1BlÜcher, two days before Waterloo and then seventy years of age, but as hard as nails and quite indefatigable, was charging at the head of the Treskow Brigade, when his horse fell on him and he was left at the mercy of the French cuirassiers. Luckily he was not recognized, and when his own side again charged, he was pulled from under his horse and got away on that of a sergeant.

2Von Schmidt, p. 229.

3Von Schmidt, p. 188.

4All the principal students of war of the type of Von Hoenig, “A.A.,” Lewal, Von Schmidt, Galliffet, Kaehler, Prince Kraft, Verdy du Vernois, Cherfils, Meckel, Waldor de Heusch, Von Schell, and others in a minor degree, express unlimited confidence in the possibilities of cavalry if trained according to a sufficiently high standard.—Elliot, Cavalry Literature, Preface.

To preserve the superiority of an army in war, the system of tactics must be changed every ten years.—Colonel Bonie.

5Colonel Bonie, speaking of the French cavalry before the war of 1870–71, says: “In the midst of this indifference war suddenly broke out and we were obliged to appear on the field with our old ideas and our old mistakes.”

6This is written with the reservation that experience shows that much of the best and most useful work rendered to an army by its cavalry is never known and certainly not recorded. The effectual manner in which General Samsonov, after the battle of Telissu, checked pursuit, held off, and at the same time kept touch with the Japanese for three weeks or more, is dismissed in a few lines of history.

7An American, writing in 1899, delivered the following prophecy: “Cavalry may be an expensive arm to organize, equip, and subsist, but if it comes to a matter of dollars and cents the security of the British Army in recent reverses would have been worth a million times what an effective cavalry screen might have cost. From the moral effect of the recent defeats the war in South Africa is expected to cost the British Government between 100 million and 300 million dollars.” Later he adds: “Let not our legislators forget in the coming reorganization of our army the importance, nay the economy in money and lives which cannot be measured by money, of maintaining an adequate force of cavalry. Cavalry cannot be made in a month from militia. The transformation process is slow. Given brave and fearless men, well-bred horses, expert marksmen, improved arms and equipments, it is not necessarily cavalry. Training is necessary and training takes time, but when war begins, time is the one element which is most in demand.”

8A cavalry reformer, writing sixty or more years ago, says: “What is the use of trying to get the authorities to abolish the steel scabbard, when no attention was paid to a similar request fifty years ago?”

9Cavalry in War and Peace, p. 175.

10Though it is said that the Afghans point very effectively by means of an upward prod.

11Leaves from the Diary of a Soldier and Sportsman, p. 256.

12Studies in Troop Leading, p. 196, note.

13For the very good reason that they possessed nothing better for the purpose.

14The disadvantages of the lance, that it is conspicuous in detached and scouting work and is in the way to some extent on dismounted work, are defects easily got over.

15The Campaign of Fredericksburg, p. 129.

16It has been remarked that in Napoleon’s army the light cavalry, though they did more work, lost fewer horses than the heavy cavalry. This is attributed to the horses being better bred.

17Most interesting deductions are to be found in General Daumas’s book, The Horses of the Sahara, in which conversations with the celebrated Chief Abd-el-Kader are related.

18Von Schmidt, p. 72. But by cohesion is not meant that the men are to be jammed together, for this only produces disorder, men being forced out of their places, the number of ranks increased.

19The reader who desires full information, examples, and proof of this well-ascertained fact should consult Colonel Ardant du Picq’s book, one of the most interesting military works ever written and one constantly referred to by French writers on cavalry.

20Von Schmidt’s Instructions for Cavalry, p. 159. The great Frederick attached the greatest importance to the rapid rallying of squadrons from the most complete confusion. “It must be impressed upon the Hussar that he must be most attentive to the sound ‘Appell,’ on hearing which each man will join his squadron and rank with the utmost rapidity possible,” etc. And again: N.B.—“His Majesty will most particularly observe that the squadrons learn to rally rapidly.” And also p. 77: “An acknowledged authority on our army says: ‘That cavalry remains master of the field and gains the victory which can most quickly rally and reform.’”

