  1Milton Reizenstein, The Economic History of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Johns Hopkins University Studies, July-August, 1897. 2Reizenstein estimates the original cost of the first 379 miles to have been $37,612 per mile, and, adding the cost of reconstruction and extension to 1853, he gets a figure of $41,237 per mile. Vide infra, p. 75. 36th Annual Report, 1832, p. 4. 435th Annual Report, 1861. 5Testimony of Mr. Blanchard, Hepburn Committee Report, p. 3171. See also Chron. 20:547, 1875. 6The Baltimore & Ohio had no line to New York. The Pennsylvania had had one since 1873, and over it Mr. Garrett was forced to send all his New York business. Disputes arose over the proper pro-rating of charges. President Garrett alleged that the terminal charge of four cents per 100 pounds which the Pennsylvania Company imposed on freight coming to or going from New York was exorbitant, and that he was paying for 100 miles of transportation when the real distance was only 90. President Scott replied that the rates for terminal services in New York were not sufficient to cover the cost of doing the business, and that the Pennsylvania’s New York and Philadelphia line was open to the Baltimore & Ohio on the same terms as to all others. R.R. Gaz. 7:71–2, 1875. 7R.R. Gaz. 6:8, 1874. The outcome was an agreement whereby the Baltimore & Ohio restored rates and fares, and the Pennsylvania agreed to haul two of the former’s trains daily each way between West Philadelphia and Jersey City, to sell through tickets West over the Baltimore & Ohio, and to give that road all necessary facilities for the handling of through freight. 8Sugar, coffee, salt, etc. 9The traffic between Cumberland and Baltimore was mostly coal. In an interview the last of May or first of June, 1875, President Garrett said that as soon as the right was conceded to his road to enter New York over the Pennsylvania Railroad as he had been doing for thirty years, and to make such rates from Baltimore and Chicago as he chose, he was ready for peace and not sooner.... The Saratoga combination, which had been gotten up to ruin the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, had only served to establish the road and give it a standing in the West.... It had been and was now his firm object to maintain the freight rate on fourth class, the principal freight shipped from the West, at 35 cents per 100. This was a reasonable rate and gave his company a fair profit. The other lines had to submit to this rate or there could be no peace. R.R. Gaz. 7:237, 1875. 10R.R. Gaz. 7:261, 1875; Ibid. 7:270, 1875; Ibid. 7:289, 1875; Chron. 20:593, 1875. The compact was to last for ten years, the companies to agree upon and to maintain moderate rates between all competing points. Each board of directors was to appoint a special committee to which was to be referred all differences which might arise. The Pennsylvania opened its lines to the Baltimore & Ohio between Philadelphia and New York on the same terms that it gave other connecting roads at Philadelphia. 11See Interstate Commerce Commission, Railways in the United States in 1902, part 2, entitled, “A Forty-year Review of Changes in Freight Tariff,” p. 79. 12For an account of the differentials at different times see the argument of counsel and the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, “In the Matter of Differential Rates to and from North Atlantic Ports,” April 27, 1905, in Elkins Committee Report, vol. 5, Appendix E. See also 7 I.C.C. Rep. 612. 13Albert Fink, Report on Adjustment of Railway Rates; also Testimony of Mr. Blanchard, Hepburn Committee Report, pp. 3171 ff. 14“Additional Arguments on the Division of [Dead] Freight from Cincinnati of the Atlantic & Great Western,” etc., N.Y. 1879, p. 5. Speaking from the standpoint of an impartial observer, Mr. Fink declared that $1,840,494 had been lost between December 19, 1878, and May 1, 1879, through the failure of the Michigan Central, Lake Shore, Pennsylvania, and Baltimore & Ohio and their connections to observe their published tariffs. Chron. 28:578, 1879. 15By agreement of March 11, 1881, the chairman of the Joint Executive Committee, Mr. Fink, was given authority to proclaim a general reduction in published rates when it should be shown that any pool line had been accepting traffic at less than the regular rate. This authority he exercised in April. Rates were restored almost immediately by special action of the Joint Executive Committee, only to be reduced again in June for similar reasons. 16The actual outbreak of the war was due to the conviction of the New York Central that traffic was being diverted to other roads by secret departures from the published tariff. R.R. Gaz. 13:347, 1881. 17Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 3, p. 558. 18Cullom Committee Report, vol. 2, p. 98. 19In January the Pennsylvania announced that it would take provisions from Chicago to New York for ten cents per hundred pounds. R.R. Gaz. 14:28, 1882. 20See Albert Fink, Report upon the Adjustment of Railroad Transportation Rates to the Seaboard, 1882; also, Letter to a New York Merchant, by the same, Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 2, Exhibits, pp. 106–119. 21For agreement see Chron. 34:116, 1882. The Commissioners’ functions were purely advisory. They reported in July that “no evidence has been offered before us that the existing differentials are unjust, or that they operate to the prejudice of either of the Atlantic seaboard cities.” Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce Report (Elkins Committee), 1905, vol. 2, pp. 1243 ff. 22The question was passed upon by C.F. Adams as arbitrator in November, 1882 (Chron. 35:603, 1882), and by the Trunk-Line Board of Arbitration in January, 1884 (Chron. 38:31, 1884). 23The attempt of the Pennsylvania to cut off the New York connection of the Baltimore & Ohio caused especial bitterness between those roads. See Chron. 39:420, 1884. 24Chron. 41:393, 1885. 25Cullom Committee Report, vol. 1, Appendix, pp. 237, and 240 ff. 26Chron. 45:692, 1887. 27The amount of issue was £2,400,000 ($11,678,400) at 4½ per cent, maturing April 1, 1933, and placed through Brown, Shipley & Co. of London. Chron. 36:426, 1883. 28Chron. 40:453, 1885. 29Chron. 41:555, 1885. 30Chron. 43:190, 1886. 31The Staten Island Rapid Transit possessed an extensive water front on Staten Island, besides franchises for two ferries from Staten Island to the Battery, New York City. Some trouble was experienced in securing permission to bridge the Kill von Kull between Staten Island and the New Jersey mainland. Congress passed an act permitting construction, New Jersey protested, and the courts upheld the authority of Congress. Stockton v. Baltimore & New York Railroad Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9. 32R.R. Gaz. 19:170, 1887; Ibid. 19:490, 1887. For an account of the Richmond & West Point Terminal Railway & Warehouse Company see the chapter on the Southern Railway. 33R.R. Gaz. 18:49, 1886. Interview with Mr. Albert Fink. A passenger rate war between the Pennsylvania and the Baltimore & Ohio took place early in 1886, and resulted in the indirect cutting by the former of the pool rate which it had agreed to maintain. Chron. 42:73, 1886. 34From $34,713,696 in 1884 to $56,868,201 in 1887. 35Such as connecting lines, iron bridges over the Ohio River, elevators, wharves, terminal facilities, etc. 36The lowest average price of the common stock before announcement of the measures taken for relief was 160, from which point the quotations rapidly dropped to 125, and on January 5, 1889, to 85. 37Chron. 45:304, 1887; Ibid. 45:824, 1887. 38About $5,000,000 of the floating debt in March, 1888, consisted of advances by the syndicate, for which they held 50,000 shares of Western Union Telegraph Company stock, and 15,000 shares of United States Express Company stock, which at current prices about covered their loan. Statement of President Spencer, Chron. 46:344, 1888. 39Ry. Age, 12:640, 1887. 40“If it [the stock] is sold,” said a statement in the New York Tribune, purporting to represent the views of Senator Gorman, a large stockholder, “it will place the control of the road practically in the hands of the syndicate.... It is clearly preferable to keep the control of the stock here [Baltimore], as the road is a city and state institution of the first importance to our business interests.” Ry. Age, 13:44, 1888. Another objection was that an issue of additional preferred stock would postpone indefinitely dividends upon the common. 41Mr. Spencer had succeeded Robert Garrett in December, 1887. 42Chron. 46:319, 1888. In connection with this proposition President Spencer made the following statement: Of the $11,148,007 floating debt, December, 1887, $7,769,314 consisted of loans and bills payable. This is now reduced to $6,446,173. There will probably be added to this $1,400,000 for equipment, already either under contract or to be constructed in the company’s shops. In addition there should be, in the near future, not less than $2,000,000 additional put into this property for the purpose of improvement. The total requirements are thus $10,000,000. Of this $5,000,000 will be disposed of by assets in the hands of the syndicate as collateral, or in the hands of the company. Of the remaining $5,000,000, $1,500,000 is floating debt. This will be more than provided for by the $2,500,000 of consolidated bonds remaining in the hands of the company for its future use after the sale of the $5,000,000 to the syndicate. The remaining $3,500,000 needed for equipment and improvements it is the desire of the company to provide for by that portion of the $2,500,000 not required for the floating debt, and by the $2,500,000 in the sinking-fund loan of 1890. Chron. 46:344. 43Ry. Rev. 28:192, 1888. 44Ry. Age, 12:728, 1887. 45R.R. Gaz. 20:417, 1888. 46Ry. Rev. 28:192, 1888. The amiability of the syndicate was profitable to it. On May 21 the subscription books of the $7,500,000 mortgage were opened in London and New York, and the whole issue was subscribed in London before the inhabitants of the American city, in spite of their proverbial alertness, were out of bed. In September, 1888, the Baltimore & Ohio was reported as “having all the funds needed for the present.” R.R. Gaz. 20:343, 1888. 47Ry. Rev. 28:163, 1888. 48Ibid. 28:236, 1888. 49Ry. Rev. 28:678, 1888; Ibid. 28:689, 1888. The coincidence was so suggestive that it was thought necessary to “credibly inform” certain bankers that the investigating committee was expected to continue its investigation and to make a full report. In December the committee was instructed by a directors’ resolution not to report till its full statement was ready, and further notice does not appear. 50Ry. Age, 16:882, 1891. At the same time the directors decided to sell $5,096,600 additional common stock to meet expenditures which would be necessary in connection with the World’s Fair at Chicago. 51Chron. 47:575, 1888. It is impossible to give an adequate account of these wars without straying too far from our subject. Some of the methods by which rebates were granted are revealed in the case of Jacob Shamberg v. Del., Lack. & W.R.R. Co. et al., 4 I.C.C. Rep. 630. The differential question took on a new phase in 1888 through the demand of weaker roads for protection against stronger. This had long been a demand of the Grand Trunk, and had been conceded to it in the last part of 1887. In January, 1888, the Pennsylvania and the New York Central agreed to allow besides a differential rate to the Erie, the Lackawanna, the West Shore, and the Baltimore & Ohio, which should vary from five cents per hundred pounds from Chicago to New York on first class to one cent on fifth and sixth classes. R.R. Gaz. 20:26, 1888; Chron. 46:57, 1888. This did not prevent active warfare throughout the year. 52Known as the Presidents’ and Bankers’ Agreement. 53There was, however, a shortage in the wheat crop in 1888. 54The comparative peace of 1889 was due as much to the abundance of traffic offering as to the efficacy of the agreement concluded in February of that year. According to the Chronicle the apportionment of traffic then contemplated proved difficult to carry out, and considerable discontent arose. Chron. 50:892, 1890. 55In 1890 difficulties occurred through the competition of the Canadian Pacific, and more particularly through the attempt of the Lake Shore to reduce the differential formerly granted to the Grand Trunk. Chron. 50:850, 1890. The matter was left to arbitration, Chron. 51:625, with the result that the lines north of Lake Ontario were allowed to charge two and one-half cents less per hundred pounds on dressed beef to the seaboard than the lines further south. R.R. Gaz. 23:64, 1891. This had the effect of putting the Canadian Pacific on an equality with the Grand Trunk. Late in 1892 still another agreement between the trunk lines was found necessary to maintain rates. Chron. 