  Quest. XII. What are the decrees of God? Answ. God’s decrees are the wise, free, and holy acts of the counsel of his will; whereby, from all eternity, he hath, for his own glory, unchangeably fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass in time; especially concerning angels and men. Quest. XIII. What hath God especially decreed concerning angels and men? Answ. God, by an eternal and immutable decree out of his mere love, for the praise of his glorious grace, to be manifested in due time, hath elected some angels to glory, and, in Christ, hath chosen some men to eternal life, and the means thereof; and also, according to his sovereign power, and the unsearchable counsel of his own will (whereby he extendeth, or with-holdeth favour, as he pleaseth) hath passed by, and fore-ordained the rest to dishonour and wrath, to be for their sin inflicted, to the praise of the glory of his justice. Having considered the perfections of the divine nature, and the Personal glories of the Father, Son, and Spirit, the next thing to be insisted on is, what God has purposed to do from eternity, or does, or will do, in pursuance thereof; the former we call his decrees; the latter, the execution of them. The object of his decree is whatever comes to pass, which is the most large and comprehensive sense of his purpose: but whereas his determinations, in a particular manner, respect angels and men, or the intelligent part of the creation, and more especially the eternal happiness of some, or the display of his righteous judgments against others; in these respects, they being taken in a more limited sense, are called as relating to the former, election, and, with respect to the latter, reprobation, which is the subject matter of these two answers. And, before we proceed to insist on this sublime and difficult subject, it may not be inexpedient for us to premise some things concerning it in general. 1. It is well known that there is no doctrine, contained in 2. If there be any who give just occasion to these prejudices, by the methods which they have used in explaining, as well as the weakness of their arguments in defending it, or by laying themselves open to those popular objections, which are usually brought against it, we cannot but conclude that they are highly to blame; and therefore we are far from approving of any unguarded expressions, which are to be met with in some writings, whereby a stumbling-block is laid in the way of those who are disposed to make men offenders for a word, rather than to judge impartially of the main drift of their discourse: it is to be owned, that this has done dis-service to the cause, which might have been better defended. 3. If these prejudices against this doctrine are ill grounded, and the objections only founded on the popular cry, by which it is endeavoured to be run down, and condemned with reproach and censure; and if persons know not, nor desire to know what may be said in defence thereof, how such-like objections may be answered; the disgust and opposition is both unreasonable and uncharitable, and contains a capricious resolution not to be undeceived, and consequently renders the person thus prejudiced, highly culpable in the sight of God, especially if there be any ground to conclude that his cause is therein maintained. 4. Let it be farther considered, that it is not a new doctrine, or such as was altogether unheard of in the world before; nor has it been only defended by the more ignorant or licentious part of mankind, or those who have been bold and presumptuous in affirming that for truth, which they had not duly weighed, or been convinced of, from the strongest evidence. Whether it be as ancient as scripture, and, indeed, founded upon it, we shall leave others to judge, when we have considered what may be said from it in defence thereof. 5. It was generally asserted, and publicly owned in most of the confessions of faith of the reformed churches in the last age, and, in particular, in the church of England, as contained in one of the articles thereof, and there is no apparent ambiguity in the words themselves, however, some have endeavoured, And to this we may add, that it was maintained by far the greatest number of divines, in their public discourses and writings in the last century, how much soever the contrary doctrines are maintained at this day: however, we do not insist on this as a proof of the truth thereof, as though it needed to be supported by numbers of advocates for it, or were founded thereon; nor do we suppose, that when it has been most strenuously, and almost universally defended, there were not at the same time, others who opposed it. This I only mention, that I may, if possible, remove those prejudices that are inconsistent with persons judging impartially of it. Since we are considering the head of prejudices against this doctrine, we think it necessary to add, that we shall endeavour to vindicate it, from the reproach that is generally cast on it, by those who suppose that it cannot be defended, without asserting God to be the author of sin, or supposing him to be severe, cruel, and unjust to his creatures, as some conclude we represent him to be, by unjust consequences deduced from it. We are far from asserting, as will hereafter appear, that God from all eternity, purposed to damn a great part of the world, as the result of his mere sovereign will, without the foresight of sin, which would render them liable to that condemnation. Moreover, we shall endeavour to make it appear, in opposition to the calumnies of some, that the decree of God does not destroy, or take away, the liberty of man’s will, with respect to things, within its own sphere; or that considered in itself, it doth not lay a natural necessity on him, to rush into inevitable damnation, as though the destruction of sinners were only to be resolved into the divine purpose, and not their own wickedness. In considering which, we shall maintain, that the decree of God does not lay any force on the will of man, nor preclude the means of grace, as ordained by him, for the salvation of them that do, or shall hereafter, believe unto life everlasting; nor does it obstruct the preaching of the gospel, and therein proclaiming the glad tidings of salvation, to those who set under the sound thereof, as an ordinance for their faith. And inasmuch as many are prejudiced against this doctrine, as being influenced by that popular out-cry, which is made by some, as though it were of a very pernicious tendency, either, on the one hand, to lead men to presumption, as giving occasion to persons to conclude that they may be saved as being elected though they live as they list; or, on the other hand, that it leads to despair, as supposing, that if there be such a decree, as that of reprobation, they must necessarily be included in it, I could not but premise these things in our entrance on this subject, as being sensible that such-like reproaches, as these we have mentioned, are brought by many, without duly weighing whether they are well grounded or no; so that this doctrine is often opposed, in such a way of reasoning, that the premises, as well as the conclusions drawn from them, are rather their own than ours; or, at least, if some ideas thereof may be found in the writings, or taken from the unguarded expressions, which some who have defended this doctrine, have made use of; yet they have appeared in such a dress that even they, who are supposed to have advanced them, would have disowned and rejected them. If persons who are in another way of thinking, resolve not to lay aside these misrepresentations, it plainly appears that they are not disposed to lie open to conviction, and then all attempts to defend this doctrine will be to no purpose; the preventing whereof has rendered these prefatory cautions needful. We shall only add, to what has been said, some rules, by which we desire that the truth, either of this or the opposite doctrine, may be judged of. 1. If we do not confirm what we assert, by proofs taken from scripture, let it not be received; but if we do, whatever may be said of our method of managing this controversy, the greatest deference ought to be paid to the sacred oracles: But since it is very common for persons to answer the arguments taken from one scripture, by producing other scriptures, which seems to assert the contrary, as desirous to shift aside in the dispute, and put us upon solving the difficulties which they suppose to be contained in them; though this is not to be declined, yet a more direct answer must be given before the doctrine itself is overthrown. Whether our explication of those scriptures, on which our faith therein is founded, be just, we shall leave others to judge; and also whether the sense we give of other scriptures that are brought as objections against it, be not equally 2. Let that doctrine be received, and the contrary rejected, on which side of the question soever it lies, that is most agreeable to the divine perfections, and explains those scriptures, brought in defence of it, most consistently therewith; which is a fair proposal; and such as ought not only to be applied to this particular head of doctrine, but to the whole of religion, as founded on scripture, which is far from overthrowing the divine glory, the advancement whereof is the great end of it. 3. Let that doctrine be rejected, as inconsistent with itself, and not worthy to be believed or embraced, whether it be ours, or the contrary thereunto, that shall detract from the harmony of the divine perfection, or pretend to set up, or plead for one, and, at the same time militate against the glory of another; and I desire nothing more than that our whole method of reasoning on this subject may be tried by these rules, and be deemed true or false, agreeably to what is contained therein. In considering this subject, relating to the decrees of God, as in the two answers, which we are explaining, we shall proceed in the following method; and shew, I. What we are to understand, by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, according to the counsel of his own will; wherein we shall compare the decree with the execution thereof, and observe how one exactly answers to the other, and is to be a rule for our judging concerning it. II. We shall prove the truth of that proposition, that God hath fore-ordained whatever shall come to pass, either in time, or to eternity. III. We shall then particularly consider intelligent creatures, such as angels and men, and that both good and bad, with respect to their present, or future state, as the objects of God’s eternal decree or purpose, and so shall proceed to speak concerning the decree of election, and reprobation, as contained in the latter of these answers. IV. We shall lay down some propositions concerning each of these, tending to explain and prove them, and that more especially as to what respects the election and reprobation of men. V. We shall consider the properties thereof, and how the divine perfections are displayed therein, and endeavour to make it appear, in various instances, that the account we shall give thereof is agreeable thereunto, as well as founded on scripture. VI. We shall enquire whether the contrary doctrine defended by those who deny election and reprobation, be not derogatory to, and subversive of the divine perfections, or, at least, inconsistent with the harmony thereof; or whether it doth not, VII. We shall endeavour to prove that their reasoning from scripture, who maintain the contrary doctrine, is not sufficiently conclusive; and that the sense they give of those scriptures, generally brought to support it, does not so well agree with the divine perfections, as it ought to do, but that they may be explained in a different way, more consistent therewith. VIII. We shall endeavour to answer the most material objections that are usually brought against the doctrine that we are maintaining. And, IX. Shew how it is practically to be improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual good and advantage. I. What we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, according to the counsel of his own will. 1. By God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, we do not understand barely his fore-knowledge of all things, that are, or shall be done in time, and to eternity, although this be included in, and inseparably connected with his eternal purpose, since no one can purpose to act without the foreknowledge thereof; yet more than this is certainly contained therein; therefore, 2. God’s pre-determining, or fore-ordaining whatsoever comes to pass, includes not only an act of the divine understanding, but an act of his sovereign will: It is not only his knowing what shall come to pass, but his determining, by his own agency, or efficiency, what he will produce in time, or to eternity. Accordingly, some call the decrees of God his eternal providence, and the execution thereof his actual providence; by the former, he determines what he will do; by the latter, he brings his determinations to pass, or effects what he before designed to do. It follows therefore, 3. That God’s fore-ordaining whatsoever shall come to pass, is vastly different from his bringing things to pass: the one is an internal act of his will; the other, an external act of his almighty power: He fore-ordained that they should come to pass, and therefore, till then, they are considered as future; though this determination necessarily secures the event, unless we suppose it possible for his eternal purpose to be defeated, which is disagreeable to the divine perfections, as will farther appear under some following heads. And, on the other hand, when we consider him, as bringing all things to pass, or producing them by his power, this renders what was before future, present. With respect to the former, he decrees what shall be; and, with respect to the latter, his decree takes effect, and is executed accordingly. They who treat of this matter, generally consider things, either as possible or future. Things are said to be possible, with Moreover, things future are rendered so, by the will of God, or his having fore-ordained, or determined to produce them; this is what we call the decree of God, which respects the event, or determines whatever shall come to pass. We are now to consider, what we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining all things, according to the counsel of his will; which is a mode of speaking used in scripture, in Eph. i. 11. Being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. 