Between the meetings of Liverpool and the ovations of New York, is there not room for a word of peace? A word of peace, I know well, must be a word of impartiality. The speaker must resign himself to be treated as an American in England, and as an Englishman in America; but what does this matter if truth make its way, and if an obstacle the more be raised in the way of this horrible war, this war contrary to nature, which would begin by ensuring the triumph of the champions of negro slavery, and would end by exposing the cause of free institutions to more than one perilous hazard?

There is one fundamental rule to follow in questions arising out of the right of search: to distrust first impressions. These, are always very vivid. An insult to the honor of the flag is always in question. Patriotic sensibilities, which I comprehend and which I respect, are always brought into play. It is impossible that these officers, these stranger sailors, who have given commands and exacted obedience, who have stopped the ship on its way, who have set foot on the sacred deck where floats the banner of the country, who have interrogated, who have searched, who have had recourse, perhaps, to graver measures—it is impossible that they should not have called forth many sentiments of anger and indignation. Even when practised with the most rigid formalities, even when confined within the limits of the strictest legality, the right of search cannot fail to produce a feeling of annoyance. The recent search of the Jules et Marie, the yards of which were carried away and the barricadings driven in, seems to me the faithful type of all visits of search on the high seas—every one of them brings damages in its train.

Notwithstanding, the right of search is disputed by no one, and will be exercised in time of war, until the moment when the American proposition, reproduced again the other day by General Scott, shall be welcomed by our Old World.

I have just written the name of General Scott, and I did so with a feeling of pleasure. Whoever has read his letter, must have said to himself with me, that there exists in the United States a class of intelligent and moderate men—patriots, who have given proof of their capacity and are capable of examining dispassionately the demands of the English Government. These men know how much the maintenance of friendly relations with England is worth in the present position of America. Whatever opinion they may form on the question of right growing out of the action of Captain Wilkes, they comprehend that no consideration can weigh in the balance against the danger of bringing about the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, the breaking of the blockade, war, in short, with a powerful and friendly nation, a sister nation, sprung from the same blood, speaking the same language, devoted to the same mission of civilization and liberty. No honorable sacrifice would cost them too dear in order to avert this fearful catastrophe.

Would that they could see with their own eyes, were it but for a moment, what is passing to-day in Europe! Their enemies triumph, and their friends are struck with consternation. We, who have always loved America, and who love her better now that she is suffering for a noble cause; we who have defended her, we who have never ceased to believe in her final success, despite mistakes and repulses, feel all our hopes threatened at once; the ground seems sinking beneath our feet. No, we cannot suppose that America, in recklessness of heart, will destroy with her own hands the fruit of so many efforts and sacrifices. This would not be patriotism, it would not be dignity, it would be an act of madness and suicide.

If the Trent has violated the rules of neutrality, it remains none the less certain that other rules have been violated by the San Jacinto. The duty of naval officers is limited to visiting ships and stopping them, if need be, to carry them before a prize court. They cannot exercise the office of judge. In substituting the arrest of individuals for the seizure of ships, and a military act for a judicial decree, Captain Wilkes has given ground for the well-founded protests of England, at the same time that he has left the way open, thank God! for measures of reparation to be adopted by the United States.

I know very well that there would have been no less indignation at Liverpool and London in case that the Trent had been stopped on her way and carried before American courts. Perhaps, indeed, the regular and correct procedure would have been more deeply wounding than that of which England complains. We may be permitted to doubt with General Scott that "the injury would have been less, had it been greater." But this is not the practical question, the only one that now concerns us. The point is to get out of embarrassment; and the error committed by the commander of the San Jacinto furnishes a reasonable ground for consenting to the liberation of the prisoners.

Far from being a humiliation to the Government at Washington, this act of wisdom would be one of its brightest titles to glory. It would prove that it is not wanting in moral power, that men calumniate it in representing it as the slave of a bad democracy, incapable of resisting the clamor of the streets, and of accepting, for the safety of the country, an hour of unpopularity.

