CHAPTER XV

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HIS GREAT ADVENTURE

All merit comes
From daring the unequal,
All glory comes from daring to begin.
Eugene Ware

Beginning with January, 1857, one thing is clearly disclosed and made conclusive by the record of Brown's subsequent activities: that he contemplated an armed invasion and conquest of the Southern States. His correspondence, and the long line of historical incidents which touch his life, during the time intervening between that date and the collapse of his fortunes at Harper's Ferry, show that his mind was preoccupied with plans for the accomplishment of that stupendous purpose. He believed that the slaves could be induced to rise against their masters; assassinate them and their families, and declare their freedom. From the ranks of the freedmen, he planned to recruit an army for the occupation of the territory affected by the insurrection, and for further invasion; and to establish and maintain the authority of a provisional government.

His scheme for conquest was probably a result of his relations with Hugh Forbes. Together the two adventurers planned the details for the undertaking. It was in pursuance of their plans for this purpose that Brown engaged Forbes's services, at a salary of a hundred dollars a month; ordered the thousand spears; published the Manual of the Patriotic Volunteer; planned to lure the soldiery of the Union from their "service with Satan to the service of God"; planned to drive a nail into Captain Kidd's treasure-chest—whatever that meant; planned the War College, whereat the prospective generals for the prospective army, and the prospective members for the prospective cabinet of the prospective Provisional Government, were to be instructed, under the direction of Forbes, in the science of war, and in the science of civil government. It was for his civil and military leaders that he engaged Stevens, Cook, Kagi, Tidd, Parsons, Realf, Gill, and others, and placed them in the school of instruction.

To hedge against treason, he met with his embryonic generals and secretaries at Chatham, Canada, and in convention assembled adopted a "Constitution and Ordinances" for the Provisional Government, which, among its provisions, declared the confiscation of the "entire personal and real property of all persons known to be acting with or for the enemy, or found wilfully holding slaves." This constitution had been printed and copies of it were available at the Kennedy farm. Every man who marched with Brown to Harper's Ferry had read it, or had heard it read, and had sworn allegiance to the government it represented.

December 23, 1858, Merriam wrote to Brown: "I have heard vaguely of your contemplated action and now Mr. Redpath and Mr. Hinton have told me your contemplated action, in which I earnestly wish to join you in any capacity you wish to place me as far as my small capacities go."[418] He spent the winter in Hayti in company with Redpath, and knew how Brown intended to "assail the Slave Power."[419]

The message that Brown requested Conductor Phelps to communicate to the management of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, interdicting further traffic over the road, was a declaration of war. It was the first and only "Proclamation" issued by the commander-in-chief of the army of the Provisional Government. At the time he gave out this declaration—1:25 a. m., October 17, 1859—he and his captains confidently believed their insurrection to be in the full tide of successful initiation; that the country in the vicinity was then in the throes of a slaughter that spared neither sex nor age; that hordes of black fiends, like furies, were surging over the land in a riot of unimaginable proportions. These adventurers believed that their dreams of conquest were about to be realized; and that the rioting thousands, excited into a frenzy by the bloody deeds which had set them free, were already pressing in bands to join them at the appointed rendezvous to fill the ranks of the "Army of Liberation"; that it was solely a question of time—a few hours at most—until these allies would be arriving, and they would have control of an army sufficiently strong to establish and maintain their authority.

That the slaves' sole way to freedom lay over the dead bodies of their masters, was a self-evident proposition. The slaves knew by tradition and by experience, and Brown and his captains knew, that if they—the slaves—ran away from their masters to join his forces, the masters, reËnforced by the citizen soldiery, would pursue them immediately, and recover them before they could organize for either defensive or aggressive warfare. The problem of Harper's Ferry had been solved by the philosophy of the Pottawatomie. The same questions were involved in each venture: how to get the "goods" and keep them—how to get the slaves for the Provisional Army and forestall pursuit. It was the Pottawatomie amplified.

