  “In every situation the principal strategical requirements must clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to these considerations.”—Frederic the Great. “One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the unknown.”—Euclid. The province of Grand Reconnaissance is exactly to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages in time, numbers, organization, topography, mobility and position, which appertain to hostile armies contained in the same strategetic plane; and to designate those Corps d’armee by which such advantages are materially expressed. Those processes which appertain to the making of Grand Reconnaissance, necessarily are argumentative; inasmuch as all the facts never are determinate. Consequently, talent of the highest order is required for the deducing of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge, and which always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities. The responsibilities inherent to Grand Reconnaissance never are to be delegated to, nor thrust upon subordinates. Scouts, spies, and informers of every kind, have their manifold and proper uses, but such uses never rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical, tactical, and logistic details. The Commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact; and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence. Lack of military talent and of Strategetic knowledge, never is more strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard. Incompetents, ignorant of this truth, and oblivious to its importance, devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates; and later, these legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per month, for failing in a service, which were the latter able to perform, would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general’s pay, of which their commander is the unfit recipient. Knowledge of the number, organization, position and movements of the enemy’s troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign and battle. Such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected. All speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but frivolity. It is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions, that men are deceived, for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly shown is most difficult. To act on uncertainty is WRONG. We do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved. In the making of Grand Reconnaissance, one always must be wary of placing too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions. Especially must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army, nor the efficacy of the kindred position. Also, one never should underrate:
It is a first essential, constantly to note the movements of the enemy, in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps. These things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course of procedure. It must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and the posts which he occupies, the measures he projects for the future, and until these are known, it is not proper to ACT. Hence: PRINCIPLEAll movements of Corps Offensive should be governed by the POSITION of the hostile army, and all movements of Corps Defensive should be governed by the MOVEMENTS of the hostile army. As soon as the enemy begins a movement, his intentions become clear. It is then possible to make precise calculations. But be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers, the position, the objectives, and the projects of the enemy. However interesting an undertaking may appear, one should not be seduced by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action. Chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception. Reason, instead of extravagancies of the fancy, always must be the guide. Men, most courageous, often undertake fearful difficulties, but impracticable things they leave to lunatics. In all situations, one must beware of venturing beyond his depth. It is wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall prescribe. Especially in crises, one must proceed most cautiously until sure information is acquired; for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous, when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy’s numbers, position, and movements. PRINCIPLESituations always should be contemplated as they EXIST, never as they OUGHT to be, or, perhaps, MAY be. In every important juncture, each step must be profoundly considered; as little as possible should be left to chance. Particularly, must one never be inflated and rendered careless and negligent by success; nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses. At all times the General should see things only as they are and attempt what is dictated by “Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from 17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”—Baron de Jomini. MILITARY EXAMPLES“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events, derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when to yield is necessary. His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming expedition and making no difference between summer or winter, between fatigue and rest. He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a second until he is assured of the success of the first and his operations are always dominated by considerations of time and place.”—Apollodorus. The facility with which one familiar with the Strategetic Art may make Grand Reconnaissance, even of an invisible theatre of action, and may evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory reports is illustrated by the following practical examples, viz.: FIRST EXAMPLE.(From the New York Journal, Dec. 26, 1899 By Franklin K. Young.) “The position of the British armies is deplorable. “With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for the greatest anxiety. “Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by a single blow. “True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British in South Africa. “For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.” The United States War Department, Report on the British-Boer War, published June 14, 1901, contains the following: (By Capt. S. L’H. Slocum, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache with the British Army.) “I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English forces, since hostilities began. (By Chas. S. Goldmann, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.) “Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule in South Africa to its foundation.” SECOND EXAMPLE.(Boston Globe, Jan. 12, 1900. By Franklin K. Young.) “Lord Roberts’ first object will be the rescue of Lord Methuen’s army now blockaded near Magersfontein by Gen. Conje. “As the first step to effect this, the British commander-in-chief at once and with all his force, will occupy the line from Naauwpoort to De Arr. There, he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route from England. “With these reinforcements, he will advance directly to the Modder River by the route previously taken by Lord Methuen.” (By Chas. S. Goldmann, Sp. Cor. British Army.) “Slow to recognize their opportunities, the enemy were still in the midst of preparation, when Gen. French reached De Arr. Meanwhile a detachment under Major McCracken occupied Naauwpoort, to which place thirty days’ supplies for 3000 men and 1100 animals had been ordered. “In the ten weeks of fighting which ensued, prior to the arrival of the British main army, Gen. French by his skillful tactics held a powerful force of Boers at bay, checked their descent into the southern part of the colony, defeated their attempt to display the Vierkleur across the cape peninsular, and materially influenced, if not absolutely determined, the entire future of the campaign.” (By Chas. S. Goldmann, Sp. Cor. with British Army.) “Arriving at Capetown on Jan. 10, Lord Roberts decided that the line of march should lead by way of Bloemfontein to Pretoria, initiating the operation by the concentration of large forces on the Modder River, forming there an advanced base.” THIRD EXAMPLE.(Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1900. By Franklin K. Young.) “It is plain that when the Boers took position at Colenso they prepared their plan for the protection of their flanks; to deny this would be to assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant of the simplest processes of warfare. “What that plan is will be unfolded very rapidly should Gen. Buller attempt to pierce the line of Boer vedettes posted upon the Spion Kop and concealing as near as can be determined from the present meagre facts, either the Second, or the Fourth Ambuscade. “In either case it signifies that the Boers are confident of annihilating Gen. Buller’s army if it should cross the Tugela. “About this time the Boers are watching Gen. Warren and his command and watching him intently. Something may happen to him.” (London Times, Jan. 22, 1900.) “On Friday, Jan. 19, Gen. Warren began a long, circuitous march to the westward for the purpose of turning the right of the Boer position. “This attempt was abandoned on account of the long ridge running from Spion Kop being occupied by the Boers in such strength as to command the entire route. “Saturday, Jan. 20, Gen. Warren, having crossed the Tugela River with the bulk of his troops, ordered a frontal attack. Our men behaved splendidly under a (British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 22, 1900.) “Gen. Warren has been engaged all day chiefly on his left, which he has swung forward a couple of miles.” (Signed) Buller. (British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 24, 1900.) “Gen. Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. The Boer position is on higher ground than ours and can be approached only over bare and open slopes. An attempt will be made tonight to seize Spion Kop.” (Signed) Buller. (British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1900.) “Gen. Warren’s troops last night occupied Spion Kop, surprising the small (Signed) Buller. (British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 26, 1900.) “Gen. Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in the night abandoned Spion Kop.” (Signed) Buller. (British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1900.) “I decided that a second attack on Spion Kop was useless (Signed) Buller. (London Daily Mail, Jan. 29, 1900.) “The richest and what was hitherto considered the most powerful nation in the world is today in the humiliating position of seeing its armies beaten back with heavy losses by two small states.” FOURTH EXAMPLE.(Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1900, by Franklin K. Young.) “Lord Roberts’ communications for nearly two hundred miles are exposed to the attack of an enemy, who at any moment is liable to capture and destroy his supply and ammunition trains and to reduce the British army to a condition wherein it will be obliged to fight a battle under most disadvantageous circumstances.” (From United States War Department Report on the British Boer War. By Capt. S. L’H. Slocum, U. S. Attache with British Army.) “Feb. 15, 1900. The main supply park of the army was attacked by the enemy near Watervale Drift. “This park consisted of one hundred ox-wagons containing rations and one hundred more wagons filled with ammunition. One hundred and fifty of these wagons and three thousand oxen were captured by the Boers. “The loss of these rations and munitions was a most serious blow. Lord Roberts was here confronted by a crisis which would have staggered and been the undoing of many commanders-in-chief placed as he was. “He was in the enemy’s country, cut off from his base of supplies on the railroad and with an unknown number of the enemy in his rear and upon his line of communication. His transport was nearly all captured and his army was suddenly reduced to three days full rations on the eve of a great movement and the country afforded no food whatever. The crisis still further developed when a courier brought the report that the Boers were in position at Watervale Drift and commanding the ford with artillery.” FIFTH EXAMPLE.(Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 1900. By Franklin K. Young.) “There is reason to believe that should worse come to worse, the Boer Army, should it be compelled to abandon its position, will be able to save its personnel by a rapid flight across the Modder. Of course, in this case, the Boers would lose their supplies and cannon.” (From United States War Department, Report on the British Boer War. By Capt. S. L’H. Slocum, U. S. Attache, with British Army.) “The enemy, under Cronje, with all his transport was in all practical effect surrounded, although by abandoning his wagons and supplies, a large number of the Boers undoubtedly could have escaped.” (Boston Sunday Times, March, 1900. By Franklin K. Young.) “Cronje’s conduct was heroic and imbecile in the extreme. As the commander on the ground he is entitled to all the glory and must assume all the blame. One of the ablest of the Boer generals, he is the only one in the whole war to make a mistake. “Cronje’s first duty was to decide whether he should stand or run; he decided to run, which was proper, but having so decided he should have run at once and not have stopped running until safe on the north bank of the Vaal River. “Properly he sent his siege guns and trains off to the north across the Vaal and improperly held his position in force on the British front, instead of withdrawing his personnel after his material. “This blunder, like all blunders of a commander-in-chief, quickly produced blunders by his subordinates. Commander Ferrera permitted French to get around Cronje’s left flank without a battle. The presence of this force on his rear cut Cronje off from his natural line of retreat across the Vaal and compelled him to flee toward Bloemfontein. “Even now Cronje was all right; he easily and brilliantly out-manoeuvred the British and gained the protection of the Modder River. But a second time he blundered. Instead of first executing Ferrera and then abandoning everything and devoting all his efforts to saving his men, he neglected an obvious and imperative military duty and clung to his slow-moving cannon and wagons. “Finally he took position on the Modder and resolved to fight the whole British army. This was fatal. “Then for the fourth time he blundered. Having made his decision to fight he should not have surrendered “Mere hope of attaining their desires, coupled with ignorance of the processes necessary to their accomplishment, is the common delusion and the certain destruction of the inexperienced.”—Plato. ORGANIZATION “To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the nation.”—Chinese Saying. Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were not enough for the Romans.” “Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.” “A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to bear arms, but to bear baggage.”—Timoleon. |
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