We had settled with Tibet direct, as was Lord Curzon’s chief object, and it had been proposed that China should sign what was styled an Adhesion Agreement, formally acknowledging the Tibetan Treaty. But Yu-tai, the Resident at Lhasa, was instructed not to sign any such agreement, and a Special Envoy was sent by the Chinese Government to Calcutta to treat with the Indian Government in the matter. Yu-tai himself had been specially deputed for these negotiations regarding Tibet, but apparently he was considered too complacent, and first of all, Mr. Tang, and then Mr. Chang, were sent to Calcutta, and from now onwards the Chinese showed first great diplomatic insistence, and then great military activity, in regard to Tibet, till, profiting by the jealousy between us and the Russians, which had prevented our reaping all the fruits of the Mission to Lhasa, they one by one gathered those fruits themselves.

Nothing resulted from Mr. Tang’s visit to India, and ill-health caused him to return to China. But on April 27, 1906, in place of an Adhesion Agreement, a Convention was signed at Peking between Great Britain and China which “confirmed” the Lhasa Convention of 1904. In addition, Great Britain engaged “not to annex Tibetan territory, or to interfere in the administration of Tibet”; while the Chinese Government undertook “not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.” We were entitled to lay down telegraph-lines to connect the trade-marts with India. And it was laid down that the provisions of the old Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, remained in full force.

The signature of this Convention, far from improving our status in Tibet, or conferring any increased regularity upon our intercourse, seems to have had a precisely opposite effect. The impression was spread abroad in Tibet that this new Convention superseded the Lhasa Convention, and the Chinese assumed that we had virtually recognized their sovereignty in the country. They had obtained from us the engagement not to annex Tibetan territory, and with this and the renewed formal recognition of their rights of suzerainty after they had shown themselves so incapable of carrying out their suzerain duties, we might have expected that they would have shown at least a neighbourly feeling in Tibetan affairs, but we have so far been disappointed in this respect, and the 1906 Convention promises to be as little use to us as the 1890 Convention.

The first indications of the tone which the Chinese were going to adopt in Tibet was furnished by Mr. Chang, who was now appointed a High Commissioner for Tibet. On his arrival in Chumbi there was at once an “incident” with the British officer, Lieutenant Campbell, in political charge there. Lieutenant Campbell had been specially chosen for his knowledge of the Chinese language and customs. He had spent a year in China learning the language, and had carried out a remarkable and interesting journey from Peking to Kashmir by Chinese Turkestan. On Mr. Chang’s arrival in Chumbi, Mr. Campbell proceeded in uniform to call on him, but he was first asked to enter by a side door, and afterwards told that Mr. Chang was not very well and was lying down. This may have been the case, but, combined with other acts, it produced the impression that he meant to ignore the British occupation and assert Chinese authority.

Mr. Chang’s action at Gyantse gave rise to a similar impression that he was aiming at the belittlement of British influence rather than at cordially co-operating with our officers as Yu-tai had. He posted there a Chinese official named Gow as Sub-Prefect, with the title of Chinese Commissioner in charge of the Chinese Trade and Diplomatic Agency; and this Mr. Gow proved so contumacious that Sir Edward Grey had eventually to press for his withdrawal. He threatened to stop the supply of provisions by Tibetans to our Trade Agent unless they were paid for at rates to be fixed by himself; and he also, apparently under sanction from Peking, claimed that in all transactions between the Tibetans and British officers he should act as intermediary.

This was a clear enough indication of Mr. Chang’s line. He meant to get in between us and the Tibetans. And the Tibetans at Gyantse had many rumours just now that he was going to eject the Europeans and the Indian troops from Gyantse; that if the Indian Government did not agree, Chinese troops would be sent to expel us by force from Tibet. It was explained that Chinese troops were not sent to oppose us during the time of the Tibet Mission because there was no time to collect them. It was also reported that Mr. Chang intended to object to British officials and other Europeans travelling in Tibet except between the trade-marts and India. And this is what in fact he did in the case of Sven Hedin. He wrote him a very polite note saying what interest he took in geography and so forth, but adding: “The last treaty between China and Great Britain contains a paragraph declaring that no stranger, whether he be Englishman or Russian, an American or European, has any right to visit Tibet, the three market towns excepted.” The Treaty has no such clause. It simply confirmed the Lhasa Treaty, in which was a clause stipulating that the agents or representatives of foreign Powers should not be admitted. As a matter of fact Sven Hedin was not the agent of a foreign Power, but a scientific traveller, and in any case the Lhasa Treaty simply laid down that agents should not be admitted “without the previous consent of the British Government.” Sven Hedin was then at Shigatse. He was being most cordially received by the Tashi Lama, who was quite willing to let him travel where he liked. It was merely Mr. Chang who twisted and misquoted the Lhasa Treaty to exclude him.

