IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.
TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY.
COMMON FAULT.
PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED.
ERRORS OF METHOD.
CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED.
SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.
MOTIVE DEFINED.
SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WILL.
OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY DIRECT ARGUMENT.
OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN ALL MINDS.
THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.
SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS.
NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.
THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.
SINFUL INCLINATIONS.
NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.
GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ABILITY.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT SCHOOLS.
STRONGEST MOTIVE REASONING IN A CIRCLE.
SECTION I.
PHRASE DEFINED.
MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS.
THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE.
THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED.
SEC. II MISCLLANEOUS TOPICS. NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT.
MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE.
OBJECTION PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.
FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR.
CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL HOW TREATED BY NECESSITARIANS.
PALPABLE MISTAKE.
DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.
NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE. GODS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES.
SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.
DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.
GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.
SIN A MYSTERY.
CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.
SECTION I. (2)
SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY.
MEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS.
CONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT.
PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED.
SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD.
OBJECTIONS.
AN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES.
LOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME THAN ANOTHER.
MOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER.
THOSE WHO ARE OR ARE NOT TRULY VIRTUOUS, HOW DISTINGUISHED.
SELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE.
COMMON MISTAKE.
DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE.
SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE.
COMMON MISTAKE. (2)
LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW.
IDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS.
SECTION I. (3)
ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL PROPENSITIES. EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.
ANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, and c.
RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.
SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.
REPENTANCE.
LOVE.
OF FAITH.
SEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH ILLUSTRATED IN THE PRECEDING SECTION.
CONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS WHY REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED.
OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA.
FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL.
RELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT.
MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS.
ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL.
PRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR.
SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES.
ERROR, WHERE FOUND. ASSUMPTION.
PRE-JUDGMENTS.
INTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS.
THE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS.
INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS.
CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE INTELLIGENCE.
LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE.
MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.
MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.
COMMON IMPRESSION.
SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE.
GOD CONTROLS ALL INFLUENCES UNDER WHICH CREATURES DO ACT.
DEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE WILL.
ELEMENT OF WILL IN FORMATION OF CHARACTER. CHARACTER COMMONLY HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.
THE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE ACCOUNT.
AN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION.
DIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER.
OBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS.
OBJECTION. GOD DETHRONED FROM HIS SUPREMACY, IF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY IS TRUE.
OBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
LAST RESORT.
WILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES.
THOUGHT AT PARTING.
Contents
Dedicatory Preface
Footnotes
DOCTRINE
OF
THE WILL.
BY REV. A. MAHAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE.
“Not man alone, all rationals Heaven arms
With an illustrious, but tremendous power,
To counteract its own most gracious ends;
And this, of strict necessity, not choice;
That power denied, men, angels, were no more
But passive engines void of praise or blame.
A nature rational implies the power
Of being blest, or wretched, as we please.
Man falls by man, if finally he falls;
And fall he must, who learns from death alone,
The dreadful secret—That he lives for ever.”
Young.
NEW YORK:
MARK H. NEWMAN, 199 BROADWAY.
OBERLIN; OHIO: R. E. GILLET.
1845.
Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1844, by
ASA MAHAN,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York.
S. W. BENEDICT & CO., STER. & PRINT.,
16 Spruce street.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Introductory Observations.—Importance of the Subject—True and false Methods of Inquiry —Common Fault—Proper Method of Reasoning from Revelation to the System of Mental Philosophy therein pre-supposed —Errors of Method
CHAPTER II.
Classification of the Mental Faculties.—Classification verified
CHAPTER III.
Liberty and Necessity.—Terms defined—Characteristics of the above Definitions—Motive defined—Liberty as opposed to Necessity, the Characteristic of the Will—Objections to Doctrine of Necessity—Doctrine of Liberty, direct Argument—Objection to an Appeal to Consciousness—Doctrine of Liberty argued from the existence of the idea of Liberty in all Minds—The Doctrine of Liberty, the Doctrine of the Bible—Necessity as held by Necessitarians—The term Certainty, as used by them—Doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian Scheme—Sinful inclinations—Necessitarian Doctrine of Liberty—Ground which Necessitarians are bound to take in respect to the Doctrine of Ability—Doctrine of Necessity, as regarded by Necessitarians of different Schools
CHAPTER IV.
Extent and Limits of the Liberty of the Will.—Strongest Motive—Reasoning in a Circle
CHAPTER V.
