CHAPTER IX. THE CULTURE SYSTEM.

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Financial system previous to the British occupation—? Raffles' changes—?Return of the Dutch—?Financial policy—?Van den Bosch Governor-General—?Introduction of the culture system—?Its application to sugar—?To other industries—?Financial results of the system—? Its abandonment—?Reasons of this—?Present condition of trade in Java—?Financial outlook.

As I have already mentioned, the Colonial Government succeeded the Dutch East India Company in the administration of Java towards the end of the last century. During the period antecedent to the British occupation, the revenue of the Government was derived from two monopolies: (1) that of producing the more valuable crops, and (2) that of trading in all products whatever. Meanwhile the mass of the natives were left entirely to the mercy of the native princes, by whom they were subjected to all manner of exactions.

The financial results of this state of things were seen in the fact that in 1810 the gross revenue of Java was only three and a half million florins,[16] a sum wholly inadequate to the requirements of administration.

During the five years of British occupation (1811-1816) Sir Stamford Raffles was Lieutenant-Governor. He at once introduced reforms. The native princes were displaced; the village community, with its common property and patriarchal government, was modified; a system of criminal and civil justice, similar to that in force in India, in which a European judge sat with native assessors, was introduced; the peasants were given proprietary rights in the soil they cultivated; and complete political and commercial liberty was established. An inquiry into the nature of the respective rights in the soil of the cultivator, the native princes, and the Government resulted in establishing the fact that, of the subject territory the Government was sole owner of seven-tenths. Of the remainder, two-tenths belonged to the Preanger Regents, and one-tenth was occupied by private estates, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Buitenzorg and Batavia. In order to teach the native the western virtues of industry and independence, Raffles determined to introduce the Ryotwarree system. The property in the land vested in the Government was handed over to individual peasant proprietors. In return for his land each proprietor was made individually and personally responsible for the payment of his land tax, and his land was liable to be sold in satisfaction of his public or private debts.

Before the English administration the peasant had paid—(1) a land rent for his rice lands to the native princes, amounting to a sum equivalent to one-half of the produce of sawah (irrigated) and one-third of tegal (unirrigated) lands; and (2) a tax of forced labour to the Dutch Government, which took the form of unpaid labour in the cultivation of the produce for export. Raffles abolished both, and in place of them he established a fixed money payment equivalent to a much smaller proportion of the produce of the land than had been paid before to the native princes alone.

The Dutch regained their East Indian possessions by the Treaty of London. On their return to Java, they restored the village community with its joint ownership and joint liability, and abolished all proprietary rights of the natives in the soil, only allowing ownership of land to Europeans. They contend that this attempt of Raffles to apply Western principles to an Eastern society had already proved disastrous. The peasants, on the one hand, had not acquired the habits necessary for the successful development of their holdings, but, on the other, through their inability to pay the land rent, were becoming hopelessly involved in debt to the Chinese and Arab money-lenders. The broad fact, however, remains that during the short period of British rule the revenue rose from three and a half to seven and a half million florins, and the population from four to five and a half millions.

As the old monopolies from which the chief part of the revenue had formerly been derived had been abolished by the policy of unrestricted commerce introduced by Raffles, it was necessary to find some other method of raising money. It was decided to retain the land tax as a basis of revenue, but, in order to make it more profitable, a return was made to the original principle of land tenure under native rule, by which the cultivator paid one-fifth of his labour and one-fifth of his produce in return for the usufruct of the land. One day of gratuitous labour in seven (the European week) was substituted for one day in five formerly given to the landlord. In certain districts, namely, those of which the Dutch became possessed by treaty and not by conquest, this contribution in kind and labour was paid to the native princes, and not to the Government. On private estates, again, as the Government had parted with their feudal rights in alienating the property, a tax of three-fourths per cent, on the estimated value of the property was substituted. This tax, called verponding, was at most equivalent to one-fifth of the net yearly income.

As before, the produce due from the peasants cultivating Government lands was commuted into a money payment assessed upon the rice crops; but this payment was made, not by the individual peasants, but by the wedanas, or village chiefs, on behalf of the whole community. Beside the land tax, an additional source of income remained in the profit arising from the sale of coffee, grown either by the Preanger Regents and sold to the Government at prices fixed by treaty, or on the coffee plantations established by Marshall Daendels, which were now restored.