Let it believe us, its true friends, that in arresting Messrs. Mason and Slidell, it has done more for the cause of the South than Generals Beauregard or Price would have done by winning two great victories on the Potomac and in Missouri. Messrs. Mason and Slidell are a hundred times more dangerous under the bolts of Fort Warren than in the streets of Paris or London; what their diplomacy would not certainly have obtained for them in many months, Captain Wilkes has procured for them in an hour. See what rejoicing is taking place in the camps of the Southern partisans! They were beginning to despair; recognition, that only chance of the defenders of slavery, seemed farther off than ever; the recent successes of the Federal army announced the commencement of a great change in affairs. The war was carried from the suburbs of Washington to the heart of South Carolina itself; the only resources of consequence remaining, were those that might spring up during the winter from the discontent of our industrial centres. Yet behold, suddenly, the state of affairs transformed; recognition becomes possible, the blockade is threatened, the United States are in danger of being forced to turn from the South to face a more redoubtable foe!

Really, what has Mr. Jefferson Davis done for you, that you should render him such a service!

Let us now turn to England, and tell her also the truth.

So long as England shall not treat the affair of the Trent on its own merits and with coolness, so long as she shall give ear to those falsehoods invented by passion, which envenom questions of this sort, and exclude conciliatory measures and pacific hopes, she will labor actively to destroy all that she has gloriously built upon earth. It is impossible to imagine the consequences, fatal to every form of liberty, which such a policy would comprise within itself.

It was at first supposed that Captain Wilkes had acted by virtue of instructions, and that Mr. Lincoln's Government had expressly ordered him to seize the Southern Commissioners on board the English vessel. Now it is found that Captain Wilkes, returning from Africa, had no instructions of any sort. He acted, to use his expression, "at his own risk and peril" like a true Yankee.

It was next supposed that Mr. Lincoln's Government had conceived the ingenious project (such things are gravely printed and find men to believe them!) of seeking of itself a rupture with England. It was in need of new enemies! It hoped, by this means, to rally to itself its present adversaries! It was about to give over combating them, and to seek compensation through the conquest of Canada! I have followed the progress of events in America as attentively as any one, I have read the American newspapers, I have received letters, I have studied documents, among others the famous circular of Mr. Seward; I have seen there more than one sign of discontent with the un-sympathizing attitude of England; I have also seen there the symptoms of the somewhat natural fear which the intervention of Europe in Mexico excites in men attached to the Monroe doctrine; but as to these incredible plans, I have never discovered the slightest trace of them. I add, that a marked return towards friendly relations with England will be manifested the moment that the latter shows herself more amicable towards America.

If there is any quality for which credit cannot be refused to the Government of Mr. Lincoln, it is precisely that of moderation and good sense. He has not taken very high ground—he has abstained, far too much, in my opinion, from laying down those principles, from uttering those words which create sympathies, and make the conscience of the human race vibrate in unison. Say that he is a little prosaic, a little of the earth, earthy; do not say that he blusters, and that the best thing that England can do is to attack him without waiting to be first attacked.

In order to support, right or wrong, a fable which has found but too ready belief, another story was invented: the Government of Mr. Lincoln was at the end of its strength; despairing henceforth of conquering the South, it wished at any price to procure a diversion. Those who hold such language have doubtless never heard either of the Beaufort expedition, or of the evacuation of Missouri by the Confederate troops, or of the victory recently gained in Kentucky. They do not know that the United States have accomplished the prodigy of putting half a million of men under arms, that acts of insubordination have nearly ceased, that volunteers for three years have everywhere replaced the three months' volunteers. They do not know that the finances of the country are prosperous, and that Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, has just negotiated, under favorable conditions, the last part of his loan. I recommend them to read the last letters of Mr. Russell, the correspondent of the Times; they will see there what an impartial witness thought lately of the respective chances of the North and South.

Yes, before the intervention of the San Jacinto,—that involuntary ally of the South, to whom the inhabitants of Charleston themselves ought to vote swords of honor—before the San Jacinto, the situation of the United States presented the most favorable aspect. Since that time, I admit, it has changed. Let us see now whether English indignation has not given to the act of Captain Wilkes greatly exaggerated proportions.

English indignation has omitted one side of the affair, I mean the conduct of the packet Trent. If, by chance, it should have violated the principles of neutrality, this question would wear quite a different aspect. This, doubtless, would not prevent the demand for reparation from being well founded; it would prevent the negotiations relating to it from assuming an air of harshness, which would suffice to render their success doubtful. Let us therefore examine the conduct of the Trent.