55:857, 1892. 56Ry. Rev. 30:382, 1890. 57Chron. 50:800, 1890; Ibid. 50:833, 1890; Ry. Rev. 30:348, 1890; R.R. Gaz. 22:448, 1890. 58Application for listing of Trustee certificates, Chron. 54:369, 1892. 59Certain extensions had been made, which it is not necessary to describe at length. The most important had been those of the Pittsburgh & Western in 1891, Chron. 52:238, 1891, the Akron & Chicago Junction, Chron. 53:756, 1891, and the West Virginia & Pittsburgh, Chron. 54:725, 1892. In 1893 the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern and the Ohio & Mississippi Railway companies consolidated, and the Baltimore & Ohio guaranteed the principal and interest of the first consolidated mortgage gold bonds of the consolidated company for $25,000,000. Chron. 56:332, 1893. 60Chron. 59:696, 1894. In October, 1893, the Baltimore & Ohio was borrowing in London on one year 5 per cent promissory notes, and 2 per cent commission, paying, therefore, an equivalent of 7 per cent interest. Ry. Times, 64:499, 1893. 61Chron. 60:42, 1895. 62In 1895 the directors speak of the unremunerative rates prevailing. Chron. 60:711, 1895. At the end of the year Mr. Alexander Shaw, chairman of the board of directors, felt called upon to say, “The two subjects which are giving the new board of directors the most to think about are the floating debt and the future management of the property. We have to fund the former, and as to the latter there is a difference of opinion among the directors.... I deny specifically that the January interest on the bonds of the company will be passed; that a receivership, either friendly or otherwise, is contemplated; that the Baltimore & Ohio and the Southern Railway systems are to be consolidated; and the statements that there has been an irregularity in the manner of keeping the books of the company.” Chron. 61:1153, 1895. 63Ry. Rev. 36:138, 1896. The receivers were appointed February 29. 64Chron. 62:777, 1896. 65The period covered was from September 30, 1888, to November 30, 1895. Report of Mr. Stephen Little to General Louis Fitzgerald, chairman of the reorganization committee. 66Chron. 64:999, 1897. 67President J.K. Cowen, Vice-President Oscar G. Murray. 68Chron. 62:907, 1896. 69Ibid. 69:128, 1899. 70R.R. Gaz. 28:781, 1896; Ibid. 29:563, 1897; Chron. 65:110, 1897; Ry. Rev. 38:628, 1898. The status of the Baltimore & Ohio stock was somewhat peculiar, in that when first issued to the state of Maryland it had been accompanied by a guarantee, or conditional guarantee, of dividend payments; and Johns Hopkins University, to which the stock had been transferred, maintained that this contract, added to the continuous payment of dividends for over fifty years, gave them rights even against the bondholders. 71Chron. 66:1235, 1898. 72The prior lien bonds were “to be secured by a mortgage upon the main line and branches, Parkersburg Branch and Pittsburg Division when acquired by the new company, covering about 1017 miles of first track, and about 964 miles of second, third, and fourth track and sidings, and also all the equipment now owned by the company of the value of upward of $20,000,000, or hereafter acquired in any manner by the use of the $34,000,000 reserved first mortgage bonds, as hereinafter stated.” 73The first mortgage 4s were to be a first lien “upon the Philadelphia, Chicago, and Akron divisions and branches and the Fairmount, Morgantown & Pittsburg Railroad, covering about 570 miles of first track, and about 332 miles of second, third, and fourth track and sidings, and also on the properties now included in the present Baltimore & Ohio Terminal mortgages of 1894, when said lines and properties are acquired by the new company; also on the Baltimore Belt Railroad, if and when the same shall be acquired by the new company. They will also be a lien subject to the prior lien mortgage upon the lines, properties, and equipment covered by the latter.” 74Annual Yield of Old and New Securities:
75Headed by Messrs. Speyer & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. of New York, and Messrs. Speyer Bros. of London. R.R. Gaz. 30:733, 1898. 76The Western Union stock was sold to the same syndicate which took the Baltimore & Ohio’s securities, at a price said to be about 90. At this price the yield would have been $3,420,000; so evidently very little other stock was sold. 77In fact they were never quite so low as this. 78Chron. 69:128, 1899. 79Chron. 67:27, 1898. 80Ry. Rev. 38:656, 1898. 81R.R. Gaz. 31:500, 1899. 82Ry. Age 28:570, 1899. 83The chief addition has been that of the Cleveland, Lorraine & Wheeling. 84Chron. 72:1079, 1901. In February, 1906, the Pennsylvania Railroad and three other companies which it controlled owned $28,480,000 of Baltimore & Ohio preferred and $42,900,000 of Baltimore & Ohio common stock out of an authorized capital of $60,000,000 preferred and $125,000,000 common. Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the Pennsylvania community of interest, February 6, 1906. 85See Chron. 76:102, 1903; and Interstate Commerce Commission, Report on Discriminations and Monopolies in Coal and Oil, January 25, 1907. The interest of the Baltimore & Ohio in the Reading dated from 1902, and was influenced in turn by the ability of the Reading to control the Central of New Jersey, over which the Baltimore & Ohio reached New York. The latter’s holdings of Reading stock were shared with the Vanderbilts. Both the Baltimore & Ohio and the Lake Shore sold a block of their Reading stock in 1904. 86See statement by the Pennsylvania management in Chron. 83:563, 1906. 87It is not necessary to do more than to mention the recent contest between the Baltimore & Ohio and the Hill-Morgan people over the Chicago Terminal Transfer Railway. By arrangement with this company the Baltimore & Ohio had enjoyed terminal facilities at Chicago on favorable terms. When the Terminal Railway went bankrupt the Baltimore & Ohio paid off the first mortgage bonds in order to prevent the loss of its privileges. Litigation followed, to end finally in an agreement between the Hill and Baltimore & Ohio interests for joint ownership of the Chicago Terminal by the Burlington and the latter, and for the use of its facilities in accordance with an equitable division of its trackage. The Pere Marquette and the Chicago Great Western, which had shared in the use of the property to that time, were left to shift for themselves. Ry. World, August 23, 1907. 88E.H. Mott, Between the Ocean and the Lakes—the Story of Erie. N.Y. 1899. 89Ibid. pp. 79–80. 90Mott, p. 129. Default was also made on the first, second, third, and fifth mortgages. 91See Adams’s Chapters of Erie, Boston, 1871. 92The capital per mile rose from $81,068 in 1864 to $117,760 in 1872. 93Chron. 12:203, 1871; Ibid. 16:489, 1873. 94R.R. Gaz. 6:100, 1874. See affidavit of S.H. Dunan in the suit of John C. Angell against the Erie Railway Company and others, reprinted in Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 2, Exhibits, pp. 591–610. 95Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 2, Exhibits, pp. 623–643. 96Angell suit, R.R. Gaz. 6:269, 1874. 97R.R. Gaz. 7:224, 1875. 98Chron. 20:520, 1875. 99From a loan of £3,000,000 placed in London, the company had received but £1,232,029 in cash; £508,431 being retained by the London Banking Association and by James McHenry for claims and commissions on which the critical condition of the company enabled them to insist. Chron. 20:500, 1875. For statement of the physical condition of the property, May 26, 1875, see Extracts from joint letter to Hon. H.J. Jewett, Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 2, pp. 517–518, Exhibits. 100See R.R. Gaz. 7:423, 1875. 101R.R. Gaz. 7:423, 1875. 102R.R. Gaz. 7:479–80, 1875. 103Chron. 21:277, 1875. 104R.R. Gaz. 7:511, 1875. 105R.R. Gaz. 7:533, 1875; Chron. 21:612, 1875. 106R.R. Gaz. 8:818, 1876. 107Chron. 22:233, 1876. 108R.R. Gaz. 8:178, 1876. 109Chron. 22:423, 1876. 110Amounts received from assessments to January 18, 1878, were:
R.R. Gaz. 11:30, 1879. Report of Pres. Jewett, Chron. 28:67–8, 1879. Shares with assessment paid sold in October, 1878, at $15 for common and $30 for preferred. R.R. Gaz. 10:516, 1878. 111Chron. 23:233, 1876; Ibid. 26:419; Ibid. 29:358, 1879; Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 2, pp. 252–7, Exhibits. 112Chron. 26:419, 1878. 113Ibid. 26:469, 1878. For indenture executed by the new corporation and for text of the first and second consolidated mortgage and of the second consolidated funded coupon mortgage, see Hepburn Committee Report, vol. 2, Exhibits, pp. 315–50. 114Mott, p. 268. 115Mott, p. 269. 116Annual Report, 1882. 117Chron. 36:427, 1883. For the necessity of Erie’s extension westward see testimony of First Vice-President Felton before the Senate Committee on Transportation Interests of the United States and Canada, 51st Congress, 1st Session, Report no. 847, pp. 130–1. 118For some account of the trunk-line rate wars see the chapter on the Baltimore & Ohio. 119Chron. 39:234, 1884. 120Annual Report, 1884, p. 12. 121R.R. Gaz. 16:421, 1884. 122Chron. 39:349, 1884. 123R.R. Gaz. 17:446, 1885. 124For terms of reorganization see Annual Report, 1890; also R.R. Gaz. 19:188, 1887. 125Annual Report, 1886. 126Upon such redemption a corresponding amount of the original coupons were to be cancelled. 127Annual Report, 1886. 128From .662 in 1887 to .610 in 1892. 129Testimony of Messrs. King and Felton, Senate Committee on Transportation Interests of the United States and Canada, pp. 44 and 121–2. 130Annual Report, 1887. 131Mott, p. 272. 132In 1890 a traffic agreement was made with the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton, to take the place of that with the Big Four. R.R. Gaz. 22:314, 1890. 133Figures for 1891 were, fixed charges, $4298 per mile; net revenue, $4897 per mile. 134Chron. 57:179, 1893. 135Mott, p. 273. 136Chron. 57:938, 1893; Ibid. 57:1083, 1893. 137Ry. Times, 65:3, 1894. 138R.R. Gaz. 26:18, 1894. 139Ry. Times, 65:120, 1894. 140Ibid. 65:152, 1894. 141Chron. 58:264, 1894. 142Ibid. 58:383, 1894. 143Ibid. 58:430, 1894. 144According to the law of 1892 the bonded indebtedness, including mortgages given as consideration for the purchase of real estate and mortgages authorized by contract prior to May, 1891, could not exceed the amount of the paid up capital stock. 145Ry. Rev. 34:181, 1894. 146R.R. Gaz. 26:472, 1894. 147Ibid. 27:554, 1895. 148New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio voting trustees agreed to foreclose and deliver the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio property, subject only to the prior lien, equipment, and leased-line securities for which reservation was made. 149Chron. 61:368, 1895; R.R. Gaz. 27:583–4, 1895. 150The following was the rate of exchange of Erie securities for New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio securities on payment by the latter of $12 per new share:
151Capital Stock—
152This real rental was increased somewhat by the assumption of New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio prior liens. 153Chron. 61:831, 1895. 154Capital—
155Calculated. Poor gives the figure of 340.3 miles of track. In 1867 the miles of track were reported as 418.1, and the miles of line as 147, the latter being 35.1 per cent of the former. Supposing the proportion to have been the same in 1862, to 340.3 miles of track there would have been 119.4 miles of line, which, divided into a capital of $23,094,829, gives $193,417. 156Annual Report, 1881, p. 63. 157Industrial Commission, vol. 19, p. 445. Area of fields as given in Annual Report for 1881 was: Schuylkill, 146 sq. miles; Western Middle, 91 sq. miles; Lehigh, 37 sq. miles; Wyoming, 198 sq. miles. 158An analysis of the Coal & Iron Company’s operations in 1881 (Annual Report, 1881) showed that there had been expended:
159Annual Report, 1881. 160Part of the difference was due to the inflation of the currency before 1879. 161R.R. Gaz. 9:225, 1877; Ibid. 9:146, 1877. 162Ibid. 9:284, 1877. 163Annual Report, 1881, p. 28. 164Chron. 31:46, 1880, Report of the English Bondholders’ Committee, June 18, 1880. This committee was in the interests of the Messrs. McCalmont. 165Ry. Age, 5:365, 1880. 166R.R. Gaz. 12:363, 1880. 167Ry. Age, 5:351, 1880; R.R. Gaz. 12:350, 1880. 168R.R. Gaz. 12:542, 1880. 169R.R. Gaz. 12:564, 1880. 170Chron. 31:536, 1880. 171Chron. 31:607, 1880. 172R.R. Gaz. 12:609, 1880. 173Ibid. 174Ibid. 13:11, 1881. 175Ibid. 12:704, 1880. 176R.R. Gaz. 12:652, 1880. 177Ibid. 12:704, 1880. 178Ibid. 13:11, 1881. 179R.R. Gaz. 13:25, 1881. 180Chron. 32:206, 1881. 181R.R. Gaz. 13:43, 1881. 182R.R. Gaz. 13:132, 1881. 183Chron. 32:313, 1881. 184Chron. 32:445, 1881. 185Chron. 32:469, 1881. 186R.R. Gaz. 13:446, 1881. 187Ry. Age, 6:528, 1881. 188Annual Report, 1881, p. 52. 189Annual Report, 1881, pp. 50 ff. 190Annual Report, 1881, pp. 50 ff.; see also Chron. 33:177, 1881. 191Ry. Age, 6:486, 1881. 192Chron. 33:256, 1881. 193Ry. Age, 6:628, 1881. 194R.R. Gaz. 13:624, 1881. 195R.R. Gaz. 13:672, 1881. 196Chron. 34:265, 1882; R.R. Gaz. 26:156, 1882. 197Chron. 34:409, 1882. 198R.R. Gaz. 14:354, 1882. 199Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p. 607. 200Ry. Age, 10:218, 1885. 201Annual Report, 1883, pp. 111 ff. 202Annual Report, 1883, pp. 139 ff. 203Chron. 37:563, 1883. 204Annual Report, 1883, pp. 25–7. 205Annual Report, 1883. The proposition was made by Mr. Gowen. 206From November 30, 1883, to January 2, 1884, reliable figures subsequently showed a deficit of $2,000,000. 207Chron. 38:679, 1884. 208Ibid. 39:461, 1884. 209Annual Report, 1884, pp. 21–8. 210R.R. Gaz. 17:80, 1885. 211R.R. Gaz. 17:144, 1885. 212Ibid. 17:160, 1885. 213Ibid. 17:224, 1885. 214Collateral bonds were to be given for the assessment. 215Chron. 40:569, 1885. The trustees were to be appointed as follows: One by foreign creditors, two by the general mortgage bondholders, one by the income mortgage bondholders, one by holders of securities junior to the income mortgage, and two by the shareholders. 216Ry. Age, 10:314, 1885. 217R.R. Gaz. 17:607, 1885. 218Chron. 41:307, 1885. 219Chron. 41:654, 1885. 220Preferred from $846,950 to $36,381,820; common from $36,822,975 to $60,134,462. 221R.R. Gaz. 18:138, 1886. 222Chron. 42:216, 1886. 223Chron. 42:365, 1896. Assessments ranged from 2½ per cent on the deferred income bonds to 15 per cent on certain junior securities and $10 on both classes of stock. 224R.R. Gaz. 18:271, 1886. 225Ibid. 18:138, 1886. 226Ry. Age, 11:376, 1886. 227R.R. Gaz. 18:502, 1886. 228Chron. 43:368, 1886; Ibid. 43:747, 1886; Annual Report, 1887. 229R.R. Gaz. 18:897, 1886. 230Ry. Age, 12:692, 1887. These bondholders even proposed a plan of reorganization of their own, which it is not worth while going into. 231Ry. Age, 12:746, 1887; Chron. 45:539, 1887. 232R.R. Gaz. 22:370, 1890. 233Chron. 50:37, 1890. 234Chron. 53:408, 1891. 235Chron. 54:288, 1892; Industrial Commission, vol. 19, pp. 455–7. 236R.R. Gaz. 24:138, 1892. 237Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p. 738. 238Annual Report, 1892. 239R.R. Gaz. 24:420, 1892. 240Chron. 55:680, 1892. 241Chron. 56:82, 1893. 242R.R. Gaz. 25:102, 1893. 243Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p. 567, testimony of A.A. McLeod. 244Ibid. vol. 9, p. 574. 245Ry. Age, 17:109, 1892. 246Ry. Rev. 32:507, 1892. 247Chron. 55:723, 1892. 248R.R. Gaz. 25:386, 1893. 249Ry. Age, 18:314, 1893. 250Ibid. 18:164, 1893. 251Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p. 573. 252Ibid. 253Ry. Times, 63:265, 1893. 254Ry. Age, 18:314, 1893. 255Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p. 739, testimony of I.L. Rice. 256Chron. 57:105, 1893; Ibid. 57:423, 1893. 257New York Herald, May 29, 1893. 258Ry. Times, 63:783, 1893. 259Ry. Age, 18:501, 1893. 260Chron. 56:905, 1893. 261Ry. Times, 63:751, 1893. 262Ry. Times, 63:783, 1893. 263R.R. Gaz. 25:496, 1893. The deposits required were: general mortgage, $41,828,000; stock, 480,424 shares. 264Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p. 737, testimony of I.L. Rice. 265Ry. Times, 64:369, 1893. 266Ry. Age, 18:897, 1893. 267Ry. Age, 18:735, 1893. 268Ry. Rev. 34:55, 1894; Ry. Times, 65:87, 1894. 269Chron. 58:774, 1894. 270Ry. Times, 65:623, 1894. See also the report of the company’s comptroller to the receivers in Annual Report, 1893. 271Ry. Rev. 34:307, 1894. 272Chron. 59:515, 1894; Ry. Age, 19:557, 1894; Ry. Rev. 34:561, 1894; Ry. Times, 66:571, 1894. 273Deposits of bonds were up to the last of January (R.R. Gaz. 27:78, 1895):
274Chron. 60:43, 1895. 275Ry. Times, 68:802, 1895; Chron. 61:1109, 1895. 276Ry. Age, 20:625, 1895. 277Chron. 63:560, 1896. 278Chron. 64:84, 1897. 279Chron. 63:923, 1896. 280See testimony of Mr. Baer before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1904, “Synopsis of Stenographers’ Minutes, etc., in the case of W.R. Hearst against the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company,” p. 55. The managers wished to take no chances. 281Organization and scope of the three Reading Companies. The Reading Company owns practically the whole of the capital stock of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company and the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, and all of the other stocks and securities which were acquired by the purchases under the sale made by the Trustees and the Receivers. It also owns the $20,000,000 purchase money mortgage bonds issued by the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, the locomotives, cars, steam collieries, tugs, and barges constituting the railway and marine equipment, and all the real estate of the old Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company which was not appurtenant to the railroad itself. This, of course, does not include the depots, rights of way, etc., which belong to the Railway Company. The Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company owns all the roads formerly belonging to the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, and it controls the roads hitherto leased to that company, either by transfer of the old leases or by new leases made since November 30, 1896. It leases from the Reading Company the railway and marine equipment which it uses in the conduct of its business and a number of wharves and warehouses on the Delaware River. Annual Report, 1898. 282Chron. 64:84, 1897. 283There are certain duplications in both of these figures, but the same duplications appear in each. 284Chron. 79:2087, 1904. 285See the nineteenth volume of the Industrial Commission’s report for a brief description of the renewed attempt at consolidation in the anthracite coal fields; also testimony in the case of W.R. Hearst against the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company. 286The Virginia state bonds were redeemable in 34 years from April 8, 1853, to September 30, 1854, by the payment of an annuity of 7 per cent. Of this rate 6 per cent covered the interest and 1 per cent, by continuous reinvestment at 6 per cent, was expected to yield the principal sum in the 34 years agreed upon. Annual Report, 1867. Like most new companies, the Richmond & Danville found difficulty at first in meeting its obligations, and was obliged to issue bonds to provide for overdue interest to the state and to keep its floating debt within bounds. R.R. Gaz. 5:499, 1873, and Ibid. 5:507, 1873. 287R.R. Gaz. 3:279, 1871. This road stretched from Goldsboro in the eastern part of North Carolina to Charlotte in the southwestern part, via Greensboro. It was principally owned by the state of North Carolina. By the terms of the lease the Richmond & Danville agreed to pay $260,000 per annum for thirty years. 288The whole road was opened for traffic in September, 1873. It went into the hands of a receiver in 1874, and was sold in foreclosure in 1876; but the Pennsylvania Railroad relieved the Richmond & Danville from all collateral liabilities incurred on its account. The reorganized line was leased by the Richmond & Danville in 1881. Chron. 32:367, 1881. 289Annual Report, 1878. 290Ibid. 1874. 291Ulrich B. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 1860. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1908, pp. 372 ff. 292Including 37 miles of running rights over the N., C. & St. L. 293R.R. Gaz. 5:475, 1873. 294Ibid. 6:178, 1874. 295Ibid. 8:540, 1876. 296The Memphis & Charleston stockholders agreed to the lease in order to avoid bankruptcy. At a meeting in May, 1877, it was pointed out to them that the net earnings of the road had not been enough to pay the interest on its bonds, and that a large amount was due to the state of Tennessee which the company had no present means of paying. Either an assessment on the stock or a lease to the East Tennessee was declared to be necessary. Accordingly, a lease was concluded. The East Tennessee agreed so to discharge the principal of the company’s indebtedness to the state as to reduce the annual interest account from $360,000 to $310,000 as a maximum, and upon the fulfilment of this and of certain other minor conditions took over the operation of the road. Two years later the lease was extended for twenty years at a definite rental amounting to 7 per cent on $4,225,000 or a yearly payment of $295,750. See R.R. Gaz. 9:421, 1877, and Ibid. 11:672, 1879. 297The Selma, Rome & Dalton was bought from the purchasers at foreclosure sale for $2,600,000. The Georgia Southern cost $367,369. Outstanding debts were assumed. To provide for these and other outlays $10,000,000 new 5 per cent bonds were authorized. R.R. Gaz. 12:622, 1880. 298This line was completed in 1882. Chron. 35:430, 1882; R.R. Gaz. 13:420, 1881. 299Chron. 33:357, 1881. 300R.R. Gaz. 13:420, 1881. 301Prominent among them were Messrs. Clyde, of the Coast Line railroads, Wilson and McGhee of the East Tennessee, Stewart, Plant, Logan, and others. 302This had been the Atlanta & Richmond Air Line. 303Chron. 37:128, 1883. 304Chron. 39:733, 1884. 305Chron. 40:29, 1885. 306The committee overestimated the net earnings of the next few years. Instead of $1,400,000 each year these proved to be $1,288,343 in 1885 and $1,382,749 in 1886. 307Chron. 40:60, 1885. There was some dispute as to the jurisdiction of the different courts in this connection. The Circuit Court appointed Mr. Fink receiver for the whole line on January 7. The next day a state court appointed R.T. Dorsey and E.P. Alexander receivers for the lines in Georgia under another mortgage. This suit was removed to the Federal Court and Dorsey, who had meantime been appointed sole receiver in Georgia, was displaced. Subsequently the Georgia Supreme Court held that the transfer was illegal, and Dorsey vainly endeavored to regain his position. The dispute was ended by the withdrawal of the suit upon which the Georgia application was based. 308Son-in-law of George Seney. 309This committee was chosen by the consolidated bondholders. Its membership consisted of Robert Fleming, a representative of the foreign holders; Charles McGhee, president of the Memphis & Charleston; G.W. Smith, of Kountze Bros.; Frederic D. Tappan, president of the Gallatin National Bank; E.W. Corlies, vice-president of the Bank of America; and Frederick P. Olcott, president of the Central Trust Company, which was trustee of the mortgages of the company. Chron. 42:155, 1886. 310As might have been expected, this estimate was too optimistic. The actual reduction was to $1,167,000. Even this constituted a cut of about one-third. 311Chron. 42:186–7, 1886. See also Poor’s Manual for 1886. 312The reader will remember that that same year the general manager had estimated the sum required for steel rails, iron bridges, and other improvements at $1,000,000. 313It is true that the severity of the treatment of the junior securities caused sharp protest. A number of the stockholders met in New York February 23, and appointed a committee to prepare a plan of assessment and to oppose foreclosure. Under the auspices of this committee, Messrs. William H. Sistare and Harold Clemens filed a suit against the reorganization committee of the East Tennessee Company. The capitalization of the company, said they, had been fraudulently inflated by the members of the Thompson-Seney-Brice syndicate. By false reports these financiers had unloaded upon the public securities which they had previously distributed among themselves, and then had entered upon a scheme for wrecking the property. The suits made specific charges of irregularity, and prayed for relief. Ry. Age, 11:192, 1886. 314Chron. 42:364, 1886. 315Ibid. 42:575, 1886. 316Ibid. 42:663, 1886. In a circular to their constituents this committee said: “That after a full and satisfactory presentation of the case by very able counsel it appeared that the committee had been misinformed as to the material facts upon which their case was predicated. It especially appeared to the Court that there was no ground for the charge of fraud against the directors of the Company or the Central Trust Company. It further appeared that the litigation must be a protracted one, without substantial benefit to either party. Your committee were not willing to assume the responsibility of such a contest, in view of the expressed willingness of the majority to give to the minority the same terms which they had accepted for themselves. It was deemed wise to harmonize all interests, and join hands to promote the future of the property.” 317Annual Report, East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia, 1887. 318Chron. 