Later other evidence of Mr. Chang’s antipathy came to light. The Tibetan Jongpens at Gyantse informed Captain O’Connor in January, 1907, that since his arrival upon the scene their position had become very difficult, for he had told them that in future the Chinese were to act as intermediaries between the English and Tibetans, and so before complying with any request of his they would be obliged to ask the permission of Mr. Gow. And on March 5 Captain O’Connor telegraphed that he was now completely cut off from personal intercourse with Tibetan officials, as Mr. Gow refused to let the Jongpens see him.

In other directions also the change for the worse since Mr. Chang’s arrival was apparent. The Resident Yu-tai, with whom I negotiated in 1904, was reported to have been dismissed from office and imprisoned in fetters in January, 1907. His Secretary was also degraded, and a desire to sweep away all Chinese officials connected with the improvement of our relations with the Tibetans seemed to have inspired Mr. Chang’s actions. A similar resentment against Tibetan officials concerned with the recent negotiations was also shown, two Councillors and a General being degraded. These incidents afforded, in the opinion of the Government of India, indubitable proof of Mr. Chang’s determination to upset the status quo and destroy the position secured to us by the Mission. Mr. Chang’s assumption seems to have been that virtual recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was involved in the signature of the latest Convention with China.

So clear, indeed, had the intention of the Chinese to work against us rather than with us been showing itself that Sir Edward Grey, on February 9, 1907,^[45] telegraphed to Sir John Jordan that, while it was our desire to have matters put right, not by separate action in Tibet, but through the medium of the Chinese Government, he should bring Mr. Chang’s action to the attention of the Chinese Government, and point out to them that the recognition by China of the Lhasa Treaty was not consistent with the punishment of officials for being concerned in its negotiation. Our Minister was further to state that interference by Chinese officers with the freedom of the dealings between the Tibetan Agent and the British Trade Agent at Gyantse could not be permitted by His Majesty’s Government.

Again, on March 15,^[46] he telegraphed that “the right of direct communication between the British Agent and local Tibetan authorities must be firmly insisted on,” and the Chinese Government must be “urged to send very clear instructions in this sense to Chang.”

Later, again, on June 27, Sir Edward Grey had again to telegraph to our Minister to make further very serious representations to the Chinese Government on the subject. He was to draw their attention to the fact that no friction existed between Captain O’Connor and the Tibetans of the locality previous to the intervention of Mr. Chang and Mr. Gow. We wanted nothing more than freedom of trade, for our political interests were safeguarded by clauses in the Treaty, and we had no wish to assert any political influence ourselves. We did not even desire to foster trade. We wished, indeed, to reduce the establishment at the marts, and, if things went on quietly, native instead of British agents might be appointed there. But Sir Edward Grey considered that China was “trifling with her obligations in the matter of Tibet,” and he suggested that Mr. Gow should be entirely removed from all employment in that country.

In consequence of these representations Mr. Gow was withdrawn from Tibet, but only to be given a higher appointment in a more popular part of the Chinese Empire—the Directorship of Telegraphs at Mukden in Manchuria—and the attitude of the Chinese in Tibet has not yet really changed. Perhaps the reason may be found in the hint given by Sir John Jordan, who, when the Grand Secretary told him that the Wai-wu-pu had always been puzzled to know the causes of the friction between Mr. Gow and the British Trade Agent, expressed his conviction that they lay in the fact that someone from Peking had been inspiring a policy in Tibetan affairs which was hostile to the Treaty and to British interests.

In any case, whether the cause lay in Peking, or with Mr. Chang, or with the Tibetans, the fact was clear that the Treaty had not been carried out; and the Government of India thought it necessary to bring the matter formally to the notice of the Secretary of State in a despatch dated July 18, 1907. Considering what had taken place at Gyantse, it was impossible to admit, they said, that the Gyantse trade-mart had been effectively open during the last few months. Our Agent had been cut off from intercourse with the Tibetan authorities, and no adequate provision had been made for British traders having resort to the mart. The agents whom the Lhasa Government had nominated for the marts had not been allowed freedom of communication with the British Trade Agent. And various minor difficulties had arisen in connection with the opening of the Gartok trade-mart. The Government of India, therefore, suggested that the Chinese and Tibetan Governments should be formally reminded of these various breaches of the Convention which had occurred, and more particularly of the failure to open the marts, which was a matter which struck at the root of the whole Convention.

Mr. Morley thought^[47] the situation at Gyantse constituted undoubtedly a serious cause of complaint, but, in view of the reply of the Chinese Government to the representations recently made to them, he doubted the expediency of making any further reference to the subject at the moment. If, when the negotiations with Mr. Chang regarding the Trade Regulations commenced, the attitude of the Chinese and Tibetan representative should prove obstructive, the question would arise whether the British representative should not be authorized to warn them that our evacuation of the Chumbi Valley depended on a satisfactory settlement of the matters connected with the trade-marts being arrived at, the Chinese and Tibetan Governments being simultaneously warned to the same effect.