Brown intended to create the "Provisional Army" in the enemy's country; hence, it was essential for him to commence the undertaking by striking the most crushing blow that it was possible for him to deliver. The success of the movement depended upon his ability to strike a blow so terrible that the survivors of the carnage, dazed and paralyzed by the horrors of the existing conditions, would be incapable of organizing and sending any opposing force to attack him. Therefore the assassinations—the destruction of the persons who, otherwise, would pursue. That was the central feature of the movement, the base of the scheme, the blow which he intended to strike. It was the only blow which he could strike; the only weapon that he could use of which any one stood in awe. The blow which he would have to strike if he would win, was the blow which he had told his Eastern friends he could strike: a blow that would shake the slave system to its foundation—the blow which he had promised Gerrit Smith he would strike, and doubtless, told him how he intended to strike it.

To the men from the Pottawatomie, a massacre was simply a means to an end. Brown and his sons harbored no feelings of animosity toward the Doyles, the Shermans, and Wilkinson; but they knew that these men would not give up to them, peaceably, the property which they coveted, therefore they murdered them and took their horses. They knew that the owners of slaves and lands in the Southern States would not, peaceably, relinquish their ownership of this property; therefore they planned to incite the slaves to kill their masters while they slept—and having thus emancipated the slaves, confiscate the estates of the slave-holders, and put the assassins and themselves in possession of them. This massacre, the most horrible that was ever seriously contemplated in the brain of man, was to be executed under the pretense that it was an humanitarian measure. In the name of humanity, they proposed to undertake the midnight assassination of millions of men, women, and children, and to contend for justification for their actions. The word, with Brown, was a convenience, or an interchangeable term. A definition of it, in the sense in which he used the word, is found in his personal understanding, or interpretation rather, of its co-relation, "The Golden Rule." He is quoted by Sanborn and others as having stated "more than once": "I believe in the Golden Rule and the Declaration of Independence. I think that both mean the same thing; and it is better that a whole generation should pass off the face of the earth—men, women and children—by a violent death than that one jot of either should fail in this country. I mean exactly so, sir."[420]

The possibility that the blacks in the South might attempt to gain their freedom by a general massacre of the whites, was a condition co-existent with their enslavement. After 1831 that possibility became a fixed impending probability; and the question of means to prevent the inevitable cataclysm of blood, was a matter of constant concern in the economy of the Southern States; with the result that various preventive measures were adopted to discourage the possibility of attempts, by the slaves, to organize for such undertakings, or to fit themselves, by education or otherwise, to promote such organizations.

In the philosophy of John Brown, what Nat Turner had done in a section of Southampton County, Virginia, could, if properly promoted, be done in any other section or locality; and, if in any locality, then in every locality, or throughout the whole South. Therefore, an insurrection by the slaves, having for its object the overthrow of the existing State governments of the South, was a venture, from his point of view, which might be undertaken with reasonable prospects for success; the ultimate result depending largely upon his ability to organize the slaves effectively for revolt; to equip them for the initial uprising, and thereafter to capably direct the movement.

No disaster that ever befell our country, war not excepted, was in any respect comparable with the horrors which would be incidental to a slave insurrection; yet our people lived during more than half a century in the shadow of that menace. They lived in a state of continual apprehension that it, the most stupendous of conceivable calamities, might at any time overwhelm them.

For years patrols had ridden the roads and men had watched of night lest the negroes turn upon their masters. It was, an ever present fear. That the Abolitionists wished the slaves to rise and kill their masters in their beds was a belief widely held in the South and often publicly expressed, and no happening that could be imagined contained a greater possibility of horror and bloodshed.[421]

It has been said, and there is great force in the statement, that the "Underground Railroad," instead of working hardship and great loss to slave-holders, was, in reality "the safety-valve to the institution." It was the sluice for the overflow of the dangerous class—the able and discontented. The Underground was organized at the close of the eighteenth century, and had on its rolls more than 30,000 "employees." It carried away from the South, probably 75,000 slaves of the value of more than $30,000,000. The slaves who thus sought and obtained their liberty, taking the risk of arrest and punishment in their attempts to gain it, were the ablest and the most influential among them. Had they remained in slavery, these men would have further developed and become leaders among the slaves, and would have organized them and led them into insurrection. "Had they remained, the direful scenes of San Domingo would have been enacted, and the hot, vengeful breath of massacre would have swept the South as a tornado and blanched the cheek of the civilized world."[422]