1. We are not hereby to understand that the decrees of God are the result of deliberation, or his debating matters within himself, as reasoning in his own mind about the expediency, or inexpediency of things, or calling in the advice of others, as creatures are said to do, when acting with counsel; for he must not be supposed to determine things in such a way, since that would argue an imperfection in the divine mind; With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the paths of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding? Isa. xl. 14. But, 2. It implies, that his decrees are infinitely wise. As what is done with counsel is said, according to human modes of speaking, to be done advisedly, in opposition to its being done rashly, or with precipitation; accordingly all the works of God are done with wisdom, therefore all his purposes and determinations to do what is done in time, are infinitely wise, which, according to our way of speaking, is called the counsel of his will: thus it is said, He is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working, chap. xxviii. 29. We are now to consider the object of God’s decree; This, as has been before observed, is every thing that has, or shall come to pass, and it may be considered in different respects. There are some things which he has determined to effect, namely, such as are the objects of his power; or all things, which have a natural or moral goodness in them, which are becoming an infinitely holy God to produce: and this includes in it every thing but sin, which God does not produce, it not being the object of power: Nevertheless, this must be supposed to be committed II. We shall now proceed to prove the truth of what is laid down in this answer, namely, that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. This will evidently appear, if we consider the five following propositions in their due connexion. 1. Nothing comes to pass by chance, with respect to God, but by the direction of his providence, which we are bound to assert against the Deists, who speak of God, as though he were not the Governor of the world. This cannot be denied by any, who think, with any degree of modesty, concerning, or pay a due deference to the divine perfections, since God may as well be denied to be the Creator as the Governor of the world. Notwithstanding, this does not argue his approbation of sin, or that he is the author of it; since it is one thing to suffer, or not to hinder, and another thing to be the author of any thing. Thus it is said, These things hast thou done, and I kept silence, Psal. l. 21. that is, I did not restrain thee from doing them, as I could have done; so it is said, in times past he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Acts xiv. 16. 3. God never acts or suffers any thing to be done, but he knows, beforehand, what he will do or suffer. This an intelligent creature, acting as such, is said do, therefore it must not be denied of him, who is omniscient, and infinitely wise: He who knows all things that others will do, cannot but know what himself will do, or what others will do by the interposition of his providence, or what he will suffer to be done, before it is acted. 4. Whatever God does, and consequently knows before-hand 5. It therefore appears, even to a demonstration, that God before determined, or fore-ordained, whatever comes to pass, which was the thing to be proved. And inasmuch, as he never began to determine, as he never began to exist, or as he never was without purposes of what he would do; therefore it is evident, that he before ordained, from eternity, whatever should come to pass, either in time, or to eternity. It farther appears, that God fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, otherwise he did not determine to create all things before he gave being to them; and then it could not be said, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all, Psal. civ. 24. There are, indeed, many admirable discoveries of wisdom, as well as power, in the effects produced; but to suppose that all this was done without fore-thought, or that there was no eternal purpose relating thereunto, would be such a reflection on the glory of this perfection, as is inconsistent with the idea of a God. Moreover, if herein he designed his own glory, as he certainly did, since every intelligent being designs some end, and the highest and most excellent end must be designed by a God of infinite wisdom; and, if he did all this for his own glory, then it must be allowed, that it was the result of an eternal purpose: all which, I am persuaded, will not be denied by those on the other side of the question, who defend their own cause with any measure of judgment. To this we may farther add, that to deny that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, is, in effect, to deny a providence, or, at least, that God governs the world in such a way, as that what he does therein was pre-concerted. And herein we expect to meet with no opposition from any but the Deists, or those who deny a God; and if it be taken for granted that there is a providence, or that God is the Governor of the world, we cannot but conclude from hence, that all the displays of his glory therein, are the result of his eternal purpose. This is also agreeable to what is said concerning him, that he doth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, Dan. iv. 35. the meaning of which is not barely this, (which is a great truth) that he acts without controul, inasmuch as his power is infinite: But that all he does is pursuant to his will; and, indeed, it cannot be otherwise, if we suppose that the divine power, and will, are so inseparably Hitherto, I presume, our argument will not be much contested; for the main thing in controversy is what relates to the divine determination respecting intelligent creatures, which will be considered under a following head: What I have hitherto attempted to prove is, the proposition in general, namely, that whatever God brings to pass, or is the effect of power, is the result of his determinate purpose. And herein, I think, I have carefully distinguished between God’s will to effect, and his will to permit; but that will be farther explained, when we speak of the decrees of God, with a particular application to angels and men, under the head of election. Having endeavoured to prove that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, we shall lay down the following propositions relating to his end and design in all his purposes, together with the nature of things, as coming to pass pursuant thereunto, and the method in which we are to conceive of the decree, when compared with the execution thereof. 1. God cannot design any thing, in his eternal purpose, as the highest end, but his own glory, which is here assigned, as the end of his decrees. As this is the principal motive, or reason, inducing him to produce whatever comes to pass; so it must be considered as the end of his purpose relating thereunto: This is very evident; for since the divine glory is the most excellent of all things, he cannot, as an infinitely wise God, design any thing short of it, as the great motive or inducement for him to act; therefore, whatever lower ends are designed by him, they are all resolved into this as the principal, to wit, the advancement of his divine perfections. Though God designs his own glory as the highest end, yet he has purposed not only that this should be brought about, by means conducive thereunto, but that there should be a subserviency of one thing to another, all which are the objects of his decree, as well as the highest end, namely, his own glory. As, for instance, he determines that the life and health of man shall be maintained by the use of proper means and medicine, or that grace shall be wrought instrumentally by those means, which he has ordained, in order thereunto: thus his purpose respects the end and means, together with the connexion that there is between them. 3. Though the purpose of God be before the execution thereof, yet the execution of it is first known by us; and so it is by this that we are to judge of his decree and purpose, which is altogether secret, with respect to us, till he reveals it; therefore we first observe the discoveries thereof, as contained in his word, or made visible in his actual providence, and from thence we infer his eternal purpose relating thereunto. Every thing that is first in the order of nature, is not first with respect to the order of our knowing it: thus the cause is before the effect, but the effect is often known before the cause; the sun is, in the order of nature, before the enlightening the world by it; but we first see the light, and then we know there is a sun, which is the fountain thereof: or, to illustrate it by another similitude, which comes nearer the matter before us; A legislator determines first to make a law, which determination is antecedent to the making, and that to the promulgation of it, whereby his subjects come to the knowledge thereof, and act in conformity thereunto; but, according to our method of judging concerning it, we must first know that there is such a law, and from thence we conclude, that there was a purpose relating to it, in him that gave it; Thus we conclude, that though the decree of God be the ground and reason of the execution thereof, yet we know that there was such a decree by its execution, or, at least, by some other way designed to discover this to us. What has been said under the foregoing heads, is sufficient to take away the force of this objection; but this will be more particularly considered, when we come to answer several objections against the doctrine of election: Therefore all I shall add at present is, that since our conduct and hope is to be governed by the appearances of things, and not by God’s secret purpose relating to the event thereof, we are to act as those who have not, nor can have, any knowlege of what is decreed, with relation thereunto, till it is evinced by the execution thereof; or, at least, those graces wrought in us, which are the objects of God’s purpose, as well as our future blessedness; and our right to one is to be judged of by the other. This leads us to consider the properties of these decrees of God, as mentioned in the former of the answers we are now considering; in which it is said, they are wise, free, and holy. This is very evident, from the wisdom, sovereignty, and holiness, which appear in the execution of them; for whatever perfections are demonstrated in the dispensations of providence, or grace, these God designed to glorify in his eternal purpose; therefore if his works, in time, are wise, free, sovereign, and holy, his decree, with respect thereunto, which is fulfilled thereby, must be said to be so likewise. These things we shall have occasion to speak more particularly to, under a following head, when we consider the properties of election, and particularly that it is wise, sovereign, and holy; I shall therefore, at present, only add, that whatever perfections belong to the nature of God, they are demonstrated by his works, since he cannot act unbecoming himself; for that would give occasion to the world to deny him to be infinitely perfect, that is, to be God. If we pass a judgment on creatures by what they do, and so determine him to be a wise man, who acts wisely, or a holy man, who acts holily, or a free and sovereign agent, who acts without constraint, certainly the same must be said of the divine Majesty; and consequently, since whatever he does has III. That intelligent creatures, such as angels and men, with respect to their present or future state, are the objects of God’s eternal decree, or purpose, which is generally called predestination. And this, as it relates to the happiness of some, or misery of others, is distinguished into election or reprobation, which is a very awful subject, and ought never to be thought of, or mentioned, but with the utmost caution and reverence, lest we speak those things that are not right concerning God, and thereby dishonour him, or give just occasion to any to deny or reproach this doctrine, as though it were not founded on scripture. Hitherto we have considered the purpose of God, as including in it all things future, as the objects thereof; and now we are to speak of it in particular, as it relates to angels and men. When we confine the objects of God’s purpose to those things that come to pass, which have no dependence on the free-will of angels or men, we do not meet with much opposition from those, who are in other respects, in the contrary scheme of doctrine; for most of them, who are masters of their own argument, and consider what may be allowed without weakening their cause, do not deny that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, nor that he did this from all eternity, if we except what respects the actions of free agents. Thus they will grant that God, from all eternity, determined to create the world, and then to govern it, and to give laws to men, as the rule of government, and a free-will, or power to yield obedience thereunto: but when we consider men’s free actions, as the objects of a divine decree, and the final state of men, as being determined by it, here we are like to meet with the greatest opposition, and therefore must endeavour to maintain our ground in the following part of this argument. First, What respects the doctrine of election. To elect, or choose, according to the common use, or acceptation of the word, signifies the taking a small number out of a greater, or a part out of the whole; and this is applied, either to things or persons. (1.) To things. As when a person has a great many things to choose out of, he sets aside some of them for his own use, and rejects the others, as refuse, that he will have nothing to do with. (2.) To persons. As when a king chooses, out of his subjects, some whom he will advance to great honours; or when a master chooses, out of a number of servants offered to him, one, or more, whom he will employ in his service; this from the nature of the thing, implies, that all are not chosen, but only a part, in which there is a discrimination, or a difference put between one and another. But we are more particularly to consider the meaning of the word election, as we find it in scripture, wherein it is used in several senses. To elect or choose, according to the acceptation of the word, does not connote the particular thing that a person is chosen to, but that is to be understood by what is farther added to determine the sense thereof; as sometimes we read of persons being chosen to partake of some privileges, short of salvation; at other times, of their being chosen to salvation; sometimes it is to be understood as signifying their being chosen to things of a lower nature, at other times their being chosen to perform those duties, and exercise those graces that accompany salvation; and we may, very easily, understand the sense of it by the context. Again, it is sometimes taken for the execution of God’s purpose, or for his actual providence, making choice of persons to fulfil his pleasure, in their various capacities; at other times, as we are here to understand it, for his fixing his love upon his people, and purposing to bring them to glory, making choice of some out of the rest of mankind, as the monuments of his 1. It is sometimes taken for God’s actual separation of persons, for some peculiar instances of service, which is a branch of his providential dispensation, in time: thus we sometimes read in scripture, of persons being chosen, or set apart, by God, to an office, and that either civil or sacred: thus, upon the occasion of Saul’s being made king, by God’s special appointment, Samuel says, See ye him whom the Lord hath chosen, 1 Sam. x. 24. so it is said elsewhere, He chose David also his servant, and took him from the sheep-fold; from following the ewes great with young, he brought him to feed Jacob, his people, and Israel his inheritance. Psal. lxxviii. 