I have often been asked what were my feelings when I first saw Lhasa—whether I was not filled with a sense of elation. I was filled with nothing of the kind. It was when I left Lhasa that I really had all that feeling of intense relief and satisfaction which everyone experiences when he has set his heart on one great object and attained it. When I left Lhasa I had my treaty, and—what I had always put at more value than the treaty itself—the good-will of the people. When I arrived at Lhasa it was very doubtful if I should be able to get a treaty at all, and still more doubtful if I could get it with the good-will of the people, without which any paper treaty would be useless. To negotiate a treaty with a people acknowledged by those who knew them best—the Chinese, the Nepalese, and the Bhutanese—to be most obstinate and obstructive, time was required. To break through the reserve of so exclusive a people, to make friends of men with whom we had just been fighting, still more time was essential. Yet it was just time that was denied me. I had pressed for it in June, but in too ineffectual a manner, and had been rebuffed. Though this was an avowedly political Mission, military considerations were allowed to preponderate. I could only stay in Lhasa a month and a half or two months. We must be back before the winter. And thus tied, I had to set to work with all speed, but with the outward appearance of having the utmost leisure, to negotiate the treaty. Hurried as I was, I had yet to assume an air of perfect indifference whether the negotiations were concluded this year, next year, or the year after. And irritated though I might be, I had above all to exercise as much control as I could possibly bring to bear to keep down any feelings of hastiness or exasperation, which might ruin our chances of securing the eventual good-will of the people.

I had, then, too much before me and still too much anxiety in regard to the very immediate present, to yet feel much elation on our first arrival at Lhasa, and my chief thought was how to start the negotiations without showing in what a hurry I really was.

Before, however, describing the course of the negotiations which were now to take place, I must give an account of the terms which I had been directed to make with the Tibetans, and the considerations on which those demands were based. Already, before I left Gyantse, I had received from the Government of India a copy of the despatch, dated June 30,^[33] containing their views on the terms which they had sent to the Secretary of State. I was to understand that the proposals contained therein had not yet been approved by His Majesty’s Government, but I was, without committing Government, to ascertain how the Tibetan Government would regard them.

It was the terms contained in these proposals—with the exception of asking for the establishment of a Resident at Lhasa—of which I informed the Tongsa Penlop, and asked him, as I have mentioned previously, to communicate to the Dalai Lama.

The first point on which the Government of India laid stress in their communication to the Secretary of State was the acceptance by the Tibetans of an accredited British agent in their country, preferably in Lhasa itself. The arguments against such a measure were largely based on the declarations of His Majesty’s Government, and on consideration of international policy. And apart from such considerations, the Government of India declared themselves deeply impressed by the grave responsibilities which they must incur by placing a resident agent at the capital of Tibet. Still, they felt it their duty reluctantly to assume the burden of that measure.

His Majesty’s Government had already recognized the necessity of asserting the predominance of British influence in Tibet, and Lord Lansdowne had clearly apprised Count Benckendorff of our attitude in this matter. To establish such an influence it was evident that we must now acquire something more practical than the nominal concessions acquired by the treaty of 1890 as the fruits of our operations in 1888. Our experience then gained showed that we could not trust to our recent military successes leaving any lasting impression. It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the best guarantee for the due observance of the new Convention, and for the adequate protection of our rights as the only European Power limitrophe with Tibet, must be that, in addition to the appointment of officers to watch over our commercial interests at the marts to be established in Tibet, we should demand the acceptance of an accredited British agent in Tibet.

The place at which this agent should reside was a question on which opinions might easily differ, and it might, the Indian Government thought, be left open until they were in possession of the fuller information that would be acquired after the Mission had reached Lhasa. The arguments in favour of placing him at Lhasa were the following: Lhasa was the pivot of the religious and political life of Tibet; it was the seat of the Dalai Lama and his Council, with whom we had to establish official relations; and it was the focus of the priestly influence, which we had to conciliate or overcome. It might be argued that it was undesirable to arouse the resentment of the Tibetans by requiring them to receive a representative of a strange race and a strange religion in the home of their most sacred associations. But after the manner in which for the past fifteen years the Tibetans had repudiated their obligations and had derided the patience with which we had submitted to their insults, Government believed that, even should such a feeling exist, it might be better to face it than to allow of the misconstruction which would be placed upon the location of an agent at any place outside Lhasa.