So for the present ended any idea of direct remonstrance regarding breaches of the Treaty. But it was not only locally at the trade-marts that the Chinese were pursuing their policy of separating the Tibetans from us. By an astute move they had already sought to effect the same end through payment of the indemnity. By the terms of the Treaty this was due from the Tibetans. Though we might well have demanded the indemnity from the Chinese, and many think that we should have demanded part, at least, for it was to enforce a Treaty which they had asked us to make, which they had assured us they could see observed, but of which, from 1890 to 1904, they were never able to secure fulfilment, that we went to Lhasa, we instead demanded it from the Tibetans, and, on account of their poverty, we reduced the amount payable from 75 to 25 lakhs of rupees—from half a million sterling to £166,666. The Chinese now said that they would pay this reduced indemnity. In an Imperial Decree issued in November, 1905, it was ordered that the indemnity should, in view of the poverty of the people, be paid by the Chinese Government—that is, that the Chinese Government should pay it over to us direct for, and on behalf of, Tibet.

In forwarding this information, Sir Ernest Satow suggested that we should inform the Chinese Government that we could not receive payment from them. He believed that the Chinese Government were trying to make themselves the intermediary of all communications between India and Tibet, and it seemed to him reasonable to conclude that this declaration of their intention to pay the indemnity was intended to force the hand of the Indian Government, and induce them to accept an arrangement which the Chinese Government could afterwards quote as a precedent in other matters.

Lord Lansdowne—these negotiations commenced while the late Government were still in office—felt difficulty in advising the India Office^[48] as to how to deal with the matter. It was on the one hand obvious that the indemnity was required of the Tibetans partly as a punitive measure and partly in order that by the annual payment of the necessary instalments they should formally recognize the binding nature of the obligations entered into by them towards the British Government. Should the annual instalments henceforth be paid by the Chinese Government, the punitive effect of the indemnity would disappear, for it did not seem to Lord Lansdowne at all probable that the Chinese Government would be able or willing to recover from the Tibetan Government the sums paid on this account, and past experience had proved that it was not in the power of China to insist effectively on the fulfilment of the other stipulations of the Convention.

Lord Lansdowne felt no doubt that the proposal had been made by the Chinese Government with the object of re-establishing their theoretical rights to supremacy over the Tibetan Government, and probably also with the object of insuring that the non-payment of the instalments at their due date should not stand in the way of the retirement of the British forces. Irrespectively of these considerations, the refusal of the Chinese Government to adhere to the Tibetan Agreement made it doubly difficult for us to entertain the offer, and upon this ground alone Lord Lansdowne considered that it should be rejected. For acceptance would be tantamount to admitting the intervention of China in relieving Tibet from this portion of her obligations while avoiding all responsibility for any other portion of the Convention.

Should the attitude of the Chinese Government undergo a change in consequence of our refusal, and should they intimate that they would adhere to the Agreement, the situation would no doubt be altered, and might be reconsidered by His Majesty’s Government. Having regard, however, to the complete inability shown by China in the past to exercise effectual control over the Tibetan authorities, it seemed to Lord Lansdowne that it would be highly inadvisable to agree to any settlement which might be regarded as an admission that responsibility for the behaviour of the Tibetans would for the future rest upon the Chinese Government.

This view of Lord Lansdowne’s and Sir Ernest Satow’s, both very able and experienced diplomatists, was justified by the event. It was here that the Chinese began their series of efforts again to thrust themselves in between us and the Tibetans, and prevent that direct relationship between us which, through the futility of the Chinese themselves, we had been compelled at so much cost to establish. If we had stood firm at the start on this point, which was one on which we had a perfect right to stand fast, much future trouble might have been saved.

The Government of India concurred in this view, and thought that the annual payment by Tibetans in Tibet, even though China should provide the money, would be preferable from the point of view of local political effect, to payment of a lump sum by China direct. The course, therefore, which was preferred was, that a notification should first be made by them to the Tibetans under Article VI. of the Convention, to the effect that we desired payment at Gyantse of the first instalment; and that His Majesty’s Minister at Peking should then inform the Chinese Government that His Majesty’s Government could not recognize the right of intervention on their part, as they had not adhered to the Convention.

A notification was accordingly given to the Tibetan Government that Rs. 100,000, the first instalment of the indemnity, was due on January 1, 1906, and should be paid at Gyantse. They replied in January, 1906, that the revenue of Tibet was not great, and that the Chinese Resident had stated that the payment of the indemnity was to be the subject of discussion with China, in which Tang at Calcutta was to act. Thus, said the Government of India, as a result of the action of the Chinese, the Treaty had been broken by the Tibetans, for no payment of the indemnity had been made on the date fixed. They proposed, therefore, to inform the Tibetan Government that they held them responsible for the payment of the indemnity under the terms of the Treaty.

Mr. Morley, who had succeeded Mr. Brodrick, approved of the proposal, but added that this would not preclude our accepting payment eventually from the Chinese Government if agreement with them as to the Tibet Convention should be arrived at; and in a later telegram he said that “direct payment by China could not be refused by us after the Adhesion Convention had been concluded.”