Some have thought to justify it, by observing that the vessel was going from America. What does this matter? Neutrals are bound to act as neutrals when they are going from a place as well as when they are coming towards it. They might as easily take sides with one of the belligerents by carrying despatches, for instance, designed to secure to it aid, as by bringing it other despatches announcing that this aid was forthcoming.

Others have based their arguments on the fact that the Trent had quitted a neutral port to repair to a neutral port. Again, a distinction which proclamations of neutrality have never admitted, and which no jurisprudence has endorsed to my knowledge. What does plain good sense tell us, in fact? That your departure from a neutral port and your destination to a neutral port do not hinder you in any way from serving the belligerent whose despatches you have received, especially if these despatches are on the way to solicit from a neutral country an alliance or supplies of munitions of war.

The rights of neutrals demand to be preserved, in my opinion, and France is interested in it more than any other nation. But these rights, let us not fear to acknowledge, have for their fundamental condition, a real neutrality. Now, you take it upon yourself, knowingly and willingly, to carry despatches destined for a country to which it is a notorious fact that one of the belligerents is looking for its only serious chances of success. These despatches are drawn up, it may be, in this wise: "Let vessels loaded with arms and ammunition leave Southampton or Liverpool as quickly as possible and come to Charleston, where the cruisers are now few in number; let expeditions be combined in such a manner as to force the blockade; we are in need of their arrival in order to push our army forward." Or else the despatches read: "Buy up the newspapers and work on public opinion in the manufacturing districts. Let maritime powers know that we will consent, if necessary, to cessions of territory or protectorates; that, in any case, we will grant them exceptional advantages if they protest against the blockade, if they disquiet our enemy, if they seek a quarrel with him and draw off his attention to fix it on, an eventual struggle with Europe. At the first step of this kind, we will attempt an offensive movement. The least menace against the blockade is worth as much to us as the despatch of an army." Is it not to mock at people, in the face of so new a position, of a war in which one of the parties, though he does not fail to boast of his strength and his resources, counts in fact, before every thing, upon European support, to propound fine theories in accordance with which the transportation of despatches sent from a neutral port and destined for a neutral country, would not be contrary to neutrality, because these despatches could not increase the military advantages of either of the belligerents?

It has been sought to assimilate mail packets to vessels of war, and consequently to except them from the exercise of the right of search. The pretence is so ill-founded that it falls to the ground upon examination. Who does not feel that the presence of a lieutenant of the royal navy or the color of a uniform is not sufficient to constitute a vessel of war or a transport?

It is asked whether other packets, which have carried ministers sent by the United States to Europe, have not also infringed the rules of neutrality? It is possible, but this does not concern us. Supposing that the mission of these ministers in Europe, where they are regularly accredited like their predecessors to the different governments, and where they have no support, no new act, no violation of the blockade to demand, may be assimilated to the mission of the Southern delegates; supposing that their letters of credit bear some analogy to the despatches intrusted to Messrs. Mason and Slidell, it belonged in any case to the Southern cruisers to stop and search the packets in which they had taken passage. The powerlessness of one of the belligerents could not impose on the other the duty of abstaining in like manner.

Resting next on the diplomatic quality of the Southern envoys, it has been attempted to insinuate that their mission was purely a civil one. Not only did the diplomatic character not exist, since it had had no recognition, but the Southern Commissioners were expressly charged with, procuring to the armies of slavery the most essential assistance which they could receive in view of military success and strategy. Their success, by ensuring the breaking of the blockade, would alone have been worth more to them than the winning of several battles. I say nothing, moreover, of the shipments of arms and ammunition which they would have doubtless organized in Europe.