Brown knew about the hot vengeful breath which had swept the white population from the fair face of San Domingo. And he was familiar with the attempts which had been made to relight its fires in this country, and to start the tornado of death. He was familiar with what his predecessors in the insurrection business had done, and with what they had tried to do. He knew, too, or thought he knew, why they had failed. Naturally he sought to avoid the mistakes which they had committed, and to safeguard his operations by improving upon their methods. The seizure of Harper's Ferry was not a "Foray into Virginia," as Mr. Sanborn chooses to call it: neither was it a "Raid" as Mr. Villard, with conspicuous persistence, seeks to make it appear to have been; nor was it either an "attack" upon the town or a "blow" or any other specious form of movement. Brown selected the place and "occupied" it as the base for his military operations, because he intended to use the generous supplies of war material, which were then in store there, for the equipment of the army that he planned to organize. The occupation was to be permanent. It was a stratagem of his campaign, an incident in his main design.

By the logic of the assassinations, Brown believed he would secure immunity from an immediate, or counter assault. Instead of being compelled to defend his position against attack by the militia, and by companies of armed citizens, which might be improvised for the occasion, he contemplated spending the first "few weeks" of the campaign in comparative security; publishing, far and wide, the proclamation of the Provisional Government, with its lure for adventurers in civil and military life; debauching the citizenship of the country and the soldiery of the Union. He also contemplated having leisure to attend such diplomatic functions as might be incidental to the situation, including negotiations with foreign nations, and the problems of "Foreign intervention," Northern conventions, etc.[423]

Forbes's letter of May 14, 1858, heretofore quoted, discloses Brown's theory of the invasion: it deals with the facts of Brown's secret movement then pending in the untried future. These two men had agreed upon an invasion of the South under cover of an "insurrection." The opinion Forbes gave Dr. Howe therein is a dissenting one, for personal reasons, from his agreement with Brown. In the revised opinion, Forbes stated his belief that the insurrection would fail; that it would be "either a flash in the pan, or it would leap beyond his control or any control," and after having spent its force in a riot of blood would be stamped out. Brown thought otherwise; he was "sure of a response," and believed that he could safeguard against "a flash in the pan." With the question of "losing control" of the insurrection he was not concerned; that was a bridge which he would cross when he came to it. Under his control, a whole generation was to pass off the face of the earth by a violent death, and nothing much could occur in excess of that if the insurrection did happen to get beyond it. The hurricane of horrors which he proposed to unloose, could not sweep too far for his purposes; he would have it spread to every Southern State, and in the language of Jeremiah Goldsmith Anderson, "make this land of liberty and equality shake to the center."[424]

That Brown expected to be strongly supported by a secret colored military organization existing in the North, and "that had its ramifications extended through most or nearly all of the Slave States," is more than probable. This organization was represented at the Chatham convention by G. J. Reynolds, of Sandusky, Ohio, "a colored man (very little colored, however)"; and after the convention adjourned, Geo. B. Gill was sent to Oberlin, Berlin Heights, and Milan, Ohio, to verify the statements which Reynolds had made concerning its forces. Gill met him and "under the pledge of secrecy which we gave to each other at the Chatham convention," he says. Reynolds took him to the room where they held their meetings, and used as their arsenal, and showed him "a fine collection of arms." "On my return to Cleveland," continues Gill, "he passed me, through the organization, first to J. J. Pierce, colored, at Milan, who paid my bill one night at the Eagle Hotel, and gave me some money, and a note to E. Moore at Norwalk; who in turn paid my hotel bill, and purchased a railroad ticket through to Cleveland for me." Reynolds asserted that they were "only waiting for Brown or some one else to make a successful initiative move, when their forces would be put in motion."[425]

It must not be assumed, because Brown did not publish a transcript of his plans for the insurrection and invasion, that he was "without any clear and definite plan of campaign," and that the consequences of his plans had not been anticipated, and provided for in minutest detail, for he was methodical. Also, secrecy was characteristic of his methods. Salmon Brown said:[426] "Father had a peculiarity for insisting on order.... He would insist on getting everything arranged just to suit him before he would consent to make a move."

