreat to Corinth. The Unionists lost between thirteen and fourteen thousand, and the Confederates between ten and eleven thousand.[210] The general notion prevailed in the North that this greatest battle that had as yet been fought in America, was saved only by the arrival of Buell. Grant’s confidence in the outcome, even after the first day’s repulse, amounted to a calmness that was interpreted by many as stolid indifference.[211]

General Braxton Bragg.

479. Capture of Corinth and Memphis.—After the defeat of the Confederates at Pittsburg Landing, or, as it is more frequently called in the South, at Shiloh, the Union force pressed on and took possession of Corinth. In March, a fleet of gunboats, supported by an army under Major General John Pope, after surmounting many and great difficulties, succeeded in opening the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis. In June, Memphis was taken, after one of the most remarkable naval engagements of the war. The river was soon afterward opened as far south as Vicksburg. The lower Mississippi had been opened by the taking of New Orleans in April (§ 488).

480. The Battle of Pea Ridge.—While Grant had been pushing south in Kentucky and Tennessee, General S. R. Curtis had also been successful in the farther West. The Confederates, under General Van Dorn, organized in the beginning of the year a force of about sixteen thousand, including thirty-five hundred Indians, for the purpose of recovering Missouri. General Curtis, supported by General Sigel, advanced across the Arkansas line with ten thousand five hundred Union troops. The forces met at Pea Ridge (March 6). The Confederates were defeated; and after that time no very important battle occurred west of the Mississippi River.

General W. S. Rosecrans.

481. Bragg’s Raid into Kentucky.—After the losses of Shiloh and Corinth, General Beauregard’s impaired health caused him to be superseded by General Braxton Bragg,[212] a capable commander, who now determined to break through the Union lines, and, if possible, recover Tennessee and Kentucky for the Confederacy. Advancing to the eastern part of Tennessee, early in September, he turned suddenly north in the hope of marching across Kentucky and taking Louisville; but Buell advanced along a shorter line and reached Louisville before the Confederates, thus saving the principal city of the state. After much maneuvering, an indecisive battle was fought at Perryville, October 8; but the Confederates were checked. They were obliged to abandon their attempt to secure a permanent foothold and had to content themselves with carrying south long trains of supplies. Though Buell’s pursuit was not vigorous, he drove Bragg out of Kentucky. At the end of the raid, the Confederates set up defenses at Chattanooga, while the headquarters of the Union army were at Nashville.

482. Battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone River.—After securing his stores at Chattanooga, Bragg moved northwestward and erected strong works at Murfreesborough. Major General William S. Rosecrans,[213] who had now superseded Buell, advanced from Nashville with the purpose of dislodging his opponent. The armies met in a great battle on Stone River, a shallow stream which flowed between the armies, near Murfreesborough. During the first day, December 31, the Unionists were driven back, but during the second and third days, they recovered their ground. On the night of January 2, 1863, the Confederates were obliged to withdraw from the field, but the Unionists were too much crippled to follow. The battle was a costly one to both sides, the Union loss having been about thirteen thousand, and the Confederate about ten thousand. Both armies soon went into winter quarters. The battle left the control of central Tennessee in the hands of the Unionists.

483. Results in the West.—The results of the campaigns in the West were highly encouraging to the North. The Union forces had kept possession of Missouri and had got control of the larger part of Tennessee and of the Mississippi River as far south as Vicksburg. The Confederates still had the advantage of being strongly intrenched at Chattanooga, the point in eastern Tennessee through which the railroads pass from Virginia to the Southwestern states. The armies had fought with equal bravery, but the balance of success was on the side of the North.

Confederate Ram.

THE WORK OF THE NAVY.

484. Ironclads.—In the East, the war was prosecuted, during 1862, partly by the navy and partly by the army. Before the outbreak of hostilities, ironclad vessels had played practically no part in naval warfare anywhere in the world. Experiments in protecting vessels with iron had, indeed, been made by the British and the French, but without much success. In the latter part of 1861, however, an event occurred which effected a complete revolution in the construction of war ships. The Confederates had secured at Norfolk the abandoned and partly destroyed frigate Merrimac. They decided to cut off the top of the vessel and build upon it a sort of Mansard roof so heavily plated with iron and so sloping that it could throw off the heaviest cannon shot. They also fitted up the ship with an iron prow, or beak, put in powerful engines, and filled the space within the roof with heavy guns. At about the same time, Brigadier General A. W. Ellet, an engineer in the Union army, devised and built in the West a fleet of steam rams of similar construction, which did great execution at the battle of Memphis.

Norfolk, Hampton Roads

485. First Success of the Merrimac.—On the 8th of March, 1862, the Merrimac sailed out from Norfolk into Hampton Roads. She there met a Union fleet, consisting of five of the largest ships and a number of smaller vessels. The battle was one-sided, and was soon over. The Merrimac with its prow sank the Cumberland and then drove the other vessels ashore and set several of them on fire. The whole fleet would have been destroyed had not darkness come on. The guns of the wooden ships made no impression whatever on the Merrimac. At night this destructive Confederate boat withdrew to Norfolk, intending to finish its work the next morning.

John Ericsson.