The principle that the Chinese should pay instead of the Tibetans was therefore practically conceded. But another point arose. The Chinese had said they wished to pay the amount of 25 lakhs of rupees (Rs. 25,00,000) in three annual instalments, but by the Treaty the payment was to be paid in annual instalments of 1 lakh each. The suggestion that the whole indemnity should be paid in three instalments the Government of India thought a Chinese device, having for its object the weakening of our position in Tibet. The Treaty obligation was clear. And the Indian Government preferred, as requested by the Tibetans themselves at the time of signing the Treaty, to receive annual payments of 1 lakh each at Gyantse, both for political effect and because money was required for recurring rent expenditure there.

Mr. Morley felt much hesitation in accepting the views of the Government of India on this point. While recognizing that certain advantages had been supposed by some to arise from the political point of view in maintaining our hold over the Tibetans for the full period of twenty-five years, he was of opinion that such advantages would be altogether outweighed by our relief from the necessity of enforcing a direct annual tribute for so long a period.

Shortly after, on April 27, the Chinese signed the Convention which has been described at the beginning of this Chapter, and the Chinese Government were informed that we agreed to accept the offer to pay the whole of the indemnity in three instalments, and that the first instalment would be accepted from the Sha-pÉ either by cheque, handed to the British Commercial Agent at Gyantse, or by cheque to the Government of India, drawn on the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

The Chinese had made good their first point, and we had receded from yet another stage which we had reached in 1904. Their next point had now to be made—to get us to accept payment in India instead of in Tibet. The Tibetan Sha-pÉ being in Calcutta at the time, we did not raise any difficulty about accepting payment of the first instalment there. But when the question of the payment of the second instalment arose, the Government of India pointed out that under the Treaty it should be paid at such place as the British Government might indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjiling or Jalpaiguri. Permission had been given to pay the first instalment at Calcutta, as the Tibetan Councillor happened to be there at the time, but the Government of India wished that the second instalment should be handed over by a Tibetan official to our Trade Agent at Gyantse. But the Secretary of State telegraphed that it would be in accordance with the present policy of His Majesty’s Government to acquiesce in the wish of the Chinese Government, and payment by telegraphic transfer was agreed to. The third instalment was also received in Calcutta. So the Chinese obtained their second point also.

The third point which they tried to make in their policy of excluding the Tibetans, was to get us to receive the indemnity direct from them instead of from the Tibetans. They suggested that they should pay the second instalment “by telegraphic transfer without the intervention of the Tibetans.” But the Government of India recommended that deviation from the procedure laid down in the Treaty should not be permitted, as their proposal seemed to them a further indication of the Chinese desire to exclude the Tibetans from relations with us.

His Majesty’s Government, however, considered that the formality of payment through a Tibetan representative was “a comparatively immaterial point,” and that if China was to make further pretensions we should not be prejudiced by the concession.

Later on, however, as the Chinese had been obstructive in other matters, and the second instalment had not yet been paid, both Mr. Morley and Sir Edward Grey adopted the proposal of the Government of India that payment to the Trade Agent through a Tibetan official at Gyantse should be required, and arrangements recently conceded by His Majesty’s Government for payment direct by the Chinese should be cancelled. But this was not eventually insisted on, and payments were received by the Government of India through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

In regard to the third instalment, Mr. Chang proposed, on December 27, 1907, that he should hand it over in the form of a cheque to the Indian Government. But the latter again stood out for receiving it from a Tibetan. It was due only to a misunderstanding that payment in the previous year had been accepted direct before orders on the subject had arrived. As regards this proposal of the Chinese, Mr. Morley, though he doubted the advantage of raising the point, saw no objection, as the Tsarong Sha-pÉ was then in Calcutta, to payment being made by the Tibetan Government through him to the Government of India.

But this method of payment Mr. Chang refused, and wrote to Sir Louis Dane: “I regret to say that I am unable to meet your wishes that Tsarong Sha-pÉ should himself tender payment. I have received very explicit instructions from my Government on this subject, that the third instalment of the indemnity (Rs. 8,33,333:5:4) is to be handed over in the form of a cheque only by myself.” When the matter arose in discussion at a meeting on January 10, Mr. Chang intimated that he based his objection to the proposal on the fact that direct dealings between us and the Tibetan authorities would be involved in it. It was no longer possible, the Government of India thought, to doubt Chang’s firm determination that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, to the exclusion of all local autonomy, should be indicated, and that direct communication of all kinds between our officials and Tibetans should be prevented. It appeared that Mr. Chang was being supported in this attitude by the Chinese Government, and that it was doubtful if we could expect, without further guarantee, loyal fulfilment of the Lhasa Convention as interpreted by His Majesty’s Government. Chinese claims might exist which contravened our distinct rights under the Lhasa Convention, as recognized in the Anglo-Russian arrangement regarding Tibet, and confirmed by the Peking Convention. The Indian Government greatly feared the reproduction in an aggravated form of the position of affairs before 1903 if Chinese contentions were admitted.

