  “The chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of the latter.”—Washington. “It is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies’ troops. “He must examine which army has the better weapons, which is the better trained and disciplined; superior in condition and most resolute in emergencies. “He must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior infantry, cavalry or artillery, and particularly must he discern any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses, and any difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be or because of such reason, advantageously may be opposed to each other. “Advantages in Organization determine the field of battle to be preferred, which latter should be selected with the view of profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped corps, to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops. “If a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all means to bring on an engagement, but if he sees himself inferior, he must avoid battle and endeavor Advantage in Organization consists in having one or more Corps d’armee which in equipment or in composition are so superior to the hostile corps to which they may become opposed, as entails to them exceptional facilities for the execution of those major tactical evolutions that appertain to any tactical area made up of corresponding geometric or sub-geometric symbols. PRINCIPLEAdvantage in Organization determines the choice of a prospective battlefield; and the latter always should be composed of those tactical areas which permit of the fullest exercise of the powers peculiar to kindred corps d’armee. Every corps d’armee thus especially equipped should be constantly and energetically employed in the prospective battle; and usually it will eventuate as the Prime Tactical Factor in the decisive Major Tactical evolution. Notions most mistaken prevail in regard to the Pawns and Pieces of the Chessboard. To suppose that the Chessmen per se may be utilized to typify the different arms of the military service is a fallacy. Many unfamiliar with the technicalities of Strategetic Science delude themselves that the Pawns, on account of their slow and limited movements properly are to be regarded as Infantry; that the Knights because topped Nothing can be further from the truth than such assumptions. As a fundamental of military organization applied to Chessplay, each Chesspiece typifies in itself a complete Corps d’armee. Each of these Chessic corps d’armee is equal to every other in strength, but all differ, more or less, in construction and in facilities, essential to the performance of diverse and particular duties. Thus it is that while every Chesspiece represents a perfectly appointed and equally powerful body of troops, these corps d’armee in Chessplay as in scientific warfare are not duplicates, except to others of their own class. Each of these corps d’armee is made up of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery in correct proportion to the service they are to perform and such proportions are determined not by simple arithmetic, but by those deployments, developments, evolutions, and manoeuvres, which such corps d’armee is constructed promptly and efficiently to execute. The Chessmen, therefore, do not as individuals represent either infantry, cavalry or artillery. But in the same manner as the movements of troops over the surface of the earth, exemplify the attributes of the three kindred grand columns in the greater logistics of a campaign; so do those peculiarities which appertain to the moves of the different Chesspieces exemplify the action of the three chief arms of the military service; either singly or in combination against given points in given times, in the evolutions of the battlefield, viz.: CORPS D’ARMEE EN MARCH.The march of:
is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied adjacent point. The march of:
is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied point, not an adjacent point. CORPS D’ARMEE EN ASSAULT.The Charge of Infantry is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an occupied adjacent point; posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located. The Charge of Cavalry is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an occupied point not an adjacent point; posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located. CORPS D’ARMEE FIRE EFFECT.Infantry:Offensive Fire Effect. Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an adjacent occupied point. Defensive Fire Effect. Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an adjacent unoccupied point. Artillery:Offensive Fire Effect. Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an occupied point not an adjacent point. Defensive Fire Effect. Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an unoccupied point not an adjacent point. CHESSIC CORPS D’ARMEE.The Corps d’armee of the Chessboard are divided into two classes: viz.:
CORPS D’ARMEE OF POSITION.“The Pawns are the soul of Chess; upon their good or bad arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game.”—Philidor. The eight Pawns, by reason of their limited movements, their inability to move backward and the peculiarity of their offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Position. Each Corps of Position has its particular and designated Point of Mobilization and of Development, which differ with the various Strategic Fronts. Upon each Corps of Position devolves the duties of maintaining itself as a consistent integer of the established, or projected kindred Pawn Integral; as a possible kindred Promotable Factor and as a Point of Impenetrability upon the altitude of an opposing Pawn. Corps of Position take their individual appelation from their posts in a given formation, viz.:
The above formations by Corps of Position are described and illustrated in detail in preceding text-books by the author, entitled:
The normal use of Corps of Position is limited to Lines of Mobilization, of Development and to the Simple Line of Manoeuvre. CORPS D’ARMEE OF EVOLUTION.“Every man in Alexander’s army is so well trained and obedient that at a single word of command, officers and soldiers make any movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare. “Only such troops as themselves can check their career and oppose their bravery and expertness.”—Caridemus. The eight Pieces, by reason of their ability to move in all directions, the scope of their movements and the peculiar exercises of their offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Evolution. Corps of Evolution acting offensively, take their individual appelations from the points which constitute their objective in the true Strategetic Horizon, viz.:
Corps of Evolution acting defensively, take their individual appelations from the particular duties they are required to perform, viz.:
The normal use of Corps of Evolution is limited to Lines of Manoeuvre. When acting on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre, a Corps of Evolution may deploy on the corresponding Line of Mobilization; but it has nothing in common with the Line of Development, which latter appertains exclusively to Corps of Position. Any corps d’armee, whether of Position or of Evolution may be utilized upon a Line of Operations. THE KING.Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the King marches as infantry, cavalry and artillery; but it attacks as infantry exclusively and never as cavalry or artillery. Although every situation upon the Chessboard contemplates the presence of both Kings, either, or neither, or both, may, or may not be present in any given Strategetic Horizon. Whenever the King is present in a given Strategetic Horizon the effect of his co-operation is mathematically outlined, thus:
THE QUEEN.Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Queen marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery. Either, neither, or both Queens may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of her co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.: At her maximum of efficiency the Queen occupies the common vertex of one or more unequal triangles, whose aggregate area is from a minimum of 21 to a maximum of 27 points. Her offensive power is equally valid against all of these points; but her defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points. THE ROOK.Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Rook marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery. From one to four Rooks may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.: At her maximum of efficiency, the Rook occupies the common angle of four quadrilaterals, whose aggregate area always is 14 points. The Offensive Power of the Rook is equally valid against all these points, but his defensive power is valid for the support of only two points. THE BISHOP.Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Bishop marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery. From one to four Bishops may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.: At its maximum of efficiency, the Bishop occupies the common vertex of four unequal triangles, having a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 9 points. His offensive power is valid against all of these points but his defensive power is valid only for the support of two points. KNIGHT.Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Knight marches and attacks as cavalry and artillery. From one to four Knights may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.: At its maximum of efficiency, the Knight occupies the centre of an octagon of two points radius, having a minimum of two points and a maximum of eight points area. His offensive power is equally valid against all of these eight points, but his defensive power is valid for the support of only one point. THE PAWN.Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Pawn at its normal post marches as infantry and cavalry. Should an adverse corps, however, take post within the kindred side of the Chessboard; that Pawn upon whose altitude the adverse Piece appears, at once loses its equestrian attributes and marches and attacks exclusively as infantry. Located at any other point than at its normal post, the Pawn is composed exclusively of infantry and never acts either as cavalry or artillery. From one to eight Pawns may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined as follows: At its maximum of efficiency the Pawn occupies the vertex of a triangle of two points. Its offensive power is equally valid against both of these points; but its defensive power is valid for the support of only one point. POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTS.Subjoined is a table of the potential complements of the Chesspieces.
