  “War is a business of position.”—Napoleon. By the term Position is signified those relative advantages and disadvantages in location, which appertain to the aggregate posts occupied by the kindred army, as compared with the aggregate posts occupied by the adverse army. Advantages and disadvantages in Position are of three classes, viz.:
STRATEGETIC SITUATIONSA Strategic Situation, and whether in warfare or in Chess-play, is produced by the presence, in any Strategetic Plane, i.e., theatre of conflict, of two or more opposing Strategetic Entireties, i.e., contending armies. These latter are of four classifications and are denominated as follows:
RULE IGiven the Strategetic Entireties present in a given Strategetic Situation, designate the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors and express the relative values of each in the terms of the Strategic Syllogism. THE STRATEGIC SYLLOGISMHaving classified the existing Strategetic Situation, it is necessary next to designate the opposing Columns of Attack, of Support, and of Manoeuvre. Then, by comparing these Prime Strategetic Factors, to determine the net advantage, disadvantage, or equality that exist between them and to express this condition in the terms of the resulting Strategic Syllogism. In the construction of a Strategic Syllogism, the Strategic, i.e., the positional value of each of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors contained in a given Strategetic Situation, is expressed in terms made up of letters and symbols, viz.,
The positional values of the several Prime Strategetic Factors are obtained as follows: COLUMN OF ATTACKThat Column of Attack which is posted upon the superior Strategic front as compared to the front occupied by the immediately opposing formation (cf, Grand Tactics, pp. 117 to 275), has the advantage in position. This relative advantage and disadvantage in position of the Column of Attack is expressed by the first term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.: (I.)
or (II.)
In the first instance (I), the White Column of Attack has the advantage and the Black formation has the disadvantage; in the second case (II), this condition is reversed. COLUMN OF SUPPORTA Column of Support has the superiority in position, as compared with the adverse Column of Support, whenever it contains more than the latter of the following advantages, viz.:
The relative advantage and disadvantage of one Column of Support, over the opposing Column of Support, is expressed by the second term of the Strategic Syllogism, thus: (I.)
or (II.)
In the first case (I), White has the advantage and Black has the disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed. COLUMN OF MANOEUVREColumns of Manoeuvre are not compared with each other. The advantage of one over another is determined by comparing their respective powers of resistance to the attack of the corresponding adverse Columns of Support. That Column of Manoeuvre which longest can debar the adverse promotable Factors from occupying a point of junction on the kindred Strategetic Rear, has the advantage. The relative advantage and disadvantage of the column of Manoeuvre is expressed by the third term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.: (I.)
or (II.)
In the first case (I), White, has the advantage and Black the disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed. In recording the values of the opposing Prime Strategetic The terms expressing the relative values of the Columns of Attack always are placed at the left; those for the Columns of Support in the center, and those for the Columns of Manoeuvre at the right. The Strategic Syllogisms are twenty-seven in number and are formulated, viz.: TABLE OF STRATEGIC SYLLOGISMS
STRATEGIC ELEMENTALS.Each of the terms contained in the Strategic Syllogism should have its counterpart in a tangible and competent mass of troops. This principle of Strategetics, when applied to warfare, is absolute, and admits of no exception. The catastrophies sustained by the French armies in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 are each and every one directly due to the persistent violation by Napoleon of In solemn contrast to that fatal and indefensible rashness which cost Napoleon five great armies and ultimately his crown, is the dictum by one whose transcendent success in warfare, is the antithesis of the utter ruination which terminated the career of the famous Corsican. Says Frederic the Great: “I adhere to those universal laws which all the elements obey; these, for me are sufficient.” Singularly enough, it seemingly has escaped the notice of the great in warfare, owing to the subtle mathematical construction of the Chess-board, its peculiar relations to the moves of the Chess-pieces, and of the latter to each other, that: PRINCIPLEI. The functions of all three terms contained in a Strategic Syllogism may be combined in a single chess Pawn, and, that: II. All three functions are contemplated in and should be expressed by every movement of every Chess-piece; and every move upon the Chess-board is weak and unscientific, to the extent that it disregards either of these obligations. Those advantages in position, which are denoted by the plus signs of the Strategic Syllogism, have their material manifestation upon the surface of the earth by Corps d’armee, and by Pieces which are equivalents of these latter, upon the Chess-board. The sign +A in the Strategic Syllogism denotes the superior Strategic Front. That point whose occupation by a kindred piece demonstrates such superiority in position is termed the Key of Position. The kindred Corps occupying such point constitutes a Corps en Line, and is termed the First Strategic Elemental. The sign +S in the Strategic Syllogism denotes the larger number of pawn altitudes open to the kindred promotable factors. Those points occupied by such kindred promotable factors are termed Logistic Origins. The kindred Corps which occupy such points constitute Corps en Route and collectively are termed the Second Strategic Elemental. The objective of Corps en Route always is the Kindred Logistic Horizon. The sign +M in the Strategic Syllogism denotes that the shortest open pawn altitude is occupied by a kindred promotable factor. Such kindred promotable factor is termed the Corps en Touch, and the point occupied by such Corps is termed the Point of Proximity. The Objective of such Corps always is a designated Point of Junction in the Kindred Logistic Horizon, and such Corps constitutes the Third Strategic Elemental. In Warfare it is imperative that each of these Strategic Elementals be represented by one or more Corps d’armee. But it is a second peculiarity of the Chessic mechanism that a single Chessic Corps d’armee may represent in itself, one, two or three Strategic Elementals and thus constitute even the entire Strategic Ensemble. Hence, in Chess play, the Strategic Ensemble may be either single, double, or triple, viz.: A Single Strategic Ensemble consists either of:
A Double Strategic Ensemble consists of either:
A Triple Strategic Ensemble consists of:
PRINCIPLEThe relative positional advantage expressed by the plus signs of the Strategic Syllogism decreases as the number of plus signs in the Strategic Syllogism exceeds the number of corresponding Strategic Elementals. Failure to observe the amalgamation of the duties of the three Grand Columns in each and every move upon the Chess-board, and to note that the tangible and material expression of these powers and advantages may be expressed either by three, by two, or even by a single Chessic Corps d’armee, has caused doubt of the exact Recognizing the truth of the foregoing, the Asiatic conqueror, Tamerlane, sought to rectify this discrepancy between the mechanism of Chess and that of War, by increasing the size of the Chess-board to one hundred and forty-four squares, and the number of pieces to forty-eight. By this innovation the geometric harmony existing between the Dynamic and the Static surfaces of the Chess-board was destroyed; and this without substituting therefor another like condition of mathematic perfection. Ultimately, this remedy was abandoned, a fate which sooner or later, has overtaken all attempts to improve that superlative intellectual exercise of which says Voltaire: “Of all games, Chess does most honor to the human mind.” The reason why the scheme devised by Tamerlane did not satisfy even himself, and why all attempted alterations in the machinery of Chess prove unacceptable in practice, is due to the present perfect adaptation of the Board and the Pieces for exemplifying the processes of Strategetic Art. Any change in the construction of the Chess-board and the Chess-pieces, to be effective, must largely increase the number of Chessmen, correspondingly increase the number of squares, and equally so, increase the number of moves permitted to each player at his turn to play. That is to say: Such innovation to be correct must permit each player at his turn to play to move one of the Corps d’armee contained in the Column of Attack, a second in the Column of Support, and a third in the Column of Manoeuvre. Necessarily, the number of pieces must be increased in order to provide Corps The student thus readily will perceive, that it is only one step from such an elaboration of Chess, to an army and the theatre of actual campaigning. Perfection in Position is attained whenever the kindred army is acting or is posted as a unit, while the hostile army is not so posted nor able so to act. MILITARY EXAMPLESCOLUMN OF ATTACK“Frontal attacks are to be avoided, and the preference always is to be given to the assault of a single wing, with your center and remaining wing held back; because if your attack is successful you equally destroy the enemy without the risk of being routed if you fail.”—Frederic the Great. At Leuctra and Mantinea, Epaminondas won by the oblique or Strategic order of battle. Alexander the Great won by the same order at Issus and the Haspades. Cyrus won at Thymbra and Hannibal won at Trebia, Thrasymene, Cannae and Herdonea, by the three sides of an octagon or enveloping formation. Caesar won by the oblique order at Pharsaleus. Gustavus Adolphus won at Leipsic by acting from the Tactical Center and Turenne and Prince Eugene gained their victories by the same means. Frederic the Great won at Hohenfriedberg, Sohr, Rosbach, Leuthern, Zorndorf and Leignitz by the oblique order and at Torgau by acting from the tactical center. Washington won at Trenton and Princeton acting by three contiguous sides of an octagon. Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram and Ligny, by acting from the tactical center. Never did he attack by the oblique order of battle. Von Moltke’s victories all were won by acting in strict accord with the system laid down for the use of the Prussian army by Frederic the Great. COLUMN OF SUPPORTThe most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper use of the Column of Support is found in that Grand Operation executed by the Roman consuls, Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius, whereby the Carthagenian Army under Hasdrubal was destroyed at the river Metaurus 207 B.C. Hannibal, with the main Carthagenian army, posted in the south of Italy near Canusium, was observed by Nero and his troops; while in the west, Hasdrubal, observed by Livius was slowly advancing southward to form a junction with his brother, a most unscientific procedure. Livius permitted Hasdrubal to penetrate into Italy to a point a few miles south of the Metaurus River; whereupon Nero, taking 7,000 of his best troops, by a rapid march of 200 miles united with Livius; and the two consuls at once falling upon Hasdrubal utterly annihilated the Carthagenian army. Nero returned at all speed and the first news of his march and of the death blow to the Carthagenian projects against Rome was furnished by the sight of his brother’s head, which Nero cast into Hannibal’s camp from a military machine. The true method for uniting the Columns of Support “We encamped about Nuremberg the middle of June, the army after so many detachments was not above 11,000 infantry and 8,000 horse and dragoons. The King posted his army in the suburbs and drew intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the whole city with his army. His works were large, the ditch deep, planked by innumerable bastions, ravelins, horn-works, forts, redoubts, batteries and palisades, the incessant labor of 8000 men for fourteen days. “On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and to starve him