Mr. Morley proposed to Sir Edward Grey that a representation should be made to the Chinese Government of the serious consequences that would ensue if payment of a third instalment of the indemnity was not made in accordance with the Treaty; and the latter telegraphed to our Minister at Peking to inform the Chinese Government that the transfer of authority in the Chumbi Valley, much as it was desired by His Majesty’s Government, would be unavoidably delayed unless payment was made in accordance with the provision of the Lhasa Convention. The result was that within a week a cheque, signed by Mr. Chang, was delivered by the Tsarong Sha-pÉ, who paid a formal visit to Sir Louis Dane, accompanied by two Tibetan officers.

The Chinese did not altogether gain their third point, but it is to be noted that the cheque was signed by Mr. Chang, and that the Tibetan official was not much more than a messenger carrying it over to the Foreign Office.

All these proceedings have an air of triviality, but that in Asiatic eyes they were of importance we may infer from the insistence of the Chinese. If they really were trivial they might have handed the money to the Tibetans, and saved themselves the worry with us.

Connected with this question of the payment of the indemnity was the question of the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley, to effect which was the most important object of Chinese policy. By the original Treaty we had the right to occupy it till seventy-five annual instalments of the indemnity had been paid, but by the declaration affixed to the ratification of the Treaty we undertook that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley should cease after due payment of three annual instalments, provided that the trade-marts, as stipulated in Article II., should have been effectively opened for three years, as provided in Article VI.; and that in the meantime the Tibetans should have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects. On December 23, 1907, the Chinese Government addressed a note to our Minister, stating that as the final instalment was ready for payment on January 1, 1908, we should “withdraw on the above date the British troops in temporary occupation of the Chumbi Valley.”

The Indian Government pointed out^[49] that the Chinese ignored the condition that evacuation was contingent on the Tibetans faithfully complying with the Treaty in every respect. Instances tending to show that this condition, and the condition that the trade-marts should be effectively opened had not been fulfilled, had already been reported to the Secretary of State. The fact that the Tibetan authorities had recently failed to provide accommodation, except at extortionate rent, for Indian traders supplied evidence of this. The Tibetans also imposed unauthorized restrictions on trade by accustomed routes across the northern frontier of Sikkim, and on traders going from the United Provinces to marts in Western Tibet. The fact that, in spite of the maintenance of the telegraph service being provided for in Article III. of the Peking Convention, there had been serious recrudescence of interruptions to it since Mr. Chang’s visit to Tibet, further illustrated the attitude of the Tibetans. There had also been obstruction to postal communication with Gartok. It could not, then, be said that marts had been effectively opened since Mr. Chang’s visit, whatever might have been the case before.

We should presumably have been entitled to claim, under the letter of the Treaty, that, until the trade-marts had been effectively opened for three years, and until the terms of the Convention had in the meantime been complied with in all other respects, the valley should be retained by us. It was not the desire of the Government of India to suggest rigid enforcement of the Convention in this respect. They bore in mind, however, the decision of His Majesty’s Government that if, after commencement of the negotiations for the Trade Regulations, the attitude of the Chinese and Tibetan representatives proved obstructive, the question of warning the Chinese and Tibetan representatives that our evacuation would depend on matters connected with trade-marts being satisfactorily settled, should be considered.

It was shown by the history of the negotiations that, in regard to important points at issue, the Chinese had been, and still were, most obstructive. Sir John Jordan’s requests regarding points which he was pressing had not yet been acceded to by the Wai-wu Pu; while, in a letter to Sir Louis Dane, which had just been received, Mr. Chang refused to yield other contested points, and forwarded further draft regulations. The transfer of the administration of the valley should, therefore, the Indian Government submitted, be deferred until some guarantee that the marts would be effectively opened, and that they would remain so, was afforded us by the new Trade Regulations. The chief lever which we possessed for securing China’s real compliance with the terms of the Lhasa Convention would be lost if the transfer was permitted before the signature of the Regulations. The possibility, in the event of non-fulfilment of conditions, of temporary postponement of evacuation was apparently contemplated by the annexure to the Anglo-Russian arrangement concerning Tibet. And the sincerity of our intention to leave the valley would perhaps be sufficiently guaranteed by the fact that discussion of the Trade Regulations was in progress, and that their settlement was to be followed by evacuation.

Mr. Morley, in reviewing these contentions of the Indian Government, said that it must be remembered that when the Government of India, in July, 1907, raised the question of the failure of the Tibetans to fulfil the conditions on which evacuation was to take place, it was decided by His Majesty’s Government that it was “not necessary at present formally to remind the Chinese and Tibetan Governments of such breaches of the Lhasa Convention as have occurred.” Nor had the incidents since reported by the Government of India been considered of sufficient importance to justify a warning either to Tibet or China that there had been a failure to comply with the conditions on which our evacuation of Chumbi depended. The fact that we kept silence at the time that these incidents occurred rendered it impossible, in Mr. Morley’s opinion, to revive them now without exposing ourselves to a charge of bad faith.

