Quest. XXII. Did all mankind fall in that first transgression?

Answ. The covenant being made with Adam, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression.

Having shewn, in the foregoing answer how our first parents sinned and fell, we are now led to consider, how their fall affected all their posterity, whom they represented; and accordingly it is said, that the covenant was made with Adam, as a federal head, not for himself only, but all his posterity; so that they sinned in, and fell with him. But, before we enter more particularly on this subject, it may not be improper to enquire, whether this character, of being the head of the covenant, respects only Adam, or both our first parents? I am sensible there are many who think this covenant was made with Adam, as the head of his posterity, exclusive of Eve; so that, as he did not represent her therein, but his seed, she was not, together with him, the representative of mankind; therefore, though the covenant was made with her, and she was equally obliged to perform the conditions thereof, yet she was only to stand or fall for herself, her concern herein being only personal; and therefore it follows, from hence, that when she fell, being first in the transgression, all mankind could not be said to sin and fall in her, as they did in Adam; therefore, if she alone had sinned, she would have perished alone.

And if it be objected hereunto, that she could not then be the mother of innocent children, for who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? The reply, which is usually given to this, which is only matter of conjecture, is, that God would have created some other woman, who should have been the mother of a sinless posterity.^[56]

The reason why these conclude that the covenant was made only with Adam, is because we never read expressly, in scripture, of its being made with Eve in behalf of her posterity; and particularly it is said, in Gen. ii. 16, 17. that the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die. And it is observed, that this law was given to him before the woman was created; for it said, in the following words, It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him. And, in other scriptures, which treat of this matter, we read of the man’s being the head of the covenant, but not his wife: thus the apostle, in 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47. compares him, whom he styles, the first man, Adam, as the head of this covenant, with Christ, whom he calls, The second man, as the head of the covenant of grace; and elsewhere he says, As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive, ver. 22. and again By one man sin entered into the world, &c. Rom. v. 12. and By one man’s disobedience, many were made sinners, ver. 19. It is not said by the disobedience of our first parents, but of one of them, to wit, Adam; therefore, from hence, they conclude, that he only was the head of this covenant, and herein the representative of mankind.

But, though I would not be too peremptory in determining this matter, yet, I think, it may be replied to what has been said in defence thereof; that though it is true, it is said, in the scripture, but now mentioned, that God forbade the man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, before the woman was created, yet she expressly says, that the prohibition respected them both^[57], when she tells the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but of the fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat thereof, lest ye die, Gen. iii. 2, 3. Besides, we read, that Eve had dominion over the creatures, as well as Adam, Gen. i. 26-28. it is true, it is said, that God created man, &c. but by the word man, both our first parents are intended; for it immediately follows, and he blessed them, therefore the woman was not excluded; so that we may apply the apostle’s words, (though used with another view) The man is not without the woman, nor the woman without the man, in the Lord, 1 Cor. xi. 11. to this particular dispensation of providence. And there seems to be the same reason for one’s being constituted the federal head of their posterity, as the other, since they were both designed to be the common parents thereof; the tenor of the covenant seems to be the same with respect to them both, and the tree of life was a seal and pledge of blessings, to be conveyed by both.

But to proceed to consider the subject-matter of this answer,

I. We shall prove, that Adam was a public person, the head of the covenant with whom it was made for himself, and all his posterity. When we speak of him as the head of our posterity, we do not only mean their common parent, for, had there been no other idea contained therein, I cannot see how they could be said to fall in him; for it doth not seem agreeable to the justice of God to punish children for their parents’ sins, unless they make them their own, at least, not with such a punishment that carries in it a separation from his presence, and a liableness to the condemning sentence of the law.