They saw, however, no reason why the presence of a resident agent in Lhasa should be a lasting source of irritation. For more than eighty years we had now had an agent at Khatmandu, a capital the isolation of which from foreign intrusion had been guarded hardly less jealously than that of Lhasa itself, and that by a people whose prowess had been proved in our own armies. The hostilities which preceded the first appointment of a British Minister at Peking, under the treaty of 1860, were also far more serious than any opposition which had so far been encountered, or was likely to be met with, on the way to Lhasa. The Government of India saw, then, no reason to anticipate greater risk in placing a Resident at Lhasa than was incurred in sending a British representative to Khatmandu or Peking.

Despite the hostility which, under the influence and leadership of the monkish faction, they had displayed against us, the Tibetan people had no dislike for us as a race, and there was nothing in the tolerant Buddhist creed which counselled hostility to strangers of a different faith or encouraged fanaticism. The exclusion of British subjects and Europeans was merely based on a concordat of the present dominant class in Tibet, and was not in any way a religious obligation. The monks were at present opposed to us, fearing the loss of their influence, but their antipathy was based on suspicion and ignorance, and with tact and patience it might be eradicated—a view which was supported by the friendly relations which the Mission was able to establish at Khamba Jong with ecclesiastical Envoys from the Tashi Lama of Shigatse.

It had always to be borne in mind that subjects of all her other neighbours—China, Nepal, and Kashmir—were allowed freely to resort to, and trade in, Tibet, while China and Nepal had official representatives at Lhasa. As at Khatmandu, our agent would, like the Nepal representative at Lhasa, abstain from all interference with the internal administration of the country, and would confine himself to watching over our trade interests and in guarding against the introduction of foreign influences. His presence, therefore, at Lhasa would be in no sense a contravention of the policy declared by His Majesty’s Government.

As to the objection which might be raised on the grounds of the difficulty of keeping open communication with the agent at Lhasa, the Government of India contended that such an objection was based upon a misapprehension, and that there was no real difficulty, except on the southern side of the watershed, to such free passage to and from Tibet as might be necessary for the adequate support of a British representative, either at Lhasa or Gyantse; and our recent operations had demonstrated that, however great the physical difficulties of communication might be, they were not insuperable even at the worst time of the year. Moreover, the difficulties on the Indian side of the Himalayas would be obviated by a road through Chumbi, which they were examining, that ran down the Amochu to the plains of Bengal, avoiding the Jelap-la.

The Government of India felt, then, that it was a necessity to have an agent at Lhasa, and they were quite willing to undertake the responsibility. That was the view of the responsible Government on the spot. The Imperial side of the question had still to be weighed, and of that the Imperial Government would be the judge, but in regard to that aspect the Government of India made the following observations:

Lord Lansdowne had given assurances to the Russian Ambassador, but he had expressly added when making them that the policy then announced was not unalterable in any eventuality, and that the action of His Majesty’s Government was to some extent dependent on the action of the Tibetans themselves. The Government of India did not desire to depart from the declaration which Lord Lansdowne had made that, so long as no other Power endeavoured to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, no attempt would be made to annex it, to establish a protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration; but they thought that recent developments might make it incumbent upon them to recommend to His Majesty’s Government a reconsideration of the opinion they had expressed in their telegram of November 6, 1903, in so far as it concerned the establishment of a permanent Mission in the country.

As to the desire not to accelerate political complications regarding the integrity of China, the Government of India pointed out that no other European Power adjoined Tibet or had any interests there, and that, so far, our arrangements had been made with the cordial co-operation of the Chinese officials deputed to meet the Mission, and it was understood that they met with the sympathy, if not with the avowed approval, of the Chinese Government, as was evidenced by Sir Ernest Satow’s telegram of June 15.

So much was urged by the Government in regard to the establishment of an agent at Lhasa. The next cardinal point in the policy which they wished to recommend was the retention of the Chumbi Valley.

They explained that this valley lay to the south of the main watershed, and was Indian rather than Tibetan in character. Our Mission had been well received by the people, and Mr. Walsh, the Political Agent who had been located among them, reported that they regarded our presence with unmixed satisfaction, and that their only fear was lest we might evacuate the valley, and expose them to the vengeance which the Lamas would surely take upon them for having lived on terms of friendliness with us. The occupation of this region was recommended by all the local authorities as far back as 1888, was strongly urged by the Bengal Government in Mr. Cotton’s letter, dated July 22, 1895, but was deferred owing to Chinese susceptibilities. The contumacious disregard of the Tibetans for their treaty obligations and for the authority of their Suzerain had culminated in armed resistance to the passage of a friendly Mission despatched by us with the full cognizance of that Suzerain, and accompanied by Chinese representatives throughout. It appeared to Government that recent developments might make it necessary to take material guarantees. They had referred to a road through the Chumbi Valley as desirable in order to secure the position of our representative in Tibet, if such a one should be appointed. The route which was projected along the Amo Chu Valley would lead into the foot of the Chumbi Valley, and it was obviously desirable that it should continue under our control up to the point where it debouches on to the open plateau of Tibet beyond the Tang-la. The opening up of such a route into Tibet proper must evidently be the precursor of any real development of trade, and, what was of far greater importance, it would provide one of the surest guarantees for the predominance of our influence and the safety of our Agents in the country.