21Cromwell, by Captain P.A. Charrier, p. 11: “After Rupert’s defeat Cromwell rallied and re-formed ready for the next job at hand. The pursuit of Rupert’s troopers was entrusted to the smallest fraction sufficient to do the work efficiently.... After each attack he re-forms quickly and in good order ready for the next effort ... attacks the royal infantry.... Towards the end of the battle he is rallied and ready to meet yet another effort; ready to meet Lucas and Goring’s squadrons.”

22“The rally after an action, mounted or dismounted, and against an enemy mounted or dismounted, requires careful thinking out and constant practice. During peace training, operations are rarely worked out to a logical conclusion, and too often cease with a final charge; so that the problem is not faced of what is to happen after the enemy has been routed, or the position captured or galloped through, or what is to happen should the attack fail.”—General Sir D. Haig’s Report on the Cavalry Divisional Training, 1909, p. 14.

23De Brack, Chapter on Charges, p. 252.

24Acrimonious discussion with officers of other branches of the service as to their relative powers is to be deprecated as not conducive to “the unison of arms.” Good cavalry will beat bad infantry, and vice versa. An officer of artillery or infantry should believe that he and his men cannot be ridden over so long as they keep steady and in good heart, whilst a cavalry officer should, on the contrary, believe that he and his men can ride over anything. These two propositions, speaking in a logical sense, it is impossible to bring into agreement. Officers on the staff and general officers have by their training risen superior to the petty jealousies between the various arms; but experience shows that this can never be the case throughout the army.

25Cavalry in Future Wars, Von Bernardi, page 115: “It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one’s own initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.”

26Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars, p. 97: “Let us consider them (mounted infantry) next in the fight. They attack like infantry and leave their horses some way behind them. How easily could these groups of horses, held by a few men, be scattered by some squadrons of cavalry. But the squadrons, it is said, will be checked by the fire of dismounted men. To begin with, this will mean so many less carbines in the firing line. But can these moderate or at most ordinary shots—for they are not Boers—stop a resolute charge? Will it not be sufficient in any case to dismount a few men with carbines and so contain the few dismounted men who have to defend these herds of horses? And if needs be, would not fire alone be good enough to disperse the troops of riderless animals and reduce the men who are fighting some way off on foot to infantry without valises, without food, and soon even without cartridges?” And on page 98: “Does this mean that cavalry are never to use their carbines? No one has, I believe, and no one ever will, uphold such a theory. Improvements in firearms have rendered this particular weapon more and more useful, one may even say indispensable. Its employment has become more frequent and more justified in every phase of the engagement.”

27In Germany it is held that mounted infantry cannot hold the field against a highly trained cavalry, for sooner or later they would be caught when in the saddle, and then before they had time to dismount and fire it would be all over with them (Elliot, p. 31).

28The sword in its scabbard may be put through the shoulder cord, and so down the back and through the belt.

29A lesson taught us by our South African experiences, of which there is a danger of our losing sight, is the possible result of bringing large bodies of troops in close formation under the effective fire of modern guns and rifles.

30I altogether disagree with General von Bernardi where he says, p. 157, Cavalry in War and Peace: “It is at the same time advisable that a specially detailed cavalry escort should be dismounted for this object.”

31This is still more applicable in the fight of the cavalry division, since two horse artillery brigades in action occupy a front of 475 yards, and once the guns are in position the direction in which this front faces can only be altered to any appreciable extent by limbering up.

32General Sir D. Haig’s 2nd Staff Ride, p. 11: “With a force of greater strength than half a squadron, defiles should never be passed at a faster pace than the trot in order that each unit of the force may keep well closed up and the column be not unduly lengthened. After passing through, deployment should be made at a gallop so as to make room for units in rear.”

33The use of the pompom, as a hint to a flank guard not to spend too long in a specially attractive farmhouse, is an extremist’s view of this question.