And to Kagi Brown wrote July 10th:[427] "Do not use much paper to put names of persons & plans upon."

The nature of Brown's plans, and of his intentions, and of his engagements, must therefore be drawn from the documentary evidence obtainable, and from such reasonable inferences as can be derived from the actions of the invaders: from the things which they did while they were free to do as they pleased; while they were yet unrestrained by the forces which later overcame them; and from such contemporaneous testimony, relating to the subject, as may be available. What they said when in prison, and in view of the impending gallows, about what they intended to do, is not the best evidence of what their intentions were.

On the 19th of August, Mr. Frederick Douglass met John Brown, by appointment, at an old stone quarry in the vicinity of Chambersburg. At that interview, Brown disclosed to Mr. Douglass his intention to seize Harper's Ferry. Mr. Douglass said:[428]

The taking of Harper's Ferry, of which Brown had merely hinted before, was now declared his settled purpose, and he wanted to know what I thought of it. I opposed it with all the arguments at my command.... He was not to be shaken but treated my views respectfully, replying that even if surrounded he would find means to cut his way out.... In parting, he put his arms around me in a manner more than friendly, and said, "Come with me, Douglas; I will defend you with my life. I want you for a special purpose. When I strike the bees will begin to swarm, and I shall want you to help hive them...."

The project that Brown had in view was clearly foreshadowed by Jeremiah C. Anderson, in a letter which he wrote, late in September, to a brother in Iowa. He said:[429]

Our mining company will consist of between twenty-five and thirty men well equipped with tools. You can tell Uncle Dan it will be impossible for me to see him before next spring. If my life is spared I will be tired of work by that time, and I shall visit my relatives and friends in Iowa, if I can get leave of absence. At present I am bound by all that is honorable to continue in the course. We go in to win, at all hazards. So if you should hear of failure, it will be after a desperate struggle, and loss of capital on both sides. But this is the last of our thoughts. Everything seems to work to our hands, and victory will surely perch upon our banner. The old man has had this in view for twenty years, and last winter was just a hint and trial of what could be done. This is not a large place but a very precious one to Uncle Sam, as he had a great many tools here. I expect (when I start again travelling) to start at this place and go through the State of Virginia and on south, just as circumstances require; mining and prospecting, and carrying the ore with us. I suppose this is the last letter I shall write you before there is something in the wind. Whether I shall have an opportunity of sending letters then, I do not know, but when I have an opportunity I shall improve it. But if you don't get any from me, don't take it for granted that I am gone up till you know it to be so. I consider my life about as safe in one place as another.

The following interesting and instructive document discloses the formation of Andersen's mining company, and indicates the character of the "mining" which the operators intended to engage in. It reads as follows:

HEADQUARTERS WAR DEPARTMENT, PROVISIONAL ARMY.

Harper's Ferry, October 10, 1859.

General Orders No. 1.

ORGANIZATION

The divisions of the provisional army and the coalition are hereby established as follows:

1—Company.

A company will consist of fifty-six privates, twelve non-commissioned officers, (eight corporals, 4 sergeants) three commissioned officers, (two lieutenants, a captain,) and a surgeon.

The privates shall be divided into bands or messes of seven each numbering from one to eight, with a corporal to each, numbered like his band.

Two bands shall comprise a section. Sections shall be numbered from one to four. A sergeant shall be attached to each section and numbered like it.

Two sections shall comprise a platoon. Platoons will be numbered one and two, and each commanded by a lieutenant designated by like number.

2—Battalion.

The battalion will consist of four companies complete. The commissioned officers of the battalion will be a chief of battalion, and a first and second major, one of whom shall be attached to each wing.

3—The Regiment.

The regiment will consist of four battalions complete. The commissioned officers of the regiment will be a colonel and two lieutenant colonels, attached to the wings.

4—The Brigade.

The brigade will consist of four regiments complete. The commissioned officer of the brigade will be a general of brigade.

5—Each General Staff.

Each of the above divisions will be entitled to a general staff, consisting of an adjutant, a commissary, a musician, and a surgeon.

6—Appointment.

