  12, Manor Road, Upper Holloway, My dear Sir, I will not make an acquaintance so slight as ours with each other my excuse for this letter, but rather hope that my object in writing it—viz., the removal of a very great misapprehension—will, of itself, prevent your regarding it as an intrusion. A friend of mine, a protestant, was present at the lecture which you recently delivered in Islington on the Jesuits, and I learn from him that you stated, that, by the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, the members of the society may actually be commanded by their Superiors to commit mortal sin. I do not understand from my friend that you cited any passage from the Constitutions in support of this fearful statement: I venture to think it most likely that you were content to make it on the authority of some, perhaps, respectable name, but, as not doubting its correctness, without referring to the Constitutions to verify it. I believe the passage on which the statement has been made to rest is to be found in Const. part vi., chap. 5, which Dr. Wordsworth and others have construed to mean what you say: Dr. Wordsworth having altered the text for the purpose. Now I confidently submit that the true version of that passage is—The Constitutions do not bind under pain of mortal or venial sin, unless the Superior commands the observance of them in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, &c. I am, my dear Sir, Rev. Edward Hoare. Ramsgate, My dear Sir, You need make no apology for writing to me on the subject of my lecture, and I am much obliged to you for so doing, as I cordially desire to elicit truth and nothing else. The passage which I quoted was, as you suppose, the 5th chap. of the 6th part of the Constitutions, and my authority is an edition of the Constitutions published by Rivington in 1838, which I have compared since your note with the extracts given in Taylor’s Loyola, who has evidently used another edition, though differing in no essential particular. I have also carefully examined the passage with your exposition before me, and submitted it to some of the best scholars that I know; but I confess myself quite at a loss to translate the words in the original so as to force upon them the meaning which you think they are intended to convey. Surely the expression, “Obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere,” makes sin the object of the obligation, and does not merely describe the character of the fault. If the words were, peccati mortalis, &c., instead I cannot close my note without adding the expression of my deep and heartfelt sorrow that you have been led to abandon the truth in which you were trained, for the, as I believe, unscriptural system of the Church of Rome. Putting all other considerations out of the question, it is enough to my mind to condemn the whole system when I find it adopting the company of Jesuits, of whose morality and mischievous intrigues it had already had, according to Clement XIV., such mournful experience. Earnestly hoping that the Lord may guide you into the way of truth, I remain, dear Sir, H. Waller, Esq. 8, New Square, Lincoln’s Inn, My dear Sir, I have to thank you for the manner in which you have received my communication, but I am sorry to find that, contrary to my expectation, a simple reference to the original text of the Constitutions has not sufficed to show you that the version for which you contend is, as I still believe I shall be able to convince you, founded in misapprehension. I attribute to you—I am bound to attribute to you a wish to see it satisfactorily proved, that the In several places in the Constitutions the expressions, “obligatio ad peccatum,” “obligatio peccati,” and “obligatio sub poen peccati,” are used indifferently, as equivalent to one another. Thus, the title of cap. v., pars vi., itself is, “Quod Constitutiones peccati obligationem non inducunt;” obviously the same thing must be meant as by, “obligatio ad peccatum,” in the chapter itself. Now you admit that, “obligatio peccati” has the same meaning as “obligatio sub poen peccati;” surely then “obligatio ad peccatum” has the same meaning too. In pars ix., c. v., § 6, the following passage occurs: “si non compulerit talis obedientia Summi Pontificis, quÆ ad peccatum obligare posset;” even in the translation which accompanies the edition of the Constitutions to which you have referred me, this is rendered, “unless such obedience to the Pope, as is compulsive under the penalty of sin, oblige him, &c.” What could have led