70, 71. It also signifies his actual appointment of persons to perform some sacred office: thus it is said, concerning the Levites, that the Lord had chosen them to carry the ark, and to minister unto him, 1 Chron. xv. 2. and our Saviour says, to his disciples, Have not I chosen you, namely, to be my disciples, and as such to be employed in preaching the gospel, and one of you is a devil, John vi. 70. 2. It is sometimes taken for God’s providential designation of a people, to be made partakers of those external privileges of the covenant of grace, which belong to them as a church, which, as such, is the peculiar object of the divine regard: thus the people of Israel are said to have been chosen, or separated, from the world, to enjoy the external blessings of the covenant of grace, as Moses tells them, Because the Lord loved your fathers, therefore he chose their seed after them, Deut. iv. 37. and elsewhere, Thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God; the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that are upon the face of the earth, chap. vii. 6, 7. And, in many other places in the Old Testament, the word election is taken in this sense, though something more than this seems to be included in some particular scriptures in the prophetic writings, in which the Jews are described, as God’s chosen people, as we shall endeavour to shew under a following head. 3. It also signifies God’s bestowing special grace on some, who are highly favoured by him, above others, as having called, or set them apart for himself, to have communion with him, to bear a testimony to him, and to be employed in eminent service, for his name and glory in the world. Thus it seems to be taken, in 1 Cor. i. 26, 27. where the apostle speaks of their calling, which imports some special privileges, that they were made partakers of, as the objects of divine power, and grace, to whom Christ was made wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption; which therefore signifies the powerful, internal, And sometimes it is taken, for some peculiar excellency, which one Christian has above another; as that hospitable, or public-spirited person, to whom the apostle John directs his second epistle, is called by him, The elect lady, ver. 1. as an excellent person is sometimes styled a choice person. But, though the word is taken, in scripture, in these various senses above mentioned, yet it is not confined to any, or all of them; for we shall endeavour to make it appear, that it is often taken, in scripture, as it is expressed in this answer; for God’s having fore-ordained particular persons, as monuments of his special love, to be made partakers of grace here, and glory hereafter, as it is styled, their being chosen to eternal life, and the means thereof. This is what we shall endeavour to prove, and accordingly shall consider the objects thereof, namely, angels and men, and that it is only a part of mankind that is chosen to salvation, to wit, that remnant which shall be eventually saved; and that these are chosen to the means thereof, as well as the end; and how this is said to be in Christ. The objects of election are angels and men. A few words may be said concerning the election of angels, as being particularly mentioned in this answer; we have not, indeed, much delivered concerning this matter in scripture, though the apostle calls those who remain in their state of holiness and happiness, in which they were created, elect angels, 1 Tim. v. 21. But, had we no mention of their election in scripture, their being confirmed in their present state of blessedness, must, from the foregoing method of reasoning, be supposed to be the result of a divine purpose, or the execution of a decree relating thereunto; though there is this difference between their election, and that of men, in that the latter are chosen unto salvation, which the angels are not subjects capable of, inasmuch as they were never in a lost, undone state; neither are they said to be chosen in Christ, as men are. But we shall proceed, to that which more immediately concerns us, to consider men as the objects of election. This is variously expressed in scripture; sometimes it is called their being appointed to attain salvation, or being ordained to eternal life or their names being written in the book of life; and it is also called, the purpose of God, according to election, or his having That election sometimes respects the disposing providence of God, in time, has been already considered, and some particular instances thereof, in scripture, referred to; but when they, on the other side of the question, maintain, that this is the only, or principal sense in which it is used therein, we must take leave to differ from them. There is a late writer 1. That though election oftentimes, in the Old Testament, respects the church of the Jews, as enjoying the external means of grace, yet it does not sufficiently appear that it is never to be taken in any other sense; especially when, there are some of those privileges which accompany salvation mentioned in the context, and applied to some of them, who are thus described; or when there are some promises made to them, which respect more than the external means of grace; therefore if there were but one scripture that is to be taken in this sense, it would be a sufficient answer to the universal negative, in which it is supposed, that the Old Testament never intends by it, any privilege, but such as is external, and has no immediate reference to salvation. Here I might refer to some places in the evangelical prophecy of Isaiah, which are not foreign to our purpose; as when it is said, Thou Israel, art my servant, Jacob, whom I have chosen; and I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away, Isa. xli. 8, 9. that this respects more than the continuance of their political and religious state, as enjoying the external means of grace, seems to be implied in those promises that are made to them, in the following words, which not only speak of their deliverance from captivity, after they had continued sometime therein, but their being made partakers of Gods special love, which had an immediate reference to their salvation: thus it is said, in the following, Fear not, for I am with thee; be not dismayed, for I am thy God; I will strengthen thee, yea, I will help thee; yea, I will uphold thee with the right hand of my righteousness; and elsewhere God, speaking to the Jews, says, I, even I, am he that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake, and I will not remember thy sins, chap. xliii. 25. and, Israel shall be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation; ye shall not be ashamed nor confounded, world without end, chap. xlv. 17. There are also many other promises, which seem to import a great deal more than the external privileges of the covenant of grace, which many very excellent Christians have applied to themselves, as supposing that they contain those blessings which have a more immediate reference to salvation; and it would detract very much from the spirituality and usefulness of such-like scriptures, to say that they have no relation to us, as having nothing to do with the Jewish nation, to whom these promises were made. Object. To this it may be objected, that these promises are directed to the church of the Jews, as a chosen people; and therefore to suppose that there were a number elected out of them to eternal salvation, is to extend the sense of the word beyond the design of the context, to destroy the determinate sense thereof, and to suppose an election out of an election. 2. Our Saviour speaking concerning the final destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman army, and a great time of distress that should ensue hereupon, tells them, in Matt. xxiv. 22. that those days should be shortened for the elect’s sake, that is, those who were chosen to eternal life, and accordingly should be converted to the Christian faith, not from among the heathen, but out of the Jewish nation; for it is to them that he more particularly directs his discourse, forewarning them of this desolating judgment; and he advises them to pray that their flight be not on the Sabbath-day, ver. 20. intimating thereby, that that nation deemed it unlawful to defend themselves from the assaults of an enemy on the Sabbath-day, though their immediate death would be the consequence thereof; therefore this advice was suited to the temper of the Jews, and none else: No people in the world, except them, entertained this superstitious opinion concerning the prohibition of self-defence on the Sabbath-day; from whence it may therefore be inferred, that our Saviour speaks of them in particular, and not of the Christians, which were amongst them; upon which account it seems probable, that these are not intended by the elect, namely, that small number for whose sake those days of distress and tribulation There is also another scripture, which seems to give countenance hereunto, where the apostle shews, that God had not cast away his people, Rom. xi. 2. to wit, the Jews, that is, he had not rejected the whole nation, but had made a reserve of some who were the objects of his special love, as chosen to salvation; and these are called, A remnant according to the election of grace, ver. 5. and this seems still more plain from what follows, ver. 7. What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for, that is, righteousness and life, which they sought after, as it were, by the works of the law, which, as is mentioned in the foregoing verse, is inconsistent with the attaining it by grace; but the election, that is, the elect among that people have obtained it; for they sought after it in another way, and the rest were blinded, that is, the other part of the Jewish nation, which were not interested in this privilege, were left to the blindness of their own minds, which was their ruin. To this let me add one scripture more, Rom. ix. 6, 7. where the apostle, speaking concerning the nation of the Jews, distinguishes between the natural and spiritual seed of Abraham, when he says, All are not Israel that are of Israel, that is, there was a remnant according to the election of grace, who were chosen to eternal life out of that people, who were in other respects, chosen to be made partakers of the external privileges that belonged to them, as God’s peculiar people. The sum of this argument is, that though, it is true, there are some scriptures that speak of the church of the Jews, as separated from the world, by the peculiar hand of divine providence, and favoured with the external means of grace, yet there are others 2. We shall proceed to consider how election is taken in the New Testament, in opposition to those who suppose that it is there used only to signify God’s bringing persons to be members of the Christian church, as being instructed in the doctrines relating thereunto by the apostles: The first scripture that we shall refer to, is in Eph. i. 4. He hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love; and, in ver. 5. he speaks of their being predestinated to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ; that this respects not the external dispensation of God’s providence, in constituting them a Christian church, or giving them the knowledge of those doctrines, on which it was founded; but their being chosen to salvation and grace, as the means thereof, according to God’s eternal purpose, will very evidently appear from the context, if we consider that they who are thus chosen, are called faithful in Christ Jesus, which implies much more than barely to be in him by external profession: they are farther described, as blessed with all spiritual blessings in Christ, in ver. 3. or blessed with all those blessings which respect heavenly things; grace, which they had in possession, and glory, which they had in expectation; and they are farther described, as having obtained redemption through the blood of Christ, and forgiveness of sins; and all this is said to be done, according to the riches of his grace, and the good pleasure of his will, who worketh all things after the counsel thereof; and certainly all this must contain much more than the external dispensation of providence Again, in 1 Thess. i. 4. the apostle says concerning them, to whom he writes, that he knew their election of God. That this is to be understood of their election to eternal life, is very evident; and, indeed, he explains it in this sense, when he says, God hath, from the beginning, chosen you unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and the belief of the truth, Whereunto he called you by our gospel, to the obtaining the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, 2 Thess. ii. 13, 14. the gospel is considered as the means of their attaining that salvation, which they are said to be chosen to; so that their election contains more than their professed subjection thereunto as a church of Christ: Besides, the apostle gives those marks and evidences of this matter, which plainly discover that it is their election to salvation that he intends; accordingly he speaks of their work of faith, labour of love, and patience of hope, in our Lord Jesus Christ, and of the gospel’s coming not in word only, but also in power, 1 Thess. i. 3, 5. by which he means not the power that was exerted in working miracles, for that would be no evidence of their being a church, or of their adhering to the doctrines that were confirmed thereby, since every one, who saw miracles wrought, did not believe; therefore he means, that by the powerful internal influence of the Holy Ghost, they were persuaded to become followers of the apostles, and the Lord, and were ensamples to others, and public-spirited, in endeavouring to propagate the gospel in the world. Certainly this argues that they were effectually called by the grace of God, and so proves that they were chosen to be made partakers of this grace, and of that salvation, that is the consequence thereof. There is another scripture, in which it is very plain that the apostle speaks of election to eternal life inasmuch as there are several privileges connected with it, which the Christian church, as such, cannot lay claim to: thus, in Rom. viii. 33. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God’s elect? It is God that justifieth. Now if justification or freedom from condemnation, accompanied with their being effectually called here, which shall end in their being glorified hereafter, be the result of their election, as. in ver. 30. then certainly this includes in it more than the external privileges of the covenant of grace, which all who adhere to the Christian faith are possessed of, and consequently it is an election to salvation that the apostle here intends. Object. It is objected, that it is more than probable, when we find, as we sometimes do, whole churches styled elect in the New testament, that some among them were hypocrites; particularly those to whom the apostle Peter writes, who were converted Answ. It is certain that there was a very considerable number among them who were not only Christians in name; but they were very eminent for the exercise of those graces, which evinced their election to eternal life; and particularly he says concerning them, Whom having not seen, ye love; and in whom believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full of glory; receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls, 1 Pet. i. 8, 9. which agrees very well with the other character given them of their being elect, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ, ver. 2. Therefore the only thing that seems to affect our argument is, that this character did not belong to every individual. But supposing this should be allowed, might not the church be here described as chosen to salvation, inasmuch as the far greater number of them were so? Nothing is more common, in scripture, than for a whole body of men to be denominated from the greatest part of them, whether their character be good or bad; thus when the greatest part of the Jewish church were revolted from God, and guilty of the most notorious crimes, they are described as though their apostacy had been universal, They are all grievous revolters, walking with slanders, Jer. vi. 28. whereas it is certain, there were some who had not apostatized: some of them were slandered and reproached for the sake of God, and therefore were not included in the number of them that walked with slanders, though their number were very small; as God says by the prophet Ezekiel, I sought for a man among them that should make up the hedge, and stand in the gap before me for the land that I should not destroy it, but I found none, Ezek. xxii. 30. whereas at that time, in which the people were most degenerate, there were found some who sighed and cryed for all the abomination that were done in the Thus having premised something concerning election in general, and the sense in which it is to be understood, in scripture, we shall briefly mention a matter in dispute, among divines relating to the objects thereof, as they are considered in God’s eternal purpose: and here we shall take notice of some different opinions relating thereunto, without making use of those scholastic modes of speaking, which render this subject much more difficult, than otherwise it would be: and shall take occasion to avoid, and fence against those extremes, which have only had a tendency to prejudice persons against the doctrine in general. The object of election is variously considered by divines, who treat of this subject. 1. There are some who, though they agree in the most material things in their defence of this doctrine yet they are divided in their sentiments about some nice metaphysical speculations, relating to the manner how man is to be considered, as the object of predestination: accordingly some, who are generally styled Supralapsarians, seem to proceed in this way of explaining it, namely that God from all eternity, designed to glorify his divine perfections, in some objects out of himself, which he could not then be said to have done, inasmuch as they did not exist; and the perfections, which he designed to glorify, were, more especially, his sovereignty and absolute dominion, as having a right to do what he will with the work of his hands; and also his goodness, whereby he would render himself the object of their delight; and, as a means conducive to this end, he designed to create man an intelligent creature, in whom he might be glorified; and since a creature, as such, could not be the object of the display of his mercy, or justice, he farther designed to permit man to fall into a state of sin and misery, that so, when fallen, he might recover some out of that state, and leave others to perish in it: the former of which are said to be loved, the other hated; and when some extend the absoluteness of God’s purpose, not only to election but reprobation, and do not take care to guard their modes of speaking, as they ought to do, but conclude reprobation, at least predamnation, to be, not an act of justice, but rather of sovereignty; they lay themselves open to exception, and give occasion to those, who oppose this doctrine, to conclude, that they represent God as delighting in the misery of his creatures, and with that view giving being to them. It is true, several, who have given into this way of thinking, have endeavoured to extricate themselves out of this difficulty, and denied this and other consequences of the like nature, which many have thought to be necessary deductions There are others, who are generally styled Sublapsarians That which is principally objected, by those who are in the other way of thinking, against this scheme, is, that the Sublapsarians suppose that God’s creating men, and permitting them to fall, was not the object of his eternal purpose. But this they universally deny, and distinguish between God’s purpose to create and suffer men to fall; and his purposes being considered as a means to advance his sovereignty, grace, and justice, in which the principal difference between them consists. We shall enter no farther into this controversy, but shall only add, that whatever may be considered, in God’s eternal purpose, as a means to bring about other ends; yet it seems evident, from the nature of the thing, that God cannot be said to choose men to salvation, without herein considering them as fallen; for 2. There are others who deny particular election of persons to eternal life, and explain those scriptures, which speak of it, in a very different way: these suppose, that God designed, from all eternity, to create man, and foreknew that he would fall, and, that, pursuant to this eternal foreknowledge, he designed to give him sufficient means for his recovery, which, by the use of his free will, he might improve, or not, to the best purposes; and also, fore-knowing who would improve, and who would reject, the means of grace, which he purposed to bestow, he determined, as the consequence thereof, to save some, and condemn others. This method of explaining God’s eternal purpose is exceptionable, as will farther appear, in the method we shall take, in prosecuting this subject, in two respects. (1.) As they suppose that the salvation of men depends on their own conduct, or the right use of their free will, without giving the glory which is due to God, for that powerful, efficacious grace, which enables them to improve the means of grace, and brings them into a state of salvation, (2.) As the result of the former, they suppose that nothing absolute is contained in the decree of God, but his fore-knowledge, which is rather an act of his understanding, than his will; and therefore it seems to militate against his sovereignty and grace, and, to make his decrees depend on some conditions, founded in the free-will of man, which, according to them, are not the object of a peremptory decree. Thus having considered intelligent creatures, and more particularly men, as the objects of predestination. IV. We proceed to the farther proof and explication of this doctrine; and, in order thereto, shall insist on the following propositions. 1. That it is only a part of mankind that were chosen to salvation. 2. That they who were chosen to it, as the end, were also chosen to sanctification, as the means thereof, And, 3. That they were chosen in Christ; which propositions are contained in that part of this answer, in which it is said, that God has chosen some men to eternal life, and the means thereof. 1. That some were chosen to salvation; not the whole race of mankind, but only those that shall be eventually saved: that the whole world is not the object of election appears from the known acceptation of the word, both in scripture, and in our But there are other arguments more conclusive, than what results barely from the known sense of the word, which we shall proceed to consider, and therein make use of the same method of reasoning, which we observed, in proving that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, with a particular application thereof to the eternal state of believers. As we before observed, that the decree of God is to be judged of by the execution of it, in time; so it will appear, that those whom God in his actual providence and grace, prepares for, and brings to glory, he also before designed for it. Were I only to treat of those particular points in controversy, between us and the Pelagians, I would first consider the method which God takes in saving his people, and prove that salvation is of grace, or that it is the effect of the power of God, and not to be ascribed to the free-will of man, as separate from the divine influence; and then I would proceed to speak concerning the decree of God relating hereunto, which might then, without much difficulty, be proved: but being obliged to pursue the same method in which things are laid down, in their respective connexion, we must sometimes defer the more particular proof of some doctrines, on which our arguments depend, to a following head, to avoid the repetition of things; therefore, inasmuch as the execution of God’s decree, and his power and grace manifested therein, will be insisted on in some following answers, we shall, at present, take this for granted, or shall speak but very briefly to it. (1.) It appears that it is only a part of mankind that are chosen to be made partakers of grace and glory, inasmuch as these invaluable privileges are conferred upon, or applied to no more than a part of mankind: if all shall not be saved, then all were not chosen to salvation; for we are not to suppose that God’s purpose, relating hereunto, can be frustrated, or not take effect; or if there be a manifest display of discriminating grace in the execution of God’s decree relating thereunto, there is, doubtless, a discrimination in his purpose, and that is what we call election. This farther appears from some scriptures, which represent those who are saved as a remnant: thus when the apostle is speaking of God’s casting away the Here it will be necessary for us to consider, that this remnant signifies only a small part of the Jewish church, selected, by divine grace, out of that nation, of whom the greater number were rejected by God; and that the salvation, here spoken of, is to be taken not for any temporal deliverance, but for that salvation which the believing Jews should be made partakers of in the gospel day, when the rejection of the others had its full accomplishment. That this may appear, we shall not only compare this scripture with the context, but with that in Hosea, from whence it is taken: as to what respects the context, the apostle, in ver. 2. expresses his great heaviness, and continual sorrow of heart, for the rejection of that nation in general, which they had brought upon themselves; but yet he encourages himself, in ver. 6. with this thought, that the word of God, that is, the promise made to Abraham relating to his spiritual seed, who were given to expect greater blessings, than those which were contained in the external dispensation of the covenant of grace, should not take none effect, since, though the whole nation of the Jews, who were of Israel, that is, Abraham’s natural seed, did not attain those privileges; yet a part of them, who are here called Israel, and elsewhere a remnant, chosen out of that nation, should be made partakers thereof; the former are called The children of the flesh, in ver. 8. the latter, by way of eminence, The children of the promise; these are styled, in ver. 23, 24. The vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, to whom he designed to make known the riches of his glory, namely, those whom he had called; not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles, which he intends by that remnant, which were chosen out of each of them, for so the word properly signifies. Object. The prophet seems to speak, in this scripture, of a temporal salvation, inasmuch as it is said, in the words immediately following, Then shall the children of Judah, and the children of Israel, be gathered together, and shall appoint themselves one head, and they shall come up out of the land, viz. of Babylon, for great shall be the day of Jezreel. Therefore this remnant, here spoken of, which should be called the sons of the living God, respects only such as should return out of captivity, and consequently not the election of a part, to wit, the believing Jews, to eternal life: for it is plain, that, when this prediction was fulfilled, they were to appoint themselves one head, or governor, namely, Zerubbabel, or some other, that should be at the head of affairs, and help forward their flourishing state, in, or after their return from captivity. Answ. It seems very evident, that part of this prophecy, viz. chap. iii. 5. respects the happiness of Israel, at that time, when they should seek the Lord their God, and David their King, and should fear the Lord and his goodness, in the latter days; therefore why may not this verse also, in chap. i. in which it is said, that they shall be called the sons of the living God, have its accomplishment in the gospel-day, when they should adhere to Christ, who is called, David their King? The only difficulty which affects this sense of the text is, its being said, that they shall return to their own land, under the conduct of a Head, or governor, whom they should appoint over them, which seems to favour the sense contained in the objection: but the sense of the words would be more plain, if we render the text, instead of [THEN] And the children of Judah, &c. as it is rendered in most translations, and is most agreeable to the sense of the Hebrew word. If it be objected, to