37:344, 1883. The debentures were cumulative income bonds entitled to 6 per cent out of earnings after payment of interest, rentals, and operating expenses, including expenditures made for the repair, renewal, and improvement of existing property and equipment necessary for the proper conduct of the business of the railroad. Certain provisions of the mortgage protected them against the insertion of new mortgage bonds before them. Chron. 37:373, 1883. 319Curiously enough the chief saving seems to have been in maintenance of cars, an expenditure which one would expect to be least affected by the syndicate control. 320Chron. 36:56, 1883. 321R.R. Gaz. 18:138, 1886. 322Chron. 42:575, 1886. 323The Richmond & Danville guaranteed interest on some $12,500,000 of Virginia Midland bonds. 324Cf. Poor’s Manual for 1887. 325The very high average price of $200 per share was reported to have been paid. R.R. Gaz. 18:825, 1886; cf. R.R. Gaz. 19:162–3, 1887. The Terminal Company issued $5,000,000 new preferred and $9,000,000 common stock. Of this it sold the preferred and $7,500,000 of the common, giving to every holder of 100 of its shares the right to subscribe to the extent of one-third of the par value of his stock, and to receive for his subscription 33? shares of the new preferred and 50 shares of common. Then to the $5,000,000 cash thus secured the Terminal Company added the $1,500,000 common stock left from its $9,000,000 issue, and turned the whole over to the Richmond & Danville in payment for the securities which it had purchased. R.R. Gaz. 18:825, 1886. 326The floating debt amounted to $3,161,325 when Mr. Sully assumed the presidency, and $1,708,700 of it matured January 1. Chron. 44:401, 1887. To provide for it, and for the Richmond & Danville shares, $5,500,000 6 per cent collateral trust bonds were issued, secured by East Tennessee first preferred, Richmond & Danville stock, Columbia & Greenville stock, Virginia Midland stock, and Western North Carolina bonds; and also $16,000,000 common stock. The bonds were sold for cash and the returns applied to the East Tennessee purchase and to the floating debt; $5,000,000 of the stock went for East Tennessee first preferred, and the rest for Richmond & Danville common, Washington, Ohio & Western stock and income bonds, and for other purposes. Chron. 44:149, 1887. Also Poor’s Manual, 1890. 327It was reported that the East Tennessee first preferred stock had been offered to the Norfolk & Western before the Richmond Terminal acquired it. 328Chron. 47:410, 1888. 329Chron. 47:532, 1888. 330Chron. 47:532, 1888; Ry. Rev. 28:663, 1888; R.R. Gaz. 20:778, 1888. 331Chron. 47:625, 1888. 332Chron. 47:663, 1888. 333Ry. Rev. 28:679, 1888. 334Ry. Age, 13:788, 1888. 335Cf. Central Railroad Company vs. Georgia, 2 Otto, 665. The Central Railroad was granted certain exemptions from taxation, and the question came up in 1874 whether the right to these exemptions was surrendered by consolidation with the Macon & Western, and whether, if not, they extended to the Macon & Western as well as to the original company. 336Including 67 per cent paid in Confederate notes during the war. 337See Ulrich B. Phillips, op. cit., chap, vi, for the early history of the Central of Georgia Railroad System. 338The following is representative from a pamphlet issued by the Rice Committee: “The matter of the purchase of sixty-five thousand shares of the first preferred stock of the East Tennessee Railroad Company and the circumstances attendant thereon. “1st. Why did the directors of the Terminal Company purchase sixty-five thousand shares of that stock at par, when fifty-five thousand and one shares would have been sufficient to have given the Terminal Company a majority of that stock, the minority stock at that time selling at about eighty? “2d. Why was the minority stock of the Danville Railroad Company purchased at the same time at a price which then amounted to about two hundred dollars per share, being a premium of one hundred per cent? “3d. Is it true that the majority of the committee appointed for the purpose of negotiating the purchase of the stock of the East Tennessee Company consisted of directors of the Terminal Company largely interested in the minority stock of the Danville Company?” Chron. 46:579, 1888. 339Chron. 46:449, 1888. The opposition pamphlet is reprinted in Chron. 46:579, 1888. It contained thirteen heads, each of which charged or insinuated fraud on the part of the existing board of directors. 340Chron. 46:699, 1888. The vote was 298,006 to 94,645. For resolutions condemning the action of the minority see Ry. Rev. 28:332, 1888. 341Chron. 47:499, 1888. 342The Erlanger or Queen & Crescent system comprised the following roads: Cincinnati Southern (336 miles); Vicksburg & Meridian (142 miles); Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific (189 miles); New Orleans & Northwestern (195 miles); Alabama Great Southern (295 miles). Total mileage, 1157. The road actually acquired was that of the Cincinnati Southern and Alabama Great Southern between Cincinnati and Meridian (about 631 miles); a close working contract being concluded with the rest. Ry. Age, 15:230, 1890. The East Tennessee made payment by the issue of $6,000,000 5 per cent collateral trust bonds, put out jointly by the East Tennessee and Richmond & Danville Companies and secured by deposit of the shares purchased. Chron. 50:560, 1890. For a monograph on the Cincinnati Southern Railway the reader is referred to a study by J.H. Hollander in the Johns Hopkins University Studies for January-February, 1894. 343Chron. 46:828, 1888. 344Ry. Rev. 28:386, 1888; Ibid. 397, 1888. 345Ry. Age, 16:76, 1891. 346Chron. 52:862, 1891. 347From the reorganization plan prepared by Drexel, Morgan & Co., dated May 1, 1893. Chron. 56:874 ff., 1893. 348Ry. Age, 14:78, 1889. 349The failure of this initial suit encouraged the Richmond Terminal to take steps to make its position more secure. In February, 1889, a collateral trust mortgage of $24,300,000 was announced, intended not only to pay off the floating debt and several classes of bonds, but also to purchase the balance of common stock of the Central of Georgia and Richmond & Danville and of the first preferred stock of East Tennessee outstanding. See Poor’s Manual for 1890; also Chron. 48:764, 1889. Subsequently the company issued common shares of its own instead of bonds in exchange for the East Tennessee first preferred, and succeeded in securing nearly $2,000,000 of the outstanding issue. Chron. 49:374, 1889. The rate of exchange was 3¼ to 1. The Richmond & Danville shares were retired by new collateral bonds at 85, plus $26 per share in cash, and in connection with the operation more stock and $5,700,000 collateral bonds were sold on favorable terms to stockholders to provide for the floating debt. 350For replies by Alexander and Inman, see New York Herald, August 10, 1891, and Chron. 53:224, 1891. 351At 97½. See R.R. Gaz. 23:718, 1891. 352Chron. 53:674, 1891. 353R.R. Gaz. 23:870, 1891. The composition of this committee was severely criticised, partly on the ground of the relations of Norton and Schiff to the Louisville & Nashville and to the Norfolk & Western respectively, and partly on the ground that the other members were creditors only and had no interest other than the repayment of their loans. It would seem, however, that the property was likely to have fared better in the hands of reputable New York bankers than in the hands in which it had formerly reposed. 354Chron. 53:922, 1891. 355Chron. 53:969, 1891. The members were: F.P. Olcott; Col. Oliver H. Payne; F.D. Tappan, president of the Gallatin National Bank; W.H. Perkins, president of the Bank of America; and Henry Budge, of Hallgarten & Co. These gentlemen appointed Messrs. Olcott, Budge, and Perkins a sub-committee to prepare a plan. Ry. Rev. 32:14, 1892. 356This excluded the Central of Georgia and the Alabama Great Southern. The figure was based on existing bonded debt, floating debt, and rentals. It included car trust payments, but excluded taxes, which were included in operating expenses, and excluded also the interest on securities owned by the system or the various corporations composing the system. 357The plan in full is reprinted in Chron. 54:487, 1892. 358Consider for instance the treatment of the Richmond Terminal preferred stock. This was quoted in December, 1891, as low as 45. The plan accorded it 100 per cent in new bonds and 20 per cent in new preferred stock. Per contra, the Richmond & Danville consolidated 5s were quoted the same months at 75 and received 100 per cent in new bonds and 40 per cent in new preferred. Was it any wonder that the holders of prior liens refused to come in? 359Chron. 54:846, 1892. 360These notes were to be secured by the same securities that were then pledged to secure the floating debt and were to be exchanged for $170 in new preferred stock if the plan should prove successful. 361Ry. Age, 17:414, 1892. It was not proposed to retain control of the Central of Georgia, but instead certificates of aliquot parts in the holdings of the Georgia stocks were to be issued to each stockholder, making him the actual owner of his proportionate share. 362This committee was subsequently enlarged and became known as the “Independent Committee of Seventeen.” 363Chron. 54:888, 1892. 364Ibid. 55:23, 1892. On July 6, Chairman Strong, of the Advisory Committee of Seventeen, appointed Messrs. George F. Stone, J.C. Maben, and W.E. Strong a sub-committee to further consider reorganization. Chron. 55:59, 1892. Subsequently Mr. Strong appointed Messrs. Coppell, Manson, and Plant a committee to look after the Terminal 5s, and Messrs. Bull, Goadby, and Cyrus J. Lawrence a committee to look after the 6s. Mr. Strong, as chairman of the Advisory Committee, was ex-officio member of each. The first of August Messrs. Thompson Dean, Albert B. Boardman, and Charles P. Huntington were appointed a committee by the holders of between 50,000 and 60,000 shares of stock and other securities of the Richmond Terminal system, “for the purpose of removing the obstacles which now stand in the way of a fair and equitable reorganization of the Richmond & West Point Terminal Railway & Warehouse Company and its constituent corporations, and to this end to employ attorneys and to take all necessary steps to secure the appointment of permanent receivers, who will be in the interest of no clique or faction in said companies.” Chron. 55:216, 1892. See in this connection Ry. Rev. 32:521, 1892. 365R.R. Gaz. 24:33, 1892. The deposit was made and the dividend paid. 366Ibid. 24:237, 1892. 367Chron. 54:965, 1892. 368It will be observed that although the minority stockholders of the Central of Georgia objected to the Terminal’s stock control they were not averse to having the precise terms of the lease to the Georgia Pacific carried out: that is, to being guaranteed 7 per cent upon their stock. 369W.P. Clyde, etc. 370Chron. 54:1010, 1892. Messrs. Huidekoper and Foster were also appointed receivers by courts in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. For reply by President and Receiver Comer, of the Central, to Clyde’s statement, see Chron. 55:22, 1892. 371Ry. Rev. 32:549, 1892. The committee also stated that the Terminal Company had been made to purchase $1,800,000 Georgia state bonds at par and interest, which paid only 3½ per cent a year, although the company was unable to borrow money at less than 6 per cent; that the drafts of the directors to a large amount were paid by the company, and that no vouchers were on file to show how this money was expended. 372Chron. 55:938, 1892. 373Chron. 55:1078, 1892. For replies of defendants see Chron. 56:414, 1893, and Ibid. 972, 1893. 374This was the letter finally declining to undertake the reorganization in 1892 because of lack of assurances of support. 375The correspondence appears in full in Chron. 56:207, 1893, and Ibid. 56:622, 1893. 376Ry. Rev. 33:95, 1893. 377These needs had already been emphasized by the Olcott plan. 378Lack of space forbids a full statement of the criticisms which the Drexel plan had to make upon the physical condition and financial practice of the Richmond Terminal properties. The following is from the plan, section 9: “As an example of the manner in which accounts have been kept, it may be mentioned that in the operating expenses of the entire Richmond & Danville system only $20,000 were charged for renewal of rails in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1890, and not a dollar in the fiscal years ending June 30, 1891 and 1892, respectively. In seven months under the receivership (July, 1892, to January, 1893, inclusive) about $600 were charged. Since that date, it is understood, about $18,000 have been charged. With these exceptions all renewals of rails were charged to construction accounts. Renewals, properly to be included in operating expenses, would be at least $100,000 to $150,000 per annum.” Other instances, almost as bad, could be stated.