486. The Merrimac and the Monitor.—Fortunately for the North, when the Merrimac came out on the second day, she was confronted by a craft still stranger in appearance than herself. In the course of the winter, John Ericsson,[214] a great Swedish engineer, then in New York, had constructed a gunboat which he called the Monitor. It consisted of the hull of a vessel with a top as low and flat as a raft. Rising only a few inches above the water, it was made enormously strong, in order that it might carry very powerful engines, as well as its very heavy armor of iron. On its deck was a low, broad iron tower, thick enough to resist the heaviest shot, and large enough to hold two of the most powerful guns. This tower, which was said to resemble a cheese box on a raft, was revolved by machinery within the hull of the vessel. Though the tonnage of the Monitor was only nine hundred, while that of the Merrimac, owing to her heavy guns, was thirty-five hundred, the advantage was decidedly with the Monitor. When the two vessels came together, they fought for four hours with the utmost desperation. Then the Merrimac withdrew to Norfolk and soon after was destroyed by the Confederates themselves. The terror that had been felt in all the seaboard cities at the end of the first day’s victories of the Merrimac was thus relieved, and a new era in naval construction began.[215]

487. Capture of Confederate Ports.—Elsewhere on the coast, several important events took place. Commodore Goldsborough and Major General A. E. Burnside captured Roanoke Island in February, and, a little later, Fort Pulaski on the Savannah River. Several places in Florida also fell into Union hands. By these captures, the blockade was made much easier and more effective.

Admiral D. G. Farragut.

488. Capture of New Orleans.—The great event in the extreme South was the capture of New Orleans. This city was of much importance to the Confederacy, for it not only controlled the mouth of the Mississippi River, but also protected the passage from Texas to the Eastern states. A naval expedition designed to attempt the capture of the place was fitted out under Commodore D. G. Farragut,[216] with auxiliary military forces under Major General B. F. Butler. The expedition set out from Hampton Roads in February. The troops, some fifteen thousand in number, landed at Ship Island, and remained there until the fleet opened the river. The city was protected by Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, with very heavy guns, on opposite sides of the river. From one side to the other, six massive chains were stretched; and connected with these was a huge raft of logs, extending from shore to shore and completely closing the passage. Above the raft was a fleet of thirteen Confederate gunboats and an ironclad floating battery. There were also several fire rafts, designed to burn the Union ships in case they forced a passage. Farragut bombarded the forts for a week without much effect, and then determined to force his way through the obstructions. One dark night several of the gunboats ran up to the raft and succeeded in cutting the chains so as to open a passage. A very desperate combat ensued. Farragut pushed forward with fourteen vessels, protected with chains and sand bags against the enemy’s fire. The movement of the ships was made plain by bonfires lighted along the shore. The cannonading from the works and the opposing ships was terrific; but the Confederate fleet was finally destroyed and Farragut found himself above the forts. The city was now at his mercy, and it surrendered on April 25.

489. General Butler in New Orleans.—General Benjamin F. Butler took command of New Orleans as military governor, and Farragut’s fleet passed on and soon opened the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg. The war governor with great difficulty wrought order out of chaos by a policy that was much criticised for its severity. One of the citizens defiantly pulled down the American flag, whereupon the general, after the offender had been duly convicted of the act, ordered him to be hanged. In other ways, he made it evident that the authority of the United States was not to be trifled with; but some of his orders naturally gave much offense to the people of the South. His services to the city from the point of view of sanitation are, however, generally acknowledged to have been very noteworthy.

THE WAR IN THE EAST.

General George B. McClellan.

490. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac.—In the East, the campaigns of 1862 were far less successful for the Union than were those in the West. McClellan,[217] whose successes in West Virginia had brought him rapidly forward, succeeded Scott, in November, 1861, as general in chief of all the armies. While, during the winter, he was successfully organizing the forces of the East, his direction of the Western armies was confusing and unsatisfactory. For this reason, and also because of his attitude toward the President, which seemed to be characterized by insubordination, his authority was limited to the Army of the Potomac. The number of parallel rivers and the swampy nature of much of the ground between Washington and Richmond, as already described (§ 460), gave excellent opportunities for defensive warfare, but made an offensive campaign, especially in the vicinity of Richmond, exceedingly difficult. The Federal government was in favor of a direct advance, such as was afterwards made by Grant; but McClellan strongly recommended a transfer of his army to the Peninsula between the York and the James rivers, and an advance upon Richmond from the southeast. Lincoln very reluctantly yielded to this plan, which had the disadvantage of separating McClellan from the forces that were to protect Washington.

491. Unfortunate Division of Forces.—Unfortunately, also, this arrangement resulted in the Union’s having in the field in the East four separate armies, under independent commanders: that under McClellan in the Peninsula; that under McDowell for the immediate protection of Washington; that under Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, to prevent the Confederates from crossing the Potomac; and that under FrÉmont in the passes leading to West Virginia. By reason of the ease with which the Confederates could move on interior lines from one point to another, it was possible to strike either of the Union armies with a large Confederate force before a Federal combination could be formed. Hence, though the Confederates were really much inferior in numbers, they were generally able, in the battles that ensued, to attack with a superior force. The Confederates had the further advantage of being in their own country, where every movement of the Federals was easily ascertained. In the early spring, the Union force numbered about two hundred thousand, while the Confederates had scarcely one hundred thousand; but the latter, by the conscription act of April 15, increased their forces considerably.

General Joseph E. Johnston.

492. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign.—McClellan, with an army one hundred thousand strong, reached the lower Peninsula, between the York and the James, early in March. Here he found himself confronted by General Joseph E. Johnston[218] at Yorktown, and later at Williamsburg. Johnston’s force was less than a third of McClellan’s, yet McClellan decided not to attack, but to employ an engineer’s slow methods of siege. If a resolute attack had been made, Johnston would probably have been defeated, and McClellan would have been free to advance up the James. Johnston watched his adversary closely, well knowing that when McClellan’s siege works were ready they could not be resisted. Meanwhile the Confederate force was constantly increasing, and a precious month was gained for drilling their new recruits. On May 3, three days before McClellan was to attack, the Confederates evacuated Yorktown. McClellan ordered Hooker to pursue. Overtaking Johnston at Williamsburg, Hooker was repulsed, after which Johnston retreated rapidly towards Richmond. McClellan followed with such slowness that fourteen days were consumed in marching less than fifty miles. During the whole of these two months, he enormously overestimated the force by which he was confronted and continually asked for reËnforcements. On the 17th of May, Lincoln ordered McDowell to join McClellan, but the order was not carried out, for reasons that will now be given.

Stonewall Jackson.

493. Stonewall Jackson’s Movements.—The slowness of McClellan’s advance up the Peninsula not only relieved the Confederate government of any fear for the safety of its capital, Richmond, but also showed that General Thomas J. Jackson’s corps could safely be spared for operations against the Federals in the North. In order to defeat the larger forces of McDowell, Banks, and FrÉmont, Jackson[219] decided first to strike the central army of the Union troops, and then to destroy the two wings in turn before they could unite. Advancing with Napoleonic rapidity from Staunton, he fell upon Banks near Winchester, Virginia, and not only routed him, May 25, but drove him across the Potomac into Maryland. Then retracing his steps, he turned his face westward, and in a similar manner overwhelmed the army of FrÉmont at Cross Keys, June 8. Meanwhile, General Shields of McDowell’s army, who, with a force about the size of Jackson’s, had crossed the Blue Ridge in order to assist FrÉmont, found, on his arrival in the Valley, that FrÉmont’s army had been broken up and practically dispersed. Jackson had no difficulty in defeating Shields, at Port Republic, as he had defeated the others. Thus, in thirty-five days, Jackson’s army had marched two hundred and forty-five miles, had fought three important battles, besides two minor ones, winning them all, and had practically destroyed three Union armies. He had also kept forty thousand men under McDowell from joining McClellan. Leaving a portion of his troops to keep up an appearance of activity, he now turned swiftly to the south with the major part of his force, and within a week was ready to coÖperate with Lee against McClellan. His movements had been so rapid and mysterious that his departure was not detected at Washington, and McDowell was needlessly kept in his place for the defense of the capital.

494. McClellan’s Slow Advance.—While Jackson was causing havoc near Washington, McClellan was slowly making his way toward Richmond. On the 11th of May, he learned that the Confederates had evacuated Norfolk and destroyed the ironclad Merrimac, thus leaving the James open for the Federal fleet. The Monitor, with its attending vessels, came up the James River, and advanced as far as Drury’s Bluff, almost within gunshot of Richmond. Had McClellan pushed rapidly on, with the help of the fleet he could, in the opinion of many military critics, have taken the city. Richmond was thrown into consternation. But McClellan’s movements continued to be so incredibly slow that all fear was soon dispelled. Instead of keeping along the James, as he should have done as soon as he learned of the movements of the Monitor, he divided his army, putting part of his forces north of the Chickahominy and part south of it. The bridges were greatly weakened by floods, and the two divisions of the army, thus separated, were in serious danger of not being able to coÖperate in case they should be attacked.

495. Confederate Attacks.—McClellan’s headquarters were at Gaines’s Mill on the north side. Johnston, on May 31, decided to attack the corps that confronted him at Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, on the south. The beginning of the battle was favorable to the Confederates, and the Federals were saved from complete rout only by the opportune arrival of Sumner’s corps, which came over “swaying and tossing bridges” from the north. But the serious wounding of Johnston and the arrival of Sumner turned the tide, and at night the Unionists had the advantage.[220] Johnston, on account of his wound, was obliged to retire from the command. In the morning, a new bridge constructed in the night enabled reËnforcements to be transferred from the north side; but McClellan, who arrived on the field only late in the day, instead of ordering an immediate pursuit, expressed himself as satisfied and recalled his army to the ground it had occupied before the battle. A Federal corps at one time was within four miles of Richmond, and it is probable that, if a prompt advance had taken place, like that of Grant on the second day at Shiloh (§ 478), the city would have fallen, for the fortifications which later made Richmond impregnable from this direction had not yet been constructed.

General R. E. Lee.

496. General Robert E. Lee.[221]—General Lee, who up to this time was Davis’s chief of staff, now succeeded Johnston as general in command. He immediately gathered the reins into his hands, and quickly showed that genius for organization and action for which he soon became so celebrated. Directing Longstreet to be prepared for an attack at any moment on his right, he devoted the major part of his energies to the construction of works which should make his lines impregnable. Though McClellan’s force was nearly twice that of Lee, the industrious Confederates were not interfered with. At length, near the last of June, Lee completed arrangements for an offensive movement. As Jackson had now finished his destructive work in the vicinity of Washington, Lee ordered him to move rapidly to the south, so as to be ready for an attack on McClellan’s flank and rear. The united forces of Lee and Jackson, amounting to fifty-five thousand, were now ready to fall upon the Federals north of the Chickahominy, just as McClellan, with the larger part of his force, was preparing to advance south of it.

