Mine Valuation (Concluded).

A large number of examinations arise upon prospecting ventures or partially developed mines where the value is almost wholly prospective. The risks in such enterprises amount to the possible loss of the whole investment, and the possible returns must consequently be commensurate. Such business is therefore necessarily highly speculative, but not unjustifiable, as the whole history of the industry attests; but this makes the matter no easier for the mine valuer. Many devices of financial procedure assist in the limitation of the sum risked, and offer a middle course to the investor between purchase of a wholly prospective value and the loss of a possible opportunity to profit by it. The usual form is an option to buy the property after a period which permits a certain amount of development work by the purchaser before final decision as to purchase.

Aside from young mines such enterprises often arise from the possibility of lateral extension of the ore-deposit outside the boundaries of the property of original discovery (Fig. 3), in which cases there is often no visible ore within the property under consideration upon which to found opinion. In regions where vertical side lines obtain, there is always the possibility of a "deep level" in inclined deposits. Therefore the ground surrounding known deposits has a certain speculative value, upon which engineers are often called to pass judgment. Except in such unusual occurrences as South African bankets, or Lake Superior coppers, prospecting for deep level of extension is also a highly speculative phase of mining.

The whole basis of opinion in both classes of ventures must be the few geological weights,—the geology of the property and the district, the development of surrounding mines, etc. In any event, there is a very great percentage of risk, and the profit to be gained by success must be, proportionally to the expenditure involved, very large. It is no case for calculating amortization and other refinements. It is one where several hundreds or thousands of per cent hoped for on the investment is the only justification.

OPINIONS AND VALUATIONS UPON SECOND-HAND DATA.

Some one may come forward and deprecate the bare suggestion of an engineer's offering an opinion when he cannot have proper first-hand data. But in these days we have to deal with conditions as well as theories of professional ethics. The growing ownership of mines by companies, that is by corporations composed of many individuals, and with their stocks often dealt in on the public exchanges, has resulted in holders whose interest is not large enough to warrant their undertaking the cost of exhaustive examinations. The system has produced an increasing class of mining speculators and investors who are finding and supplying the enormous sums required to work our mines,—sums beyond the reach of the old-class single-handed mining men. Every year the mining investors of the new order are coming more and more to the engineer for advice, and they should be encouraged, because such counsel can be given within limits, and these limits tend to place the industry upon a sounder footing of ownership. As was said before, the lamb can be in a measure protected. The engineer's interest is to protect him, so that the industry which concerns his own life-work may be in honorable repute, and that capital may be readily forthcoming for its expansion. Moreover, by constant advice to the investor as to what constitutes a properly presented and managed project, the arrangement of such proper presentation and management will tend to become an a priori function of the promoter.

Sometimes the engineer can make a short visit to the mine for data purposes,—more often he cannot. In the former case, he can resolve for himself an approximation upon all the factors bearing on value, except the quality of the ore. For this, aside from inspection of the ore itself, a look at the plans is usually enlightening. A longitudinal section of the mine showing a continuous shortening of the stopes with each succeeding level carries its own interpretation. In the main, the current record of past production and estimates of the management as to ore-reserves, etc., can be accepted in ratio to the confidence that can be placed in the men who present them. It then becomes a case of judgment of men and things, and here no rule applies.

Advice must often be given upon data alone, without inspection of the mine. Most mining data present internal evidence as to credibility. The untrustworthy and inexperienced betray themselves in their every written production. Assuming the reliability of data, the methods already discussed for weighing the ultimate value of the property can be applied. It would be possible to cite hundreds of examples of valuation based upon second-hand data. Three will, however, sufficiently illustrate. First, the R mine at Johannesburg. With the regularity of this deposit, the development done, and a study of the workings on the neighboring mines and in deeper ground, it is a not unfair assumption that the reefs will maintain size and value throughout the area. The management is sound, and all the data are given in the best manner. The life of the mine is estimated at six years, with some probabilities of further ore from low-grade sections. The annual earnings available for dividends are at the rate of about £450,000 per annum. The capital is £440,000 in £1 shares. By reference to the table on page 46 it will be seen that the present value of £450,000 spread over six years to return capital at the end of that period, and give 7% dividends in the meantime, is 4.53 x £450,000 = £2,036,500 ÷ 440,000 = £4 12s. 7d. per share. So that this mine, on the assumption of continuity of values, will pay about 7% and return the price. Seven per cent is, however, not deemed an adequate return for the risks of labor troubles, faults, dykes, or poor patches. On a 9% basis, the mine is worth about £4 4s. per share.

Second, the G mine in Nevada. It has a capital of $10,000,000 in $1 shares, standing in the market at 50 cents each. The reserves are 250,000 tons, yielding a profit for yearly division of $7 per ton. It has an annual capacity of about 100,000 tons, or $700,000 net profit, equal to 14% on the market value. In order to repay the capital value of $5,000,000 and 8% per annum, it will need a life of (Table III) 13 years, of which 2-1/2 are visible. The size of the ore-bodies indicates a yield of about 1,100 tons per foot of depth. At an exhaustion rate of 100,000 tons per annum, the mine would need to extend to a depth of over a thousand feet below the present bottom. There is always a possibility of finding parallel bodies or larger volumes in depth, but it would be a sanguine engineer indeed who would recommend the stock, even though it pays an apparent 14%.