this sense of the text, that their return from captivity is mentioned after that promise, of their being called the sons of the living God, therefore it cannot be supposed to relate to a providence that should happen before it; I need only reply to this, that it is very usual, in scripture, for the Holy Ghost, when speaking concerning the privileges which the church should be made partakers of, not to lay them down in the same order in which they were to be accomplished; and therefore, why may we not suppose, that this rule may be applied to this text? And accordingly the sense is this: the prophet had been speaking, in the tenth verse, of that great salvation, which this remnant of the Jews, converted to Christianity, should be made partakers of in the gospel-day; and then he obviates an objection, as though it should be said, How can this be, since the Jews are to be carried into captivity, and there broken, scattered, and, as it were ruined? In answer to this, the prophet adds, that the Jews should not be destroyed in the captivity, but should be delivered, and return to their own land, and so should remain a people, till this remnant was gathered out of them, who were to be made partakers of these spiritual privileges under the gospel-dispensation, as mentioned in the foregoing words. Thus having endeavoured to prove, that this remnant, spoken of in Rom. xi. are such as should be made partakers of eternal salvation, we may now apply this to our present argument. If that salvation, which this remnant was to be made partakers of, be the effect of divine power, as the apostle says, in Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God, that sheweth mercy; and if it be the gift of divine grace, as he says elsewhere, in Eph. ii. 8. By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God; then it follows from hence, that God designed, before-hand, to give them these blessings; and if he designed them only for this remnant, then it is not all, but a part of mankind, to wit, those that shall be eventually saved, that were chosen to salvation. (2.) The doctrine of election may be farther proved, from God’s having foreknown whom he will sanctify and save. It In this sense we are to understand those scriptures that set forth God’s eternal purpose to save his people, as an act of fore-knowledge: thus, in Rom. xi. 2. God hath not cast away his people, whom he fore-knew, that is, he hath not cast them all away, but has reserved to himself a remnant, according to the election of grace. That he either had, or soon designed, to cast away the greatest number of the Jewish nation, seems very plain, from several passages in this chapter: thus, in verses 17, 19. he speaks of some of the branches being broken off, and ver. 22. of God’s severity, by which we are to understand his vindictive justice in this dispensation: But yet we are not to suppose, says the apostle, that God has cast them all away, as in ver. 1. and so he mentions himself, as an instance of the contrary, as though he should say, I am called, and sanctified, and chosen, though I am an Israelite. Moreover, God’s not casting away his remnant of the Israelites, being the result of his fore-knowledge, does not barely respect his knowing what they should be, or do, whom he had chosen to eternal life, for it is represented as a discriminating act of favour; whereas, in other respects, they, who are rejected by him, are as much the objects of his knowledge, as any others, since the omniscience of God is not the result of his will; but it is a perfection founded in his nature, and therefore not arbitrary, but necessary. God’s knowledge, in scripture, is sometimes taken for his approving, or loving, those who are the objects thereof: thus he says unto Moses, in Exod. xxxiii. 17. Thou hast found grace in my sight, and I know thee by name, where one expression explains the other, and so it imports a knowledge of approbation; and, on the other hand, when our Saviour says to some, in Matt. vii. 23. I will profess unto you, I never knew you, it is not to be supposed that he did not know they would behave themselves, or what they would do against his name and interest in the world; but I never knew you, that is, I never approved of you, and accordingly, it follows, Depart from me, ye that work iniquity; and when it is said concerning knowledge, as applied to man, in John xvii. 3. This is life eternal, that they may know thee, the only true God; no one supposes that a speculative knowledge of divine truths will give any one ground to conclude his right to eternal life; therefore to know God, is to love, to delight in him: and the same is applied, by the apostle, to God’s loving man, when he says, in 1 Cor. viii. 3. If any man love God, the same is known of him, that is, beloved by him. Now if God’s knowing his people signifies his loving them, then his fore-knowing them must signify his determining to do them good, and to bestow grace and glory upon them, which is the same as to choose them to eternal life: he fore-knew what he designed to confer upon them; for he prepared a kingdom for them, from the foundation of the world, Object. As all actions, performed by intelligent creatures, as such, suppose knowledge, so their determinations are the result of fore-knowledge, for the will follows the dictates of the understanding; therefore we must suppose God’s fore-knowledge, to be antecedent to, and the ground and reason of his determinations. This the apostle seems to intimate, when he says, in Rom. viii. 29. Whom he did fore-know, he did predestinate, that is, he had a perfect knowledge of their future conduct, and therefore determined to save them. Answ. I do not deny that, according to the nature of things, we first consider God as knowing, and then as willing: but this does not hold good, with respect to his knowing all things future; for we are not to suppose that he first knows that a thing shall come to pass, and then wills that it shall. It is true, he first knows what he will do, and then does it; but, to speak of a knowledge in God, as conversant about the future state, or actions of his people, without considering them as connected with his power and providence, (which is the immediate cause thereof) I cannot think consistent with the divine perfections. As for this scripture, Whom he did fore-know, them he did predestinate, we are not to suppose, that the meaning is, that God fore-knew that they, whom he speaks of, would be conformed to the image of his Son, and then as the result hereof, determined that they should; for their being conformed to Christ’s image, consists in their exercising those graces which are agreeable to the temper and disposition of his children, or brethren, as they are here called; and this conformity to his image is certainly the result of their being called: but their calling as well as justification and glorification, is the consequence of their being fore-known; therefore God’s fore-knowing here, must be taken in the same sense as it is in the scriptures, but now referred to; for his having loved them before the foundation of the world, or chosen them to enjoy those privileges which are here mentioned. (3.) It farther appears, that there is a number chosen out of the world to eternal life, from the means which God has ordained for the gathering a people out of it, to be made partakers of the blessings which he has reserved for them in heaven. This is what we generally call the means of grace; and from hence it appears, that there is a chosen people, whose advantage is designed hereby. For the making out of this argument, let it be considered, 1st. That there always has been a number of persons, whom God, by his distinguishing providence, has separated from the world, who have enjoyed the ordinances, or means of grace, 2dly. They who have been favoured with these means of grace, have had some peculiar marks of the divine regard to them. Thus we read, in the early ages of the world, of the distinction between those, who had the special presence of God among them, and others, who were deprived of it; as Cain is said, to go out from the presence of the Lord, Gen. iv. 16. as one, who, together with his posterity, was deprived of the means of grace, and also of God’s covenant, in which he promised to be a God to some, from which privilege others were excluded: thus he was called the God of Shem, chap. ix. 16. and afterwards of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Exod. iii. 6. whose descendants were hereby given to expect the ordinances and means of grace, and many instances of that special grace, which a part of them should be made partakers of: and would he have made this provision, for a peculiar people, in so discriminating a way, if there had not been a remnant among them, according to the election of grace, to whom he designed to manifest himself here, and bring to glory hereafter? No, he would have neglected, or over-looked them as he did the world; whereas both they and their seed had the promises of the covenant of grace made to them which argues, that there was a remnant among them, whom God designed hereby to bring into a state of grace and salvation, and, in this respect, they are said to be the objects of divine love. This leads us to consider the meaning of that text, which is generally insisted on, as a very plain proof of this doctrine, in Rom. ix. 11, 12, 13. The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election, might stand; not of works, but of him that calleth: It was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger; as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. Here is an express mention of the purpose of God, according to election, and Jacob is, pursuant thereunto, said to be the object of divine love. For the understanding of which, let us consider the sense that is given of it, by those on the other side of the question; and how far it may be allowed of, and what there is in the words to prove this doctrine, and wherein our sense of them differs from their’s. It is supposed, by those who deny particular election, that Jacob and Esau are not here considered in a personal capacity, This seems a very plausible sense of the text; but yet the apostle’s words may very well be reconciled with those two scriptures, cited to enervate the force of the argument taken from it; and at the same time, it will not follow from thence, that there is no reference had to the doctrine of eternal election therein. Therefore, 1. We will not deny, when it is said, Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, that their respective descendants were intended in this prediction, yet it will not follow from hence, that Jacob and Esau, personally considered, were not also included. Whoever reads their history, in the book of Genesis, will evidently find in one the marks and characters of a person chosen to eternal life; whereas, in the other, we have no account of any regard which he expressed to God or religion, therefore he appears to have been rejected; yet, 2. So far as it respects the posterity of Jacob and Esau we are not to suppose that God’s having loved the one, and rejected the other, implies nothing else, but that Jacob’s posterity had a better country allotted for them, or exceeded Esau’s in those secular advantages, or honours, which were conferred upon them. This seems to be the principal sense, which they, on the other side of the question, give of the apostle’s words; when comparing them with those of the prophet Malachi, who, speaking concerning Esau’s being hated, explains it, as relating to his lands being laid waste for the dragons of the wilderness. This had been foretold by some other prophets, Jer. xlix. 17, 18. Ezek. xxxv. 7, 9. Obed. ver. 10. and had its accomplishment soon after the Jews were carried captive into Babylon, from which time they ceased to be a nation; but, certainly, though this be that particular instance of hatred, which the prophet Malachi refers to, yet there is more contained in the word, as applied to them by the apostle Paul. It is true, the prophet designs, in particular to obviate an objection which the Jews are represented as making, against the divine dispensations Neither could this love or hatred signify nothing else but the descendants of Jacob being planted in a more fruitful soil; for there is little difference put between them, in this respect, in the patriarchal benediction pronounced by their father, who tells Jacob, that God would give him the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine; and to Esau he says, Thy dwelling shall be the fatness of the earth, and the dew of heaven from above, chap. xxvii. 28, compared with 39. therefore, when one is described, in the prediction, as loved, and the other as hated, we are not to suppose, that outward prosperity on the one hand, or adversity on the other, are, principally intended thereby, for that might be said of both of them by turns; therefore let me add, 3. That God’s loving or hating, as applied to the posterity of Jacob or Esau, principally respects his determining to give or deny the external blessings of the covenant of grace, or the means of grace, and therewith many special tokens of his favour. In Jacob’s line the church was established, out of which, as has been before observed, there was a remnant chosen, and Object. 1. But to this it will be objected, that Job and his friends were of Esau’s posterity, as is more than probable; but these were far from being rejected of God. Answ. To this it may be replied, that a few single instances are not sufficient to overthrow the sense we have given of this divine oracle, since the rejection of Esau’s posterity may take its denomination from the far greater number thereof, without including in it every individual, as it is very agreeable to the sense of many scriptures. Moreover, we may consider, that these lived, as we have sufficient ground to conclude, before the seed of Jacob were increased, and advanced to be a distinct nation, as they were after their deliverance from the Egyptian bondage; as also before that idolatry, which first overspread the land of Chaldea, in Abraham’s time, had universally extended itself over the country of Idumea, where Esau’s family was situate; so that it doth not follow from hence, because this prediction did not take place in a very considerable degree, in the first descendants from him, that therefore it does not respect their rejection, as to what concerns the spiritual privileges of that people afterwards. And, indeed, idolatry seems to have had some footing in the country where Job lived, even in his time, which gave him occasion to exculpate himself from the charge thereof, when he signifies, that he had not beheld the sun when it shineth, or the moon walking in brightness, and his heart had not been secretly enticed, or his mouth kissed his hand, Job xxxi. 26, 27. alluding to some modes of worship, practised by idolaters in his day, who gave divine honour to the sun and moon; and, soon after his time, before Israel had taken possession of Canaan, there seems to have been an universal defection of the Edomites from the true religion, otherwise, doubtless, Moses might, without any difficulty, have got leave to have passed through their country, in his way to the land of Canaan, which he requested in a most friendly and obliging manner, but to no purpose, Numb. xx. 14-21. especially considering they had no reason to fear that they would do any thing against them in a hostile manner; therefore the unfriendly treatment they met with from them, proceeded from the same spring with that of the Amalekites, and other bordering nations, namely, they had all revolted from the God and religion of their father Abraham; so that this prediction seems to have been fulfilled, before the promise, respecting Jacob’s posterity, in any considerable degree, began to take place. Having briefly considered this objection, we return to the argument, namely, that God’s loving or hating, in this scripture, as it has a relation to the distinct nations that descended Object. 