Can it be that mail packets have the singular privilege of facilitating such operations without failing in the duties of neutrality? If this be true, it is worth while to have it understood, and so long as it is not understood, we must make some allowance for belligerents who do not consider it self-evident. It is clear that when the exercise of the right of search was defined by precedents and treaties, mail packets did not exist. Perhaps it would be well to lay down special regulations concerning them. This agreement might be profitably negotiated at present between the United States and the maritime powers of Europe. Why should not the conflict which occupies our attention, instead of ending in war, result in a useful negotiation? I have no doubt that the noble overtures, the initiative of which has just been taken by General Scott, would be approved by Mr. Lincoln. To enlarge the scope of the present question, by causing an international progress, an emancipation of the commerce of the world to grow out of it, would be somewhat better, it seems to me, than to cut each other's throats and to ensure the triumph in the middle of the nineteenth century of the most shameful revolt that has ever broken out on earth—a revolt in favor of slavery. England and America, these two great countries, are worthy of giving to the world the spectacle of a generous and fruitful mutual understanding in which a deplorable disagreement shall be swallowed up, as it were, and disappear. Who does not see that, combined with the promulgation of a more liberal regulation of the right of search, the satisfaction demanded of the United States would assume a new character, and would have many more chances of being accorded?

It is the less difficult for the English to take this ground, since the act of the San Jacinto, in which the design of offending England in particular might at first have been suspected, appears to-day under a very different aspect. In proportion as we learn all the exploits of this terrible vessel, its impartiality becomes less dubious. French, Danish, and other vessels were visited by it within a few days; it is certain that if the French instead of the English mail packet had been carrying the commissioners and their papers, the former would have been boarded by Captain Wilkes.

His mode of procedure was rough, and on this point apologies ought to be made. Not indeed that England, who has just sustained in Prussia the famous MacDonald negotiation, is in a very good position to show herself difficult in points of courtesy; nevertheless, the errors of Great Britain in Germany do not excuse those of the United States on the ocean. It appears that Captain Wilkes fired shot to enforce his first order to stop. The remainder was in keeping. Nevertheless, to give every one his due, it is just to remember that he offered to take on board the families of the commissioners and to give them his best cabins. It is just also to add that, after the arrest, the intercourse between the officers of the San Jacinto and the prisoners never ceased to be full of decorum and courtesy.

Let us now approach more closely the question of right. It was well in the first place to rid ourselves of secondary questions which hinder us from seeing it, and above all from seeing it as it is.

They seem to have been afraid in England to look this question of right boldly in the face. There is no subterfuge that they have not tried in order to avoid its serious investigation.

Have they not gone so far as to object to the United States that, considering the Southern States as rebellious and refusing them the quality of belligerents, they could not exercise the right of search, which is reserved to belligerents? From this point of view they add, Messrs. Mason and Slidell would simply be rebels taking refuge under the English flag; and what country would consent to give up political refugees? The answer is simple: no country more than England has recognized, in this instance, the quality of belligerents which her partisans are seeking to contest in her name. Moreover, the Southern blockade is admitted by her and by the other powers; now, blockade is as impossible as right of search apart from a state of war.

Another subterfuge: the United States have always opposed the right of search—it ill becomes them to exercise it. England has always exercised the right of search; it ill becomes her to oppose it. Let us be honest; rights of this kind are always odious to those who submit to them and always dear to those who profit by them. Alas! this is not the only instance in which, a change in our position works a change in our mode of viewing things. Let us take the human heart as it is, and not demand under penalty of war, that the Americans, in the midst of one of the most terrible social crises (and also of the most glorious) of which history makes mention, should hesitate to seize a weapon which was formerly used against them and which they feel the need of using in return. In neglecting to seize it, they would fail perhaps in their duty to themselves and to the noble cause of which they are the representatives.

There is finally a last and more simple manner of avoiding an embarrassing examination: "What is the use of examining precedents?" we hear on every side, "This is not a matter for legal advisers." It appears to me, however, that it is something of the kind, since Great Britain has begun by interrogating the lawyers of the Crown, and since she has made peace or war depend on the decision which they might render. It would be too convenient, truly, to take exception to precedents made by one's self, and to say to those who act as he has not ceased to do: "I permit no one to imitate me; what I practised in times past, I authorize no one to practise to-day. I have not apprised you of this, but you ought to have divined it, and for not having divined it, you shall have war."

Precedents keep then their full value. What are they?

The enemies of America have cited one which has nothing to do here; the letter written by King Louis Philippe to Queen Victoria to express his regret that a pilot under the protection of the British flag had been carried away by the expedition bound to Mexico. A very different thing is an abduction of this kind, having nothing in common with the right of search or the maintenance of neutrality, and the capture of the Southern Commissioners.