Non-commissioned officers will be chosen by those whom they are to command.

Commissioned officers will be appointed and commissioned by this department.

The staff officers of each division will be appointed by the respective commanders of the same.

(This document is in the handwriting of J. H. Kagi.)[430]

Oliver Brown and Jeremiah G. Anderson were captains in the provisional army. A copy of Brown's commission is published herewith:

GREETING:

HEADQUARTERS WAR DEPARTMENT.
Near Harper's Ferry Maryland.

Whereas Oliver Brown has been nominated a captain in the army established under the provisional constitution,

Now, therefore, in pursuance of the authority vested in us by said constitution, we do hereby appoint and commission the said Oliver Brown a captain.

Given at the office of the Secretary of War, this day, October 15, 1859.

John Brown,
Commander in Chief.

J. H. Kagi. Secretary of War.

(This document is printed in the original, with the exception of the words in italics and the figures, which are in the handwriting of Kagi, with the exception of the signature of John Brown, which is in his own hand.)[431]

Except as to Mr. Sanborn and Mr. Stearns, it is hard to believe that the members of Brown's war committee were ignorant of his intention to incite a slave insurrection, and invade the South. Rev. Theodore Parker said:

I should like of all things to see an insurrection of the Slaves. It must be tried many times before it succeeds, as at last it must.[432]

Dr. Howe also knew of the impending insurrection. Mr. Sanborn says:[433]

Dr. Howe, returning from Cuba, (whither he accompanied Theodore Parker in February 1859), journeyed through the Carolinas, and there accepted the hospitality of Wade Hampton, and other rich planters; and it shocked him to think that he might be instrumental in giving up to fire and pillage their noble mansions.

Thaddeus Hyatt, of New York, too, seems to have known what Brown intended to do, and from whence he derived his inspirations. Also the indiscriminate massacre of non-combatants, white women and children, by the negroes of Hayti seems to have had his approbation. He presented to the Black Republic a portrait[434] of the man, John Brown, who in 1859 sought to incite the negroes of the Southern States to do what the negroes of San Domingo did, when "one August night, in the year 1791 the whole plain of the north was swept with fire and drenched with blood. Five hundred thousand negro slaves in the depths of barbarism revolted, and the horrors of the massacre made Europe and America shudder."[435]

August 27, 1859, Gerrit Smith wrote the following letter to the "Jerry Rescue Committee":[436]

It is, perhaps, too late to bring slavery to an end by peaceable means,—too late to vote it down. For many years I have feared, and published my fears, that it would go out in blood. These fears have grown into a belief. So debauched are the white people by slavery that there is not virtue enough left in them to put it down.... The feeling among the blacks that they must deliver themselves gains strength with fearful rapidity. No wonder, then, is it that intelligent black men in the States and in Canada should see no hope for their race in the practice and policy of white men.... Whoever he may be that foretells the horrible end of American slavery, is held at the North and the South to be a lying prophet,—another Cassandra. The South would not respect her own Jefferson's prediction of servile insurrection; how then can it be hoped that she will respect another's?... And is it entirely certain that these insurrections will be put down promptly, and before they can have spread far? Will telegraphs and railroads be too swift for the swiftest insurrections? Remember that telegraphs and railroads can be rendered useless in an hour. Remember too that many who would be glad to face the insurgents would be busy in transporting their wives and daughters to places where they would be safe from the worst fate that husbands and fathers can imagine for their wives and daughters. I admit that but for this embarrassment Southern men would laugh at the idea of an insurrection and would quickly dispose of one. But trembling as they would for beloved ones, I know of no part of the world, where, so much as in the South, men would be like, in a formidable insurrection, to lose the most important time, and be distracted and panic stricken.

Commenting upon this letter, Mr. Sanborn, after quoting from Mr. Smith's biographer the expression "This Cassandra spoke from certainty," says that he (Smith) "knew what Brown's purpose was; and his last contribution to Brown's campaign was made about the time the Syracuse letter was written." Referring to the same letter, his biographer, Frothingham, says:

It is hard to believe that the writer of these passages had not had John Brown's general plan in mind. There was no visible sign of peril. The blacks, North and South, were to all appearances quiet.... But for the whole-handed destruction of documents immediately on the failure of the project, Mr. Smith's participation in John Brown's general plans could be made to appear still closer.