There remained the argument that the evacuation of Chumbi would deprive us of our only practical means of bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to expedite a satisfactory settlement of the negotiations now in progress for the revision of the Tibetan Trade Regulations. But though it might be inconvenient to be deprived of this weapon, it appeared to Mr. Morley that, since by our own action we were precluded, for the reasons stated above, from alleging that there had been breaches of the Lhasa Convention of such a nature as to necessitate our retention of Chumbi, it would be an unjustifiable extension of the interpretation to be placed on the conditions laid down in that Convention to maintain, as we should have in effect to do, that the marts cannot be regarded as effectively open till the revised Trade Regulations have been satisfactorily settled. The Lhasa Convention clearly contemplates the marts being conducted under the old Regulations, which in form were sufficiently comprehensive until the new ones were introduced. It contained no stipulation, as it well might have done, that a revision of the Regulations satisfactory to ourselves was essential before the marts at Gyantse and elsewhere could be held to have been effectively opened.

The possibility had also to be borne in mind, given the peculiarities of Chinese diplomacy, that the continued occupation of Chumbi might have no other effect than to increase the obstinacy of the Chinese Government in the matter of the revision of the Regulations. In that case, as time went on, our position would have become increasingly difficult, and if our occupation was seriously protracted, as might not improbably have been the result of delaying evacuation, the whole policy of His Majesty’s Government in Asia would to a certain degree be stultified. A comparison of the British and Chinese drafts of the proposed Regulations showed that the points at real issue in the Regulations were not only those of political status involved in the wording of the preamble, but practical commercial questions of great complexity and inherent difficulty, such as that, for instance, to which the Government of India drew special attention, of the terms under which Indian tea was to be admitted into Tibet. It could not seriously be contended that our occupation was to continue till terms as to tea, satisfactory to the Indian trade, had been accepted by Tibet and China. On the other hand, no line could be logically and defensibly drawn between those matters in the Trade Regulations which were, and those which were not, essential points in the consideration of the question whether the trade-marts had been effectively opened.

The conclusion at which Mr. Morley had arrived was that, on an impartial interpretation of the Lhasa Convention, by the light of the events of the last three years, there were not sufficient grounds to justify a refusal to withdraw from Chumbi, and that, for reasons of policy and expediency, it was desirable that our occupation should terminate at once. Whatever difficulties might be in store for us from Chinese obstructiveness, Mr. Morley was of opinion that our power of coping with them would be diminished, not increased, if we placed ourselves in what would be an essentially false position by declining to withdraw from the Chumbi Valley, in accordance with our pledges and declared intentions.

Sir Edward Grey concurred in the views expressed by the Secretary of State for India in regard to the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley; but he considered that it would be well to point out to the Chinese Government that His Majesty’s Government would expect, in return for evacuation, that their wishes would be met in regard to the Trade Regulations then under discussion at Calcutta, and that conciliatory instructions would be sent to Chang with a view to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations. He had accordingly sent to His Majesty’s Minister at Peking a telegram in the above sense.

The final instalment of the indemnity having been paid, orders for the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley were issued on January 27, 1908.

Thus we deliberately abandoned the sole guarantee for the fulfilment of the Treaty. For years prior to the conclusion of the Lhasa Treaty we had had practical experience that Chinese engagements regarding Tibet were useless. Since the signature of the Lhasa Treaty we had three years’ evidence that the Chinese were trying to evade its execution. Its provisions had not been fulfilled, and have not yet been carried out, six years after it was signed. Extreme moderation had been shown; concession after concession had been made. With a broad-mindedness in which some might suspect indifference we had given way point after point. In spite of all this, the Chinese were not observing the Treaty. And yet we gave up the one and only material guarantee for its fulfilment.

Now, at least, when we had withdrawn from Chumbi, and when we had been complacent in so many respects, we might fairly have expected that a change of tone would have come over Chinese policy. But, as we have on many other occasions experienced, the Chinese are not always most reasonable when we are most accommodating. And from the time we evacuated the Chumbi Valley they commenced a great forward movement in Tibet, which has resulted in the practical extinction of the Tibetan Government, and necessitated our despatching a much larger number of troops than we had in Chumbi to Gnatong, an inhospitable spot over 12,000 feet above sea-level, where they still have a 15,000-feet pass between them and Chumbi, and can, in consequence, exert only one-quarter of the moral effect they had in Chumbi itself.

But before this movement actually commenced, the Chinese had concluded some Trade Regulations with us; again at the instance of the Chinese Government, who seem to have a shrewd suspicion that these various agreements bind us to a far greater extent than they confer benefit on us. On April 7, 1907, the Chinese Government had notified our Minister at Peking that if the Government of India would appoint a special representative, Mr. Chang would proceed to Calcutta to negotiate the new Trade Regulations with him. Sir John Jordan, in accordance with instructions he had received, pointed out that under Article III. of the Lhasa Convention it was the Tibetan Government who should appoint a delegate to negotiate a revision of the Trade Regulations. We were, however, willing not to insist on negotiating these Trade Regulations exclusively with delegates of the Tibetan Government. But before the negotiations began a Tibetan delegate should be appointed by the Tibetan Government, with full power to negotiate and sign on behalf of the Tibetan Government in such a manner as to bind that Government to the settlement arrived at. This delegate should then be associated with Mr. Chang and proceed together with him to Simla, to negotiate there with a special representative of the Government of India.