It is in the familiar history of the right of search that precedents must he sought, and they abound there.

In quoting some of them, I impose on myself a double law: first, I will not confound acts of violence with precedents, and from the abuse which the English made in times past of their maritime preponderance, I will not conclude that every one is at liberty to do to-day as they have done; secondly, among the grave and weighty authors who have made a special study of these questions in the quiet of their retirement, I will confine myself to consulting none but English authorities. Doubtless, they will not think of challenging these in England.

Chancellor Kent writes: "If, on making the search, it be discovered that the vessel is employed hi contraband trade, that it transports the enemy's property, troops, or despatches, it may be rightfully seized and carried for adjudication before a prize court."

Mr. Phillimore, an English author and an authority on these questions, and one of the judges in the Admiralty, expresses himself thus: "The carrying of official despatches written by official personages on the public affairs of one of the belligerents, impresses a hostile character on those bearing them."

Sir William Scott is no less precise: "The transportation of two or three shiploads of ammunition is necessarily a limited assistance; but, by despatches, the whole plan of the campaign may be transmitted in such a manner as to destroy all the plans of the other belligerent in that part of the world." And he dwells at length on this idea, insisting on the incompatibility which exists between veritable neutrality and the bearing of despatches, "which is an act of the most prejudicial and hostile nature."

Let us also cite Mr. Jenkinson, afterwards Lord Liverpool. He establishes in clear terms the fundamental principle of the matter by putting this question, which plain good sense must answer: "Can it be lawful for you to extend this right (that of the free navigation of neutral vessels) in such a way as to injure me and to serve my enemy?"

Observe that the Queen, in her proclamation of neutrality, has been careful not to omit the interdiction of the transport of despatches. She therein declares that those who transport "officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, ammunition, or any other article considered by law and modern usage as contraband of war, for either of the contenders, will do it at his own risk and peril, and will incur the high displeasure of her Majesty."

Nothing can be more explicit, more consistent, and at the same time more reasonable than these declarations. Sir William Scott is right in saying, that, in undertaking to carry despatches, persons cease to be neutrals and become enemies; this is evident, above all, in the present conflict. As the serious chances of success of the South are all in Europe, as it would not have revolted had it not counted on Europe, as it would lay down its arms to-morrow if it were proved to it that never, for cotton or any thing else, would Europe come to its aid, it follows, thenceforth, that the despatches forwarded from the South to Europe greatly surpass in military importance the sending of soldiers or supplies.

This being so, what ought the commander of the packet Trent to have done? I do not impugn his intentions, he may have acted very innocently; but if this excuse of ignorance of the rules of the law be valid for him, I think that it should also be so for Captain Wilkes, and that there would be little justice in treating with extreme rigor a first offence which evidently has taken every one by surprise, and has found nowhere a very complete understanding of the conditions of the right of search.

The commander of the Trent saw men come to him, whose quality as Southern Commissioners challenged his attention. He knew what anxiety and trouble were pervading the North concerning their mission and despatches, the contents of which excited grave suspicions; there had even been talk, exaggerated, doubtless, of a proposition of a protectorate and other offers, designed to gain at any price the support of one or more maritime powers. The enthusiastic welcome which the people of Havana, enemies of the United States, and ardent friends of slavery, had just given to Messrs. Mason and Slidell, permits no doubt of the especial gravity of the hostile mandate with which they were charged. Then or never was the occasion to say that messengers and messages of this nature must travel under their own flag, and that neutrals were bound not to facilitate their mission in any manner. In circumstances so grave, and with such a responsibility, commanders of packets could not take refuge behind their innocence, or argue that the consul of the United States had not taken pains to forewarn them. I should like to know what reception a neutral would find in England, who should take it into his head to say to her: "I thought myself at liberty to carry hostile despatches and those bearing them, because the English consul did not come to bind me to do nothing of the sort."

Is it true, as has been maintained, that the fault was divided, the message having been carried by one packet and the messengers by another? This appears doubtful, and matters little, moreover, in the eyes of impartial judges. The fact is, that voluminous papers were seized on the Trent, at the same time with the rebel commissioners.

Now, and to have done with the question of right, shall I say a few words of what it is permissible to call the hackneyed rhetoric and declamation of the subject?