34Cf. Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars. Speaking of the battle of Colenso, he says: “The cavalry received no orders, and did nothing. In the whole day’s fighting the cavalry brigade (six squadrons) lost two men altogether.” May not this want of direction have been due in some degree to the well-known prejudice of the generalissimo against the cavalry arm?

35Cf. p. 206, Von der Goltz, Nation in Arms: “It is not sufficient to have good cavalry, it must also be well handled by the superior authorities. These latter are really responsible for many mistakes unfairly laid at the door of the cavalry. Cavalry divisions must be allowed a proper liberty of action, without entirely slipping out of the hands of the commander-in-chief; whilst the masses of cavalry were formerly kept back to be employed in reserves or in the pursuit, the tendency now exists to send them forward at once, on the first day, to a great distance in a certain direction. This, again, may produce the inconvenience of cavalry being wanting one day when most urgently required. The despatch of squadrons to the front, and the choice of the direction in which they are to proceed, must also be in accordance with a definite plan. Moreover, the commander-in-chief must not only be clear as to his real intentions, but must also communicate them with perfect clearness to the cavalry.”

German Cavalry Regulations, 1909, para. 395: “Attempts on the more distant hostile communication may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a zest for victory must be the watchword for every formation, whether great or small.” See also section 104, para. 4, section 110, para. 4, of the British F.S.R.

36German Cavalry Regulations, 1909, para. 393: “During the battle decisive intervention, whether to support or ward off the hostile attack, is possible only by throwing in large masses of cavalry.”

Also see p. 33 of the Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride, by General Sir D. Haig, where the co-operation of a cavalry division in ground to some extent obstructed by obstacles is described, and attention is drawn to the historical instances of Salamanca and Austerlitz, in which the co-operation of cavalry was a special feature.

37See Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars, where the greatest stress is laid throughout on the depth of modern dispositions of troops on the battlefield.

38[This battle will be found well described by Colonel Lonsdale Hale, vol. liv., March 1910, Journal of R.U.S.I.]

It was afternoon on this occasion before the twenty-four guns rightly belonging to the cavalry mass were released from employment alongside the batteries of the general defence and allocated to work with the cavalry.

39There are few more striking instances of this than the episode at Vionville, where General Frossard, who had desired General de Preuil to make a charge, replied to the latter when he pointed out that the charge was sure to result in failure, “Attack at once, or we are all lost.”

40The cavalry attack en route to the relief of Kimberley and several other occasions, when General French galvanized the squadrons into action, afford us certain proof that energetic action on the part of one combatant compels the other to take similar action or, as happened in these cases, decamp.

41“The greatest error that the Russians made before even the outbreak of hostilities, and which continued throughout the course of the campaign, was, notoriously, the underrating of their opponents. It is said that the most influential authorities could not bring themselves, and did not deem it necessary, to detail a sufficient proportion of the good regular cavalry present in European Russia—guards and dragoons—for the theatre of war in Asia. Only three regiments were sent out, of which it may be added the 51st and 52nd Dragoons only reached their destination in the 17th Army Corps area at the end of July 1904. How blameworthy the action of the army leaders was in not devoting more attention to the employment of their best-trained and most reliable cavalry was most conclusively proved by both these regiments of dragoons. For they succeeded, in what the Cossacks up till then had had extremely limited success, namely, in thoroughly clearing up the situation as regards their opponents,...” etc., etc.—Supplement No. 86, Internationale Revue Über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten.

42Von Bernardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, p. 81: “The cavalry should be forward and sideward to the line of battle.”

43General Sir D. Haig’s Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride, p. 33: “The main lessons are that the cavalry leader must be in close communication with the commander-in-chief, that the staff and all leaders must be carefully prepared for this kind of work, and the troops trained to take advantage of ground.”

44Ardant du Picq gives an account of how two parties of infantry, suddenly meeting each other as they advanced over a hill-crest, both turned and ran away.

45Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” found riding alone in rear of the retreating French army, was asked, “Where is the rearguard?” “I am the rearguard,” was the reply.