As late as 1867, Mr. Smith disclaimed having any knowledge of Brown's plans or of his intentions. He denied that he gave money with the purpose of aiding the insurrection. Concerning this Mr. Frothingham continues:

Did Gerrit Smith really think that this was a complete and truthful statement of his relations with John Brown? A statement in which nothing true was suppressed, and nothing untrue suggested? A statement that would be satisfactory to Edward Morton, and F. B. Sanborn and Dr. Howe and other friends of the Martyr?... We must believe that his insanity obliterated a certain class of impressions, while another class of impressions on the same subject remained distinct.

The theory of Brown's operations being the conquest of the South through an insurrection of the slaves, the collapse of the scheme was coincident with the failure of the slaves to execute the part assigned to them in the plan of the invasion. It is herein that Brown's leadership may be criticised. The creation of the army depended upon the success of the insurrection. The latter, therefore, should have been made safe—beyond the possibility of failure—before he committed any subordinate irremediable acts.

At Cleveland, Brown took credit for never having killed anybody, but said, in a self conscious manner, referring to his Kansas successes, that on "some occasions he had shown his young men with him how some things might be done as well as others and that they had done them." Brown plainly attributed the failure of the insurrection, and his consequent failure, to a cause which he could have controlled—to his failure to do things which he could have done, and which he then reproached himself for not having done.

"It is my own fault," he said, October 18th, "that I have been taken. I could easily have saved myself from it, had I exercised my own better judgment rather than yielded to my feelings."

"You mean if you had escaped immediately?" inquired Mr. Mason.

"No," he said, "I had the means to make myself secure without any escape, but I allowed myself to be surrounded by a force by being too tardy."

Brown had planned how to prevent being surrounded, and continuing said: "I do not know that I should reveal my plans. I am here a prisoner and wounded because I foolishly allowed myself to be so. You overrate yourself in supposing I could have been taken if I had not allowed it."

Nat Turner had shown his followers how to start an insurrection. He personally spilled the first blood, the blood which turned loose the furies in Southampton County, and Brown now saw, too late, that if he and his captains had each led a party of negroes, as Turner had led; and shown them how to kill, as Turner had shown his followers; they too might have turned loose the furies of which Brown and Forbes dreamed, and launched the hurricane of death. Then, with thousands of rioting slaves, brandishing their bloody spears, the occupation of Harper's Ferry would have been but an incident of minor importance in this history.

Forbes perceived the weak link in the chain of Brown's forecast, and made the point, that unless the slaves were "already in a state of agitation, there might be no response, or a feeble one." But Brown, carried away by an enthusiasm inspired by a continuous contemplation of the grandeur of his scheme, failed to give the warning the consideration which its importance deserved. He dismissed Forbes's caution with the confident assertion that he "was sure of a response" His over-confidence led to his immediate undoing. Upon the rock that Forbes had pointed out foundered the new-born ship of state. The great uprising of the blacks upon which he relied, failed to materialize; the thousands of reËnforcements which he looked for, appeared not at all.[437] The plans for the conquest of the Southern States, and for the establishment of the Provisional Government miscarried.

Concerning Brown and his plans Mr. Vallandigham said:

It is in vain to underestimate the man or the conspiracy. Captain John Brown is as brave and resolute a man as ever headed an insurrection, and, in a good cause, and with a sufficient force, would have been a consummate partisan commander. He has coolness, daring, persistency, the stoic faith and patience, and a firmness of will and purpose unconquerable. He is the farthest possible removed from the ordinary ruffian, fanatic or madman. Certainly it was the best planned and best executed conspiracy that ever failed.[438]