380The new company reserved the right at any time to redeem its preferred stock in cash at par. 381Of which $104,303,894 for stock and the rest for bonds outstanding. 382The reorganization plan estimated the capitalization under its provisions at about $20,000 per mile of road owned and controlled; about $10,000 preferred stock per mile owned and controlled; about $25,000 common stock per mile owned and controlled. 383The plan is published in full in Chron. 56:874, 1893. 384Ry. Rev. 33:388, 1893. 385Modified reorganization plan. Chron. 58:385, 1894. Some information concerning traffic conditions in the South in 1894 is to be found in the Eighth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, pp. 20–24. 386From $140,000,000 5 per cent bonds, $75,000,000 preferred and $160,000,000 common stock to $120,000,000 bonds, $60,000,000 preferred and $125,000,000 common stock. Since, however, some of the poorer properties were cut off and the terms granted to others were made more liberal, the smaller absolute amount of new securities represented a greater relative increase than before. 387The actual charges in 1895 were $4,195,000. 388“The increase in car trusts is due to the existence of about $1,200,000 of such obligations on the Richmond & Danville system, which, up to the date of the plan of reorganization, had not been entered on the ledger of either the Railway Company or its Receivers, although, as it appears, they were well known.” Modified reorganization plan. 389R.R. Gaz. 26:613, 1894. 390Statement compiled by the reorganization committee. Chron. 59:515, 1894. The mileage controlled by the Richmond Terminal system on November 30, 1892, had been 9053.3. 391J.P. Morgan, Charles Lanier, and George F. Baker. See Chron. 59:836, 1894, and Ibid. 880, 1894. 392See statement by Receiver Comer. Chron. 55:805, 1892. 393Chron. 60:1008, 1895. 394With a charter from the state of Georgia. 395The capital stock of the Central of Georgia Railway was held by the Richmond Terminal Reorganization Committee until the spring of 1907. It was then sold to Oakleigh Thorne, president of the Trust Company of America, and Marsden J. Perry. Later the same year these gentlemen resold this stock to E.H. Harriman and his associates. 396The original estimate was $19,000,000. The amount available seems to have been finally $20,000,000. 397The voting trust was extended in 1902, in respect to a majority of the stock, for a period of five years. See Chron. 75:442, 1902, and R.R. Gaz. 34:826, 1902. 398Annual Report, 1906. 399The narrow-gauge equipment included in these figures is as follows:
400“It will hardly be claimed,” said the Interstate Commerce Commission, of the Southern Railway in 1900 (8 I.C.C. Rep. 583), “that the cost of reproducing that property in its present state would equal $40,000 a mile.” 401This route followed roughly the old Santa Fe Trail. 402Chron. 29:583, 1879. 403Ibid. 33:23, 1881. 404Chron. 34:315, 1882, Circular of Sonora Railroad Company to stockholders. 405Chron. 29:630, 1879. Statement by Vice-President Baker. 406Ibid. 29:630, 1879. 407Chron. 34:243, 1882. 408Chron. 41:444, 1885. 409Annual Report, 1885, contains a discussion of the Atlantic & Pacific and of the California Southern projects. 410Chron. 42:462, 1886; Annual Report, 1887. 411Ibid. 42:518, 1886. 412Annual Reports, 1886 and 1887. 413Annual Report, 1888. 414Ry. Rev. 29:511, 1889. 415Ry. Age, 12:107, 1887. 416Ibid. 12:325, 1887. 417This increase in dividend gave rise to sharp and well-merited criticism. The directors defended their action as follows: “In forming a just opinion of this matter,” said they, “it is necessary to recall to the stockholders the statement made in the circular of July 30, 1887.... It was stated in the circular referred to that for the six months ending July 1, 1887, the net earnings exceeded by more than $1,200,000 the net earnings for the first six months of the year 1886, that the earnings were still increasing, and what has always been true in the past may be expected this year also; namely, that the revenue of the second six months of the year will be considerably in excess of that of the first six months.... It will ... be seen that ... the year 1887 formed a remarkable exception to what had hitherto been the regular course of Atchison’s earnings; the second half of that year showing an increase over the first half of only $278,096 gross, and $204,144 net.... Drouths, failure of crops, excessive competition, continually decreasing rates, unwise legislation, strikes, and other calamities have befallen us as they have other Western roads; but your directors could not know in advance that any of these unfavorable conditions would have to be met, much less that they would all have to be met at one and the same time.” Annual Report, 1888. This defence was altogether unsatisfactory. An increase in the dividend rate is too important to be justified by anything but earnings actually in hand. Moreover, the conditions which the directors held responsible for the decline in Atchison earnings were either well known at the time when the dividend was declared, or could easily have been anticipated. It was even alleged that the decrease in business which the annual report for 1888 disclosed was due to lessened carriage of company material to the West for construction of new track, and not to crop failure or other decline in general business. See R.R. Gaz. 21:327, 1889. 418Chron. 47:472, 1888. The use of $3,000,000 of the notes was specifically deferred. 419Ry. Age, 14:644, 1889.
421The income bond certificate is printed in full in W.A. Wood, Modern Business Corporations, pp. 237–9. 422Ry. Age, 14:682, 1889. 423Annual Report, 1890. Economies were secured at this time through consolidation of branch lines with the main stem and in other ways. 424Annual Report, 1891. 425Chron. 51:171, 1890. 426Ibid. 53:474, 1891. 427Annual Report, 1892. 428Ry. Age, 17:413, 1892. 429Annual Report, 1892. 430Chron. 56:1014, 1893; Ibid. 57:1038, 1893. 431Ry. Rev. 34:68, 1894. 432Ry. Times, 64:533, 1893. 433See Chron. 58:42, 1894, for an official statement of the reasons for the application to the courts. 434Ibid. 57:1121, 1893. Some information concerning subsequent railroad competition during the Atchison receivership is to be found in 7 I.C.C. Rep. 61. 435R.R. Gaz. 26:465, 1894. 436Ry. Rev. 34:358, 1894. 437Ry. Times, 65:817, 1894. 438Ry. Rev. 34:379, 1894. 439Report of Mr. Stephen Little to the New York, London, and Amsterdam Committees of Reorganization, 1894. 440Chron. 59:233, 1894. 441Ry. Times, 66:543, 1894. 442Chron. 59:878, 1894; Ibid. 59:919, 1894. 443In addition, prior lien bonds were authorized to a maximum of $17,000,000, of which $12,000,000 might be used if desirable in place of general mortgage bonds in the retirement of guarantee fund notes, equipment bonds, etc., and $5,000,000 for necessary improvements within five years. 444Second mortgage A bonds received 113 per cent in new preferred stock. Second mortgage B bonds received 118 per cent. “After careful consideration,” said the plan, “it was decided to be best for the interest of those [the second mortgage] securities that they should now be converted into 5 per cent preferred stock, possessing full voting powers and preferential rights as to principal as well as interest, rather than revert to their original form of ‘Income Bonds.’ It was not thought that a greater assessment than $10 could be raised from the stock, and the remainder had to come from the junior bonds.” 445The plan of reorganization was published separately, but was reprinted in Chron. 60:658, 1895. 446Ry. Rev. 35:208–9, 1895. 447Ry. Age, 20:199, 1895. 448Ry. Times, 67:482, 1895. 449R.R. Gaz. 26:675, 1894. 450Ry. Times, 66:506, 1894. 451Ry. Rev. 34:589, 1894. 452Chron. 61:1064, 1895. 453Chron. 64:609, 1897. 454Ibid. 67:841, 1898. 455This was not all the Atchison stock which Union Pacific interests acquired. President Ripley testified before the Interstate Commerce Commission on January 8, 1907, that two years before E.H. Harriman and his associates had secured $30,000,000 of Atchison stock, and had caused the election of Messrs. H.C. Frick and H.H. Rogers to the Atchison directorate to represent them. 456Statutes at Large, 37th Congress, 2d Session, chap. 120. 457Statutes at Large, 38th Congress, 1st Session, chap. 216. 458Aldrich Committee Report. The value of gold used is that given in the American Almanac for 1878, and varied from year to year as follows:
459John P. Davis, History of the Union Pacific Railroad, p. 151. 460Useful accounts of the CrÉdit Mobilier may be found in Davis, Union Pacific Railroad; Crawford, CrÉdit Mobilier of America; Hazard, The CrÉdit Mobilier of America; White, History of the Union Pacific Railroad; Poland Committee, Report and Testimony, 42d Congress, 3d Session, House Reports, No. 77. 461Davis, pp. 163–70. 462Union Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p. 52. The Government endeavored to force the cancellation of the above mentioned construction contracts and the restoration of unlawful profits, but was held by the Supreme Court to have no standing in the case which would entitle it to demand relief. U.S. vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 98 U.S. 569. 463Statutes at Large, 39th Congress, 1st Session, chap. 159. 464United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p. 55. 465Ibid. vol. 8, p. 4975. 466Records in Union Pacific Railway Foreclosure Cases, 55th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 10, Part 3. 467Parties to agreement were: Sidney Dillon, Fred L. Ames, Jay Gould, C.S. Greeley, John D. Perry, Robert E. Carr, Adolphus Meier, B.W. Lewis, Jr., Henry Villard, John P. Usher, D.M. Edgerton, Artemas H. Holmes. 468United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of A.H. Holmes, p. 165. 469Ibid. Testimony of Jay Gould, pp. 454–6. The change to a mortgage was made between April, 1878, and May, 1879. 470Records in Union Pacific Railway Foreclosure Cases, 55th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 10, part 3 (contains text of mortgage). 471United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of A.H. Holmes, pp. 130 and 133. 472Ibid. vol. 8, p. 4987, Report of William Calhoun, Accountant. 473United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of Jay Gould, p. 463. 474United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p. 58. 475Ibid. pp. 59 to 65. 476Ibid. Testimony of F.L. Ames, p. 668. The combined capital is given in the agreements as $51,762,300, but this is apparently a mistake. 477Quotations of Kansas Pacific common during 1879 (Chron. 1880):
478United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, testimony of Jay Gould. 479United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p. 100. 480Except the Missouri Pacific, which Gould retained. 481United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of Jay Gould, pp. 467–9, 523, 524. 482United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of Charles Wheeler, pp. 1735–6. Amount, $571,000. 483Ibid. Testimony of John Evans, pp. 1853–4. 484Ibid. Testimony of C.F. Adams, p. 47. 485United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, pp. 91 ff. 486Thirty Years of American Finance, pp. 86 to 98. 487Chron. 35:578, 1882. 488United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p. 67. 489Annual Report, 1884, p. 5. 490United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of C.F. Adams, pp. 45–6. 491Chron. 53:436, 1891. 492Annual Report, 1884, p. 165. 49391 U.S. 72. 494Statutes at Large, 45th Congress, 2d Session, chap. 96. 495The Court held that while up to the passage of the Thurman Act expenditures for improvements could be deducted from gross earnings in calculating net, the language of that Act seemed to preclude the deduction of any charges for improvements or betterments, or increase of permanent value of the works in any manner whatever. See 99 U.S. 402; 99 U.S. 455; 138 U.S. 84. 496Report of the Government Directors for 1893. 497Chron. 57:684, 1893. 498Ibid. 57:639, 1893. 499Sen. Com. 1896, 54th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 314, p. 42, testimony of E.E. Anderson. For bill of complaint see Report of the Commissioner of Railroads, 1894, pp. 99–120. 500Ibid. pp. 391–2, testimony of O.W. Mink. This gave to the Government three out of the five receivers. For petition of the Attorney-General see Report of the Commissioner of Railroads for 1894. 501Chron. 16:292, 1873. 502Report of the Commissioner of Railroads, 1895, p. 14. 503Ry. Rev. 34:335, 1894. 504Chron. 58:775, 1894. 505Ibid. 60:132, 1895. 506Report of the Commissioner of Railroads, 1895, pp. 9–10. 507Senate Commission, 54th Congress, 1st Session, Document 314, testimony of W.S. Pierce. See generally the report of this committee for a discussion of alternatives from the government point of view. 508Ibid. Testimony, pp. 451–2. 509Chron. 60:303, 1895. 510Ry. Times, 64:732, 1893. Mr. Brice was also a member of the Senate Committee on Pacific Railroads. 511Ry. Age, 18:883, 1893. 512Ry. Times, 65:336, 1894. 513Ry. Times, 65:750, 1894. The reorganization committee stated that this plan was not final. They concurred, however, with Mr. Boissevain in his recommendation of the above scheme. 514Chron. 60:132, 1895. 515Ibid. 60:303, 1895. 