2. It will be farther objected, that men’s enjoying the external privileges of the covenant of grace, has no immediate reference to their salvation, or election to it. Answ. Since salvation is not to be attained, but by and under these means of grace, we must conclude, that whenever God bestows and continues them, to a church or nation, he has a farther view therein, namely, the calling some, by his grace, to partake of those privileges that accompany salvation. If there were no such blessings to be conferred on the world, there would be no means of grace, and consequently no external dispensation of the covenant of grace; for it is absurd to suppose that any thing can be called a means, where all are excluded from the end which they refer to; therefore the sum of this argument is, that God had a peculiar love to the posterity of Jacob, and accordingly he designed to give them those privileges which were denied to others, namely, the means of grace, which he would not have done, had he not intended to make them effectual to the salvation of some of them; and this purpose, relating hereunto, is what is called election, which, though Thus having considered that God has chosen a part of mankind to salvation, we may, without being charged with a vain curiosity, enquire whether this privilege belongs to the greater or smaller part of mankind, since the scripture goes before us in this matter. If we judge of the purpose of God by the execution thereof, it must be observed, that hitherto the number of those, who have been made partakers of the special privileges of the gospel, has been comparatively small. If we look back to those ages before our Saviour’s incarnation, what a very inconsiderable proportion did Israel bear to the rest of the world, who were left in darkness and ignorance! And, after this, our Saviour observes, that many were called, in his time, but few were chosen, Matt. xx. 16. and he advises to enter in at the strait gate, chap. vii. 13, 14. by which he means the way to eternal life, concerning which he says, that there are, comparatively, few that find it. And when the gospel had a greater spread, and wonderful success attended the preaching thereof, by the apostles, and many nations embraced the Christian faith, in the most flourishing ages of the church, the number of Christians, and much more of those who were converted, and effectually called, was comparatively small. Whether the number of true believers shall be greater, when there is a greater spread of the gospel, and a more plentiful effusion of the Spirit, to render it more successful, as we hope and pray for that time, and that not altogether without scripture-warrant; I say, whether then the fewness of those who have hitherto been chosen and sanctified, shall not be compensated, by a far greater number, who shall live in that happy age of the church, it is not for us to be over-curious in our enquiries about: However, we may determine this from scripture, that, in the great day, when all the elect shall be gathered together, their number shall be exceeding great, if what the apostle says refers to this matter, as some suppose it does, when he speaks of a great multitude, which no man could number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people and tongues, who stood before the throne, and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands, Rev. vii. 9. But these things are no farther to be searched into, than as we may take occasion, from thence, to enquire whether we are of that number; and, if we are, we ought to bless God for 2. That they who are chosen to salvation, are also chosen to sanctification, as the means thereof: As the end and means are not to be separated in the execution of God’s decree, so they are not to be separated in our conception of the decree itself; for, since God brings none to glory, but in a way of holiness, the same he determined to do from all eternity, that is, to make his people holy, as well as happy; or first to give them faith and repentance, and then, the end of their faith, the salvation of their souls. There are many scriptures, in which the purpose of God, relating hereunto, is plainly intended; as when it is said, He hath chosen us that we should be holy, and without blame, before him in love, Eph. i. 4. and elsewhere the apostle tells others, that God had, from the beginning, chosen them unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, 2 Thes. ii. 13. and the apostle James saith, that God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom, James ii. 5. and elsewhere the apostle Paul speaks of persons being predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, which he explains of their being called, justified, and glorified, Rom. viii. 29. and it is also said, speaking of those who were converted under the apostle Paul’s ministry, as many as were ordained unto eternal life believed, Acts xiii. 48. accordingly they were ordained to one as well as the other. The argument, which seems very plainly contained in these, and such-like scriptures, is, that God’s eternal purpose respects the grace that his people are made partakers of here, as well as the glory that they expect hereafter, which are inseparably connected; this cannot reasonably be denied by those who are not willing to give into the doctrine of election: But if the inseparable connexion between faith and salvation be allowed, as having respect to the execution of God’s purpose, it will be no difficult matter to prove that this was determined by him, or that his purpose respects faith, as well as salvation. Therefore the main thing in controversy between us is, whether this grace, that accompanies salvation, is wrought by the power of God, or whether it depends on the free-will of man. That which induces them to deny that God has chosen persons to faith, is this supposition; that that which is the result of man’s free-will, cannot be the object of God’s unchangeable purpose, and consequently that God has not chosen men to it. This is the hinge on which the whole controversy turns, and if the doctrine of special efficacious grace be maintained, all the prejudices against that of election would soon be removed; but this we must refer to its proper place, being obliged to insist on that As to what the apostle says, in 2 Thess. ii. 13. God hath, from the beginning, chosen you unto salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth, that plainly intimates, that sanctification is the end of election; and therefore the principal answer that some give to it, which appears to be an evasion, is, that the apostle does not speak of eternal election, because God is said to have done this from the beginning, that is, as one explains the words, from the beginning of the apostle’s preaching to them: But if we can prove that there is such a thing as a purpose to save, it will be no difficult matter to prove the eternity of the divine purpose; and this is not disagreeable to the sense, in which the words, From the beginning, are elsewhere used. As for that other scripture, in James ii. 5. where it is said, God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom; here the words, That they may be, As for that other text, in Rom. viii. 29. He hath predestinated us to be conformed to the image of his Son; these words, to be, are supplied by our translators, as I apprehend they ought, As for that scripture, in Acts xiii. 48. As many as were ordained to eternal life believed; their faith is here considered as the result of their being ordained to eternal life, or they are represented as predestinated to the means, as well as the end. Object. 1. But it will be objected by some, that this is not agreeable to the sense of the Greek word here used; Answ. 1. If the word, which we render ordained, be justly translated, the thing which they were ordained to, being something that was future, it is, in effect, the same, as though it were said they were fore-ordained to it, as Beza observes. 2. Suppose the word ought rather to be translated, they were disposed unto eternal life; that seems to contain in it a 3. As to that other sense given of it, viz. their being internally disposed for eternal life, it seems very disagreeable to the import of the Greek word; and those texts, that are generally brought to justify this application thereof, appear to be very much strained and forced by them, to serve their purpose; Object. 2. It is farther objected, that it cannot respect their being ordained, or chosen to eternal life, who believed, inasmuch as none that plead for that doctrine suppose that all, who are elected in one place, believe at the same time; had it been said, that all, who believed at that time, were ordained to eternal life, that would be agreeable to what is maintained by those who defend the doctrine of election; but to say, that all, who are elected to eternal life, in any particular city, are persuaded to believe at the same time, this is what they will not allow of: besides, it is not usual for God to discover this to, or by, the inspired writers, that, in any particular place, there are no more elected than those who are, at any one time, converted; and, indeed, it is contrary to the method of God’s providence, to bring in all his elect at one time, therefore we cannot suppose that this was revealed to the inspired writer, and consequently something else must be intended, and not eternal election, namely, that all those that were prepared for eternal life, or who were disposed to pursue after it, believed. Object. 3. There is another objection, which the learned author, Answ. According to this author, we must either quit the doctrine we are maintaining, provided it be the same as he represents it to be, or else must be charged by all mankind, with such horrid blasphemy, as is shocking to any one that reads it, as charging the Lover of souls with the greatest cruelty, and with acting in such a way, as their greatest enemy is said to do; determining, that the dispensations of his providence should tend to aggravate their condemnation, and that the gospel should be preached for this end, and no other. But let the blasphemy rest on his misrepresentation, and far be it from us to advance any such doctrine; therefore that which may be considered, in answer to it, is, 1. The immediate reason why men believe to eternal life, is, because God exerts the exceeding greatness of his power, whereby he works faith; and the reason of his exerting this power, is, because he determined to do it, as it is the execution of his purpose. 2. It does not follow, from hence, that the only reason why others do not believe, is, because they were not ordained to eternal life. It is true, indeed, that their not having been ordained to eternal life, or God’s not having purposed to save them, is the reason why he does not exert that power that is necessary to work faith: and unbelief will certainly be the consequence thereof, unless man could believe without the divine energy; yet the immediate spring and cause of unbelief, is the corruption and perverseness of human nature which is chargeable on none else but man himself. We must certainly distinguish between unbelief’s being the consequence of God’s not working faith, whereby corrupt nature takes occasion to exert itself, as being destitute of preventing grace; and its being the effect hereof. Is God’s denying the revengeful person, or the murderer, that grace, which would prevent his executing his bloody designs, the cause thereof? Or his denying to others the necessary supply of their present exigencies, the cause of their making use of unlawful means, by plundering others to subsist themselves? No more is his denying special grace, which he was not obliged to give to any, the cause of men’s unbelief and impenitency; for that is to be assigned only to that wicked propensity of nature, which inclines us to sin, and not to the divine efficiency; and how farsoever this may be the result of God’s determining to deny his grace, it is not to be reckoned the effect of that determination. 3. The design of the word’s being preached, is not to aggravate the damnation of those that shall not believe, according to this vile suggestion; but that men might be hereby led to know 4. God’s denying that grace, which would have enabled men to believe, is not to be charged as an instance of cruelty, any more than his denying it to fallen angels, but it is rather a display of his justice. He was not obliged to give grace to any of the apostate race of man; shall therefore his denying the grace of faith be reckoned an instance of cruelty, when we consider the forfeiture that was before made thereof, and man’s propensity to sin, which is chargeable only on himself? 