CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

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BOOK FIRST.
ON CERTAINTY.
CHAPTER PAGE
I. Importance and Utility of the Question of Certainty 3
II. True State of the Question 7
III. Certainty of the Human Race and Philosophical Certainty 14
IV. Existence of Transcendental Science in the Absolute Intellectual Order 24
V. Transcendental Science in the Human Intellectual Order cannot emanate from the Senses 32
VI. Transcendental Science.—Insufficiency of Real Truths 37
VII. The Philosophy of the Me cannot produce Transcendental Science 41
VIII. Universal Identity 56
IX. Universal Identity,—Continued 64
X. Problem of Representation: Monads of Leibnitz 67
XI. Problem of Representation examined 71
XII. Immediate Intelligibility 76
XIII. Representation of Causality and Ideality 83
XIV. Impossibility of Finding the first Principle in the Ideal Order 89
XV. The Indispensable Condition of all Human Knowledge.—Meansof perceiving Truth 92
XVI. Confusion of Ideas in Disputes on the Fundamental Principle 102
XVII. Thought and Existence.—Descartes' Principle 105
XVIII. The Principle of Descartes, continued.—His Method 111
XIX. Value of the Principle, I Think:—Its Analysis 118
XX. True Sense of the Principle of Contradiction.—Kant's Opinion 126
XXI. Does the Principle of Contradiction merit the Title of Fundamental; and if so, in what Sense 140
XXII. The Principle of Evidence 146
XXIII. The Criterion of Consciousness 151
XXIV. The Criterion of Evidence 157
XXV. The Objective Value of Ideas 163
XXVI. Can all Cognitions be reduced to the Perception of Identity? 171
XXVII. Continuation of the same subject 176
XXVIII. Continuation of the same subject 183
XXIX. Are there true Synthetic Judgments a priori in the Sense of Kant 188
XXX. Vico's Criterion 200
XXXI. Continuation of the same subject 212
XXXII. The Criterion on Common Sense 219
XXXIII. Error of Lamennais on Common Consent 230
XXXIV. Summary and Conclusion 253
BOOK SECOND.
ON SENSATION.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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