516For a summary of the foreclosure suit pending in 1895 see the Report of the Government Directors for that year. 517Chron. 60:303, 1895. 518Chron. 60:132, 1895. 519Ry. Rev. 35:153, 1895. 520Chron. 61:663, 1895. 521Chron. 61:705, 1895. (Reorganization plan in full.) 522See testimony of W.S. Pierce, Senate Commission, 1896, 54th Congress, 1st Session, Document 314. 523Testimony, Senate Commission, 1896, p. 23. 524Ibid. 525Chron. 62:187, 1896. 526Report of Commissioner of Railroads, 1897, p. 8. The Government’s dealings with the reorganization committee followed upon the defeat in the House of a renewed proposition for refunding the Government’s loan. 527The guarantee was provided by a syndicate with the same personnel as that which had agreed to advance the money for reorganization expenses. 528Chron. 65:730, 1897; Report of Commissioner of Railroads, 1897, p. 9. 529Ry. Age, 24:897, 1897. 530Report of the Commissioner of Railroads, 1898, p. 9. 531The entire indebtedness of the Kansas Pacific to the Government was $12,891,900. After the sale the Government brought suit for the balance, but received a decree for $821,898 only. 532Cf. H.R. Meyer, The Settlements with the Pacific Railways, Quarterly Journal of Economics, July, 1899. The receivership records have been published in fourteen volumes. At its final meeting in 1898 the reorganization committee nominated a proxy committee of five members “to permanently represent, at the annual and other meetings, such holders of common and preferred stock as (should) desire to entrust their proxies to the said committee for the purpose of maintaining the management and general policies inaugurated by the reorganization committee.” This took the place of a compulsory voting trust. 533Thomas Warner Mitchell, The Growth of the Union Pacific and its Financial Operations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 21, p. 569, 1907. 534Besides $824,910 in Northern Securities stubs. 535See B.H. Meyer, A History of the Northern Securities Case, Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, July, 1906. 536As in the Southern Pacific purchase the acquisition of the Northern Pacific stock was financed mainly by the issue of convertible collateral bonds. Some $30,000,000 besides, it is supposed, were borrowed from the banks. 537Testimony of Mr. Harriman before the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is true that the Northern Securities stock held by the Union Pacific system had been pledged as security for an equal amount of Oregon Short Line 4 per cent and Participating 4s, and that when these bonds were refunded there was pledged for the new issue whatever the Union Pacific interests should receive in exchange for their Northern Securities holdings, and any other shares or bonds at not exceeding 80 per cent of their appraised value. But the purchase of the Southern Pacific and of the Northern Pacific stocks had been previously financed by an issue of convertible collateral bonds for which other collateral had been pledged. From 1904 on, the rising price of Union Pacific stock made conversion desirable and rapidly released the securities back of the original issue. These released securities, with $18,000,000 Southern Pacific preferred stock paid to the Union Pacific in 1904 (with $2,460,960 cash), proved a sufficient pledge for the Oregon Short Line refunding bonds, and the Great Northern and Northern Pacific stock shares were therefore free for other purposes. 538Annual Report, 1907. See also Interstate Commerce Commission, Report in the Matter of Consolidations and Combinations of Carriers, Relations between such Carriers, and Community of Interests therein, their Rates, Facilities, and Practices, 12 I.C.C. Rep. 319. 539The Union Pacific acquired a half-interest in the San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company in 1904. 540Recent reports suggest that a holding company is to be formed, which will take over the securities now owned by the Union Pacific Railroad. 541Dividends upon Union Pacific Railroad Stock:
542Entitled An Act granting Lands to aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from Lake Superior to Puget’s Sound, on the Pacific Coast, by the Northern Route. Statutes at Large, 38th Congress, 1st Session, chap. 217. 543To make possible the selection of indemnity lands. 544Josiah Perham was the prime mover at first and after him certain Boston capitalists were prominent. 545Ellis Paxsom Oberholtzer, Life of Jay Cooke. Philadelphia, George W. Jacobs & Company, 1907. See also Smalley, History of the Northern Pacific. 546The notes were put on the market at par, though sold to the syndicate at 88. 547Chron. 18:16, 1874. 548R.R. Gaz. 6:135, 1874. The indebtedness of the Northern Pacific to Jay Cooke & Co. amounted to about $1,500,000. 549R.R. Gaz. 6:496, 1874; Congressional Record, 43d Congress, 1st Session, May 11, 1874, pp. 3749, 3773. 550Net earnings “shall be construed to mean such surplus earnings of the said railroad as shall remain, after paying all expenses of operating the said railroad and carrying on all its business, including all taxes and assessments and payments on incumbrances, and including the interest and sinking fund on the first mortgage bonds, the expenses of repairing or replacing the said railroad, its appurtenances, equipments, or other property, so that the same shall be in high condition, and of providing such additional equipment as the said Company shall deem necessary for the business of said railroad.” Annual Report, 1876, p. 45. 551Annual Report, 1876; Chron. 20:522, 1875; Ibid. 21:15, 1875. 552Annual Report, 1876. 553R.R. Gaz. 7:330, 1875. Deposits of bonds kept coming in, until on June 30, 1879, when the rights of conversion into preferred stock expired, there remained outstanding but $529,000. Annual Report, 1879. 554These lands were reserved for the time because some of them had not been surveyed, and others which had been surveyed had not yet been deeded to the company owing to a dispute with the Interior Department over the payment of the costs of the surveys. R.R. Gaz. 7:340, 1875. 555R.R. Gaz. 7:420, 1875. 556Annual Report, 1881. 557Annual Report, 1882, p. 13. 558Henry Villard, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 272–94. 559Memoirs, p. 297. 560For the manner in which the Northern Pacific directors attempted to keep Villard from obtaining control, see notices in the Chronicle for 1881. 561See First Annual Report of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company; R.R. Gaz. 14:516, 1882 (contains statement of organization and purposes). 562Annual Report, 1883. Arrangements had been made with the Oregon & Transcontinental Company for necessary advances in order to avoid the accumulation of a large floating debt. 563R.R. Gaz. 15:716, 1883. For attempted explanation of this deficit, see Villard’s statement to the stockholders in 1884, just after his retirement from the presidency. 564Memoirs, p. 315. 565Villard was back in control by 1887 with the backing of German capital. 566In 1886 the Oregon Railway & Navigation was obtaining 28 cents per 100 pounds for its haul of 213 miles from Wallula Junction to Portland, leaving to the Northern Pacific 28 cents for its haul of 1699 miles from St. Paul to Wallula. R.R. Gaz. 18:681, 1886, Report of Vice-President and General Manager Oakes. 567For the negotiations between the Union Pacific, the Oregon Railway & Navigation, and the Northern Pacific from 1885 to 1889, see the financial papers of that time and the reports of the railroads concerned. 568In 1890 it was reorganized as the North American Company. 569Annual Report, 1888, p. 8; Chron. 44:752, 1887; Ibid. 44:782, 1887. 570The preponderance of west-bound freight prior to 1888 forced the Northern Pacific to carry grain east-bound at very low rates in order to fill its empty cars. See Daniel Buchanan vs. the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 5 I.C.C. Rep. 7. 571For immigrant traffic into the Northwest see Ry. Rev. 28:163, 1888. 572The capital stock of the Coeur d’Alene Company was $1,000,000, and there were $360,000 in 6 per cent guaranteed bonds outstanding. Ry. Rev. 28:551, 1888. 573Interest due and accrued, bills payable and accounts payable for the following years were:
574Annual Report, 1889. 575Annual Report, 1889; Chron. 50:279, gives text of mortgage. 576Ry. Rev. 29:541, 1889. In fact the issues were all made at 5 per cent. 577Annual Report, 1890. For answer of directors see R.R. Gaz. 21:759, 1889. 578Chron. 51:539, 1890. The point of view of the stockholders is briefly but clearly set forth in a circular issued by Mr. Robert Harris, chairman of the board of directors. Ry. Age, 14:658, 1889. 579In 1919. 580Evidence of this appears in the $10,000,000 reserved for premiums. 581Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 336. 582Annual Report, 1889; R.R. Gaz. 21:318, 1889. The Wisconsin Central divided its gross earnings into two parts, 65 per cent and 35 per cent; retained 35 per cent for its own use, and appropriated 65 per cent for operating expenses and for certain improvements tending to reduce operating expenses. When operating expenses were less than 65 per cent the Wisconsin Central was to pay over one-half of the difference to the Northern Pacific in consideration of the business which the latter gave it. When operating expenses exceeded 65 per cent the Wisconsin Central was to pay not exceeding 2½ per cent of this excess out of its 35 per cent, and to divide one-half of any excess of operating expenses above 67½ per cent equally between the Wisconsin Central and the Northern Pacific. The Northern Pacific, however, was not bound to pay its half of such excess except out of future profits received under the contract. 583Annual Report, 1890. For a brief statement of the complicated relations between the Wisconsin Central, the Chicago & Northern Pacific, and the Chicago & Great Western, see R.R. Gaz. 22:350, 1890. Terms were agreed upon with the Baltimore & Ohio for the use of the Chicago terminals of the Chicago & Northern Pacific, by that corporation. Annual Report, 1891. 584Annual Report, 1890, p. 14; R.R. Gaz. 21:318, 1889. 585Chron. 54:845, 1892. Resolutions adopted at the stockholders’ meeting were in substance: “Resolved, That the $3,347,000 of consolidated mortgage bonds now deposited with the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee for the preferred stockholders ... be not sold below 90 and accrued interest. “Resolved, If all the bonds be not sold as above, and smaller lots can be disposed of at 90 and interest, then the Directors may sell enough to make up the deficiency any year between the dividend actually paid to preferred stockholders and the 4 per cent which should be paid. “Resolved, If 4 per cent dividends or more are declared by the Board of Directors any year, then enough bonds shall be sold to produce 1 per cent additional dividend to be paid to preferred stockholders.” Chron. 55:679, 1892. 586Ry. Rev. 32:687, 1892. Members were, Henry Clews, Brayton Ives, Frank Sturges, William Solomon, and Jay Cooke, Jr. 587Ry. Times, 63:275, 1893; Chron. 56:332, 1893. 588Ry. Rev. 33:143, 1893; Chron. 56:362, 1893; Ry. Times, 63:302, 1893; Ibid, p. 360. See also R.R. Gaz. 25:161, 1893. 589Memoirs, pp. 359–60. 590Among others the investigating committee protested loudly against a sale. Ry. Rev. 33:127, 1893. 591Ry. Times, 65:595, 1893. 592Chron. 56:1017, 1893; R.R. Gaz. 25:398, 1893. 593The heaviest subscribers were the Rockefellers and Villard and his friends. 594Annual Report, 1893; Ry. Times, 64:290, 1893. 595Criticism was aroused by the alleged fact that all three receivers were adherents and virtually protÉgÉs of Henry Villard. Ry. Times, 64:290, 1893. See also Smalley, p. 291. 596Except that Henry Stanton of New York was to be the Eastern receiver for all the branches. 597Ry. Times, 64:337, 1893. 598These officers had resigned in consequence of the non-payment of their salaries. 599Ry. Rev. 33:587, 1893. 600Chron. 59:697, 1894. 601Ibid. 57:765, 1893. 602Ry. Age, 19:40, 1894. 603Ry. Age, 23:154, 1897. 604Ry. Rev. 33:783, 1893; Chron. 57:1123, 1893; Ry. Age, 19:11, 1894. 605Ry. Age, 19:89, 1894. 606Ibid. 19:231, 1894. 607R.R. Gaz. 26:294, 1894; Chron. 58:683, 1894. 608R.R. Gaz. 26:642, 1894; Chron. 59:473, 1894. 609Chron. 59:738, 1894; Ibid. 59:697, 1894. 610This is not to be explained by more liberal expenditures by the receivers on maintenance of way and equipment, for the sums applied to both these purposes were materially less in 1894 than in 1893. 611Ry. Times, 65:87, 1894. 612Ibid. 65:38, 1884. 613R.R. Gaz. 27:160, 1895. 614For opposing circulars by the Livingston Committee and by the directors see Ry. Rev. 35:55, 1895. On February 20, 1896, a Stockholders’ Protective Committee was appointed, consisting of August Belmont, Brayton Ives, and George R. Sheldon of New York, and Charlemagne Tower, of Philadelphia. Chron. 62:365, 1896. 615Chron. 60:930, 1895. 616R.R. Gaz. 27:590, 1895. 617For the use of trackage and terminals at and between St. Paul and Minneapolis. See Ry. Age, 20:161, 1895; Ibid. 20:198, 1895; Ry. Rev. 35:209, 1895. 618Chron. 61:325, 1895. 619Pearsall vs. Great Northern Railway Company, 161 U.S. 647. 620Ry. Rev. 35:461, 1895. 621Proceedings were begun in the Seattle court in August. See Chron. 