It had been estimated that, if our forces had all left Tibet by October, the cost of the expedition would not be less than £648,000. The contingency of such an early withdrawal was remote, and it seemed probable that the operations necessary to assert our treaty rights and to exact reparation from the Tibetans would cost us not less than a million sterling.

The Indian Government were, therefore, of opinion that, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Convention, and as a security for the payment of the indemnity, that they proposed to require, as well as in the interests of the people of the valley themselves, the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for such period as might be necessary for the due protection of our treaty rights, and international interests would become inevitable.

The next point to be considered was this question of demanding an indemnity.

Now that it had become necessary to send a regular military expedition to Lhasa, Government submitted that they had a good claim to be recouped the expense to which they had been put. It was obvious that the retention of the Chumbi Valley would not, from a monetary point of view, be an adequate return for the outlay in which they had been involved, and Government thought it well to put forward a claim to compensation against the Tibetans. Further, they considered that, having regard to the recent attacks upon their Mission at Gyantse, and as a measure calculated to increase the security of their representative in Tibet, they should follow the precedent of the demands presented by the allied Powers to the Chinese Government after the events of 1900, and should insist on the razing of all fortified positions which might impede the course of free communication between our frontier and Lhasa, and on the prohibition of the importation of arms into Tibet or their manufacture within the country except with their special permission.

Finally the Government of India discussed what might be done if His Majesty’s Government declined to agree to the appointment of a representative at Lhasa. In that case they would urge that a Resident Agent should be posted at Gyantse, whose functions would primarily be to supervise and maintain the trading facilities which we must undoubtedly secure. Although the duties of such an agent would be mainly commercial, they would necessarily comprise that of seeing that the Convention or treaty which we should eventually conclude with the Tibetan Government was observed in all respects. The agent should, therefore, have the right of proceeding to Lhasa, as occasion might require, to discuss matters with the Chinese Amban or with the high officials of the Dalai Lama.

In making the terms of his appointment Government considered that the grounds and conditions of our self-restraint in this matter should be clearly indicated to the Tibetans. It should be explained that His Majesty’s Government consented to waive their claim to the appointment of a Resident Agent at Lhasa solely out of regard for the Tibetan desire to maintain their freedom from contact with European influence at the political and religious capital of their country; that they were prepared to forego this demand, so long as the Tibetan Government preserved an attitude of isolation from external affairs, and avoided all intercourse with other European Powers; but that, in the event of any departure by the Tibetans from this policy in the future, the British Government would reserve to themselves the right to require the acceptance of an agent at the capital itself.

Government considered, however, that this alternative, the least which could be contemplated, was not calculated, in the same degree, to afford a guarantee of satisfactory results. An agent at Gyantse, though possibly in greater personal security, would probably not be in so good a position for knowing what transpired in political circles at Lhasa.

But whether or not a British agent was established in Tibet, Government considered that recent events justified their requiring from the Tibetans and from the Chinese Government a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Tibet, and an engagement that they would not admit to Tibet the representative of, that they would cede no portion of Tibetan territory to, and that they would enter into no relations regarding Tibet with, any other foreign Power, without the previous consent of the British Government.

Turning to less contentious matter, namely, that of facilities for trade with Tibet, to secure which was the primary object of the Mission when it was originally despatched on an errand, which was then indubitably peaceful in character and intention, Government contended that it was, of course, necessary to insist on access for purposes of trade to convenient centres in Tibet proper in the place of Yatung, which was beyond all question unsuitable for the object for which it was intended. In Central Tibet present information led to the belief that the town of Gyantse provided the site which was best fitted to our requirements. And, in view of recent developments, they thought that it might be advisable to insist on the opening up to trade of the neighbouring town of Shigatse, the seat of the Tashi Lama, and also of Lhasa itself, if a British Resident should be posted to the capital. They considered, too, that the present opportunity should be taken of completing the road to the frontier, and of opening another market at Gartok or some other convenient place in Western Tibet, which, with its vicinity to Chinese Turkestan, might acquire considerable importance in the future.