The student clearly should understand that this table does not indicate prowess, but relates exclusively to normal facilities for bringing force into action. The relative advantage in Organization possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.: RULE.1. Above a line, set down in order those abbreviations which properly designate the White corps d’armee present in a given Strategetic Situation; and below the line, set down those abbreviations which in like manner designate the Black corps d’armee, viz.:
2. Cancel all like symbols and resolve the unlike symbols remaining, into their respective Potential complements, viz.:
3. Subtract the lesser Potential total from the greater and the difference will be the relative advantage in Organization. 4. To utilize the relative advantage in Organization select a battlefield in which the Strategic Key, the Tactical Keys and the Points of Command of the True Strategetic Horizon are situated upon the perimeters of those geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the corps d’armee whose superior potentiality is established by Section 2. 5. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Organization, occupy the necessary posts upon the battlefield selected in such a manner that the kindred decisive points are situated not upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols appertaining to the adverse corps d’armee of superior potentiality; while the adverse decisive points are situated upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the kindred corps d’armee of inferior potentiality. MILITARY EXAMPLES“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed to fatigue and inured to want.”—Caesar. “That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be composed of your best troops.”—Epaminondas. The Sacred Band of the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor and character. Epaminondas called them Comrades and by honorable rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers. At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band led by Epaminondas. This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.) The Macedonian Phalanx was devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long. The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were called Dilochie; four With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian—Theban—Boeotian army at Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus (333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at the Hydaspes (326 B.C.). The Spanish Heavy Cavalry and Nubian Infantry of Hannibal was a reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great had conquered the world. With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at Apulia (208 B.C.). At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus; “Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now they send against me a General without an army.” The Tenth Legion of Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of artillery. The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected. The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers. The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears. With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain, Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion. At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth. The Scots Volunteers of Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars. At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the allied Protestant army, were routed at The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers, looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key to every castle in Europe.” The Van-Guard of Frederic the Great is the perfect adaptation of the minor tactics of Epaminondas to gunpowder. This choice body was made up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry, cuirassiers, dragoons and light artillery. The Van-Guard, a miniature army in itself, always marched between the main body and the enemy; it always led in the attack, followed by that wing containing the best soldiers, in two lines; and supported by the heavy cavalry on that flank. At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) the Prussian Van-Guard, composed of 4,800 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 30 guns, annihilated 70,000 French regular troops, by evolutions so rapidly executed that the Prussian main army was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the battle, other than as highly interested spectators. The Continentals of the Revolutionary army under Washington were made up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by Baron von Steuben, a Major-General in the Prussian service, who had served throughout the Seven Years War under Frederic the Great. The Continentals, without firing a shot, carried by assault, Stony Point (July 16, 1779), Paulus Hook (July 20, 1779) and the British intrenchments at Yorktown (Oct. 19, 1781). Of these troops, the Baron von Steuben writes: “I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation; officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and the equal of any in the world.” The Consular Guard was the reproduction of the Van Guard of Frederic the Great, but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by Bonaparte, who, instead of placing his best troops in the front of his army, as is the practice of all other of the Great Captains; subordinated their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon himself. This Corps d’elite was but once notably in action; at Marengo (June 14, 1800) it undoubtedly saved the day for France, by maintaining the battle until the arrival of Gen. Desaix and his division. The Imperial Guard of Napoleon was the development of the Consular Guard of Bonaparte. Under the Empire the Guard became an independent army, consisting of light and heavy infantry, horse and field artillery, The functions of this fine body, like that of its prototype, was limited to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the Emperor; and perhaps next to announcement of victory, Napoleon’s favorite bulletin always read, “The Imperial Guard was not engaged.” Many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this policy, which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare, is putting the cart before the horse; and seemingly is that speck of cloud in Napoleon’s political sky, which properly may be deemed a precursor of St. Helena. At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805), the cuirassiers of the French Imperial Guard routed a like body of Russian cavalry. At Eylau (Nov. 7, 1807) the Guard, as at Marengo again saved the day, after the corps d’armee of Soult and Angereau had been destroyed, by maintaining the battle until the arrival of Ney and Davoust. In the retreat from Russia (1812) the Guard then numbering 64,000 men was nearly destroyed. What was left of it won at Ligny (June 16, 1815), Napoleon’s last victory and at Waterloo (June 18, 1815), one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of the French army, while the other escorted Napoleon in safety to Paris. The Royal Prussian Guard, under Von Moltke, was organized and utilized in accord with the teachings of Frederic the Great. Its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of 1870. The right flank of the French having been turned by the battle of Woerth (Aug. 4, 1870) and Marshal MacMahon’s army being driven to the westward, The Royal Prussian Guard out-marching both friends and enemies first reached the Nancy road (Aug. 18, 1870) and until the German corps reached the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the assault of nearly the entire French army. In the first half-hour the Guard lost 8,000 men. As the result of all this, Marshal Bazine with 150,000 men was forced back into and taken in the intrenched camp at Metz; and the Emperor Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon and a second French army of 140,000 men was captured at Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870), in an attempt to rescue Marshal Bazine. “I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”—Gustavus Adolphus. “Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain. The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole, and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note of the trumpet or a motion of their banners. “The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both glorious and terrible. “Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain, and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.… “Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying. Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back, nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day in rank and file as they were drawn up.” Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and precision any and every prescribed evolution. TOPOGRAPHY “Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we may gain the victory.”—Phocion. “There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the advantage in ground.”—Gustavus Adolphus. “That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass of the enemy.”—Napoleon. |
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