The Chinese Government replied on May 21, suggesting that Tibet should depute a Tibetan and India an Indian Government official to negotiate, and that the actions of the Tibetan representative would be subject to the approval of Mr. Chang, and those of the Indian representative to that of the Viceroy of India. This was a thoroughly Chinese device to put India on a par with Tibet and Mr. Chang on a par with the Viceroy. What reply it met with is not on record, but on July 18 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy that he should address to the Tibetan Government a friendly and uncontroversial letter, notifying them of the negotiations to be held at Simla, and requesting that their delegate might be supplied with proper credentials. In carrying out these instructions the Viceroy telegraphed that he had also told the British Trade Agent to give a copy of the communication to Mr. Chang, and that the Foreign Secretary had written a friendly letter to Mr. Chang announcing that he, Sir Louis Dane, had been appointed British delegate.

The Regulations were eventually signed at Calcutta on April 20, 1908, by Mr. Wilton (who had taken Sir Louis Dane’s place), Mr. Chang, and the Tsarong Sha-pÉ. The questions relating to extradition, the levy of Customs duties, the export of tea from India into Tibet, and the appointment of Chinese Trade Agents, with Consular privileges, were reserved for future consideration.

By these new Regulations it was laid down that the old Regulations of 1893 should remain in force, in so far as they were not inconsistent with the new Regulations. The boundaries of the Gyantse mart were fixed. British subjects were allowed to lease land at the marts for the building of houses and godowns; the administration at the marts was to remain with the Tibetan officers, under the Chinese officers’ supervision and directions; the Trade Agents and Frontier Officers were to hold personal intercourse and correspondence one with another, and the Chinese authorities were not to prevent the British Trade Agents holding personal intercourse and correspondence with the Tibetan officers and people; and British subjects were to be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they pleased and to buy goods from whomsoever they pleased. China engaged to afford effective police protection at the marts and along the routes, and on due fulfilment of arrangements for this, Great Britain undertook to withdraw the Trade Agents’ guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet, so as to remove all cause for suspicion and disturbance among the inhabitants. In a letter accompanying the Regulations Mr. Wilton wrote to the Chinese and Tibetan delegates that the strength of the armed guards at Gyantse and Yatung would not exceed fifty and twenty-five respectively, and the desirability of reducing these numbers even before their actual withdrawal would be carefully considered from time to time, as occasion might offer.

These Regulations would have been of value if they had been observed, but even in 1910 the Indian Government reported that the Chinese did not allow the Tibetans to deal directly with our Agents, and once they were concluded the Chinese seem to have been more engrossed with the great forward movement which, I have stated, they commenced as soon as we had evacuated Chumbi, than in carrying out their part of the agreement.

The first indication of this significant change of Chinese policy was the appointment of Chao Erh-feng, the Acting Viceroy of Szechuan, as Resident in Tibet, in the spring of 1908. It was unusual, said Sir John Jordan in reporting this, to select an official of his standing and record for this position. The appointment was all the more significant because his brother, Chao Erh-hsun, who succeeded Chang Chih-tung as Viceroy at Hankow in the previous September, was suddenly transferred to the less important post of Viceroy of Szechuan at the same time as Chao Erh-feng was sent to Tibet.

A Memorial of the Board of Finance, approved by an Imperial Rescript of March 19, which was published in the Chinese press on March 31, threw some light on these appointments and the intentions of the Chinese Government. Chao Erh-feng was apparently expected to perform in Tibet functions similar to those of the Marquis Ito in Korea, and especially to extend the control of the Chinese Government over the Tibetan Administration. The appointment of Chao Erh-hsun as Viceroy was intended to strengthen his brother’s hands and insure harmony of action.

The Memorial of the Board of Finance stated that Tibet acted as a rampart for the province of Szechuan, and, in view of its extent and the backward civilization of the natives, plans for such important measures as the training of troops, the promotion of education, the development of agriculture, mining and industries, the improvement of means of communication, the increase in the number of officials, and the reform of the Government, should be prepared without delay, so that the administration of the country might gradually be put on a better basis. Chao Erh-feng had been appointed to the post of Imperial Resident in Tibet, and, as a mark of the importance of his office, exceptionally high rank had been conferred upon him.

Chao Erh-feng was directed to investigate the local conditions in concert with Lien Yu, to prepare comprehensive schemes for all the measures to be undertaken in Tibet, and to draft Regulations. The officials should receive liberal salaries, and be generously rewarded for meritorious service. They should all be permitted to bring their families with them, and would be required to hold their appointments for long periods. To meet the necessary expenditure, the Board of Finance was to provide a sum of from 400,000 to 500,000 taels every year in order to aid in this important undertaking, and the Viceroy of Szechuan was to give his assistance when required, even beyond the limits of his own jurisdiction.