5. God’s purpose to deny the grace of faith to those whom he has not ordained to eternal life, is not inconsistent with that scripture, 1 Tim. ii. 4. in which it is said, that he will have all men to be saved; so that, as will be farther observed elsewhere, 6. They who are elected to salvation, are chosen in Christ: thus it is expressly said, in Eph. i. 4. He hath chosen us in him, before the foundations of the world. We are not to suppose that the apostle intends hereby, that we are chosen for the sake of Christ, as though any of his mediatorial acts were the ground and reason thereof; for election is an act of sovereign grace, or is resolved into the good pleasure of the will of God, and is not to be accounted a purchased blessing; therefore when we speak of the concern of the Mediator, with relation hereunto, this is to be considered as a means ordained by God, to bring his elect to salvation rather than the foundation of their election. This proposition necessarily follows from the former; for if they, who are chosen to the end, are chosen to the means, then Christ’s mediatorial acts being the highest and first means There are some very considerable divines, This distinction of Christ’s double relation to the elect, is, doubtless, designed by those who thus explain this doctrine to advance his glory; notwithstanding it remains still a matter of doubt to me, whether Christ’s Headship over his church be not a branch of his Mediatorial glory; and, if so, it will be very difficult to prove that a Mediator respects any other than man, and him more particularly considered as fallen; and accordingly, God did not design hereby to advance him to an higher condition, than what was barely the result of his being a creature, but to deliver him from that state of sin and misery, into which he foresaw that he would plunge himself. Therefore, in considering the order of God’s eternal purpose, relating to the salvation of his people, we must suppose that he first designed to glorify all his perfections in their redemption and salvation; and, in order hereunto, he fore-ordained, or appointed Christ to be their great Mediator, in whom he would be glorified, and by whom this work was to be brought about: He appointed him to be their Head, Surety, and Redeemer; first, to purchase V. We shall now consider the properties of election, and how the divine perfections are displayed therein, agreeably to what is said concerning it in scripture. 1. As it is taken for the purpose of God, relating to the sanctification or salvation of men, as distinguished from the execution thereof, it is eternal: This is evident, because God is eternal, his purposes must be concluded to be of equal duration with his existence; for we cannot suppose that an infinitely wise and sovereign Being existed from all eternity, without any fore-thought, or resolution what to do, for that would be to suppose him to have been undetermined, or unresolved, when he first gave being to all things; nor is it to be supposed that there are any new determinations in the divine will, for that would argue him to be imperfect, since this would be an instance of mutability in him, as much as it would be for him to alter his purpose; but neither of these are agreeable to the idea of an infinitely perfect Being. Moreover, if God’s purpose, with respect to the salvation of men were not eternal, then it must be considered as a new after-thought arising in the divine mind, which, as to its first rise, is but, as it were, of yesterday, and consequently he would have something in him that is finite. If it be contrary to his omniscience to have new ideas of things, it is equally contrary to the sovereignty of his will to have new determinations, therefore all his purposes were eternal. 2. God’s purpose relating to election, is infinitely wise and 3. The purpose of God, relating to the final state of man, is secret, or cannot be known, till he is pleased to discover it. Nothing is more obvious than this; for even the purposes or resolutions of creatures are secret, till they are made known by them: thus the apostle says, What man knoweth the things of a man, that is, what he designs to do, save the spirit of a man, which is in him? and infers, in the following words, so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God, 1 Cor. ii. 12. and elsewhere he says, Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his councellor? Rom. xi. 34. And, for this reason, it is called, The mystery of his will, Eph. i. 9. and this also follows from its being eternal, therefore it was hid in God, from before the foundation of the world, and consequently would for ever have been so, had he not, by his works, or word, made some discoveries thereof, to those whom he first brought into being, and then gave some intimations of his purpose to them. Therefore it could not have been known that God had purposed to save any, had he not revealed this in the gospel: much less have any particular persons ground to conclude themselves to be elected, without first observing those intimations which God has given, whereby they may arrive at the knowledge thereof. This head ought to be duly considered, by those who deny, and are prejudiced against this doctrine, though it be generally neglected in the methods they take to oppose it; for they will not consider the distinction we make between God’s having chosen a person to eternal life, and a person’s having a right to conclude that he is thus chosen; but take it for granted, that if there be such a thing as election, that we must necessarily determine ourselves to be the objects thereof, and ought to regulate our future conduct accordingly. It is from thence they This leads us to consider a distinction, which we are often obliged to make use of, when we speak concerning the will of God, as secret or revealed, by which we account for the sense of many scriptures, and take occasion from it to answer several objections that are brought against this doctrine. I am sensible that there is nothing advanced in defence thereof, which they, who are in the other way of thinking, are more prejudiced against, than this distinction, which they suppose to contain a reproachful idea of the divine Majesty, and is the foundation of many popular prejudices against the doctrine we are defending, as though we hereby intended that God has a secret meaning, different from what he reveals; or that we are not to judge of his intentions by those discoveries which he makes thereof, which it would be the highest reproach to charge any creature with, and contrary to that sincerity which he cannot be destitute of, but he is hereby rendered the object of detestation; therefore no one, who conceives of an holy God, in such a way as he ought to do, can entertain a thought, as though the least appearance thereof were applicable to him. However, this is the common misrepresentation that is made of this distinction. Whether it arises from its being not sufficiently explained by some; or a fixed resolution to decry the doctrine of election, and render it odious, as it must certainly be, if supported by a distinction, understood in so vile a sense, I will not determine. However, that we may remove this prejudice, and consider how it First, That the will of God is sometimes taken, in scripture, for that which he has, from all eternity, determined, which is unchangeable, and shall certainly come to pass, which is impossible for any creature to disannul, resist, or render ineffectual; and it is such a branch of divine sovereignty, that to deny it, would be, in effect, to deny him to be God. This the apostle intends, when he represents the malicious and obstinate sinner as replying against God, and defending himself in his bold crimes, by saying, Why doth he yet find fault; for who hath resisted his will? Rom. ix. 19, 20, 21, 22. In answer to which, he asserts the sovereignty of God, and that he is not accountable to any for what he does, nor to be controuled by them; and this is also intended in another scripture, in Eph. i. 11. where it is said, that God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will; and elsewhere he says, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure, Isa. xlvi. 10. This will of God is the rule of his own acting, and, as it determines the event of things, it is impossible for him to act contrary to it; and it is equally disagreeable to his perfections, to signify to his creatures, that he determines to do one thing, but will do another; therefore, in this sense, we are far from asserting that there is a revealed will of God, which contradicts his secret. Secondly, We often read, in scripture, of the will of God, as taken for what he has prescribed to us, as a rule of duty; and also of our judging concerning the apparent event of things. (1.) The will of God may be considered as a rule of duty, which is a well-known and proper sense of his revealed will: thus our Saviour teaches us to pray, Let thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven; by which he principally intends his revealed will, or law. Enable us to yield obedience to thy law, in our measure, as thou art perfectly obeyed in heaven. So our Saviour says, Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother, Mark iii. 35. which can be meant of no other than his revealed will, or of his law, in which it is contained; because no one can act contrary to God’s determination, which is that sense of his will, contained in the foregoing head; and, consequently, a doing his will, in that sense, would not have been laid down as a distinguishing character of those whom Christ preferred above all, who were related to him in the bonds of nature. Again the apostle understands the will of God in this sense, when he says, Thou knowest his will, Rom. ii. 18. where he speaks to the Jews, who were instructed out of the law, in which it is contained; and elsewhere, Eph. vi. 6. he speaks of his will, as what is to be obeyed, and therefore gives this description of (2.) The revealed will of God may be considered as a rule which he has given us, whereby we are to judge of the apparent event of things. I make this a branch of God’s revealed will, inasmuch as sometimes he condescends to discover future events to his creatures, which otherwise they could never have known; but yet there is a difference, as to the manner of their judging thereof, pursuant to the intimations which he has given them. Accordingly, when God has told us expressly, that this or that particular thing shall come to pass, then we are infallibly sure concerning the event, and need no other rule to judge of it, but by considering it as revealed: As when God has said, that there shall be a general resurrection of the dead, and that Christ shall come to judgment, and receive his redeemed, and sanctified ones, to heaven, to behold his glory, we are infallibly assured of these events, because they are expressly revealed; and, when we speak of the secret and revealed will of God, as applicable to things of this nature, we intend nothing else hereby but what all will allow of, viz. that what would have been for ever a secret, had it not been discovered, is now revealed, and therefore ceases to be so; and in that sense, the revealed will of God, in all respects, agrees with his secret; in this case, we suppose that God expressly revealed the event. But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof; and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which, perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form, at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein, It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose, that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the promise before given him, that in Isaac his seed should be called, by supposing that God, at some time or other, would raise him from the dead, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a difference between the will of God, determining the event of things, which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be contrary to what will afterwards appear to have been From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we may infer, 1st, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes them known; for secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever, Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair: that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency, which many pretend that it has. 4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election; therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation. This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature: if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But more particularly, (1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15. He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. And there are many other scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives, taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied, even to the common blessings of providence; Nevertheless, he saved them for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known, Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise of God’s patience, For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off, Isa. xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy, For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is represented as doing great things for his people, he puts (2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will farther appear, if we consider, 1st. That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the word condition, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore, 2dly. That the performance of the condition is the next, or immediate cause of a conditional purpose’s taking effect; and, to apply this to the case before us, 3dly. If, on our performing the condition of God’s purpose to save us, it be rendered effectual, which otherwise it would not have been, (agreeably to the nature of a conditional purpose) then we are more beholden to our own conduct, than the divine purpose, and so the glory thereof will be due to ourselves; which would not only cast the highest dishonour on the divine perfections, but it is contrary to the design of the gospel, which is to stain the pride of all flesh, and take away all occasions of glorying, from the creature. Thus the prophet Isaiah, fore-telling the glory of the gospel-state, considers its tendency to humble the pride of man, when he says, The loftiness of man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low, and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, Isa. ii. 17. and the apostle, describing the nature of faith, considers its tendency to exclude boasting; Rom. iii. 27. and We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support the conditionality of God’s purpose, as well as of his works of grace, in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle speaks of such a confession of Christ with the mouth, as is attended with believing in the heart, that God raised him from the dead, and calling on the name of the Lord, as connected with salvation, Rom. x. 9, 13. and our Saviour says, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life, John iii. 15. and that he that believeth shall be saved, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere, Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish, Luke xiii. 3. and many other scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the dispensations of God’s providence, the gifts of his grace, and the execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained, agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider, 1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces, are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was before laid down, viz. that If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against, when we assert the absoluteness of God’s purpose. 