46After the action at the bridge of El Rey, St. Cyr sent his cavalry in pursuit of the Spanish forces who were making for the defiles of Montserrat. The French cavalry, gaining ground at a gallop on the left flank of the column of fugitives, took up a position at the entrance to the defile, and captured the whole of the enemy’s supplies and baggage as well as 10,000 prisoners and twenty-five guns.

47“Casse cou,” a rare plant, and much smothered in Great Britain in the twenty-five years previous to the South African War with the inevitable effect.

48Un corps de rÉserve de cavalerie qui devait, À la fois, Éclairer, couvrir et seconder l’armÉe.—Picard, vol. i. p. 257.

49In the campaign of Jena, 1806, the Prussian cavalry still maintained the Ziethen and Seydlitz tradition; they were well horsed, well trained, and extraordinarily exact in their evolutions; but the squadrons were mixed up with infantry divisions by groups of ten squadrons, and commanded by the aged lieutenants of the Great Frederick, still living on the traditions of their youthful successes. Direction was entirely wanting in the disposition of the cavalry, though it is said that at no time was military literature in a more flourishing condition than in the years following the death of Frederick the Great, and mathematical science was especially held in honour.

50Von Bernardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, p. 32 of Goldman’s translation.

51Von Bernardi, Cavalry in Future War, p. 28.

52In a well-reasoned article on “Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War” in the Internationale Revue Über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten, it is said: “So it is seen that in this war it has been proved once again, and that to a high degree, that nothing great can be accomplished with improvisations of cavalry, and that cavalry, especially when incorporated in divisions, if it wishes to be led to high aims, cannot be stamped out of the ground immediately before great events.”

53Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, p. 168, says: “The armies of the French Republic numbered many members of the highest aristocracy in the lower ranks, and there was no lack of intelligence, but it was an undisciplined intelligence wanting in uniform training—hence also an absence of unity of action. This latter is guaranteed by certain principles being engrafted into the flesh and blood of the commanders of troops by teaching and practice. The idea of utilizing our numerical superiority and the efficiency of our troops in a vigorous and rapid offensive pervaded all our minds, this principle having been imbibed with the very air of our military school. If such discipline of the intelligence exists, the commander may, with composure, leave much to the initiative of the individual.”

54Nor does the effect of the victory of masses end there. “It intensifies and invigorates the sense of superiority in individual combats, and is essential if the patrols are to carry out their duties in the true cavalry spirit.”—Von Bernardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, p. 31.

55Extract from Von Pelet Narbonne’s Lectures on and Cavalry Lessons from the Manchurian War.

56A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day, What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, he is ill-posted and should seek to remedy it.—Napoleon’s Maxims, No. 8.

57In continuous heavy rain one tent should be made into a “drying” tent by putting a fire on a stone fireplace in it, and thus bringing the heat up to 120°, to 130°, or more. The wettest clothes hung up in it will dry in about twenty minutes.

58BlÜcher on one occasion shouted to a tottering regiment: “You scoundrels, do you then want to live for ever?”

59Napoleon considered it necessary, in 1807, to write to Lasalle as follows: “Be very careful to send out frequent reconnoitring parties, but do not let them go out each day by the same way and at the same time, and return in similar fashion, so that what happened to you at Wischau occurs again”!

60The French cavalry regulations state that between the service of sÛretÉ and exploration in the cases of small forces ill-provided with cavalry, the line is not drawn so clearly as in the case of large forces with their normal establishment of cavalry.—Service de la cavalerie en campagne, p. 58.

61Wrangel, in Cavalry in the Japanese War, puts tersely the true line to take:—“The idea of a thin cavalry screen surrounding their own army for protection against view of the enemy is very fallacious. An energetic enemy, full of enterprise, will easily pierce this thin web with his scouts. Only an active screen can be of any use, which really in practice is no longer a screen only, but is coincident with the true offensive reconnaissance. He who advances regardlessly into the hostile reconnaissance zone, and attacks the cavalry detachments of the enemy with determination wherever they are found, gives the death-blow to the information apparatus of the enemy. His patrols and detachments robbed of these supports are soon useless. They, like their reports, only in the fewest cases are able to reach their destination.”