the translator to put a different meaning on the same expression in the passage we are discussing, I cannot conceive, except I impute it to prejudice. I do not deny that obligare ad aliquid frequently means to oblige a person to do something; but I deny that it does or, construed with all the context, can mean this in the particular passage. I would beg you to consider the whole chapter, which, I really must say, is turned, not only into something fearful, but into something quite absurd by the construction you give it. Only reflect on the frightful incongruity of any one commanding another to commit sin in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the person of I may observe, though I do so with some diffidence, as I have almost forgotten my grammar, that in order to make the passage bear the sense which you put on it, the pronoun “ea” should be, not in the plural but the singular, as I presume you refer it to “peccatum mortale vel veniale,” which is disjunctive; and then should be, not id but hoc. I find that many Protestant writers have repudiated, or at least not adopted, the bad meaning. Thus, Steinmetz in his Novitiate says: “Part vi., c. 5.—Where it is decided, that the guilt of sin attached to disobedience when the superior commands in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of obedience.”—Novitiate, p. 98, 2nd ed. 1847. And in his History of the Jesuits, he does not, so far as I have been able to find, say anything different. I might say more in vindication of the Constitutions of the Jesuits, but I think I have said enough to justify an expectation that you will be convinced of the incorrectness of your statement. As to what you say at the end of your letter, permit me to remark, that I abandoned no positive doctrine [in which I had been trained], in embracing the Catholic faith; and as to the hope which you very kindly express, that the Lord may guide me into the way of truth, I must tell you that when I remain, my dear Sir, Rev. Edward Hoare. Ramsgate, My dear Sir, I thank you very much for your full communication, and I fear that you will think me very much prejudiced when I state that whatever were the intention of the writer, I still think that the version which I have given is most in accordance with the Latin. With reference to your criticisms, I have read the constitutions carefully, and I cannot agree with you that the expressions “obligatio ad peccatum”—“peccati”—and “sub poen peccati”—are used indifferently in any other portion of the book, unless it be the extract quoted by you from the 9th part. This appears to me a very important extract, and is the only thing which has at all shaken my opinion. I am, however, exceedingly doubtful whether the translator has given its true meaning, while at the same time I fully admit that his having so translated it is a strong and valid argument in favour of your interpretation. With reference to your two other points, I certainly think that the words “obligatio peccati” might include either sense; so that the utmost that can be gathered from I had noticed the “ea” before you mentioned it, and you will perhaps be surprised at hearing that it failed to carry conviction to my mind. It does not agree with peccatum, but what does it agree with unless it be with “Constitutiones, &c.”; and if it does, the meaning is not at all altered, as it is the “vis constitutionum” by which the Jesuit is to be drawn “in Iaqueum peccati.” Then again, if this be the meaning of the passage, it appears to me very strange that it should be placed just after the chapter on obedience, in the middle of the Constitutions, and not at the commencement or close of the book. It certainly is a very extraordinary place for it, if it really describes the obligatory force of the whole code. On the whole, therefore, I confess myself very much at a loss upon the subject, and am inclined to think that very possibly it may be understood by members of the Society in the sense in which you apply it, while on the other hand I am thoroughly convinced that the majority of Latin scholars would translate it as I did in my lecture. I cannot therefore withdraw it, because I am not prepared to acknowledge any inaccuracy in my version; but I will subjoin the Latin, and add the reference from the 9th Part, so that the matter may be fairly presented to the reader. Once more thanking you for your communication, and deeply regretting our difference of opinion on the great questions affecting Christian truth, I remain, dear Sir, H. Waller, Esq.