497. The First of the Seven Days’ Battles.—The arrival of Jackson was half a day later than had been expected, and consequently the first Confederate attack was repulsed. But the next day, June 27, with Lee in command, the Confederates, fifty-five thousand strong, led by Jackson, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill, at Gaines’s Mill assaulted the Federals, thirty-one thousand strong, under the command of General Fitz John Porter. A stubborn and magnificent resistance was made, but it was only partially successful. Porter, however, with the help of reËnforcements from Sumner, was able to withdraw in good order to the south side of the river. While the battle on the north side of the Chickahominy was going on, there were only about twenty-five thousand Confederates on the south side, under Magruder, between Richmond and the seventy thousand under McClellan. Again, however, no attempt was made to take the capital.

498. McClellan’s Change of Base.—McClellan believed that he was confronted by about one hundred and eighty thousand men, and for safety determined to change his base of supplies and transfer his army to the James River. In this move he completely deceived Lee, and, after destroying a large part of his stores, brought his army together in an orderly retreat. The Confederates pursued, and severe battles took place at Savage’s Station, Frayser’s Farm, and Glendale. The attacks of the Confederates were, however, repulsed. Finally, Lee, in opposition to the advice of his generals, determined on a desperate assault upon Malvern Hill, where McClellan was very strongly posted. The Confederates were defeated with great slaughter, July 1.[222] Then McClellan, who had won the majority of the battles, but had lost the campaign, withdrew his army to Harrison’s Landing on the James River.

PUBLIC FEELING IN THE NORTH AND GREAT BRITAIN.

499. Influence of McClellan’s Defeat.—McClellan’s defeat greatly depressed the North and cheered the South; but Lincoln showed his spirit by issuing a circular letter to the governors of the loyal states, in which he declared that his purpose was to fight the war through to the restoration of the Union, and expressed the belief that the cause would best be promoted if a call for new troops were first suggested by the governors. The governors accordingly, on July 2, in a circular letter, asked the President to call for “men enough to speedily crush the rebellion.” Lincoln called for three hundred thousand volunteers, and so hearty was the response, that the number furished was over four hundred and twenty-one thousand.

500. Attitude of Congress.—Congress, also, showed that there could be no thought of abandoning the contest, but, on the contrary, promptly authorized the President to take possession of all the railroads and telegraph lines whenever the public service should seem to require it. Faith in the future was furthermore proved by the enactment of many laws of a far-reaching nature. Besides other important measures, Congress provided for the construction of a railroad to the Pacific Ocean, established the Department of Agriculture, and voted the “Morrill Grant,” which gave to each state as many times thirty thousand acres of land as it had members of Congress, for the support of colleges in which agriculture and the mechanical arts should be especially taught. The Morrill Act was the foundation of most of the agricultural colleges and many of the state universities in the country, and thus was of great educational importance.

501. The Question of Slavery.—In the course of the summer there was a general demand on the part of radical Republicans that, either by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, slavery should be abolished. Lincoln held the opinion that slavery could not be interfered with by Congress, but only by an amendment of the Constitution or as a war measure by the President, as commander in chief of the army. FrÉmont had, as we have seen (§ 470), declared the slaves free in Missouri, and Hunter had done the same in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; but the President had promptly annulled both these orders, with the declaration that he could not allow any general to free the slaves and throw the responsibility of the act upon the President. Lincoln’s course provoked much opposition on the part of radical opponents of slavery, and their dissatisfaction was strongly expressed, August 20, in an editorial of Horace Greeley’s in the Tribune, entitled “The Prayer of Twenty Millions.” Lincoln’s clear and pungent answer[223] served to satisfy public opinion, but there is now evidence that he was thinking seriously of the matter of emancipation. On the 13th of July, he had said to Seward and Welles that “something must be done in the line of a new policy,” that he had “about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity, absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation, that we must free the slaves, or be ... ourselves subdued.” Following this line of thought, on the 22d of August, he surprised all the members of his Cabinet, excepting Seward and Welles, by presenting a proclamation which he proposed to issue. The proposal met with general favor, but Seward questioned the expediency of issuing it at that juncture. In view of recent reverses, he thought it would be regarded as “our last shriek on the retreat.” Seward’s objection struck the President with force, and he put the proclamation aside to await a victory.

502. Dangers from Great Britain.—The ill feeling of Great Britain, which showed itself at the beginning of the war, and was intensified by the Trent affair, in November, 1861, was still further increased by the reverses of McClellan. It was apparent that a majority of the British upper and middle classes favored the South, that leading statesmen regarded the defeat of the Union cause as inevitable, and that the most delicate tact of diplomacy would be needed to prevent a formal recognition of the Confederacy. In March, 1862, the Florida, a vessel built and equipped for service with the Confederates, sailed from Liverpool. Though seized at Nassau, she was acquitted by what the British Chief Justice afterward called “a miscarriage of justice,” and set free. In June attention was called to a far more serious matter. The American Minister at London, Charles Francis Adams, and Mr. Dudley, the American Consul at Liverpool, became aware that another war steamer, far more powerful than the Florida, was being fitted out for the Confederate service. Adams at once called the attention of Lord Russell, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact, and asked that the ship be detained, unless it should be found, on investigation, that its purpose was not hostile to the United States. The British government was bound by international usage either to arrest the vessel or make the investigation requested. They undertook the latter course, but the process was so slow, and the work on the ship was so rapid, that just before an arrest was to be made, the vessel escaped and put to sea. This was the famous Alabama, which, with the Florida and the Georgia, very nearly cleared the ocean of American commerce.

THE WAR IN THE EAST CONTINUED.

Major General H. W. Halleck.
[By courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons.]