Therefore Adam must be considered as constituted their head, in a federal way, by an act of God’s sovereign will, and so must be regarded as their representative, as well as their common parent; which, if it can be proved, then they may be said to fall with him. For the understanding hereof, we must conclude him to have been the head of the world, even as Christ is the Head of his elect; so that, in the same sense as Christ’s righteousness becomes their’s to wit, by imputation, Adam’s obedience, had he stood, would have been imputed to all his posterity, as his sin is, now he is fallen. This is a doctrine founded on pure revelation: and therefore we must have recourse to scripture, to evince the truth thereof. Accordingly,

1. There are several scriptures in which this doctrine is contained; as that in Rom. v. 14. where the apostle speaks concerning our fall in Adam, whom he calls, the figure^[58] of him that was to come. Now, in what was Adam a type of Christ? Not as he was a man, consisting of soul and body; for, in that respect, all that lived before Christ, might as justly be called types of him. Whenever we read of any person, or things, being a type in scripture, there are some peculiar circumstances by which they may be distinguished from all other persons, or things that are not types. Now Adam was distinguished from all other persons, more especially as he was the federal head of all his posterity; and that he was so, appears from what the apostle not only occasionally mentions, but largely insists on, and shews in what respect this was true; and he particularly observes, that as one conveyed death the other was the head, or Prince of Life. These respective things indeed, were directly opposite, therefore the analogy, or resemblance, consisted only in the manner of conveying them; so that as death did not become due to us, in the first instance of our liableness to it, for our own actual sin, but the sin of Adam; that right we have to eternal life, by justification, is not the result of our own obedience, but Christ’s: This is plainly the apostle’s method of reasoning. Now, if Christ was, in this respect a federal Head and Representative of his people, then Adam, who is in this, or in nothing, his type, or figure, must be the Head of a covenant, in which his posterity were included.

There is another scripture, by which this may be proved in 1 Cor. xv. 45-59. where the apostle speaks of the first and second Adam; by the latter he means Christ. Now, why should he be called the second man, who lived so many ages after Adam, if he did not design to speak of him, as typified by him, or bearing some resemblance of him? And, in other expressions, he seems to imply as much, and shews how we derive death from Adam, of whom he had been speaking, in the foregoing verses. Accordingly, he says, The first man was of the earth, earthy: and, as is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and we have borne the image of the earthy; so that if Adam was the root and occasion of all the miseries we endure in this world, arising from his violation of the covenant he was under, it plainly proves, that he was therein the head and representative of all his posterity.

For the farther proof of this, we may take occasion to consider the apostle’s method of reasoning, in the scripture but now referred to, By one man sin entered into the world, that is, by the first man, in whom all have sinned, Rom. v. 12. so I would choose to render it rather than as it is in our translation, since this seems to be the most natural sense of the word^[59]; and it proves Adam, in whom all sinned, to be their head and representative, and also agrees best with the apostle’s general design, or argument, insisted on, and farther illustrated in the following verses.

Again, the apostle speaks of those penal evils consequent on Adam’s sins, which could not have befallen us, had he not been our federal head and representative; Thus, in ver. 18. By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation^[60]. It may be observed, that the apostle, in this text, uses a word, which we translate condemnation^[61]; which cannot, with any manner of consistency, be taken in any other than a forensick sense; and therefore he argues, from thence, that we are liable to condemnation, by the offence of Adam; which certainly proves the imputation of his offence to us, and consequently he is considered therein as our federal head.

2. This farther appears, in that all mankind are exposed to many miseries, and to death, which are of a penal nature; therefore they must be considered, as the consequence of sin. Now they cannot be the consequence of actual sin, in those, who are miserable and die, as soon as they are born, who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression; therefore this must be the result of his sin, which it could not be, had he not been the federal head of all his posterity.^[62]

Object. It is objected to this, that God might, out of his mere sovereignty, ordain that his creatures should be exposed to some degree of misery; and, if this misery be not considered, as the punishment of sin, in infants, then it does not prove the imputation of Adam’s sin to them; and even their death, considered only as a separation of soul and body, may not contain in it a proper idea of punishment, (which consists in the stroke of justice, demanding satisfaction for sin) if it be only reckoned an expedient, or a necessary means for their attaining eternal life. Therefore it doth not follow, that, because we are liable to death, before we have done good or evil, it must necessarily be a punishment due to that sin, which was committed by Adam.