My dear Sir, The festivals of this holy season have not left me leisure to reply to your letter as I ought, until now, and deeply I regret that it should not have called for a different answer from this. When I wrote last, I submitted for your consideration, not all that occurred to me in behalf of the true meaning of the Constitution, but so much as it seemed to me might be urged without implying a misgiving as to the charity and fairness of mind of the person to whom it should be addressed,—a misgiving I am unwilling to entertain with regard to you or any one. But it is, I confess, with greatly diminished confidence as to the result of what I shall say, that I now proceed to add to what I have said already. When you say that whatever were the intention of the writer, you think the version you have given of the passage is most in accordance with the Latin, and that though very possibly it may be differently understood by members of the Society, you are convinced that the majority of Latin scholars would translate it as you do, you surely forget that the question we are concerned with is, not one of scholarship, not one of mere words, but simply a question of fact,—What is the Constitution? The question is precisely, What did the founder mean, what do the members understand? What he meant, and what they understand, that the Constitution is and nothing else. However, as a mere question of Latin I should have no reason to fear the result of an appeal to scholars, for those to whom I have submitted it, two Oxford men and a Cambridge man, and all Protestants, agree in construing the passage as I do; on the other hand, I suppose I may But supposing the words capable of receiving the sense which you impute to them, surely you are not therefore justified in making your statement, if, as you seem to allow, another and an unexceptionable meaning is also admissible. Ambiguity, in some degree or other, is a property of all language, even of inspired language; the fact does not leave us at liberty to choose which of several possible meanings we will, but obliges us to have recourse to recognised principles of construction, to ascertain the determinate meaning of the author. Every fair principle of interpretation with which I am acquainted seems to me to be disregarded in your translation. Here, then, I will cite a passage from a work of the greatest authority, Rodriguez on Christian Perfection: Rodriguez was himself a Jesuit, and speaks thus of the Constitution in question: first there is this heading, “That though our rules do not oblige under penalty of sin, yet nevertheless we ought exactly to observe them”; and then he proceeds, “Our Rules and Constitutions,” he is speaking of the Society of Jesus, “do not oblige us under pain of mortal sin, nor even of venial, no more than the commands of our Superiors, unless it be, as our Constitutions declare, when they command on God’s part or by virtue of holy obedience. Yet we ought to take heed, lest for this reason we come to neglect them, &c. Our holy founder would not on the one side bind us so fast as might give us an occasion of sin, and on the other, being desirous to move us to an exact observance of them, with all possible perfection, he gives us this wholesome advice. Let the love of God, says he, succeed in the place of the fear of offending How are we ever to arrive at the sense of a document, if we are not to be guided by the understanding of those whose position enables them to speak with most knowledge of its subject-matter, [intention, and end]? Ask the meaning of the chapter in whatever quarter of the Church you will, and but one reply will be made. I cannot at all agree with you, that having this meaning the chapter is misplaced; on the contrary, I know not where a more fit place could be found for it. Since you are doubtful as to the meaning of “obligare ad peccatum” in the place to which I have referred you, I can hardly hope that you will look more favourably upon the expression in two other places in which it occurs, viz.,—Pars. ix, cap. iv, § 5, and cap. v, § 6. But I have to submit to you the following sentence from the Protestant Bishop Sanderson’s PrÆlectiones: “omnis enim obligatio aut ad culpam est aut ad poenam, vel etiam utramque.” (PrÆl. vi, p. 154, ed. Lond., 1686.) I shall never be induced to give this a bad meaning. I imagined that you referred the pronoun “ea” to “peccatum mortale vel veniale,” because I found that Dr. Wordsworth did so in rendering the passage as you do; he, with much cleverness, altered ea into id. I regret the length to which my letter has extended; I had indeed hoped that our correspondence by this time would have been brought to a more agreeable issue. I remain, my dear Sir, Rev. Edward Hoare. Ramsgate, My dear Sir, I am sorry that you do not think me candid in the consideration of the Constitution, for I have heartily desired to ascertain the truth, and perhaps you will allow me to suggest that where there is a difference of opinion it is scarcely fair to attribute it to want of fairness of mind in the discussion. The fact is, that I have given the subject much anxious study, and you will perhaps be surprised when I tell you, that my opinion is less shaken than it was when I wrote last, so that when I