Men have talked, of course, of an insult to the flag; they have called to mind that the deck of an English vessel is the same as the soil of the country; they have invoked the rights of British hospitality, and demanded whether she could consent to see her guests taken from her by force. So many phrases for effect, which unhappily never fail to arouse implacable passions! But what is there behind these phrases?

The flag is not insulted when the search is exercised in conformity with the law of nations. It is in vain that the deck of an English merchant vessel is the soil of the country; a belligerent is authorized to seize it, if it is carrying men employed in behalf of the enemy; officers, for example. The rights of hospitality are bounded by the duties of neutrality, and the vessel which would claim to protect its guests at any price, when its guests serve the war, would simply be guilty of a culpable action.

In brief, there are wrongs on both sides, and if ever difference admitted of discussion, interpretation, if necessary, arbitration even, it is certainly this. Be sure, therefore, that Europe, attentive to all that is passing, and desirous of averting war, will find it inexplicable if the question be put in insulting terms, of a nature to render hostilities almost inevitable.

If, in fine, Captain Wilkes had seized the vessel instead of seizing the Commissioners, and if the vessel had been duly condemned by an American court, the proceeding would have been irreproachably regular. This being so, by the acknowledgment of the English themselves, who will be willing to admit that any will be found bold enough to cause an irretrievably fatal rupture to grow out of a quarrel of this kind, concerning the mode of procedure. England has consulted her legal advisers; America will consult hers also. Do disputes in which the national honor is involved admit of consultations of this sort? Are lawyers or judges ever asked whether the country is insulted or attacked when it really is so?

Let England assure herself that the first condition of the demand for reparation is, that she shall make the reparation possible. Time is needed. Patience is needed—patience which will not pause before the first difficulty, and take as final the first refusal. Courtesy is needed—courtesy, which, in the stronger, agrees so well with dignity, and avoids rendering the form of satisfaction unnecessarily wounding and consequently almost inadmissible. It is clear that if she contents herself with signifying to Washington an absolute demand, if she gives a single week, if she exacts (let us foresee the impossible) not only the setting at liberty of the Commissioners themselves, but their transportation on an American vessel charged to trail its repentant flag across the seas, if she accepts no more easy mode, if she hearkens to no mediation, it is clear that Mr. Lincoln will need superhuman courage to grant what she thus demands.

This superhuman courage I wish for him, I ask of him; in displaying it, he will have deserved much of America and of humanity. But I hope little for such marvels, nor do I believe that it is fitting to exact miracles in serious affairs.

The English were full of condescension and generosity towards America while she was strong. If they should be so unfortunate as no longer to have condescension and generosity towards America, when she is weak, they would warrant suppositions much more fatal to their honor than is the grave error (yet easily reparable with the good will of both parties) just committed by Captain Wilkes.

I have the right to hold this language to them, for I am of the number of those who lore England and have proved it. In my first parliamentary speech, which was on occasion of this very right of search, I exposed myself to much animosity in defending her. Later, in the Pritchard affair, I did not draw back. Even from the depths of my retreat, it has rarely happened to me to take up my pen without rendering homage to a country and government which are not popular among us. I have reason, therefore, to hope that my words will have some weight. Nothing is more antipathetic to me than a coarse and ignorant anglophobia.

But it is important for England to know all the phases of the debate in which she has entered. It has a European phase. This is not a discussion between two powers; a third, the first of all, public opinion, must also have its say. It wishes peace, and will not let it be sacrificed for an error easily repaired and voluntarily exaggerated. Public opinion strongly repudiates the cause of the South, which is that of slavery; (the speeches of Mr. Stephens, Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, give proof of this.) At the announcement of the heinous fact that England recognizes the Confederacy expressly founded to maintain, glorify, and extend slavery, public opinion, believe me, would give vent to an outburst of wrath which would cast the indignation meetings of Liverpool wholly in the shade.