61:241, 1895; Ry. Age, 20:394, 1895; Ibid. 20:418, 1895; Ibid. 20:430, 1895. 622Up to this time such accounts had been filed in the Milwaukee court. 623Ry. Age, 20:442, 1895; Ry. Rev. 35:503, 1895. 624Ry. Age, 20:478, 1895; R.R. Gaz. 27:648, 1895. 625Chron. 61:611, 1895; Ry. Times, 68:442, 1895. 626Justices Brown, Harlan, Brewer, and Field. 627“We are of the opinion,” said Justices Field, Harlan, and Brewer, “that proceedings to foreclose a mortgage upon lines extending through more than one district should be commenced in the Circuit Court in which the principal operating offices are situated, and in which there is some material part of the railroad embraced by the mortgage. Such court should be the court of primary jurisdiction. But in view of the fact that a portion of the line of road owned by the Northern Pacific Company is within the State of Wisconsin, and that at the time of the filing of the creditors’ bill the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was operating a road through the Eastern District of Wisconsin, although such road was under lease to it for 99 years; and in view of the further fact that the railroad company assented to the action of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in taking jurisdiction, and as such jurisdiction has been recognized by the Circuit Court in every district ... for the space of about two years, we are of the opinion that the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin has jurisdiction to proceed to a decree of foreclosure which will bind the mortgagor company and the mortgaged property, and ought to be recognized by the Circuit Court of every district along the line as the court of primary jurisdiction.” Chron. 62:234, 1896. 628Justice Field of the Supreme Court declined to exercise his authority to remove Burleigh, intimating that the existing arrangement was satisfactory. Ry. Age, 21:174, 1896. 629The existing general mortgage covered only the main line, land grant, and equipment so far as owned by the company. 630See Circular of the Reorganization Committee, or Chron. 62:550, 1896; Ry. Times, 69:287–8, 1896. 631In addition there were $73,875 of unpaid interest on receivers’ certificates. 632See R.R. Gaz. 28:219, 1896, for editorial on plan. 633Ibid. 28:349, 1896. 634Chron. 62:1139, 1896; Ibid. 63:155, 1896. 635Chron. 62:990, 1896; Ibid. 62:1041, 1896. 636Chron. 62:1088, 1896. 637Ry. Times, 69:511, 1896. 638Chron. 62:779, 1896. 639Curiously enough the sale did not extinguish the old Northern Pacific Railroad Company. Some 25,000 or more shares did not assent to the reorganization plan and are still outstanding. They assert that it is because of them that the old organization is kept up. 640From 1898 to 1907 inclusive. This does not include advances to subsidiary companies, which have aggregated nearly $20,000,000. 641The average train load in 1907 was 406.77 tons; that in 1898 was 264.59 tons. 642Chron. 83:1524, 1906; Ibid. 84:103, 1907. The new issue is to go in part for improvements previously made out of income. The directors have adopted the questionable policy of charging all such expenditures to capital account. 643For this and for an account of the Northern Securities episode see B.H. Meyer, A History of the Northern Securities Case, Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, July, 1906. 644Annual Report, 1901. 645The dividends declared by the Northern Pacific Railway have been:
AIncluding August. 646Poor’s Manual, 1878. The name was first the Rock Island & La Salle Railroad Company, and was changed to the Chicago & Rock Island Railroad Company in February, 1851. 647Chron. 30:356, 1880. 648Chron. 30:616, 1880. 649For the attempt of Vanderbilt to get representation on the board see the pamphlet issued by the Rock Island Company at this time; also R.R. Gaz. 16:420, 1884; Annual Report, 1884; Ry. Age, 9:428, 1884. 650R.R. Gaz. 16:891, 1884. 651R.R. Gaz. 16:709, 1884. 652Annual Report, 1891. 653Ibid. 1889. 654Ibid. 1892. 655Annual Report, 1892. 656“With the Chicago, Rock Island & Texas Railway Company this company has financial and traffic agreements under which the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company supplies all funds necessary to build and equip the road in consideration of receiving all the stock and all of the bonds of the Texas company, the latter issued at the rate of $15,000 per mile of completed road and additional for equipment to an amount equal to cost of the same, not exceeding $5000 per mile.” Annual Report, 1893.
658Ry. Age, 33:186, 1902. 659 Stock quotations:
660The par was $50 for both common and preferred. 661R.R. Gaz. 34:562, 1902. 662This line had been leased before, and the majority of its stock and that of the Rock Island & Peoria had been owned by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific. 663See financial papers for 1897. 664Annual Report, 1903. 665Quotations of securities:
666Chron. 75:212, 1902. 667Ry. Age, 34:301, 1902. 668R.R. Gaz. 34:750, 1902. 669Previous to this the stockholders of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company had approved the deal, had authorized the new bonds of 1913, and had voted to increase the capital stock of their company $20,000,000, which increase was turned into the treasury of the Rock Island Company of New Jersey, in return for an equal amount of this latter company’s stock. It is worth noting that the purchase was to be made by Railroad Company and not by Rock Island Company bonds, although the desire of the management was ultimately to see the indebtedness of all subsidiary roads replaced by Rock Island Company bonds. 670Ry. Rev. 43:408, 1903. 671Chron. 76:1192, 1903. 672Ry. Age, 36:1, 1903. 673Ry. Age, 37:1153, 1904. 674See the Annual Report of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad for 1904. 675A consolidation in 1905 of the Arkansas Southern Railroad Company, the Arkansas & Louisiana Railroad Company, and the Little Rock & Southern Railroad Company. See the Annual Report of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company for 1906. 676See letter from Mr. C.W. Hilliard, vice-president of the Colorado Southern, New Orleans & Pacific Railroad, and comptroller of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, in Chron. 84:507, 1907. 677After October, 1906. 678Ry. World, 51:531, 1907. 679Chron. 85:468, 1907.
Carl Snyder, American Railroads as Investments (N.Y., The Moody Corporation, 1907), offers, inter alia, an analysis of the results of operation of the railroads considered in the text. 681The lien of a floating debt is inferior to that of a bond when unsecured, except as it represents arrears of wages and payment for supplies. But it is usually very well secured. 682In the case of the Rock Island in 1902 there was no floating debt to be considered, while in 1885 the Erie funded overdue coupons and issued a 6 per cent mortgage on its Jersey City terminals to cover accumulated liabilities, but did not disturb its outstanding mortgage bonds, and cannot, therefore, be said to have reorganized. 683This was, in fact, a prominent feature of the reorganizations between 1893 and 1898. The Atchison surrendered the St. Louis & San Francisco; the Erie absorbed the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio into its system instead of continuing the lease thereof; the Northern Pacific surrendered the lease of the Wisconsin Central and cancelled various unprofitable traffic contracts and traffic agreements; the Reading gave up the Lehigh Valley and its New England extensions; the Southern reduced its mileage by over one-half; and the Union Pacific shrunk from 7674 miles in 1892 to 5399 in 1899. 684See Interstate Commerce Commission: In the Matter of Consolidations and Combinations of Carriers, etc., 12 I.C.C. Rep. 319. 685Testimony of C.F. Adams, United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, vol. 1, p. 45. 686“It is only by the fullest knowledge of the affairs of the company that a correct judgment of the best manner of meeting its wants can be formed, and there is no other practicable way to manage the business of the company to its best advantage than for the stockholders to elect directors worthy of confidence, and to leave the management to them.” Annual Report, 1887, Robert Harris, President. 687In the case of the Atchison, old income bonds were retired by new second mortgage bonds, with the result that the aggregate value of creditors’ holdings was largely increased. 688Speech at Columbus, Ohio, August 19, 1907. 689Forum, September, 1890, and March, 1894. 690The percentages for the Atchison are corrected according to the report of Mr. Little. Owing to the lack of available detail it has been necessary to increase operating expenses by the total amount of the errors which he discovered, and this figure is, therefore, unduly inflated. 691In 1893, after the Northern Pacific failure, the consolidated 5 per cent bondholders formed a committee; Mr. Brayton Ives invited bondholders to send in their names and addresses to him (1894); and later in 1894 the falling off in the railroad’s earnings induced the formation of the Livingston and Van Nostrand committees, and the announcement of the consolidated committee that it would accept the deposit of second and third mortgage bonds. Finally, within four months after the Atchison failure of 1893, four important reorganization committees were asking for deposits in the United States and one was soliciting deposits in London. 692The officers of bankrupt roads have no need of committees to make their wishes known, but only so far as they are bondholders, or in so far as they can influence bondholders by argument do their opinions carry weight. President Ives of the Northern Pacific in 1893 was able to use his position to fight his opponents through the courts, and secured besides appointment on a stockholders’ protective committee, but exercised no great influence on the reorganization; President Jewett, of the Erie, gained the confidence of the visiting committee of English bondholders in 1875, and had some voice accorded him; but generally speaking officers have to rest content if they can successfully defend themselves against charges of inefficiency and mismanagement. They are, in fact, both the choice and the representatives of the stockholders, and the stockholders having no authority in the event of bankruptcy can delegate none. Officers of the courts which are in control of bankrupt railroads enjoy sometimes a different position from officers of the corporations themselves, in that they do not represent or depend on stockholders, and may not be connected with the circumstances which have caused the ruin of the road. Thus the receivers of the Union Pacific in the nineties were called to testify before Congressional committees, and those of the Erie chose a committee which prepared the first reorganization plan suggested, but in both cases the functions of the court officers were purely advisory, and so they must always be. 693In 1895 the final Atchison reorganization plan announced the following arrangement: “A contract has been made with a syndicate to furnish an amount of money equal to the assessments of non-assenting or defaulting stockholders, and such syndicate, by such payment, shall take the place of the non-assenting or defaulting stockholders, and shall be entitled to receive the new common and preferred stock, which non-assenting or defaulting stockholders would have been entitled to receive if they had deposited their stock and paid their assessment in full. Syndicates may also be formed to furnish the money needed, in case of foreclosure, to pay the non-assenting bondholders their pro rata share of the proceeds of sale, and to advance any cash which may be required during the reorganization and for other purposes.” Chron. 60:658–62, 1895. The reorganization plan of the Baltimore & Ohio in 1898 contained the following: “A syndicate has been formed ... which agrees: 1st, To purchase $6,975,000 of the new preferred stock, and $30,250,000 of the new common stock, and to offer the same for sale to depositing holders of old 1st and 2d preferred and common stock of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.... 2d, To purchase $9,000,000 3½ per cent prior lien bonds; $12,450,000 1st mortgage 4 per cent bonds; $16,450,000 preferred stock. 3d, To protect the new company in the ownership and possession of the properties covered by $49,974,098 ... of the existing mortgage bonds of the old company of different issues by agreeing to purchase from the new company the new securities not taken, but to which the holders of such bonds would have been entitled if depositing under the plan, at a price equal to the principal of the respective old securities, and also to make advances and perform other obligations essential for the purposes of the plan.” Poor’s Manual, 1898, p. 1381. Similar provisions appear in the plans of the Erie, the Northern Pacific, the Reading, the Southern, and the Union Pacific. 694In 1894. 695H.V. Poor (Manual, 1900) compiles the following statement for 57 selected companies reorganized between 1886 and 1898: Securities provided for other corporate purposes of new companies