Greatest apparent Good.—Phrase defined—Its meaning according to Edwards—The Will not always as the Dictates of the Intelligence—Not always as the strongest desire—Nor as the Intelligence and Sensibility combined—Necessitarian Argument—Motives cause acts of the Will, in what sense—Particular Volitions, how accounted for—Facts wrongly accounted for—Choosing between Objects known to be equal, how treated by Necessitarians—Palpable Mistake
CHAPTER VI.
Doctrine of Liberty and the Divine Prescience.—Dangers to be avoided—Mistake respecting Divine Prescience—Inconsistency of Necessitarians—Necessitarian Objection
CHAPTER VII.
Doctrine of Liberty and the Divine Purposes and Agency.—God’s Purposes consistent with the Liberty of Creatures—Senses in which God purposed moral Good and Evil—Death of the Incorrigible preordained, but not willed—God not responsible for their Death—Sin a Mystery—Conclusion from the above
CHAPTER VIII.
Obligation predicable only of the Will.—Men not responsible for the Sin of their progenitors—Constitutional Ill-desert—Present Impossibilities not required
CHAPTER IX.
Standard of Moral Character.—Sincerity, and not Intensity, the true Standard
CHAPTER X.
Moral acts never of a mixed Character.—Acts of Will resulting from a variety of Motives—Loving with a greater Intensity at one time than another—Momentary Revolutions of Character
CHAPTER XI.
Relations of the Will to the Intelligence and Sensibility, in states morally right, or wrong.—Those who are and are not virtuous, how distinguished—Selfishness and Benevolence—Common Mistake—Defective forms of Virtue—Test of Conformity to Moral Principle—Common Mistake—Love as required by the Moral Law—Identity of Character among all Beings morally Virtuous
CHAPTER XII.
Element of the Will in complex Phenomena.—Natural Propensities—Sensation, Emotion, Desire, and Wish defined—Anger, Pride, Ambition, &c.—Religious Affections—Repentance—Love—Faith— Convictions, Feelings and external Actions, why required or prohibited— Our Responsibility in respect to such Phenomena—Feelings how controlled by the Will—Relation of Faith to other Exercises morally right
CHAPTER XIII.
Influence of the Will in Intellectual Judgments.—Men often voluntary in their Opinions—Error not from the Intelligence, but Will—Primary Faculties cannot err—So of the secondary Faculties—Assumptions— Pre-judgments—Intellect not deceived in Pre-judgments—Mind, how influenced by them—Influences which induce false Assumptions—Cases in which we are apparently, though not really, misled by the Intelligence
CHAPTER XIV.
Liberty and Servitude.—Liberty as opposed to moral Servitude—Mistake of German Metaphysicians—Moral Servitude of the race
CHAPTER XV.
Liberty and Dependence.—Common Impression—Spirit of Dependence—Doctrine of Necessity tends not to induce this Spirit—Doctrine of Liberty does—God controls all Influences under which Creatures act—Dependence on account of moral Servitude
CHAPTER XVI.
Formation of Character.—Commonly how accounted for—The voluntary element to be taken into the account—Example in Illustration— Diversities of Character
CHAPTER XVII.
Concluding Reflections.—Objection, The Will has its Laws—Objection, God dethroned from his Supremacy if the Doctrine of Liberty is true—Great and good Men have held the doctrine of Necessity—Last Resort—Willing and aiming to perform impossibilities—Thought at Parting
To one whose aim is, to “serve his generation according to the Will of God,” but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming the attention of the public in the capacity of an author—the existence in the public mind of a want which needs to be met, and the full belief, that the Work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Under the influence of these two considerations, the following Treatise is presented to the public. Whether the author has judged rightly or not, it is not for him to decide. The decision of that question is left with the public, to whom the Work is now presented. It is doubtful, whether any work, prepared with much thought and pains-taking, was ever published with the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was unworthy of public regard. The community, however, may differ from him entirely on the subject; and, as a consequence, a work which he regards as so imperiously demanded by the public interest, falls dead from the press. Many an author, thus disappointed, has had occasion to be reminded of the admonition, “Ye have need of patience.” Whether the following Treatise shall succeed in gaining the public ear, or not, one consolation will remain with the writer, the publication of the work has satisfied his sense of duty. To his respected Associates in the Institution over which he presides, Associates with whose approbation and counsel the work was prepared, the Author would take this occasion publicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important suggestions which he received from them, during the progress of its preparation.
Having said thus much, he would simply add, that, To the Lovers of Truth, the Work is now respectfully dedicated, with the kind regards of
THE AUTHOR.
INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.