Answ. 1. I will not deny but that God might dispense some lesser degrees of natural evil, to a sinless creature, out of his mere sovereignty; neither will I contend with any, who shall say, that he might, without any dishonour to his perfections, send on him an evil, sensibly great, provided it were not only consistent with his love, but attended with those manifestations and displays thereof, which would more than compensate for it, and, at the same time, not have any tendency to prevent the answering the end of his being; yet I may be bold to say, that, from the nature of the thing, God cannot inflict the least degree of punishment on a creature, who is, in all respects guiltless. If therefore these lesser evils are penal, they are the consequence of Adam’s sin.

2. As for death, that must be considered as a penal evil; for, as such, it was first denounced, as a part of the curse, consequent on Adam’s sin; and the apostle says, The wages of sin is death, Rom. vi. 23. and elsewhere he speaks of all men, as dying in Adam, 1 Cor. xv. 22. and therefore his sin is imputed to all mankind; and consequently he was their federal head and representative in the covenant that he was under.

II. They, whose federal head and representative Adam was, are such as descended from him by ordinary generation. The design of this limitation is to signify, that our Saviour is excepted, and consequently that he did not sin or fall in him, inasmuch as he was born of a virgin; therefore, though he had the same human nature with all Adam’s posterity, yet he did not derive it from him, in the same way as they do; and a similitude of nature, or his being a true and proper Man, does not render him a descendant from Adam, in the same way as we are. The formation of his human nature was the effect of miraculous, supernatural, creating power; therefore he was no more liable to Adam’s sin, as being a Man, than a world of men would be, should God create them out of nothing, or out of the dust of the ground, by a mediate creation, which would be no more miraculous, or supernatural, than it was to form the human nature of Christ in the womb of a virgin. Now, as persons, so formed, would not be concerned in Adam’s sin, or fall, whatever similitude there might be of nature; even so our Saviour was not concerned therein.^[63]

Moreover, that we might understand that he was not included in this federal transaction with Adam, the apostle opposes him, as the second Man, the federal Head of his elect, or spiritual seed, to Adam, the first man, and head of his natural seed, in that scripture before referred to, ver. 45. And, as an argument, that his extraordinary and miraculous conception exempted him from any concern in Adam’s sin and fall; the angel, that gave the first intimation hereof, when he tells the blessed virgin, his mother, that the Holy Ghost should come upon her, that the power of the highest should over-shadow her, he says, Therefore that Holy Thing, that shall be born of thee, shall be called, the Son of God; thereby implies, that, in his first formation, he was holy, and consequently had no concern in the guilt of Adam’s sin, because of the manner of his formation, or conception; and this is certainly a better way to account for his being sinless, than to pretend, as the Papists do, that his mother was sinless; which will do no service to their cause, unless they could ascend in a line to our first parents, and so prove, that all our Saviour’s progenitors were immaculate, as well as the virgin; which is more than they pretend to do.

III. It is farther observed, in this answer, that mankind sinned in and fell with Adam in his first transgression, and therefore they had no concern in those sins, which he committed afterwards. This appears from hence, that Adam, as soon as he sinned, lost the honour and prerogative, that was conferred upon him, of being the federal head of his posterity, though he was their natural head, or common father; for the covenant being broken, all the evils, that we were liable to, arising from thence, were devolved upon us, and none of the blessings, contained therein, could be conveyed to us that way, since it was impossible for him, after his fall, to perform sinless obedience, which was the condition of the life promised therein. This doth not arise so much from the nature of the covenant, as from the change that there was in man, with whom it was made. The law, or covenant, would have given life, if man could have yielded perfect obedience; but since his fall rendered that impossible, though the obligation thereof, as a law, distinct from a covenant, and the curse, arising from the sanction thereof, remains still in force against fallen man; yet, as a covenant, in which life was promised, it was, from that time, abrogated; and therefore the apostle speaks of it, as being weak through the flesh, Rom. viii. 3. that is, by reason of Adam’s transgression, and consequently he ceased, from that time, to be the federal head, or means of conveying life to his posterity; therefore those sins that he committed afterwards, were no more imputed to them, to inhance their condemnation, than his repentance, or good works, were imputed for their justification.

IV. Having considered the first transgression of Adam, as imputed to all those who descended from him by ordinary generation, we shall proceed to consider, how this doctrine is opposed, by those who are in the contrary way of thinking.