out. “The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones, acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until their work was done. “The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle, Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria. “Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and having drawn together their forces from various parts and ALL joined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in the world.” Only once, at the battle of Torgau, (Nov. 5, 1760) did Frederick the Great rely upon the co-operation of his Columns of Support for victory. As the result, his Column of Attack of 25,000 men fought the entire battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of 90,000 enemies and 400 pieces of artillery that, as the sun went down the King charged at the head of two battalions, his sole remaining troops. At this moment Gen. Zeithen, with the Column of Support, of 22,000 men occupied Siptka Hill, the tactical key of the battlefield, and fired a salvo of artillery to inform the King of their presence. The astonished Austrians turned and fled; the King’s charge broke their line of battle and Frederic grasped a victory, “for which” says Napoleon, “he was indebted to Fortune and the only one in which he displayed no talent.” This comment of course is not true. Frederic displayed magnificent talent that day, by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous Column of Support. Had Napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct of battles during 1813, 1814 and 1815 it is possible that he would have terminated his career at some other place than at St. Helena. The experience, however, was enough to fully satisfy Frederic, and never again did he attempt a Logistic battle. The capture of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown is perhaps the nearest approach to the achievement of Nero and Livius in the annals of the military art. Decoyed by the retrograde movements of Gen. Greene, the British army was deluded into taking up a position at Yorktown, having the unfordable James River in rear, and within striking distance of the main American army under Washington about New York City. Lafayette was ordered to reinforce Greene; Count All this took time, but everything was executed like clockwork. The French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake; the next day came a British fleet to rescue the Earl’s army. In the naval fight which ensued, the British were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to New York. By a swift march, Washington, with his Continentals and the French, joined Greene and Lafayette, and two of his redoubts being taken by storm, Lord Cornwallis surrendered. This victory established the independence of the American Colonies. The Logistic Battle, i.e., the combination of the Columns of Attack and of Support was first favorite with Napoleon and to his partiality for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his astonishing career. The retrieving of his lost battle of Marengo, by the fortuitous arrival of Dessaix column, seems to have impressed Napoleon to the extent that he ever after preferred to win by such process, rather than by any other. The first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at Jena. Single handed his column of attack destroyed the Prussian main body, while Davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times his numbers. The French Column of Support under Bernadotte did not arrive in season to fire a shot. At Eylau, the French Column of Support under Davoust was four hours in advancing six miles against the opposition of the Russian general Doctoroff. The second French Column of Support under Ney did not reach the field until the battle was over. In the retreat from Russia, the French Column of Support under the Duke of Belluno was driven from its position at Smolensko, thus permitting the Russians under Kutosof to occupy the Strategic center, which disaster cost Napoleon 30,000 men in clearing his communications. In 1813, the Column of Support under Ney at Bautzen was misdirected and the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the French Column of Attack. In 1814, Napoleon conformed to the Art by acting in three columns, but yielding to his besetting military sin, he joined his Column of Support to his Column of Attack and through the open space thus created in the French Strategetic Front, Blucher advanced triumphantly to Paris. In the Waterloo campaign, Napoleon properly began with three Grand Columns. At the battle of Ligny, his Column of Support arrived upon Blucher’s left flank and then without firing a shot, wheeled about and marched away. At Waterloo, by uniting his Columns of Attack and of Support prematurely, Napoleon permitted Blucher to penetrate the French Strategetic Front and to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at Paris. Von Moltke won the battle of Sadowa by the arrival of the Prussian Column of Support, commanded by Prince Frederic William. But in the interim, the German main army was driven in several miles by the Austrians, and Prince Bismark’s first white hairs date from that day. COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE“A small body of brave and expert men, skillfully handled and favored by the ground, easily may render difficult the advance of a large army.”—Frederic the Great. At the river Metaurus, the Roman Consul Livius gave a fine example of the duties of a Column of Manoeuvre which are slowly and securely to retreat before an advancing enemy and never to be induced into a pitched battle until the arrival of the kindred main body. Frederic the Great made great use of Columns of Manoeuvre. In the Seven Years War he constantly maintained such a column against the armies of each State with whom Prussia was at war; while himself and his brother Henry operated as Columns of Attack. In the Revolutionary War, Washington maintained a Column of Manoeuvre against the British in Rhode Napoleon constantly used Columns of Manoeuvre in all his campaigns; notably at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, in 1812, 1813, 1814 and at Ligny and Waterloo in 1815. PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS |
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