503. Pope and Halleck.—Nearly a month before the end of McClellan’s Peninsula campaign, the President summoned General John Pope from the West, where he had been successful as commander of the Army of the Mississippi. The remnants of the forces of McDowell, Banks, and FrÉmont were consolidated by Pope into a new organization, known as the Army of Virginia, and pushed forward to the Rapidan River. McClellan, on reaching Harrison’s Landing (§ 498), had written the President that his “army had been saved,” but that it was completely exhausted, and needed a reËnforcement of one hundred thousand men. This surprising statement, prompted by McClellan’s standing belief that Lee’s forces greatly outnumbered the Federal army, induced Lincoln to visit the camp at once. After a long conference with McClellan, Lincoln decided, on July 11, to appoint Major General Henry W. Halleck[224] general in chief of all the armies of the United States. Halleck had commended himself to the country by successfully directing affairs in the West. Lee, anticipating the course of Halleck, whom he had formerly known well, immediately detached Jackson from his army before Richmond, and sent him to confront Pope. Halleck visited McClellan on July 24, and, immediately afterward, in order ultimately to reËnforce Pope,[225] ordered that the Army of the Potomac be withdrawn, and be transferred by way of Fortress Monroe to the Potomac near Fredericksburg. The McClellan campaign was thus admitted to have been a failure. Lee, now freed from danger in the vicinity of Richmond, hastened to reËnforce Jackson by sending to the Rapidan Longstreet’s corps, which arrived on the 15th of August. A little later, Lee followed and took command of the entire force.

General John Pope.
[By courtesy of G. P. Putnam’s Sons.]

504. The Second Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.—In the last week of August, Lee sent Jackson and Longstreet in succession around Pope’s right flank, interposing their forces between him and Washington. Before any of McClellan’s army, except Fitz John Porter’s corps, had arrived, the forces of Lee and Pope fought the second battle of Manassas, or Bull Run, on the 29th and 30th of August. In view of the position of the forces, it is not strange that the Union army, numbering about sixty thousand men, was overwhelmingly defeated by the Confederate force of about fifty thousand. The Union loss was more than fourteen thousand, while that of the Confederates was less than ten thousand. The issue of the battle was, at the time, largely attributed to the delay of McClellan’s force in returning from the James River, and especially to the failure of General Fitz John Porter’s corps[226] to render the proper assistance, after it had arrived.

505. Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg.—Lee, instead of making a direct attack on Washington, decided to cross the Potomac for an invasion of Maryland and the North. His chief purpose, as he announced in a proclamation, was to arouse the Confederate sentiment in Maryland and unite the state with the Confederacy. Crossing the river near Harper’s Ferry, he took Frederick City and pushed forward toward Pennsylvania. But no signs of a sympathetic rising of the people encouraged him. He was surprised to find that even farmers whom he supposed to be Southern sympathizers would not sell their produce for Confederate money. As soon as Lee saw that he was not to get supplies in Maryland, he sent Stonewall Jackson back to take Harper’s Ferry and thus open communications for supplies with the rich Shenandoah Valley. The heights above Harper’s Ferry had been neglected by the Federals, and Jackson easily took the place, with twelve thousand five hundred prisoners. McClellan, who on the 2d of September, had arrived in Georgetown with the major part of his army, after a long conference with the President in Washington, was directed to resume command, not only of his own forces, but also of the Army of Virginia. By spasmodic promptness of movement, and encouraged by an accidental discovery of Lee’s orders disclosing his whole plan of campaign, the Union commander was able to advance so rapidly as to throw his army in front of Lee. McClellan was jubilant, and had confident hope of destroying or capturing Lee’s army. But his later movements were so dilatory that Jackson returned from Harper’s Ferry before the battle. The two armies first came in contact in the vicinity of South Mountain. The preliminary conflict was decidedly in McClellan’s favor. Then occurred the desperate battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, on the 17th of September. The Union army was the larger of the two, but the number of the forces engaged cannot be confidently estimated. The tactics of McClellan on the field have been regarded by military critics as very faulty, while Lee is thought to have handled his troops with great skill. It was the most desperate and bloody single day’s battle of the war. The final advantage was with the Federals, though the victory was not by any means decisive. The losses of McClellan were more than thirteen thousand, and Lee’s more than eleven thousand.[227] McClellan had lost another great opportunity; but Lee’s advance was checked. He was so weakened that he was compelled to withdraw to Virginia, and his movement as a whole was a failure. At this time, when a rapid pursuit might have broken up Lee’s army, which, according to Longstreet, was so crippled that ten thousand fresh troops could have destroyed it, McClellan had about twenty thousand troops in reserve. The latter, mainly in consequence of his excessive caution and lack of promptitude, was soon superseded by General A. E. Burnside.[228]

General A. E. Burnside.

506. Burnside’s Disastrous Campaign.—Burnside hastily brought together all the Union forces in north Virginia for the purpose of a direct advance on Richmond. With an army which, early in December, numbered about one hundred and thirteen thousand men, he crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg; but Lee and Jackson had reached the southern bank before him, and had posted their forces advantageously on the high grounds back of the town. Burnside, having arranged his army in three divisions, under Franklin, Hooker, and Sumner, crossed the river on December 13, and had the temerity to attempt to carry the works by storm. The result was disastrous. The Union army was pushed back in confusion upon the river, and might have been annihilated if Lee had used his advantage. As it was, Burnside safely withdrew his shattered forces to the north side of the river. The Union loss was over twelve thousand, while the Confederates lost considerably less than six thousand.[229] General Joseph E. Hooker soon superseded Burnside, and the Union army went into winter quarters. Lincoln was especially depressed by the result, as he had hoped for a victory which would counteract the hostility of Great Britain. The contrary effect was indicated by the London Times, which referred to the battle as “a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic.” Throughout the North, the following days were days of darkness and gloom. Stocks declined, and troops volunteered more slowly than ever before.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN EFFECTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1862.