John Brown was not a pioneer in the slave insurrection business, nor does his plan of procedure at Harper's Ferry suggest any novelties or anything original in the way of such insurrections. He had before him a long line of precedents and examples which he studied; and ideals, written in blood, which he sought to emulate. His heroes were Toussaint L'Ouverture and Nat Turner, their hands red with the blood of innocence. Turner had killed between fifty and sixty white people, mostly women and children, and Mr. Redpath tells us that Brown "admired this negro patriot equally with George Washington." Turner was his most recent and most direct example. It was from what Turner had done, that Brown and Forbes formed their estimates of what they could do. From the example furnished by this ideal patriot, they framed the Maryland-Virgina equation. They reasoned in this way: If an ignorant slave, with a score of poorly armed negro followers, who were also slaves, could kill sixty white people in a day, how many white people could a thousand negroes, who are well equipped for midnight slaughter, kill in a single night? Their solution of that problem found expression in the order which they placed, in March, 1857, with the Collinsville blacksmith. It was Brown's answer to this question, expanded as Brown sought to expand it at Harper's Ferry, that was to "make slavery totter from its foundations."

Upon several occasions—notably, once in South Carolina, and twice in Virginia—the slaves of this country had engaged in conspiracies against their masters. In each instance the men who promoted the revolt were themselves slaves. In two instances the insurgents planned to seize the arsenals, and public arms and ammunition, as Brown planned to do, and did, at Harper's Ferry. In each instance the revolt was to be accomplished by a general massacre of the white inhabitants. Brown and Forbes, in 1857, studied the trails that had been blazed on these occasions, and planned with reference to the experiences of the men who had directed the efforts.

The first attempt at insurrection in this country was led by "General" Gabriel in September, 1800. The date agreed upon was Saturday [Monday], September 1st. The place of rendezvous was on a brook six miles from Richmond, Virginia. The force was to comprise eleven hundred men, divided into three divisions. The attack was to have been made upon Richmond, then a town of eight thousand population, under cover of the night.[439]

The plan for the occupation of Richmond was similar in some respects to Brown's plans at Harper's Ferry. One of the divisions of the army was to take the penitentiary, which had been improvised into an arsenal. Another division was to seize the powder-house. A statement of the trouble was published in the United States Gazette of Philadelphia, September 8, 1800:

The penitentiary held several thousand stand of arms; the powder-house was well stocked; the capitol contained the State Treasury; the mills would give them bread; the control of the bridge across the James river would keep off enemies from beyond. Thus secured and provided, they planned to issue proclamations, summoning to their standard "their fellow negroes and the friends of humanity throughout the continent." In a week they estimated they would have 50,000 men on their side, when they would possess themselves of other towns.[440]

A formidable insurrection was attempted in 1822 by Denmark Vesey. The slaves involved in this plot were distributed over a territory of forty-five to fifty miles in extent around Charleston, South Carolina. Vesey's plan of revolt contemplated the wholesale slaughter of the white population and the occupation of the country by the blacks.

"Every slave enlisted was sworn to secrecy. Household servants were rarely trusted. Talkative and intemperate persons were not enlisted. Women were excluded from participation in the affair that they might take care of the children. Peter Poyas, it is said, had enlisted six hundred without assistance.

"During the excitement and the trial of the supposed conspirators, rumor proclaimed all, and doubtless more than all the horrors of the plot. The city was to be fired in every quarter. The arsenal, in the immediate vicinity, was to be broken open, and the arms distributed to the insurgents and an universal massacre of the white inhabitants was to take place. Nor did there seem to be any doubt in the minds of the people that such would actually have been the result, had not the plot, fortunately, been detected before the time appointed for the outbreak. It was believed, as a matter of course, that every black in the city would join in the insurrection, and that, if the original design had been attempted and the city taken by surprise, the negroes would have achieved an easy victory, nor does it seem at all impossible that such might have been, or yet may be the case, if any well arranged and resolute rising should take place." The plot failed because a negro, William Paul, "made enlistments without authority, and revealed the scheme to a house servant. The leaders of this attempt at insurrection died as bravely as they had lived; and it is one of the marvels of the remarkable affair, that none of this class divulged any of the secrets to the court. The men who did the talking were those who knew but little."[441]

Two promoters of slave insurrections were born during the year 1800: John Brown and Nat Turner. The latter was born in Southampton County, Virginia, October 2d. Turner became a preacher, and later, saw visions. He saw visions of conflicts "between white spirits and black spirits engaged in battle; and the sun was darkened, the thunder rolled in the heavens, and blood flowed in the streams...." Afterward he had another vision in which an angel told him that "the time is fast approaching when the 'first shall be last and the last first'"; which he interpreted as foreshadowing the promotion of the blacks to control in public affairs, and the subordination of the whites. Encouraged by his conclusion, he determined to attempt the promotion of the blacks by eliminating the whites. In pursuance of this he planned a general uprising of the slaves and massacre of their white masters. His blow was struck on the night of August 21, 1831, near Jerusalem Court House, Virginia.