Object. 1. It is objected, that what is done by one man cannot be imputed to another; for this is contrary to the divine perfections, to the law of nature, and the express words of scripture. It is true, that which is done by us, in our own persons, may be imputed to us, whether it be good or evil. Thus it is said, that Phinehas’s zeal in executing judgment, by which means the plague was stayed, was counted to him for righteousness, Psal. cvi. 30, 31. so was Abraham’s faith, Rom. iv. 9, 23. Accordingly God approved of these their respective good actions, as what denominated them righteous persons, and placed them to their account, as bestowing on them some rewards accordingly; so, on the other hand, a man’s own sin may be imputed to him, and he may be dealt with as an offender: But to impute the sin committed by one person to another, is to suppose that he has committed that sin which was really committed by another; in which case, the Judge of all the earth would not do right.

Answ. When we speak of persons being punished for a crime committed by another, as being imputed to them, we understand the word imputation in a forensick sense, and therefore we do not suppose that here is a wrong judgment passed on persons or things, as though the crime were reckoned to have been committed by them; accordingly we do not say, that we committed that sin, which was more immediately committed by Adam. In him it was an actual sin; it is ours, as imputed to us, or as we are punished for it, according to the demerit of the offence, and the tenor of the covenant, in which we were included.

Moreover, it is not contrary to the law of nature, or nations, for the iniquity of some public persons to be punished in many others, so that whole cities and nations have suffered on their account; and as for scripture-instances hereof, we often read of whole families and nations, suffering for the crimes of those, who had been public persons, and exemplary in sinning. Thus Achan coveted the wedge of gold, and, for this, he suffered not alone; but his sons and daughters were stoned, and burned with fire, together with himself, Joshua vii. 24, 25. though we do not expressly read, that they were confederates with him in the crime. And as for the Amalekites, who, without provocation, came out against Israel in the wilderness, God threatens them, that he would have war with them for this, from generation to generation, Exod. xvii. 16. and in pursuance of this threatening, God, imputing the crime of their forefathers to their posterity, some hundreds of years after, ordered Saul to go and utterly destroy them, by slaying both man and woman, infant and suckling, 1 Sam. xv. 2, 3. And the sin of Jeroboam was punished in his posterity, according to the threatening denounced, 1 Kings xiv. 10, 11. as was also the sin of Ahab, 1 Kings xxi. 21, 22. And the church acknowledges, that it was a righteous dispensation of providence for God to bring upon Judah those miseries, which immediately preceded, and followed their being carried captive, when they say, Our fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne their iniquity, Lam. v. 7. and our Saviour speaks to the same purpose, when he tells the Jews, That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel, unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar, Matth. xxiii. 35. These instances, and others of the like nature, prove that it is no unheard of thing, for one man to suffer for a crime committed by another^[64].

But I am sensible the principal thing intended in the objection, when this is supposed to be contrary to scripture, is, that it contradicts the sense of what the prophet says, when he tells the people, that they should not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge; for the soul that sinneth shall die, Ezek. xviii. 2-4. the meaning of which scripture is, that if they were humble and penitent, and did not commit those crimes that their fathers had done, they should not be punished for them, which was a special act of favour, that God would grant them on this supposition; and it is as much as to say, that he would not impute their father’s sins to them, or suffer them to be carried captive, merely because their fathers had deserved this desolating judgment. But this does not, in all respects, agree with the instance before us; for we are considering Adam as the federal head of his posterity, and so their fathers were not to be considered in this, and such like scriptures. Moreover, the objectors will hardly deny, that natural death, and the many evils of this life, are a punishment, in some respects, for the sin of our first parents. Therefore the question is not, whether some degree of punishment may ensue hereupon? but, whether the greatest degree of the punishment of sin in hell, can be said to be the consequence hereof? But this we shall be led more particularly to consider, under a following answer^[65].