62A regulation in the French army is as follows: “One of the most important missions on which young officers should be sent is the conduct of reconnaissance of discovery. Opportunity should be taken to give them practice in this, by sending them to reconnoitre the movement of troops of another garrison. These exercises where the officer stays out for two or three days at the head of his troop are extremely useful.”—Service de la cavalerie, p. 190.

63Plain English words should always be used, if possible, in instruction.

64CurÉly, in 1812, at Pultusk, with 100 men of the 20th Chasseurs, captured from the enemy twenty pieces of artillery, and took the general-in-chief of the Russian army a prisoner.

65Maude, Cavalry: Its Past and Future, p. 185.

66The Atlanta Campaign, p. 389 of Wood and Edmonds’ Civil War in the United States.

67Undoubtedly the press wrote against the cavalry and the medical departments far more than against other arms and departments during the late South African War. Both have made great progress since the war. Sic itur ad astra!

68True nobility is seen in the reply of Von Moltke, who, asked why he was so economical, as far as his person was concerned, whilst generous to others, replied, that it was in the hope that the officers of the army might be persuaded to follow his example, for that he knew how many families grudged themselves all possible luxuries to keep their sons in their position of officers of the army. “The less a man requires the greater he is,” he added.

69We like to call to mind Ruskin’s saying in The Future of England: “Riches, so far from being necessary to noblesse, are adverse to it. So utterly that the first character of all the nobility, who have founded past dynasties in the world, is to be poor; poor often by oath, always by generosity, and of every true knight in the chivalric age the first thing that history tells you is that he never kept treasure himself.”

70Prince Kraft points out how great a price a German officer pays for the swagger of belonging to a cavalry regiment. He enlarges on the trials to health entailed thereby, the long work in the riding school, with the shakes and jars given to the bowels and spine, which in many cases have sown the seeds of chronic illness, even during their first year of service as lieutenants, owing to which some of them have been invalided before their time. Then he goes on to point out the expenses entailed by good chargers and their upkeep. Finally, he says that in the German cavalry in no regiment can an officer live unless he can afford to pay £100 a year out of his own pocket, and so he reckons that a cavalry officer before he has twenty years’ service has expended £2000, that is, has sacrificed that sum to the Fatherland.

71The French rightly lay stress on ability to cross an intricate country. Their Service de la cavalerie en campagne, p. 191, says: “To ride hard across country and particularly over a steeplechase course is an excellent preparation for reconnaissance work. An officer accustomed to long gallops, not only at ordinary, but also at racing pace, may defy pursuit by one who has not had the same experience of leaping, and especially of leaping at full speed, and of the powers of his horse.”

Our British cavalry officers had justly a great reputation for their abilities in this respect in the Peninsular War.

72After a sharp fight one day in South Africa, a colonial officer remarked to his column commander, “We did not think there would be anything on to-day, because you were wearing your slacks and riding the black horse!” The column commander felt, though he did not acknowledge, the justice of the remark.

73In Before Port Arthur in a Torpedo Boat the Japanese officer reflects: “Is there any situation which can happen for which I and my men have not been practised?”

74Cf. Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars, p. 144: “The manner in which troops are to be employed in the different situations which arise must be left to the initiative of those in command in every degree of rank.”

75Germany’s Swelled Head, p. 165.

76Note the strong measures which Lasalle, one of Napoleon’s best cavalry leaders, is said to have taken at Pultusk in 1807. His brigade was about to attack the Russian artillery, and about 2 P.M. had hardly advanced twenty paces before the cry of “Halt!” was heard and at once passed down the line without any one knowing where it had started. The two regiments turned and began to retire at a gallop, though the Russian guns had not fired a shot. Rallied after seven or eight minutes and brought back, their brigadier-general, in a furious rage, kept them in line until midnight under the enemy’s fire. So heavy was this that the general had two horses killed under him. Men and horses fell at every minute, but it is said not a man stirred, nor was a murmur heard.—Picard.