These two methods of raising revenue were resorted to by the Dutch upon their return to the island, and continued in force during the period 1816-1833. They were wholly inadequate. Whether the Dutch were right or not in characterizing Raffles' reforms as a failure, it is certain that nothing could be more desperate than the state of the island in the years immediately preceding the introduction of the culture system. At the end of the period 1816-1833 both revenue and population seem to have become stationary. The mass of the natives were becoming so impoverished that they ceased to be able to keep a supply of domestic animals and implements necessary for the cultivation of their lands. Apart from the princes, there was no class, merchants or tradespeople, possessing any wealth that could be taxed. Not only was the revenue stagnant, but, owing to a war with the sultans of the interior, a debt of over 35,000,000 florins was incurred by the Government. In a word, the colony seemed likely to become an intolerable burden to Holland. It was at this crisis that General Van den Bosch proposed the culture system as a means of rescuing the island from its financial and social difficulties.

The immediate object of the culture system was to extend the cultivation of sugar, coffee, and other produce suited for European consumption; its ultimate object was to develop the resources of the island. This latter was, of course, the most important. Van den Bosch saw that the natives would never be able to do this by themselves. In the first place, they were still organized on the patriarchal model in village communities; and, in the second, owing to the tropical climate and the extreme ease with which life could be sustained in so fertile a country, they were naturally indolent and unprogressive. He therefore proposed to organize their labour under European supervision. By this method he thought that he would be able both to raise the revenue and to improve the condition of the peasants by teaching them to grow valuable produce in addition to the rice crops on which they depended for subsistence. Van den Bosch became Governor-General of Java and its dependencies in 1830. Before leaving Holland he had made his proposals known, and obtained the approval of the Netherlands Government. He took with him newly appointed officials free from colonial traditions, and his reforms inspired such confidence, that a number of well-educated and intelligent persons were willing to emigrate with their families to Java in order to take up the business of manufacturing the produce grown under the new system. Upon his arrival in the island, a special branch cf the Colonial Administration was created. The first work of the new department was to found the sugar industry. It was necessary to supply the manufacturers with both capital and income. Accordingly, a sum amounting to £14,000 was placed to the credit of each manufacturer in the books of the department. Of this sum he was allowed to draw up to £125 per month for the expenses of himself and his family during the first two years. From the third year onwards he paid back one-tenth annually. Thus at the end of twelve years the capital was repaid. The manufacturer was to apply the capital so advanced to the construction of the sugar-mill, which was to be fitted with the best European machinery, and worked by water-power. Free labour, and timber from the Government plantations, was supplied; and the customs duties upon the machinery and implements imported were remitted. The building of the mills was supervised by the contrÔleurs, the officials of the new department, and had to be carried out to their satisfaction. The department also undertook to see that the peasants in the neighbourhood of each mill should have from seven hundred to a thousand acres planted with sugar-canes by the time the mills were in working order. In Java, as in other Eastern countries, the landlord has the right of selecting the crop which the tenant is to plant, and therefore the peasants saw nothing unusual in this action of the Government. The contrÔleurs ascertained, in the case of each village, how much rice land was necessary for the subsistence of the village, and they then ordered the remainder, usually one-fifth, to be planted with sugar-canes. At the same time, they explained that the value of the crop of sugar would be much greater than that of the rice crop, and promised that the peasants should be paid not only for the crops, but also for the labour of cutting the canes and carrying them to the mill. When, at the end of two years, the mills had been built and the plantations established, another advance was made by the department to the manufacturers. This was capital sufficient to pay for the value of the sugar crop, estimated as it stood, for the wages of the peasants, and generally for the expenses of manufacture. This second advance was at once repaid by the produce of the mill. At first the department required the manufacturer to deliver the whole amount of produce to them at a price one-third in excess of the cost of production. Subsequently he was allowed the option of delivering the whole crop to Government, or of delivering so much of the produce only as would pay for the interest on the crop advance, together with the instalment of the original capital annually due. Working on these terms, large profits were made by the manufacturers, and there soon came to be a demand for such new contracts as the Government had at their disposal.

Page 156.

A PRODUCE MILL.