Third, the B mine, with a capital of $10,000,000 in 2,000,000 shares of $5 each. The promoters state that the mine is in the slopes of the Andes in Peru; that there are 6,000,000 tons of "ore blocked out"; that two assays by the assayers of the Bank of England average 9% copper; that the copper can be produced at five cents per pound; that there is thus a profit of $10,000,000 in sight. The evidences are wholly incompetent. It is a gamble on statements of persons who have not the remotest idea of sound mining.

GENERAL CONDUCT OF EXAMINATION.

Complete and exhaustive examination, entailing extensive sampling, assaying, and metallurgical tests, is very expensive and requires time. An unfavorable report usually means to the employer absolute loss of the engineer's fee and expenses. It becomes then the initial duty of the latter to determine at once, by the general conditions surrounding the property, how far the expenditure for exhaustive examination is warranted. There is usually named a money valuation for the property, and thus a peg is afforded upon which to hang conclusions. Very often collateral factors with a preliminary sampling, or indeed no sampling at all, will determine the whole business. In fact, it is becoming very common to send younger engineers to report as to whether exhaustive examination by more expensive men is justified.

In the course of such preliminary inspection, the ore-bodies may prove to be too small to insure adequate yield on the price, even assuming continuity in depth and represented value. They may be so difficult to mine as to make costs prohibitive, or they may show strong signs of "petering out." The ore may present visible metallurgical difficulties which make it unprofitable in any event. A gold ore may contain copper or arsenic, so as to debar cyanidation, where this process is the only hope of sufficiently moderate costs. A lead ore may be an amorphous compound with zinc, and successful concentration or smelting without great penalties may be precluded. A copper ore may carry a great excess of silica and be at the same time unconcentratable, and there may be no base mineral supply available for smelting mixture. The mine may be so small or so isolated that the cost of equipment will never be justified. Some of these conditions may be determined as unsurmountable, assuming a given value for the ore, and may warrant the rejection of the mine at the price set.

It is a disagreeable thing to have a disappointed promoter heap vituperation on an engineer's head because he did not make an exhaustive examination. Although it is generally desirable to do some sampling to give assurance to both purchaser and vendor of conscientiousness, a little courage of conviction, when this is rightly and adequately grounded, usually brings its own reward.

Supposing, however, that conditions are right and that the mine is worth the price, subject to confirmation of values, the determination of these cannot be undertaken unless time and money are available for the work. As was said, a sampling campaign is expensive, and takes time, and no engineer has the moral right to undertake an examination unless both facilities are afforded. Curtailment is unjust, both to himself and to his employer.

How much time and outlay are required to properly sample a mine is obviously a question of its size, and the character of its ore. An engineer and one principal assistant can conduct two sampling parties. In hard rock it may be impossible to take more than five samples a day for each party. But, in average ore, ten samples for each is reasonable work. As the number of samples is dependent upon the footage of openings on the deposit, a rough approximation can be made in advance, and a general idea obtained as to the time required. This period must be insisted upon.

REPORTS.

Reports are to be read by the layman, and their first qualities should be simplicity of terms and definiteness of conclusions. Reports are usually too long, rather than too short. The essential facts governing the value of a mine can be expressed on one sheet of paper. It is always desirable, however, that the groundwork data and the manner of their determination should be set out with such detail that any other engineer could come to the same conclusion if he accepted the facts as accurately determined. In regard to the detailed form of reports, the writer's own preference is for a single page summarizing the main factors, and an assay plan, reduced to a longitudinal section where possible. Then there should be added, for purposes of record and for submission to other engineers, a set of appendices going into some details as to the history of the mine, its geology, development, equipment, metallurgy, and management. A list of samples should be given with their location, and the tonnages and values of each separate block. A presentation should be made of the probabilities of extension in depth, together with recommendations for working the mine.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

The bed-rock value which attaches to a mine is the profit to be won from proved ore and in which the price of metal is calculated at some figure between "basic" and "normal." This we may call the "A" value. Beyond this there is the speculative value of the mine. If the value of the "probable" ore be represented by X, the value of extension of the ore by Y, and a higher price for metal than the price above assumed represented by Z, then if the mine be efficiently managed the value of the mine is A + X + Y + Z. What actual amounts should be attached to X, Y, Z is a matter of judgment. There is no prescription for good judgment. Good judgment rests upon a proper balancing of evidence. The amount of risk in X, Y, Z is purely a question of how much these factors are required to represent in money,—in effect, how much more ore must be found, or how many feet the ore must extend in depth; or in convertible terms, what life in years the mine must have, or how high the price of metal must be. In forming an opinion whether these requirements will be realized, X, Y, Z must be balanced in a scale whose measuring standards are the five geological weights and the general industrial outlook. The wise engineer will put before his clients the scale, the weights, and the conclusion arrived at. The shrewd investor will require to know these of his adviser.