507. Military Results of the Year.—Thus the events of the year, notwithstanding great losses on both sides, had not essentially changed the situation. While no territory of importance had been lost, no considerable gain had been secured. McClellan, McDowell, Banks, FrÉmont, Pope, and Burnside had all proved unable to cope successfully with their opponents, and had all been relieved. Up to the end of 1862, the military successes of the Union troops had all been in the West and the great losses had all been in the East. The military history of the year had made it evident to President Lincoln and to Congress that every resource of the North must at once be brought to bear upon the conflict in order to insure success. The commander capable of holding his own against Lee had not yet appeared. It was to require another year to reveal him. Meanwhile, the necessities of the situation led to the emancipation of the slaves, the levy of new taxes, and the conscription of troops.

508. Emancipation of Slaves.—In March, 1862, slavery had been abolished in the territories by Act of Congress, and in April, emancipation had taken place in the District of Columbia. In the same year, Lincoln had urged the governors of the border states to adopt a proposition for compensation to such of the border states as might abolish slavery. The failure of the Peninsula campaign and the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and the defeat at Manassas, convinced the President that emancipation was justifiable as a war measure, and should be resorted to as soon as a victory could be secured. Accordingly, immediately after the battle of Antietam, he issued a proclamation, declaring that in such slaveholding states as should not have returned to their allegiance to the United States on January 1, 1863, all slaves would, on that day, be declared free. As none of the seceding states returned to its allegiance, the Proclamation of Emancipation was issued on the 1st of the following January, and thereafter, all negroes in these states were regarded by the Union army as free men.

509. Influence of Emancipation on the War.—The effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was not quite what was anticipated. Contrary to general expectation in the North, the negroes showed remarkable faithfulness in remaining with their old masters. They were very generally employed in the South in caring for the plantations, and sometimes were used for work on fortifications. It was only in recovered territory that their relations were much changed. Before the end of the war, about one hundred thousand of them were enlisted in the Union army, and they fought with great bravery. As the South refused to recognize them as soldiers, they could not be exchanged when taken prisoners. The embarrassment which followed had much to do with the entire cessation of exchanges in the latter part of the war. In consequence of this cessation, prisons were overcrowded and the sufferings of prisoners increased.

510. Effect of Emancipation upon Europe.—In Great Britain, public opinion was very slow to respond to the proclamation of freedom. The fact that their supply of cotton was cut off by the more complete blockade of the Southern ports caused great suffering on the part of the British manufacturing population. While the laboring classes were generally in sympathy with the North, the owners of the factories and the wealthy classes, led by Palmerston, the Prime Minister, and Russell, the Foreign Secretary, were in favor of the South. Many, not realizing that it was a war for national integrity, regarded it as a war for liberty on the part of the South, and for conquest on the part of the North.

511. Change of British Policy.—About the middle of October, 1862, the danger that Great Britain might recognize the Southern Confederacy was averted. On the 7th of October, at a banquet at Newcastle, Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer declared, “Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, which is more important than either, a nation.” When the applause which followed this utterance had subsided, he continued, “We may anticipate, with certainty, the success of the Southern states so far as their separation from the North is concerned.” This speech, of which these sentences were the keynote, created a great sensation, and was immediately interpreted as a purpose on the part of the government to recognize the Confederacy. The American Minister, seeing clearly that the drift was unmistakably toward recognition, wrote to his government for instructions in such a dire contingency. Then President Lincoln sent a masterly letter which changed the whole situation. His instructions to Mr. Adams in case the British Ministry should approach him, directly or indirectly, on any matter of our internal affairs, were as follows: “You will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind. If the British government, either alone, or in combination with any other government, should acknowledge the insurgents, you will immediately suspend the exercise of your functions, and give notice of that suspension to Earl Russell, and to this department.” The letter also contained these resolute words: “We meet and confront the danger of a war with Great Britain. We have approached the contemplation of that crisis with a caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us.” Adams hesitated to present this letter to Earl Russell, but made its contents known to Russell’s friend, William E. Forster, and gave his consent that Forster should in turn make them known to Russell. It was probably at this juncture that the Queen, if the “credible report” is true, said to Russell, “My lord, no step must be taken which will involve us in war with the United States.” On October 23, Russell informed Adams that the policy of neutrality was not to be changed.

512. Suspension of Habeas Corpus.—In the summer of 1862, the Northern opponents of the war took every advantage of the military disasters to denounce the course of the government, to discourage enlistments, to demand a cessation of hostilities, and, in many ingenious ways, to thwart the success of the Union cause. After the disasters in the Peninsula and at Manassas, the clamors were so great and the difficulties of conviction for treason so many that, on the 24th of September, President Lincoln issued an order suspending the writ of habeas corpus throughout the country. This act was of doubtful constitutionality, and shows, better than any other one thing, the almost desperate straits into which the government was driven. The suspension of the writ enabled the military authorities to seize and imprison without trial any persons who might be accused of treasonable acts, or even of disloyal speech. Large numbers were arrested and thrown into prison.[230]

513. The Elections in 1862.—The disasters in the field and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus had a marked effect on the fall elections. In every one of the Northern states the Republican majority was greatly reduced, and in six of them[231] that had cast their votes for Lincoln in 1860, the Democrats were victorious. The House of Representatives barely escaped being Democratic. It was almost a vote of “want of confidence” in the President. An analysis of the vote showed that many of the people regarded the Emancipation Proclamation as a surrender of Lincoln to the radical Republicans. It seems certain that more votes were lost than gained in consequence of the Proclamation. But the President, though disappointed, never for a moment swerved from his purpose, as his message to Congress in December, 1862, plainly showed.