As for the peasants, they were undoubtedly benefited by the introduction of the system. While the land rent continued to be calculated as before, on a basis of the produce of ricefields, the value of the sugar crop was so much greater than that of the rice, which it partially displaced, that the money received for it amounted on the average to twice the sum paid to Government for land rent on the whole of the village land. Moreover, although the estimated price of the crop was paid to the wedanas, or village chiefs, the wages for cutting and carrying were paid to the peasants individually. The value of the crop, the rate of wages, and the relations between the peasants and the manufacturers generally, were settled by the contrÔleurs.

In 1871, when the culture system was in full operation, there were 39,000 bouws, or 70,000 acres, under sugar-cane, giving employment to 222,000 native families, and ninety-seven sugar-mills had been started. One-third of the produce was delivered to Government at the rate of eight florins per picul,[17] and the remaining two-thirds were sold by the manufacturers in open market. In the five years 1866-1870 the Government profit on sugar amounted to rather more than 25,000,000 florins.

Subsequently the cultivation of coffee, indigo, cochineal, tobacco, pepper, tea, and cinchona was added to that of sugar. The system pursued was not identical in the case of all produce. Cochineal, indigo, tea, and tobacco were cultivated in a manner similar to that adopted for sugar. But in the case of coffee, cinnamon, and pepper it was not found necessary to have any manufacturers between the contrÔleurs and the peasants. Of these coffee, the most important, is grown on lands having an elevation of from 2000 to 4500 feet. Each head of a family is required to plant a certain number of trees in gardens (the maximum was fixed in 1877 at fifty a year), and to keep a nursery of young trees to replenish the plantations. These gardens and nurseries are all inspected by native and European officials. The process of harvesting the berry is similarly supervised, but after that is accomplished the peasants are left to dry, clean, and sort the berries by themselves, and are allowed to deliver the crop at the coffee stores at their own convenience. Finally, private persons contract for periods of two or three years to pack and transport the coffee to the central stores at the ports. Of the coffee produced on Government account, one-fifth only is sold in Java, and the remainder is sent home to Europe and sold there.

The culture system was so successful as a financial expedient, that between the years 1831 and 1875 the colonial revenue yielded surpluses to Holland amounting to 725,000,000 florins. This total seems the more remarkable when we know that from 1838 onwards, the colonial revenue was charged with 200,000,000 florins of the public debt of Holland, being the proportion borne by Belgium before the separation of the two countries, which took place at that date.

In 1876, however, the long series of surpluses ceased, and they have since been replaced by deficits almost as continuous. These deficits are due to three well-ascertained causes: (1) the Achin war, (2) public works, and (3) the fall in the price of sugar and coffee. In order to show that this remarkable change in the financial fortunes of Java is in no way due to the culture system, it is necessary to go somewhat more into detail.

(1) Before the outbreak of the Achin war in 1873, the average expenditure of the Colonial Government for military purposes was 30,000,000 florins annually. During the period 1873-1884 this expenditure rose to an average of 50,000,000 florins, and the total cost of the war during that period amounted to 240,000,000 florins. Since 1884 the expenditure has been reduced by confining the operations of the troops to such as are purely defensive; even then the average annual expenditure has reached 40,000,000 florins.

(2) Since 1875 the construction of railways and of other public works, notably the harbour works at Tanjong Priok, the port of Batavia, has been undertaken by Government. Since the cost has been paid out of current revenue, and not raised by loans, these works have necessitated a further annual expenditure of 8,000,000 florins. The total sum spent in public works between the years 1875-1884, amounting to 75,000,000 florins, is almost exactly equivalent to the deficit incurred during the same period.

(3) In suffering from the competition of France in sugar, and of Brazil in coffee, Java has not been peculiar. The British West Indian colonies are at the present time most disastrously affected by the bounty-fed sugar industry of France, and Ceylon is only just learning how to compensate itself for the diminution of its coffee export by the introduction of a new industry—tea.

As for the general progress of the island, it is sufficiently indicated by the fact that since the date (1831) of the introduction of the system, the population has increased from six to twenty-three millions, and the revenue from thirty million florins to one hundred and thirty-two.

