In a Lecture on the Jesuits, recently delivered before the Islington Protestant Institute by the Rev. Edward Hoare, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Ramsgate, and since published, there occurs the following passage with the note subjoined:—“It would not be fair to attach to the Order the opinions of the individual, unless these can be proved to be fully borne out and sanctioned by the fixed and authoritative documents of the Society. Nothing, however, can be clearer, than that the sentiments then expressed, [i.e., alleged to have been expressed on an occasion before referred to], were those not of the man, but of the Order; for although there is an exceptive clause inserted in one of the Constitutions, as if for the relief of unseared consciences, so that the Statute runs thus, ‘Conforming their will to what the Superior wills and thinks in all things, where it cannot be defined that any kind of sin interferes;’ [3] yet a little further on there is another section wherein that clause is wholly nullified, and the original principle boldly asserted. ‘Although the Society desires that all its Constitutions, &c., should be undeviatingly observed, according to the Institute, it desires, nevertheless, that all its members should be secured or at least assisted against falling into the snare of any sin which may originate from the force of any such Constitutions or injunctions; therefore, it hath seemed good to us in the Lord, with the express exception of the vow of obedience to the Pope for the time being, and the other three fundamental vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, to declare that no Constitutions, declarations, or rule of life, can lead to an obligation to sin, mortal or venial.’ Thus far all is well; what more can be required? But now mark the next passage. ‘Unless the Superior may command them in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of the vow of obedience; and this he may do whenever, and to whomsoever, he may judge it conducive either to individual good or to the universal well-being of the Society. And in the place of the fear of offence, let the love and desire of all perfection succeed; that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may follow.’ So that the poor Jesuit may be compelled to commit what he knows to be a mortal sin at the bidding of his Superior. He may clearly see it to be utterly opposed to every principle of Scripture; his own conscience may turn from it with horror; his moral sense may utterly condemn it; he may see clearly that he is flying in the face of the most High God; but on he must go, because his Superior bids him; and in order to obtain an object, which the Superior considers conducive to the interests of the Society, he must freely consent to have his deepest convictions wholly disregarded, and his principles of moral rectitude for ever crushed within his soul.” [4]The present writer is the person alluded to in the note as having complained of this shocking statement, and stated what is the true meaning of the Constitution of which it is such an utter perversion. What he said on the subject forms his portion of the following correspondence. The publication of the entire correspondence that passed on the occasion, will, it is hoped, afford Mr. Hoare’s readers the readiest means of determining for themselves whether the accusation he has brought is sustainable or not.

The writer may advert here to a consideration which was overlooked in the course of the correspondence by both Mr. Hoare and himself. From first to last Mr. Hoare has considered the question simply with reference to the rules of scholarship; it is believed, however, that the ordinary principles of scholarship, i.e., of classical scholarship, have hardly any place in the discussion at all, and this for the following reason:—Christianity having introduced its new and complex subject-matter, there followed, in matter of fact, what we should beforehand expect to find, viz., a corresponding modification of the language which became its organ. Expression had to be found for the mind of the Church in a medium to which almost all her ideas were foreign and strange; she had to adapt it to her purpose in her own way; new ideas provided for themselves new forms of language; words were added, existing words acquired new meanings and were used in new combinations; and by this natural process there was brought about in the course of years, almost as great a difference, as regards idiom, between the Latin of the Church and the classical Latin, as is observable in the case of any two modern languages having a common origin. The writer is not a theological student, and is not saying this from his own knowledge; but he understands from those who are qualified to speak on the subject, and in whom he places implicit confidence, that the fact is as he has stated.So then, possibly “obligatio ad peccatum,” meaning “an obligation binding under pain of sin,” may displease the classical Latinist, but it is a term of Theology, and beyond his province. The question is not how he would express that meaning in Latin, but how he should construe a particular phrase which he finds Theologians have adopted. It is used by Catholic [7] and Protestant writers alike, and must be understood as they understand it. Its use by St. Alphonso was but very lately brought into prominent view: a writer in the Dublin Review for October last, had occasion to animadvert on a Protestant author’s having translated these words of St. Alphonso, “nullo jure obligante ad mortale,” thus—“by no law that is obligatory,” and so having omitted to render the important words “ad mortale.” It appears from a reply by the Protestant author, that “the misprint,” as he calls it, was corrected in a second edition of his work; but that the phrase meant “obligatory under pain of mortal sin,” was admitted on all hands; and this was in a most adverse quarter.

It will be seen that for so much of the note extracted above as follows the Latin quotation, Mr. Hoare is not responsible; it was added, through mistake, by another gentleman. The circumstance will account for a contrariety of statement to be observed with reference to Const., part iv, chap, i, but which does not call for more particular notice.

It is said, with some ambiguity, “that the version thus excepted against is by no means an exclusively Protestant one, but has been adopted by most competent Roman Catholic authorities;” and Dr. Wordsworth’s work seems to be referred to in behalf of the statement. It will be found, however, that the “historical research” of that writer has only enabled him to adduce the instance of Stephen Pasquier, who is said to have given the version in a speech which he made as an advocate in a cause, in which the Jesuits were his opponents. In the Biographie Universelle, Stephen Pasquier is spoken of as “un homme passionÉ,” and “en titre adversaire des Jesuites.” [8]

With Mr. Hoare’s Lecture as a whole, the writer is not concerned: the friend, a Protestant, who kindly directed his attention to the single statement which he has exposed, informed him at the same time that there was little besides in the lecture that seemed to him to call for notice; a cursory glance over its pages has satisfied the writer of the correctness of that view; and statements which few, surely, can believe, will, he trusts, produce in the minds of readers an effect the very reverse of that intended.