References.—Grant, Memoirs, Vol. I., 242-284. Rhodes, History, Vol. III., 404-639, for the period from the appointment of Lee to the capture of New Orleans; the same, Vol. IV., from the beginning of McClellan’s campaign at Yorktown till Lincoln’s reËlection, is at all points full, painstaking, and valuable. Schouler’s History of the United States, Vol. VI., covers the whole period and is valuable on all points of the Civil War. Allan, Army of Northern Virginia; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I., 388-443, 611-692, Vol. II., 135, 189-319; Dodge, Bird’s-Eye View of Our Civil War, chaps. vi., x.–xiii.; Dabney, Life of Stonewall Jackson; Maclay, History of the United States Navy, Vol. II., 282-324, for Monitor and Merrimac, and 364-497, for the capture of New Orleans; Old South Leaflets, III. No. 3, for contest of Monitor and Merrimac. The biographies of Lincoln by Tarbell and by Nicolay and Hay may be constantly consulted with profit.


Born in Ohio, 1814; died, 1869. Built up an important business as a lawyer in Pennsylvania and Ohio before the war; became Attorney-General in Buchanan’s Cabinet in 1860; succeeded Cameron in Lincoln’s Cabinet, 1862; ruled his Department with great vigor; had noteworthy controversies with McClellan and Sherman; strenuously opposed Johnson’s reconstruction policy; was nominated by Grant for Justice of the Supreme Court, but died before taking his seat.

Born in Ohio, 1822; died, 1885. Graduated at West Point, 1843; fought gallantly in the Mexican War; resigned in 1854, and engaged in business with indifferent success till 1861; was appointed colonel, and given command at Cairo in 1861; took Fort Donelson, thus gaining the first brilliant victory for the Union arms, February, 1862; defeated Confederates at Pittsburg Landing, April, 1862; took Corinth and surrounding region in the summer of 1862; opened the Mississippi River by capture of Vicksburg, July 4, 1863; was placed in command of Western armies, September, 1863: took Chattanooga in November, 1863; succeeded Halleck in command of all the armies in the spring of 1864; fought a series of great battles against Lee, in Virginia; took Petersburg and Richmond and compelled surrender of Lee’s army, April 9, 1865; was unanimously nominated for President in 1868; served two terms; traveled around the world and was everywhere received with the greatest honor; wrote his Personal Memoirs with remarkable skill when suffering intensely from the disease which caused his death.

Born in Kentucky, 1803; died, 1862. Graduated at West Point, 1826; served in Black Hawk War, in Texas before annexation, and in the Mexican War; was paymaster and colonel in the United States army; in charge of the Department of the Pacific when the Civil War broke out; resigned, and was appointed general in the Confederate service and intrusted with the command in the West; concentrated his forces at Corinth, and planned a surprise for Grant at Shiloh; fought a desperate battle, but lost his life near the close of the first day’s conflict, while leading a charge.

The Union army present for duty, according to the official records, numbered 44,805; the Confederate array, 40,335. The Union loss was 13,647; the Confederate, 10,609. See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I., pp. 538-539.

The impression made by newspaper correspondents on the country was very unfavorable, and there was a loud and general demand for the removal of Grant. The feeling took possession of a large majority of Congress and of the President’s most ardent supporters. Delegates waited on Lincoln and urged a change of commanders. Finally, A. K. McClure, a prominent editor of Philadelphia, called on the President at eleven o’clock at night, and for two hours urged Grant’s removal. After a long silence, Lincoln drew himself up in his chair, and simply said, “I can’t spare this man, he fights.”

Born in North Carolina, 1817; died, 1876. Graduated at West Point, 1837; distinguished himself in Mexican War; resigned at close of the war; offered his services to the Confederate cause in 1861; succeeded Beauregard in the West; invaded Kentucky in 1862, but was driven out by Buell; was repulsed by Rosecrans at Stone River, but won the great battle at Chickamauga; was defeated by Grant at Chattanooga in 1863, and superseded in his command by General Joseph E. Johnston.

Born in Ohio, 1819; died, 1898. Graduated at West Point, 1842; colonel of Ohio Volunteers in 1861; served successfully in West Virginia in 1861; succeeded McClellan in command of the Department of the Ohio; succeeded Buell in command of the Army of the Cumberland; fought successfully the great battle of Stone River; was defeated by Bragg at Chickamauga; was superseded and put on waiting orders in the West; resigned in 1867; Minister to Mexico, 1868–1869; congressman from California, 1881–1885; Register of United States Treasury, 1885–1893.

Born in Sweden, 1803; died, 1889. Became a mechanical engineer; came to America in 1839; invented the screw propeller, and in 1843 applied his self-acting gun-lock to a gun on the Princeton; invented the turreted ship, the Monitor, the principle of which soon displaced wooden ships from all the navies in existence; made a large number of other important inventions.

In twenty years there was hardly a wooden ship of war afloat. The Monitor, however, did not prove to be a good sea-going vessel, and sank in December, 1862.