Turner trusted his plans to four men: Sam Edwards, Hark Travis, Henry Porter, and Nelson Williams. After the plans had been completed. Turner made a speech appropriate to the occasion. He said: "Our race is to be delivered from slavery, and God has appointed us as the men to do his bidding; and let us be worthy of our calling. I am told to slay all the whites we encounter without regard to age or sex. We have no arms or ammunition but we will find these in the homes of our oppressors; and, as we go on, others can join us. Remember we do not go for the sake of blood and carnage, but it is necessary that in the commencement of this revolution, all the whites we meet should die, until we have an army strong enough to carry on the war on a Christian basis. Remember that ours is not war for robbery nor to satisfy our passions; it is a struggle for freedom. Ours must be deeds, not words. Then let us away to the scene of action." In his confession after sentence of death had been passed upon him, Turner described the scenes of the murders which they committed. Of the attack upon the home of Joseph Travis, his master, he said:[442]

On returning to the house, Hark went to the door with an axe, for the purpose of breaking it open, as we knew we were strong enough to murder the family, should they be awakened by the noise; but, reflecting that it might create an alarm in the neighborhood, we determined to enter the house secretly, and murder them whilst sleeping. Hark got a ladder and set it against the chimney, on which I ascended, and, hoisting a window, entered and came down stairs, unbarred the doors, and removed the guns from their places. It was then observed that I must spill the first blood, on which, armed with a hatchet and accompanied by Will, I entered my master's chamber. It being dark, I could not give a death blow. The hatchet glanced from his head. He sprang from the bed and called his wife. It was his last word. Will laid him dead with a blow of his axe.

After they had taken the lives of the Travis family, "they went from plantation to plantation, dealing death blows to every white man, woman and child they found." A list of the "dead that have been buried" was published August 24th: At Mrs. Whitehead's, 7; Mrs. Waller's, 13; Mr. Williams's, 3; Mr. Barrow's, 2; Mr. Vaughn's, 5; Mrs. Turner's, 3; Mr. Travis's, 5; Mr. J. Williams's, 5; Mr. Reece's, 4; names unknown, 10; total, 57.

The news of the massacre spread rapidly, and the excited whites quickly armed themselves to suppress the insurrection. As a result, "Arms and ammunition were dispatched in wagons to the county of Southampton. The four volunteer companies of Petersburg, the dragoons and Lafayette Artillery Company of Richmond, one volunteer company from Norfolk and one from Portsmouth, and the regiments of Southampton and Sussex, were at once ordered out. The cavalry and infantry took up their line of march on Tuesday evening, while the artillery embarked on the steamer 'Norfolk' and landed at Smithfield."[443]

A Mr. Gray, to whom Turner made his confession, said of him:

... I shall not attempt to describe the effects of his narrative, as told, and commented on by himself, in the condemned hole of the prison; the calm, deliberate composure with which he spoke of his late deeds and intentions; the expression of his fiend-like face, when excited by enthusiasm; still bearing the stains of the blood of helpless innocence about him, clothed with rags and covered with chains, yet daring to raise his manacled hands to Heaven with a spirit soaring above the attributes of man.

And yet, such were the phenomenal inconsistencies occurring in the philosophy of persons who professed, and who, perhaps, believed themselves to be humane, this negro's crime was exultingly approved of by Brown's Eastern supporters. Mr. William Lloyd Garrison, at a meeting called to witness "John Brown's resurrection" said in his speech:

... As a peace man—an "ultra" peace man—I am prepared to say: "Success to every slave insurrection at the South, and in every slave country." And I do not see how I compromise or stain my peace profession in making that declaration....[444]


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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