Although the culture system has yielded such satisfactory results, it has been gradually abandoned since 1871.The reason for this change of policy is the feeling that the system, though necessary originally to develop the resources of the island, is at variance with the best interests of the natives, and hinders the introduction of private enterprise and capital. Increased commercial prosperity is expected to compensate for the loss of revenue caused by the withdrawal of the Government from the work of production. In the mean time, it has been found necessary to impose various new and direct taxes. The most important of these is a poll tax on the natives, which has taken the place of the personal services formerly rendered by them on the Government plantations. Originally imposed in 1871, it yielded two and a half million florins in 1886. Another compensating source of revenue is the growth of the verponding. As already mentioned, this is a tax of three-fourths per cent, on the capital value of house property and industrial plant. It is assessed every three years, and therefore is an accurate test of the growth of private wealth invested in the colony. In the fifteen years from 1871 to 1886, the amount yielded by this tax showed a growth of seventy-five per cent.

It is not necessary to detail the various steps by which the Dutch have carried out this policy of abandonment. It is sufficient to note the general result.

To-day all industries, with the exception of coffee, opium, and salt, are free. In the production of the two latter, opium and salt, the Colonial Government maintains a complete monopoly; in the case of coffee they compete with the planters. The extent of the shares respectively taken by the Government and private enterprise in the trade of the island is exhibited by the following returns for 1889:—

Imports. Exports.
Government 13,009,445 florins 33,072,175 florins
Private Persons 160,375,326 " 164,590,439 "
Total 173,384,771 " 197,662,614 "

The Government still produces two-thirds of the coffee crop. In 1889 the amount produced respectively by the Government and the planters was 578,000 and 356,000 piculs.Of the two chief industries of the island, sugar and coffee, the exports in 1890 amounted in value to fifty and fifteen million florins respectively. To these must be added two new industries—tea and cinchona bark. The former is only in its infancy, and is confined to the immediate neighbourhood of Soekaboemi, the head-quarters of the planting interest in Java. Here there are two important estates, Sinagar and Parakan Salak, which are from 12,000 to 15,000 acres in extent. The latter industry is especially hopeful. In 1890 the area of cinchona plantations was 22,500 acres, and 6,000,000 pounds of bark, containing four per cent, of sulphate of quinine, was exported. This amount is equivalent to half the world's supply for the year.

Of the import trade it is not necessary to say more than that the most important item is that of the various cotton goods, coming mainly from this country, which serve the natives with material for clothing suitable for their tropical climate. It is also important to remember that there are a quarter of a million Chinese residents in the island, by whom all the retail, and part of the wholesale, trade is conducted.

Last year the administration of Java was the subject of a severe criticism in the Netherlands Parliament. The complaints were chiefly directed against the conduct of the Achin war, the opium monopoly, and the continued interference of the Government in the coffee industry. The reply of Baron Mackay, the colonial minister at the Hague, was in substance as follows:—

The Achin war, he said, was the result of unavoidable circumstances, and neither the Colonial nor the Home Government could be regarded as responsible for the loss of revenue involved in it. He added, however, that "excellent results were expected from the blockade system" now adopted, and that there were already signs that the Atchinese would before long be brought to terms. With regard to the sale of opium, he assured the States-General that "every possible means were being taken to reduce the sale of the drug, and to remedy its evil effects." He frankly recognized the importance of the question of coffee-culture, but at the same time urged the advisability of maintaining the system for the present. It was not certain, in the first place, that the existing system could be changed with advantage; and, in the second, "no product in the immediate future could be looked for to replace coffee as a source of revenue."

Undoubtedly the resources of Java are at the present time subjected to a heavy strain. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that (1) the burden of the Achin war may be at any time removed, and (2) all public works are being paid for out of current revenue without recourse to loans. There is, therefore, no reasonable ground for supposing that the present financial difficulties of the Colonial Government are more than temporary. A glance at the balance-sheet of the island for the year 1889 shows to what an extent the difficulties are due to an increasing sense of responsibility towards the natives, and to an intention to eventually open all the industries of this singularly fertile island to private enterprise.

Heads of Revenue and Expenditure for 1889 in Million Florins.
Revenue. Expenditure.
Taxes 40 Instruction 10
Monopolies 31 Army and navy 40
Sale of produce (of this coffee contributes 37, sugar 2) 49 Public works (of this railways cost 10) 20
Other sources (railways, school fees, etc.) 14 Administration, etc. 60
In round numbers 134 130

When the natives have been educated and the industries of the island freed from unnatural restrictions, financial and commercial prosperity will return to Java.

Footnotes:

[16] 12 florins = £1.

[17] The picul = 135 lbs.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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