77On one occasion in the operations in South Africa, 1899–1902, a troop, ordered to gallop a kopje, halted at 700 yards from it, dismounted, and began to shoot; a troop of a rival corps was at once sent to gallop through them and did what they had been told to do—took the kopje; a salutary and effective lesson.

Another time a squadron attacking was held up by wire whilst under fire, and began to come back; another squadron was led at a gallop through them. The irresolute squadron at once turned and followed them. The art is to loose the support at the right moment and with due emphasis.

78German Cavalry Regulations, 1909, par. 398.

79The French Service de la cavalerie en campagne, 1909, at page 190, thus lays down the rÔle of the commanding officer: “To direct his officers towards a common doctrine, that of resolves which are determined, even rash, but well considered; to develop in them initiative and personality, and to make them not merely carriers-out of orders, but leaders who know how to reflect, decide, and take responsibility on themselves.”

80Supplement No. 86 to the International Revue Über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten, May 1907.

81CurÉly, the hero of countless brave deeds and daring reconnaissances in Napoleon’s campaigns, had by 1814 got as far as the command of a regiment, the 10th Hussars. On the 12th February at ChÂteau-Thierry he got an opportunity, and successfully threw his regiment at the flank of thirty squadrons of Landwehr. This gave an opportunity to Letort with the Dragoons of the Guard to charge the front. Napoleon in his bulletin only put: “Colonel CurÉly made himself conspicuous”; but he at once promoted him to the rank of general for this feat of arms.

82Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars, p. 70.

83Von Schmidt, Instructions for Cavalry, p. 7.

84Von Schmidt, p. 227.

85Ibid. p. 73.

86Ibid. p. 13.

87Every manoeuvre which is not founded upon the nature of the ground is absurd and ridiculous.—Lloyd’s Maxims.

88The tests in map-reading for a field officer for tactical fitness for command and for a cavalry trooper for service pay were at one time almost identical.

89There is an additional reason for this, in that, if one horse refuses, the next two or three who have seen him do so will probably do the same. Horses are extremely impressionable.

90Von Bernhardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, p. 90.

91Taking an instance which comes to mind: a troop of cavalry on outpost duty at Colesberg found themselves cut off at dawn by some 500 Boers; instantly they rode at the enemy, and, with small loss and doing some execution with their lances, came out.

92The cavalry soldier is often required to perform independent duties and penetrate far into the enemy’s lines under conditions entailing danger and hardship. He should, therefore, not only be brave, strong, and determined, but also intelligent, enthusiastic, deliberate, and calm. He must be able to act on his own initiative in accordance with the orders he receives and the situation of the moment. His horse is the cavalryman’s best weapon. The soldier should prize his horse more than his own body, and thus in an emergency he will be able to rely without fail upon this weapon. It is only when the foregoing qualities have been acquired by training and experience in the field that a man can call himself a true cavalry soldier.—Japanese, Cavalry Drill Regulations, 1907, 44 (trans.).

93For practical riding, however, turning on the forehand is not advocated.

94At the same time these natural movements are not all that we demand of a horse; we must therefore add the proviso that with the weight of a rider on the horse’s back, some of the natural turns, and twists, and bearings can be, and need be, improved on. For instance, by means of the bit and legs, we pull a polo pony on to his haunches, and then turn him with the snaffle in order that on slippery ground we may save a slip, slide, or fall, which would very probably occur if we let him turn on the forehand in his own natural and easiest way. Nor does every horse, as he moves along at the walk, trot, or gallop, or as he jumps, necessarily do so in the best or safest way; he will often slouch, as we would describe it in a man, in doing so. We then use the aid of bit, leg, spur, or whip to make him go up to his bit, which we know by experience is a better fashion than his natural mode of carrying himself.