had to revise the proof I erased a part of the note that I had previously written, and have now simply stated your opinion and added the Latin. With reference to your last letter I think that you can scarcely have referred to the two passages which you mention as containing the expression—“obligatio ad peccatum;” for in the one (ix, iv, 5.) the words are—“sub poen peccati,” and the other (ix, v, 6.) is the very one already under discussion. I cannot imagine what I should have said which has led to the idea—“that the Catholic faith is commensurate with our judgments, and has no surer basis than opinion;” the basis of the Gospel is the revealed word of God, and that remains the same whatever be man’s opinion. I remain, dear Sir, H. Waller, Esq. 8, New Square, Lincoln’s Inn, My dear Sir, I greatly regret my carelessness in having given you such faulty references. Instead of referring to the Constitutions, part ix, c. iv, § 8, and c. v, § 6, I should have referred to the Declarations corresponding to those passages. In the first passage, where the Constitutions have, as you say, “obligando sub poen peccati,” the corresponding declaration says, “nec Societas approbabit, si Pontifex prÆcepto quod ad peccatum obliget, non compelleret.” As to part ix, c. v, § 6, to which I referred you in a previous letter, I find that the declaration has the same expression as the Constitution. There is still another place in the Constitutions in which “ad peccatum obligare” occurs, viz., My reference for the sentence out of Sanderson might have been more complete. It is to be found in the PrÆlectiones de ConscientiÆ Obligatione, prÆl. vi, § 6, p. 156 of the ed. Lond. 1696; the sentence is a parenthesis and independent of the context:—“Nemo potest jure obligari ad id faciendum, cujus omissio non potest ei imputari ad culpam nec debet ei imputari ad poenam; (omnis enim obligatio aut ad culpam est aut ad poenam, vel etiam utramque) sed rei impossibilis omissio non potest alicui imputari ad culpam.” I have found the same expression in the other work of Sanderson, De Juramenti Obligatione. I must beg you to excuse the length of the following extract:—“PrÆter illam obligationis distinctionem ex origne natam, per respectum ad Jus unde oritur obligatio: est et alia ab objecto sumpta per respectum scil. ad debitum solvendum, quo tendit et in quod fertur obligatio. Duplex autem est debitum. Debitum officii, quod quis ex prÆcepto juris tenetur facere: et Debitum supplicii, quod quis ex sanctione juris tenetur pati, si officium suum neglexerit. Priori sensu dicimus mutua caritatis officia esse debita, quia lex Dei illa prÆcipit, juxta illud, Rom. xiii. Nihil cuiquam debete, nisi ut diligatis invicem. Posteriori sensu dicimus peccata esse debita ut in oratione Dominica, Dimitte nobis, &c. et mortem Æternam esse debitam, juxta What I said at the end of my last letter had reference to an expression of yours with regard to the faith—“our difference of opinion”—which seemed to me objectionable, as being what is called latitudinarian; it was, perhaps, unduly observed upon by me. I remain, my dear Sir, Rev. Edw. Hoare. Ramsgate, My dear Sir, I am much obliged to you for your letter, and I shall have much pleasure in referring to as many of the passages named as I can find in my own library or borrow from my friends, but it cannot be with the view of altering my lecture, as that is already published. The Latin of the Constitution is subjoined in a note, so that if I am wrong I am open to the correction of all Latin scholars. I remain, dear Sir, H. Waller, Esq.
My dear Sir, I have procured your Lecture, and read the statement which led to our correspondence, together with the note which you have subjoined as the result of it. I cannot but feel surprised at the character of that note. There has been such an acknowledgment, on your part, of doubt on the subject, that I think I was justified in expecting some reference to it, and to the grounds of it, and then, either an admission of continued doubt, or, if so it be, a statement of the considerations which removed it. Under all the circumstances I feel that, should I think proper to do so, I shall be justified in giving publicity to the correspondence which has taken place. Very deeply lamenting its most painful issue, I remain, dear Sir, Rev. Edward Hoare. Hampstead, My dear Sir, With reference to your letter of the 13th, forwarded to me from Ramsgate, I think it due to myself to inform you that I had nothing whatever to do with any portion of the note in question, except the passage extending to the end of the Latin quotation, which is exactly what I told you in my last letter I intended to insert. The remainder was added through a very great mistake on the part of —, but it was not in the copy which I transmitted to the Should you publish my correspondence, you will of course take care to acquaint your readers with its private character, and to inform them that the letters, having been written without the least idea of publication, do not contain any attempt at a complete discussion of the subject, but are merely the expression of my varying thoughts during the process of careful investigation. I remain, dear Sir, H. Waller, Esq. |
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