Sir John Jordan, as events have proved, was amply justified in drawing attention to the significance of this appointment of Chao Erh-feng. He was a man of both ability and energy, but also of severity. His dealings with the semi-independent States of Eastern Tibet will be related in the following Chapter. Here it is important to emphasize the facts that he was turning these States one after another into districts directly administered by Chinese officials, and that he was making a special set against Lamaism^[50]—regulating the numbers who might become priests, curtailing the donations to monasteries, increasing the taxes they had to pay, prohibiting the construction of temples except by Chinese officials, and declaring the inefficacy of the Lama’s prayers—excellent reforms in many ways, but when carried out with the severity with which Chao was introducing them in Eastern Tibet, inevitably calculated to arouse anger and suspicion at Lhasa.

Following the appointment of this high-handed Viceroy bearing a special mandate to “reform” the Government of Tibet appeared anti-British articles in a Lhasa newspaper,^[51] published by the Chinese officials and circulated throughout Tibet. The Tibetans were exhorted not to be afraid of Chao and his soldiers; they were not intended to do harm to Tibetans, but “to other people.” The Tibetans were to remember how they felt ashamed when the foreign soldiers arrived in Lhasa, and oppressed them with much tyranny. Chinese and Tibetans must all strengthen themselves on this account; otherwise their common religion would be destroyed in a hundred, or perhaps a thousand, years. In the west the “foreign frontier” was very close. In that direction, also, was Nepal. The Tibetans were therefore to make friends quickly with the Nepalese, and “become as one to resist the foreigners.” In Tibet were “some wicked, aggressive foreigners,” with whom intercourse had to be maintained, and for this purpose English schools would be opened. Then, again, in the south was Bhutan, and “Tibet and Bhutan were as inseparable as the cheek from the teeth.” It would be even more advantageous to make friends with Bhutan than with Nepal. If at any future time the Bhutanese wanted help, the Chinese Resident would give it. “Bhutan is like a wall of Tibet. The Emperor thinks that the Gurkhas, Bhutanese, and Tibetans should live like three men in one house.”

The next Chinese move was the Imperial Decree issued in November, 1908, to which more detailed allusion will be made later,^[52] ostensibly conferring an additional honour on the Dalai Lama, in reality containing, as Sir John Jordan put it, "the first unequivocal declaration on the part of China that she regarded Tibet as within her sovereignty"—sovereignty, be it noted, not suzerainty.

Then, a year later, came the announcement by the Chinese Government to our Minister, that "Chao Erh-feng was faced with a serious state of unrest on the Tibetan marches—so much so that the Chinese Government, having reason to fear complications with Tibet, and desiring to strengthen their influence at Lhasa, were contemplating the despatch of a body of troops to the Tibetan capital."

By a remarkable coincidence, on the very day, November 12, 1909, on which the Chinese Councillor made this announcement to our Minister, the Dalai Lama, from a monastery three marches outside Lhasa, despatched a messenger to him, expressing the Dalai Lama’s concern to find, on his return to Tibet, that active measures were being taken in the country by Chinese troops, and adding his hope that the Minister would do what he could in the matter.

The events which led up to this will be set forth in detail in the following Chapter. To make the consecutive narrative of Chinese action complete, it will merely be noted here that three months later the Chinese troops arrived in Lhasa; that on the day of their arrival ten soldiers were sent to each of the Tibetan Ministers’ houses; that the Dalai Lama thereupon fled to India; that the Chinese sent several hundred soldiers to “attend” and “protect” him, but that he escaped across our frontier; that only a fortnight after he had left Lhasa he was deposed by Imperial decree; that the Chinese then took the Government of Tibet into their hands, preventing the sole remaining Minister from doing anything without the Resident’s consent, holding the ferry across the Brahmaputra, and preventing anyone crossing the river without a pass from the Resident, replacing Tibetan by Chinese police, seizing rifles, closing the arsenal and mint; and, what more intimately concerns ourselves, and what was immediately opposed to Treaty obligations, preventing the Tibetans dealing directly with our Trade Agents.

All this was done, moreover, with the object, as our Minister was informed, of “tranquillizing the country,” of “protecting the trade-marts,” and of “seeing that the Tibetans conform to the Treaties.”

Whether the Chinese forward movement extended beyond Tibet to Nepal and Bhutan, there is no official information. But Government evidently expected some such action, for in January, 1910, they concluded a Treaty with Bhutan, increasing the annual allowance from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 100,000, and securing from the Bhutanese an agreement that they would be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to their external relations. And on Lord Morley’s suggestion, the Chinese Government was informed in February of this year that we could not prevent Nepal from taking such steps to protect her interests as she might think necessary under the circumstances; while in April we went a step farther, and gave a clear intimation to China^[53] that we could not allow administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity either of Nepal or of Sikkim and Bhutan, and that we were prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States. It was also impressed upon the Chinese Government that it was inadvisable to locate troops upon, or in, the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and the adjoining States in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements on the part of the Government of India and the rulers of the States concerned.