Born in Tennessee, 1801; died, 1870. Entered the United States navy at a very early age; was in the War of 1812; had little opportunity to display his ability till the Civil War, when he adhered to the Union, and was at once assigned an important command; established his permanent fame by the passage of the forts and the capture of New Orleans, April 24, 1862; added to his distinction by the great battle of Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864; was appointed vice-admiral in 1864, and admiral in 1866, both of which offices were created for him by Congress.

Born in Philadelphia, 1826; died, 1885. Graduated at West Point at the head of his class, 1846; served in the Mexican War, and was sent to Europe as expert to study military methods; published Armies of Europe; was appointed major general and commanded successfully in West Virginia; appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac in 1861; succeeded Scott as commanding general, but March 11, 1862, was again limited in command to the Army of the Potomac; rendered invaluable service in organizing and drilling the army, but excess of caution subjected him to severe criticism; commanded in the Antietam campaign; was placed on waiting orders, November 7, 1862; resigned, 1864; was Democratic candidate for President in 1864; was governor of New Jersey, 1878–1881.

Born in Virginia, 1807; died, 1891. Graduated at West Point, 1829; distinguished himself in Indian wars and in War with Mexico; appointed Confederate major general in 1861; had charge of campaigns in Virginia till he was wounded in the battle of Fair Oaks, and was superseded by General Lee; was raised to full rank of general and sent to relieve Vicksburg, but failed; succeeded Bragg; was driven by Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta, where he was superseded by Hood; was recalled to confront Sherman in North Carolina; surrendered to Sherman, April 26, 1865. He was one of the ablest strategists of the war.

Born in Virginia, 1824; died, 1863. Graduated at West Point, 1846; fought in Mexican War; taught in the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington; was appointed brigadier general in 1861; held his command with such firmness at Bull Run that the epithet “Stonewall” was given him, 1861; outgeneraled FrÉmont, Banks, and Pope, May and June, 1862; defeated the Union forces at Cedar Mountain, August 9; seized Harper’s Ferry, September 15; commanded left wing at Antietam, September 17; took important part at Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862; made the deciding move at Chancellorsville, where, by mistake, he was shot by one of his own men, May, 1863.

The losses of the Federals were 5031; those of the Confederates, 6134. See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. II., p. 219.

Born in Virginia, 1807; died, 1870. Graduated at West Point, 1829; distinguished himself as engineer in Mexican War; was commandant at West Point, 1852–1855; resigned when Virginia seceded, and was appointed general in the Confederate army, April, 1861; succeeded General Johnston, May 31, 1862; commanded against McClellan in the “Seven Days’ Battles”; defeated Pope in the second battle at Bull Run; fought the drawn battle of Antietam; gained great victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville; was defeated at Gettysburg; fought stubbornly against Grant’s larger forces at the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, and Cold Harbor; held out against assaults on Petersburg and Richmond till April, 1865; was obliged to surrender to Grant, April 9, 1865; became president of Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, where he remained till his death.

In the Seven Days’ Battles, McClellan’s loss was 15,849; Lee’s, 20,135. See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. II., p. 315.

“My paramount object in this struggle,” replied Lincoln, “is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all its slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause.”

Born in New York, 1815; died, 1872. Graduated at West Point, 1839; published classic work on Elements of Military and Naval Science, 1846; was prominent in military and political affairs in California, 1846–1854; was appointed major general of the Department of Missouri, 1861; was advanced to command of the Department of the Mississippi in 1862; was made general in chief of the army, which position he held till Grant ranked him as lieutenant general; commanded the Pacific Division, 1865–1869; Division of the South, 1869–1872.

Born, 1823; died, 1892. Graduated at West Point, 1842; was in Mexican War; became an explorer, and on the opening of the Civil War received a command in Maryland; captured a Confederate force at Blackwater in December, 1861; took Memphis and Island No. 10 in 1862; was advanced to command of the Army of Virginia; after defeat at second battle of Bull Run and Chantilly, was relieved of command and sent against insurgent Indians in Minnesota; was department commander till 1886; major general in 1892.

General Porter’s failure to support Pope was popularly supposed to be owing to his dissatisfaction with the recall of McClellan. He was tried by court-martial and dismissed from the army. But the case was reviewed by direction of Congress, and he was acquitted in 1878, and in 1886 was restored to his army rank.

McClellan reported that the force under his command numbered 87,164, but only about 60,000 were in the battle. Lee says that his own force engaged was “less than 40,000 men.” The Union losses were 13,203; the Confederate, 11,172. See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. II., pp. 601-603.

Born in Indiana, 1824; died, 1881. Graduated at West Point, 1847; led a brigade at Bull Run; commanded an expedition to Roanoke Island, February 8, 1862; commanded a corps of the Army of the Potomac at South Mountain and Antietam; succeeded McClellan in November, 1862; was disastrously defeated at Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862; was superseded by Hooker in January, 1863; was sent to defend Knoxville, Tennessee; was corps commander in Army of the Potomac till close of the war; governor of Rhode Island, 1867–1869; United States senator, 1875–1881.

The Union force “available for line of battle” was 116,683; the Confederate, 78,315. The Union loss was 12,653; the Confederate, 5377. See Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III., pp. 145-147.

The records do not enable one to give the numbers so arrested. Alexander Johnston estimates the number as thirty-eight thousand. Rhodes, Vol. IV., p. 231, seems to think this number is an exaggeration, but inclines to the belief that the number may have been nearly twenty thousand.

New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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