England has maintained her neutrality in the New World for the year past, and she deserves well for this, for angry instincts dictated to her another policy. However, if she has been neutral, she has not been sympathizing. This vast social revolution, which, began with the election of Mr. Lincoln, which had inscribed on its banner, "No extension of slavery," and which thus entered in the way leading one day to emancipation; this generous revolution which deserved to be encouraged, has met with little in England but distrust and hostility. Upon other points, while preserving her neutrality, England knows very well how to give her moral support to causes which she loves—the support of journals, of parliamentary speeches, and of public meetings. Here, there is nothing of the sort. I know not what fatal misunderstanding has kept down the generous sentiments which should have made themselves felt. From the beginning, the principal English journals, especially those reputed to express the views of Lord Palmerston, have not ceased to proclaim openly that the South was right in seceding, that the separation was without remedy, that it was just and in conformity with the wishes of England. Again and again has the recognition of the South been presented as an act to be expected and for which we must be prepared.

From all this, if care be not taken, the inference will be drawn that, in the excessive eagerness with which the affair of the Trent has been seized upon, in the peremptory terms of the demand for redress, in the form adopted in order to render the reparation difficult, may be seen the intention of reaching the end which England proposes; of effecting the recognition, breaking the blockade, obtaining cotton, and substituting a parcelled-out America for the too powerful Republic of the United States.

Liverpool has, this time, given the signal, Lancashire urges on the rupture; behind the national honor, there may be something else. Take care! if this must not be thought, it must not be true.

And it will be true if you declare the question closed at the very moment when it begins to attract public attention; if you exact a reparation without admitting an explanation; if, in short, you reject in advance all idea of negotiation, mediation, or arbitration.

War, instead of negotiation, mediation, or arbitration; war, at the first word, for a question which has been submitted to legal advisers, and which offers facilities assuredly for several equally sincere interpretations; war at, any price does not belong to our times.

What I say here, others will make it their business to say on the other side of the channel; there have been, there will be, liberal and Christian voices there, who will not fear to protest against the incitements of passion. We have heard little yet except the bells of the manufactories; other sounds will soon make themselves heard; the great party which, in abolishing slavery and combating the slave trade, has won the chief title of honor in England—this great party, I think, is not dead. It is time for it to give signs of life.

As to America, its friends are awaiting its final resolutions with an anxiety which I scarcely dare depict. Never was graver question placed before a government. The whole future is contained in it. If she be sufficiently mistress of herself to grant what is asked and to admit a reparation, even though it be excessive, of the fault evidently committed in her name, she will have the approbation and esteem of all true hearts. Her ship—the ship which brings, back the Commissioners—will be welcomed with acclamations to our shores, and it will be plainly seen that the United States in yielding much is neither weakened nor humiliated.

Ah! the affair would he so easily arranged, if both sides desired it! On both sides are men so worthy to effect a reconciliation for the glory of our times and the happiness of humanity! On both sides are nations so well fitted to understand and to love each other! Must we despair then of the progress of the spirit of peace? Must we look with our own eyes upon English vessels employed in ensuring the success of the champions of slavery? Must we veil our head with our mantle?

A. DE GASPARIN.

VALLEYRES, (SWITZERLAND,) December 5, 1861.

P.S.—I wish to add here a single observation: I have not pretended to exhaust, in this rapid study, the decisions which might be borrowed from English authors, and which would be of a kind to be appealed to by America. Sir William Scott, for example, (see C. Robinson, p. 467,) says in express terms: "You may stop the ambassador of your enemy." I have been careful not to draw the conclusion from this, on my part, that Captain Wilkes was right in acting as he did; I simply infer from it that the case is by no means a hanging one, and that in stopping the Commissioners and their papers without stopping the ship and turning her from her course, he yielded perhaps (let us be just to all) to the desire of not exposing the packet and passengers to serious inconveniences. Let us say that he was unfortunate, since his courtesy on this point seems to have become the blackest of his misdeeds. In truth, to see in the affair of the Trent, all that England has seen in it, it is necessary to commence by supposing that the United States, which have already a sufficiently heavy task on their hands, it seems to me, have been tempted, besides, to procure a quarrel with Great Britain. Hypotheses of this kind will be welcomed only by those who feel themselves unconquerably impelled to praise the messages of Mr. Jefferson Davis, and to stretch their hand decidedly to the brave South, which has so much to complain of, and which is defending so just a cause!^[C]

FOOTNOTES:[C] This article, with the exception of a few changes and additions, was inserted in the Journal des DÉbats, December 11, 12, and 18.