It would be useless at the present stage, the Government of India thought, to enter into details of the draft Convention, of the trade regulations, of the terms as to Customs duty, of the arrangements in regard to mining rights and concessions which appeared to be necessary, and of the boundary settlements on the Sikkim and Garhwal Frontiers which stood for decision. These questions must first be discussed by their Commissioner with the representatives of the Tibetan Government.

Summarized, the proposals of the Government of India were: the placing of a Resident at Lhasa, or, failing that, an agent at Gyantse, with the right to proceed to Lhasa; the formal recognition of exclusive political influence; the demand of an indemnity; the occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security; the establishment of trade-marts at Gyantse, Yatung, Shigatse, and Gartok; the settlement of the Sikkim and Garhwal boundaries, Customs duties, and trade regulations. The amount of the indemnity to be demanded was not mentioned in the despatch, but in a telegram to me, giving a summary, and which was also sent to the Secretary of State on June 26, it was suggested that it should be £100,000 for every month from the date of the attack on the Mission at Gyantse until one month after the signature of the Convention.

These proposals appeared to His Majesty’s Government to be excessive, and after some telegraphic communication with the Government of India the Secretary of State telegraphed on July 26^[34] the terms which might be named to the Tibetans, and which the Government embodied in a draft Convention which they afterwards sent to me.

Neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere was a Resident to be demanded. Provisions for the maintenance of our exclusive political influence in Tibet were to be made. An indemnity was to be asked, though the sum to be demanded was not to exceed an amount which it was believed would be within the power of the Tibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread over three years, but I was “to be guided by circumstances in the matter.” Trade-marts were to be established at Gyantse and Gartok in addition to Yatung, and a British agent was to have right of access to the Gyantse mart; the Chumbi Valley was to be occupied as security for the indemnity and for the fulfilment of the conditions regarding the trade-marts; the boundary laid down in the Convention of 1890 was to be recognized; the two Sikkim-British subjects who had been captured in 1903 were to be released; fortifications were to be demolished.

In amplification and explanation of these telegraphic instructions the Secretary of State, on August 5, addressed to the Government of India a despatch,^[35] setting forth the deliberate policy of His Majesty’s Government. They had to consider the question, not as a local one concerning India and Tibet alone, but from the wider point of view of the relations of Great Britain to other Powers, both European and Asiatic, and as involving the status of a dependency of the Chinese Empire. Formerly European nations and their interests were, in the main, far removed from the scope of Indian policy, and the relations of India with the States on her borders rarely involved any European complications; but the effect of Indian policy in relation to Afghanistan, Siam, Tibet, or any other dependency of the Chinese Empire was now liable to be felt throughout Europe. This immediate responsibility towards Europe, which Indian policy nowadays imposed on this country, necessarily involved its correlative, and the course of affairs on the Indian frontiers could not be decided without reference to Imperial exigencies elsewhere.

His Majesty’s Government had also been consistently averse to any policy in Tibet which would tend to throw on the British Empire an additional burden. The great increase to our responsibilities, however necessary, which recent additions to the Empire had involved, made it obvious that it would be imprudent further to enlarge them except upon the strongest ground. In military and naval matters the resources of Great Britain and India must be considered together. India had from time to time given effective and ready help in the defence of British interests and British Colonies. On the other hand, it had to be remembered that the British army largely existed in order to defend India, and every new obligation undertaken by India was as much a charge upon the common stock of our heavily burdened resources as if it were placed upon the people of this country.

The satisfactory nature of the assurances given by Russia in regard to Tibet rendered it unnecessary and undesirable that any demand for the recognition of a Political Agent, either at Gyantse or at Lhasa, should be made to the Tibetans. His Majesty’s Government held that such a political outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate with any benefits which, in the situation created by the Russian assurances, could be gained by it.

They did not even consider it desirable to claim for the agent, who under the Trade Regulations would have access to Gyantse, the right in certain circumstances to proceed to Lhasa. The effect of this proposal, they considered, would be to alter the character of the duties of the agent, which, it was intended, should be essentially commercial, and to assimilate them to those of a Political Resident.

“As regards the amount of the indemnity,” continues the despatch, “our ignorance of the resources of the country makes it impossible to speak with any certainty. The question, in the circumstances, must be left to the discretion of Colonel Younghusband. The condition that the amount should be one which, it is estimated, can be paid in three years, indicates the intention of His Majesty’s Government that the sum to be demanded should constitute an adequate pecuniary penalty, but not be such as to be beyond the powers of the Tibetans, by making a sufficient effort, to discharge within the period named.”

This despatch did not reach me till after the Treaty was signed.