Many a slack rider has let his horse, when he was wearily plodding his way home after a long day’s hunting, fall and break his knees; whereas, if the animal had been well balanced by the strong pressure of the legs and warning spurs, and light hand on the curb, of a good and alert horseman, he would have reached home safely.

95The Boer system of training a horse not to fall in the antbear and porcupine holes was to put a native on the animal and lunge it where there were nests of these holes.

96The pose, however, of decrying haute École methods is a totally mistaken one. The finest all-round horsemen in the world are the masters of haute École, whilst some of the worst horsemen are the butchering hard-riders to hounds, who bunch up their reins in their mutton fists, and hold on by them till their mount stops pulling and going. They are little better than, though of another class to, the viceroy who said to his A.D.C., “Don’t talk to me now; don’t you see I am busy riding?”

97Cavalry Journal, July 1910.

98Experience shows that the noisiest instructors are almost invariably the worst; they are usually trying to appeal by means of their lungs to the rider’s ears instead of demonstrating their meaning by an appeal to his sense of sight.

99The material common-sense changes made in regard to the comfort, amusements, health, and pay of the cavalryman, in common with the other arms, is one of the most marked advances in the army of to-day.

100General Romer, after the American Civil War, wrote as follows: “Bad saddles destroy more horses than are lost in action.”

It is certain that wet horse blankets put on under a saddle will give more sore backs in one day’s march than will occur in a month of ordinary marching.

101It has been said that “it is a peace theory that mounted infantry are as good as trained cavalry; it is a war fact that their ignorance of horse-management makes them five times as costly at the commencement of a war.” However that may be, we know that under first-rate officers, a proportion of whom have since joined the cavalry to its advantage, there was exemplary horse-management in some corps of mounted infantry, not only in the late South African War of 1899–1902 but long ago in the eighties.

102Picard, Cavalry of the Revolution and Empire, vol. ii. p. 94.

103“The idea of drawing cavalry recruits from the best horse-breeding districts,” says Denison, “is not original. Zenophon says that Argesilaus did so” (p. 41). It is certain that our best cavalry soldiers come from Ireland now.

104Von Bernhardi, Cavalry in Peace and War, p. 273, says, speaking of German cavalry: “In the cavalry there is a want of trained instruction, and most regiments are even reduced to borrowing infantry under-officers and officers to assist in their musketry training, who are then also employed to teach the rudiments of the cavalry fight.”

105The Japanese realize how far strength and activity go to make up for the unsuitability of the race for cavalry work, and from the moment a recruit enters barracks, every effort is made to render him active and energetic.—Education and Training of the Japanese Divisional Cavalry, p. 13.

106Les Hussards Étaient d’ailleurs les maraudeurs par excellence; ils se sentaient encore de leur premier recrutement. On respectait ce penchant des troupes lÉgÈres pour leur donner plus de mordant dans la poursuite À laquelle elles se trouvaient ainsi plus particuliÈrement intÉressÉes.—Picard, La Cavalerie dans les guerres de la Revolution et de l’Empire, p. 201.

107“In teaching it is not sufficient for the teacher to express clearly what he means—the words may be to him quite clear, but the real question is, are they clear to the pupil, do they put his mind into a condition in which he follows and grasps the idea that the teacher would emphasize?”—Professor Culverwell on the Herbartian Psychology.

108May not a trace of this religious fanaticism, however, be seen in the letter of an Irish soldier, who wrote home during the South African War of 1899–1902 as follows:—

“Dear mother, we are having a lovely time of it, shooting Protestants all day long, and no one to stop us.”

109This view was expressed in 1907 by the commander of the 1st Japanese cavalry regiment.

110General Kleber, when his men, overcome by fatigue, refused to move a step farther, called them cowards. As they protested that they were at any rate always brave in a fight, he replied, “Yes, you are brave men, but you are not soldiers. To be a soldier is not to eat when you are hungry, not to drink when you are thirsty, and to carry your comrade when you cannot drag yourself along.”—Manuel du gradÉ de cavalerie.