Object. 2. It is farther objected, that it is not agreeable to the divine perfections, for God to appoint Adam to be the head and representative of all his posterity; so that they must stand, or fall, with respect to their spiritual and eternal concerns in him, inasmuch as this was not done by their own choice and consent, which they were not capable of giving, since they were not existent. The case say they, is the same, as though a king should appoint a representative body of men, and give them a power to enact laws, whereby his subjects should be dispossessed of their estates and properties, which no one can suppose to be just; whereas if they had chosen them themselves, they would have no reason to complain of any injustice that was done them, inasmuch as the laws, made by their representatives, are, in effect, their own laws. Therefore, to apply this to the case before us, had all mankind chose Adam to be their representative, or consented to stand or fall in him, there would have been no reason to complain of the dispensation of God’s providence, relating hereunto: but, inasmuch as it was otherwise, it does not seem agreeable to the justice of God, to constitute him the head and representative of all his posterity: so that, by his fall, they should be involved in ruin, and eternal perdition.

Answ. There are various methods taken to answer this objection.

1. Some say little more to it than this: That if Adam had retained his integrity, we should have accepted of, and rejoiced in that life, which he would have procured by his standing; there would then have been no complaint, or finding fault, with the divine dispensation, as though it had been unjust; therefore, since he fell, and brought death into the world, it is reasonable that we should submit, and acknowledge, that all the ways of God are equal. But, though we must all allow that submission to the will of God, in whatever he does, is the creatures duty, yet I cannot think this a sufficient answer to the objection, and therefore would not lay much stress upon it, but proceed to consider what may be farther said in answer to it.

2. Others say, that, since Adam was the common father, and consequently the most honourable of mankind, (our Saviour only excepted, whom he did not represent) therefore it was fit that he should have this honour conferred upon him; so that, had all his posterity been existent, and the choice of a representative been wholly referred to them, the law of nature would have directed to, and pointed out the man, who ought, in this respect, to have the preference to all others. This answer bids fairer, I confess to remove the difficulty than the other, especially if it be added, that God might have given Adam some advantages of nature, above the rest of mankind, besides that relative one, arising from his being their common father; and therefore, that it would have been their interest, as well as their duty, to have chosen him, as being best qualified to perform the work that was devolved upon him.

3. But, since this will not wholly remove the difficulty, it is farther alleged, that God chose him, and therefore we ought to acquiesce in his choice; and, indeed, had all mankind been then existent, supposing them to be in a state of perfect holiness (and we must not suppose the contrary) then they would have acknowledged the equity of this divine dispensation, otherwise they would have actually sinned, and fallen, in rejecting and complaining of the will of God. But this will not satisfy those who advance the contrary scheme of doctrine, and deny the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, who still complain of it, as a very severe dispensation, and conclude, that the sovereignty of God is pleaded for against his other perfections; therefore something farther must be added, in answer to the objection.

We freely allow, that it is not equitable (to use the similitude taken from human forms of government) for a king to appoint a representative, who shall have a power committed to him, to take away the properties, or estates of his subjects: but this does not, in many respects, agree with the matter under our present consideration: nevertheless, if we were to suppose, that these subjects had nothing which they could call their own, separate from the will of the prince, and their properties and estates were not only defended, but given by him, and that upon this tenure, that he reserved to himself a right to dispossess them of them at his pleasure; in this case, he might, without any injustice done them, appoint a representative, by whose conduct they might be forfeited, or retained; and this agrees with our present argument. Accordingly let it be considered, that there were some things which Adam was possessed of in his state of innocency, and others which he was given to expect, had he stood, which he had no natural right to, separate from the divine will; therefore it follows, from hence, that God might, without doing his posterity any injustice, repose this in the hands of a mutable creature, so that it should be retained or lost for them, according as he stood or fell. And this will appear less exceptionable, when we consider the nature of that guilt, which all mankind were brought under, by Adam’s sin, and the loss of original righteousness, as the consequence of his fall; which they, who maintain the other side of the question, generally represent, in such a way, as though we supposed that there were no difference between it, and the guilt contracted, together with the punishment ensuing on actual sins, how great soever they are. But this will be more particularly considered under a following answer,^[66] in which we shall endeavour to take a just estimate of the difference between the guilt of Adam’s sin, imputed to us, and that of actual sins committed by us.