That adverse decision and judgment were based on a technicality,—on a point of law, not on a point of fact. The learned Justice who rendered decision and pronounced judgment did not find that Belasco had failed to prove his contention that, actually, he was in partnership with Klaw & Erlanger, not with Brooks, in presentation of “The Auctioneer.” He found that “parol evidence” could not be held to alter the effect of a written and sealed instrument of engagement. “The rule,” he declared, “allowing parol proof of an undisclosed principal is limited to simple contracts, for if the agreement be a sealed one, only the parties thereto subscribing can be held bound.” The question of prime public interest in this case (and it is of prime public interest, because the veracity, reputation and standing of one of the most eminent and influential men in our Theatre are affected by it) is not whether Belasco could, in law, under a strict rule of evidence, enforce against Klaw & Erlanger the contract actually signed by Brooks: the question is whether or not that contract was, in fact, signed by Brooks as “a man of straw” for Klaw & Erlanger, and by Belasco under duress. I cannot conceive that any intelligent and judicious person could read the testimony adduced and reach any other conclusion but that Belasco had proved his allegations as to fact. And it seems clear to me that the learned Justice must have felt satisfied that Belasco had proved his case, as to fact,—otherwise he would not have been at such pains to argue in extenso the incompetency of such proof under the rule.