The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme, next demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential condition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man free, according to the doctrine of Necessity?

“The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty,” says President Edwards, “is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we please to call that by, is a person’s being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.” “The only idea, indeed, that we can form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will,” says Abercrombie, “is, that it consists in a man’s being able to do what he wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency, on the other hand, would consist in a man’s being compelled, by a force from without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he wills.”

With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty known, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more different and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will, considered as the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal, considered as the consequent. On this definition I remark,

1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from Servitude, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.

2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the language of a very distinguished philosopher, “if you cut off a man’s little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;” because, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of moral obligation?

3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all the Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In this scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location somewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after “wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none,” at length is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living habitation.

4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of moral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will, whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian?

5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true? Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means, when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given manner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and opposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and opposite manner from what they do.

VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the practical tendencies of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which they occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To this I reply:

1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself. For I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its force.

2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circumstances, and not to place himself there again?