696Where stock- or bondholders are compelled to subscribe to an issue of new securities the operation becomes an assessment and not a sale. 697Among the reorganizations of the eighties, for instance, the Denver & Rio Grande levied $8 per share in 1885 upon its $38,000,000 common stock; the Pittsburgh & Western assessed its common stock 4 per cent in 1887; the New York, Chicago & St. Louis assessed its common $10, and its preferred an equal sum; and the Central Iowa levied 2½ per cent on its debt certificates, 5 per cent on its 1st preferred stock, 10 per cent on its 2d preferred, and 15 per cent on its common. See Chron. 40:480; Ibid. 44:212, 370, 653. 698A syndicate guaranteed the assessment in each case between 1893 and 1898. The Reading assessment is calculated on a par of $100. 699The assessments before 1893 were as follows: The Erie levied 2½ per cent on its common and preferred in 1859, and a minimum of $4 on its common and $2 on its preferred in 1877, with no allowance of new securities in either case. The East Tennessee assessed its common stock 6 per cent and its income mortgage 5 per cent in 1886, and gave to the one a corresponding amount of 2d preferred, and to the other of 1st preferred stock. The Reading assessments in 1886 ranged from 2½ per cent on the deferred incomes to 15 per cent on certain junior securities, with an assessment of $10 on both classes of stock. Preferred stock was given for all assessments up to the full amount of the sums taken. 700The quotations six months after reorganization are for the combined securities given in exchange for the old preferred stock. In the case of the Baltimore & Ohio e. g., this was 150 per cent in new common; for the Northern Pacific it was 50 per cent new common and 50 per cent new preferred. Only $5,000,000 of Baltimore & Ohio preferred stock were outstanding before the reorganization of 1898, and no record of quotations can be found. Quotations are similarly unobtainable for the Reading in 1886. 701The very large increase in the Baltimore & Ohio quotations was doubtless due to the lateness of the reorganization. 702Chron. Investors’ Supplement, January, 1894. 703Ibid. 62:641, 1896. 704Chron. 45:792, 1887 (reorganization plan). See also Chron. 49:269, 1889. 705Pages 84–5, supra. 706Chron. 50:141, 1890. 707Ibid. 58:762, 1894. 708Chron. 62:829, 1896. Poor states in his Manual for 1900 that of $96,094,960 of assessments levied on securities of fifty-seven selected companies, $86,972,703 were on stock and $9,122,257 on bonds. 709The figure of $9,043,944 is the true figure for the Reading fixed charges after reorganization, eliminating duplications. In computing the percentage of charges to earnings in 1898, however, the unrefined figure of $12,210,291 is used in connection with a similarly unrefined figure of earnings. 710The reorganizations omitted are those of the Union Pacific in 1880, which did not alter fixed charges, and of the Erie in 1859 and the Northern Pacific in 1875, for which precise figures are not available. In this last charges were almost entirely removed; its exclusion, therefore, tends to lessen the percentage of reduction shown for the reorganizations before 1893. 711The six reorganizations before 1893 include that of the Atchison in 1892, which was not caused by inability to earn charges, and consequently made no attempt to lower their figure. Excluding this reorganization, the reductions in charges before 1893 overbalanced the increases. H.V. Poor calculates the absolute reduction in fixed charges for sixty-eight railroads reorganized between 1885 and 1897 at $24,007,490. (Manual, 1900, p. cvi.) 712The decrease in charges per mile for the Reading in 1880 was due, not to any reduction in charges, but to an increase in mileage through the lease of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. In this case the increase in absolute charges better represents the real effect of the reorganization. 713It is perhaps unnecessary to warn the reader that these tables can be taken as generally indicative only. The percentage of charges to earnings varies not only with charges but with earnings; and an increase or decrease in the latter may conceal a decidedly contrary movement in the former. Since the reorganizations were accomplished at different dates the error is not in all cases in the same direction, and in particular the percentage of charges to earnings for one road cannot be compared with the percentage for another. The figures of charges per mile of line are somewhat more reliable, but are nevertheless to be used with care. Different railroads report their mileage differently, and it has not been possible in all cases to use the homogeneous figure of mileage operated. Further, the significance of high charges per mile varies with the character of the mileage. A reorganization which lops off many unprofitable branch lines may conceivably cause thereby an increase in the charges per mile of road remaining, and yet place the system in a much stronger position than before. This difficulty disappears if the figure of charges per mile be used in connection with the percentage of charges to earnings, and in general the three columns given correct each other. 714These figures do not include the comparatively small amount of bonds for which no interest rate was specified. 715Income bonds sometimes, though rarely, possess the right to vote. 716E.S. Meade, Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci. March, 1901. 717The figure for the Reading in 1880 is affected by the lease of the Central of New Jersey, which took place simultaneously with the reorganization. Excluding the increase in rentals, the remaining increase in fixed charges amounted to only 9.5 per cent. The East Tennessee reported no rentals in either 1885 or in 1887. The data for the Southern Railway are not in such shape that rentals and interest can be compared. Its reorganization reduced rentals, however, very greatly. 718The 32 per cent paid has been included under rentals. 719Government Debt. 720In considering the capitalization of the Erie before and after the reorganization of 1895 the securities of the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio have been excluded. 721The difficulties which prevent wider extension of these tables consist partly in the absence of quotations for certain classes of bonds, and partly in the lack of sufficiently detailed and precise information in some of the early reorganization plans. Thus there are no quotations recorded in 1874–5 for the 2d consols and convertible bonds of the Erie Railroad which were disturbed by the subsequent reorganization; and no detailed figures of the exchange of new bonds for old appear in the reports of the reorganization plans of the Reading in 1881–3, and of the Northern Pacific in 1875. The reorganization of the Union Pacific and of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific in 1880 did not disturb the bonds outstanding. 722The twenty-six railroads are as follows: Canad. Pac.; Canad. So.; C. & O.; C., B. & Q.; C. & E.I.; C., M. & St. P.; C. & N.W.; C., R.I. & P.; C., C., C. & St. L.; D., L. & W.; Ill. C.; L.S. & M.S.; L. & N.; Manh. El.; Mich. C.; M., K. & T.; Mo. Pac.; Mob. & O.; N.Y.C. & H.R.; N.Y., O. & W.; So. Pac.; Wabash; Tex. & P.; C. of N.J.; L.E. & W.; St. P., M. & M. 723The securities in the table are taken from the following companies: St. P., M. & M.; Wabash; N.Y.C.; C., B. & Q.; C., M. & St. P.; L. & N.; D., L. & W.; Penna.; W.U. Tel.; B., R. & P.; Can. So.; Long I.; P.C.C. & St. L.; Tex. & P.; C. & N.W.; I.C.; C. & E.I. 724See Annual Report for 1906. 725Chron. 54:369, 1892. 726Investors’ Supplement, April, 1897; Chron. 62:41. 727Chron. Investors’ Supplement, April, 1897. 728Chron. 79:2087, 1904. 729161 U.S. 647. 730138 U.S. 84. 731New York, 1879. 73249th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report, No. 42. 73342d Congress, 3d Session, House Reports, No. 77. 73450th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 51. 73554th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 314. 73658th Congress, 3d Session, hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, in Special Session, 1905. 737Memoirs of Henry Villard, 1835–1900. Boston, 1904. 738Ellis Paxon Oberholtzer, Life of Jay Cooke. Philadelphia, 1907. 739H.G. Pearson, An American Railroad Builder. John Murray Forbes. Boston and New York, 1911. 740Bouck White, The Book of Daniel Drew. New York, 1910. 741C.M. Depew, A Retrospect of Twenty-five Years with the New York Central Railroad and its Allied Lines. New York, 1892. 742Hazard Stevens, The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens by his Son. Boston, 1900. 743Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science, March, 1901. 744Forum, September, 1890, and March, 1894. 745Die Bank, July, 1911. 746Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1911. 747H.H. Swain, Economic Aspects of Railroad Receiverships, Economic Studies of the American Economic Association, April, 1898. 748John P. Davis, History of the Union Pacific Railroad. Chicago, 1894. 749Alfred von der Leyen, Die Finanz-und Verkehrspolitik der Nordamerikanischen Eisenbahnen, 2d ed., Berlin, 1895. 750I.H. Bromley, Pacific Railroad Legislation. Boston, 1886. 751J.F. Dillon, Pacific Railroad Laws. New York, 1890. 752J.B. Crawford, The CrÉdit Mobilier of America. Boston, 1880. 753Rowland Hazard, The CrÉdit Mobilier of America. Providence, 1881. 754Henry Kirke White, History of the Union Pacific Railroad. Economic Studies of the University of Chicago, 1895. 755Hugo R. Meyer, The Settlements with the Pacific Railways. Quarterly Journal of Economics, July, 1899. 756T.W. Mitchell, The Growth of the Union Pacific and its Financial Operations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1907. 757W.F. Bailey, The Story of the First Trans-Continental Railroad, its Projectors, Construction, and History. Pittsburg, 1906. 758John R. Robinson, The Octopus. A History of the Construction, Conspiracies, Extortions, Robberies, and Villainous Acts of the Central Pacific, the Union Pacific, and Other Subsidized Railroads. San Francisco, 1894. 759E.H. Mott, Between the Ocean and the Lakes; the Story of Erie. New York, 1899. 760Charles Francis and Henry Adams, Chapters of Erie and Other Essays. Boston, 1871. 761George Crouch, Another Chapter of Erie. New York, 1869. 762Milton Reizenstein, Economic History of the Baltimore & Ohio, 1827–53. Johns Hopkins University Studies, July-August, 1897. 763W.P. Smith, The Book of the Great Railway Celebrations of 1857. New York, 1858. 764Laws, Ordinances, and Documents Relating to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. Baltimore, 1840. 765E.V. Smalley, History of the Northern Pacific Railroads. New York, 1883. 766B.H. Meyer, A History of the Northern Securities Case. Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, July, 1906. 767Alfred von der Leyen, v. supra. 768W.W. Chapman, The Northern Pacific Railroad. Washington, 1880. 769Robert von Schlagintweit, Die Santa Fe und Sudpacificbahn in Nordamerika. KÖln, 1884. 770W.B. Wilson, History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Philadelphia, 1899. 771T.K. Worthington, Historical Sketch of the Finances of Pennsylvania. Publications of the American Economic Association, May, 1887. 772A.L. Bishop, The State Works of Pennsylvania. Publications of Yale University, New Haven, 1907. 773W.K. Ackerman, Historical Sketch of the Illinois Central Railroad. Chicago, 1890. 774J.H. Hollander, The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A Study in Municipal Activity. Johns Hopkins University Studies, January-February, 1894. 775E.A. Ferguson (Compiler), Founding of the Cincinnati Southern Railway; with an Autobiographical Sketch. Cincinnati, 1905. 776Charles S. Potts, Railroad Transportation in Texas. Bulletin of the University of Texas, Humanistic Series, March 1, 1909. 777P. Briscoe, The First Texas Railroad. Texas Historical Association Quarterly, Austin, 1904. 778Chicago, 1905. 779E.B. Hinsdale, History of the Long Island Railroad. New York, 1898. 780Judson W. Bishop, History of the St. Paul and Sioux City Railroad, 1864–1881. Minnesota Historical Society, Collections, vol. x, pp. 399–415. St. Paul, 1905. 781George Bliss, Historical Memoir of the Western Railroad. Springfield, 1863. 782Cary, Organization and History of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Company. Milwaukee, 1893. 783U.B. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 1860. New York, 1908. 784George Francis Train, My Life in Many States and in Foreign Lands. New York, 1902. 785G.H. Smyth, The Life of Henry Bradley Plant, Founder and President of the Plant System of Railroads and Steamships and also of the Southern Express Company. New York and London, 1898. 786S.F. Van Oss, American Railroads as Investments. New York, 1893. 787Carl Snyder, American Railways as Investments. New York, 1907. 788Charles F. Carter, When Railroads were New. New York, 1909. 789F.H. Spearman, The Strategy of Great Railroads. New York, 1904. 790Philadelphia, 1888. 791New York, 1887. 792New York and London, 1900. 793Leipzig, 1883. 794Berlin, 1909. 795Chicago, 1910 796San Francisco, 1890. 797San Francisco, 1891. 798Springfield, 1874. 799Baltimore, 1899. 800Madison, 1899. 801Madison, 1908 and 1910. 802Chicago, 1896. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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