2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the means, since these are inseparably connected in God’s purpose, as well as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general rule for our understanding One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lot escape to Zoar, telling him, that he could not do any thing till he came thither. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God, or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom, and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it; one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that God’s purpose, relating to Sodom’s destruction, was founded on Lot’s escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he designed that those two things should be connected together, and that one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as their respective connection, were the object of God’s absolute and peremptory determination. There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob, Let me go, for the day breaketh; and Jacob replies, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me, which does not infer, that God’s determinations were dependent on Jacob’s endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart; but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as it is said elsewhere, Weeping and making supplication, Hos. xii. 4. Let me go, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the blessing which he received, was God’s gift, and both were connected in the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself was free, sovereign, and unconditional. Again, there is another scripture, in which God condescends There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. that he could not do many mighty works there, at that time, in his own country, because of their unbelief? where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought: or else of the unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it. 5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it; that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance, superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be sufficient to justify their prejudices against it. They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another. Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free actions of the creature Object. The most material objection against this doctrine, is take from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7. It repented the Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord said, I will destroy man, whom I have created; and, at other times he is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36. The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants; when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or left; and in Joel ii. 13. Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil; and in Psal. xc. 13, Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee concerning thy servants; and in Jer. xviii. 8. If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I have thought to do unto them. And we have a very remarkable instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, that within forty days they should be destroyed. Answ. It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19. God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good? And elsewhere, in 1 But we must have recourse to some methods to reconcile this seeming contradiction, and so consider the sense thereof, in different respects, as applicable to them both; in some scriptures, God is said to repent; in others, it is said that he cannot repent. That these may not appear inconsistent with one another, nor either of them infer any imperfection in God, let it be considered, that God is sometimes represented, in scripture, in condescension to our common mode of speaking, as though he had human passions, as in others, he is described, as though he had a body, or bodily parts: But such expressions are always to be taken in a metaphorical sense, without the least supposition, that he is subject to any such imperfections; and particularly we must not conclude, that repentance is ever ascribed to God in the same sense as it is to men, viz. as implying a change in his purpose, occasioned by an unforeseen occurrence, which is the sense contained in the objection. Such a repentance, as this, is a passion peculiarly belonging to the creature, and therefore in this sense we must understand those words; God is not a man, that he should lye, nor the son of man, that he should repent; accordingly, he is said to repent, not by changing his purpose, but by changing his work. Thus when it is said, that he repented that he had made man, nothing is meant by it, but that he determined to destroy him, as he did afterwards by the flood. And this was no new determination arising from any thing in the creature, which God did not foresee; he knew before-hand that all flesh would corrupt their way, and therefore his determination to punish them for it, was not a new resolve of the divine will, after the sin was committed; but God determined things in their respective order, first to permit sin, and then knowing what would be the consequence thereof, namely, that they would rebel against him, he determined to punish it, or to destroy the old world, which is, in effect, the same, as though he had repented that he made it. He cannot be said to repent as we do, by wishing that he had not done that which he is said to repent of, but by denying us the advantage, which we might have otherwise expected from it. In this sense we are to understand all those scriptures that speak of God, as repenting of the good that he had bestowed on man. And, on the other hand, when he is said to repent of the evil which he threatened to bring on men, as in the case of Nineveh, this does not argue any change in his purpose; for he determined that Nineveh should be destroyed, provided they did not repent, and it was not uncertain to him whether they would repent or no; for, at the same time, he determined to give them If it be objected hereunto, that this is nothing less than to establish a conditional purpose in God, and so overthrows the argument that we are maintaining; the reply that may be made to it, is, that we distinguish between a conditional purpose, in God’s secret will, and a conditional proposition, which was to be the subject of the prophet’s ministry: The prophet, it is plain, was not told, when he received his commission to go to Nineveh, that God would give them repentance, but only, that, without repentance, they should be destroyed; whereas God, as the event makes it appear, determined that they should repent, and therefore that they should not be destroyed; and, consequently, we must not suppose, that, when God sent him, he was undetermined, in his own purpose, whether to destroy them or not, or that there was any thing conditional in the divine mind, that rendered the event uncertain to God, though there was a condition contained in the subject-matter of the prophet’s message, which the Ninevites very well understood, namely, that they had no ground to expect deliverance without repentance, and therefore they repented, in hope of obtaining mercy, which they supposed would be connected with their repentance; and it is evident, that Jonah himself suspected that this might be the event, though God had not told him that it would be so, and therefore says, in chap. iv. 2. For I knew that thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil. 6. The purpose of God, in choosing men to eternal life, renders their salvation necessary; so that nothing shall defeat, or disannul it. What God says concerning Israel’s deliverance from the Babylonish captivity, may be applied to all his other determinations, and particularly to what relates to the eternal salvation of his people; My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure; yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it, Isa. xlvi. 10, 11. The purposes of God, indeed, are distinguished from his bringing them to pass; it is one thing to design to bring his people to glory, and another thing to bring them to it. It is not to be supposed that the decree of God has, in itself, a proper efficiency to produce the thing decreed: The purpose of God, is, indeed, the internal moving cause, or the first ground and reason of the salvation of those who are elected to it; but his power is the more immediate cause of it, so that his purpose is the reason of his exerting this power, and both concurring to the salvation of men, render it certain and necessary. Therefore some distinguish, for the explaining of this, between the determining and powerful will of God; the latter of which, is sometimes called the word of his power, and renders the former effectual; this it must certainly do, otherwise God would be said to will the existence of things, that shall never have a being. In this respect, the purpose of God renders things necessary, which are in themselves contingent, or arbitrary, and would otherwise never come to pass. This is a great encouragement to those who are enabled to make their calling and election sure; for their perseverance in grace, notwithstanding all the opposition that they meet with, is the necessary consequence of their election to eternal life. Thus, as we before distinguished predestination into election and reprobation, we have considered the former of these, and we proceed, Secondly, To speak concerning the doctrine of reprobation; And here we shall take occasion to consider the meaning of the word, as it is contained in, or deduced from scripture, where the same word that is used to signify the execution of this decree, may be applied to express the decree itself. Thus we read of God’s rejecting, or disregarding men, as a punishment of their rebellion against him: and these are compared by the prophet Jeremiah, chap. vi. 30. To reprobate silver, because the Lord hath rejected them; or, as it is in the margin, The refuse of silver; and, in the New Testament, the same word But, that we may more particularly consider the sense of the word, it seems, in scripture, to contain in it two ideas. 1. God’s determining to leave a part of the world in that state of sin and misery, which he from all eternity, fore-knew that they would bring themselves into, or his decreeing not to save them; and, since all will allow that a part of mankind shall not be saved, it cannot reasonably be denied that this was determined by him before-hand; and this is what divines generally call preterition. 2. There is another idea in the word reprobation, which is also contained in scripture, or deducible from it, and that respects the purpose of God to punish those for their iniquities, whom he will not save. Not to be saved, is the same as to be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power. And God’s purpose, relating hereunto, is expressed in scripture by his appointing them to wrath, 1 Thess. v. 9. for those sins which he fore-saw they would commit. This is what some call pre-damnation, as taken from that expression of the apostle, Jude, ver. 4, 13. concerning some who had crept into the church unawares, whom he describes as ungodly men, that is, notoriously so, who turned If this doctrine be thus explained, it will appear agreeable, not only to scripture, but to the divine perfections, and therefore too great a truth to be treated with that abhorrence, with which it generally is, without explaining, distinguishing or fairly entering into the merits of the cause. It is a very easy matter to render any doctrine odious, by misrepresentation, as they on the other side of the question, have done this of reprobation, which we shall briefly consider, and therein take leave to explain it in a different manner, whereby it will appear not only worthy to be defended, as redounding to the glory of God, but a plain and evident truth, founded on scripture. If this doctrine were to be considered no otherwise, than as it is often represented by them, we should dislike it, as much as they do; for when they pretend that we herein suppose God to be severe and cruel to his creatures, delighting himself in, and triumphing over them, in their misery: and that he decreed, from all eternity, to damn the greatest part of mankind, without any consideration of their sin, as the result of his arbitrary will, or dominion, as he has a right to dispose of his creatures, according to his pleasure, and that as a means to attain this end, as though it were in itself desirable, he leaves them to themselves, blinds their minds, and hardens their hearts, and offers these occasions of, and inducements to sin, which are as stumbling-blocks in their way, and that he determined that his providence should be so conversant about the will of man, as that it should be under a natural necessity, or kind of compulsion, to what is evil, without considering the corruption and depravity of nature, as a vicious habit, which they had contracted; and that all this is done in pursuance of this decree of reprobation. It is very probable that many who give this account of this doctrine, have no other foundation for it, but the popular outcry of those who are not apprised of the methods that are generally taken to explain and defend it; or else they suppose that it cannot be defended, without being exposed to those exceptions which are contained in the account they give of it. But we shall take no farther notice of this, but proceed to explain and defend it another way. And, 1. As to the former branch thereof, namely, preterition, or God’s passing by, or rejecting those whom he hath not chosen But that which must be farther enquired into, as to this matter, is, whether God’s determining to pass by a part of mankind, be an act of sovereignty or of justice. And this may also be judged of, by the external dispensation of his providence; so But on the other hand, God is said sometimes, in the external dispensations of his providence, to leave men to themselves, to give them up to their own hearts lust, in a judicial way, which supposes not only the commission of sin, but persons being obstinate and resolutely determined to continue in it. Thus God saith concerning his people; Israel would none of me; so I gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels, Psal. lxxxi. 11, 12. and the Psalmist says elsewhere, Add iniquity to their iniquity, Psal. lxix. 27. which words I would rather consider as a prediction than a prayer, or as an expression of the church’s acquiescence in God’s righteous judgments, which they had ground to conclude, that he would inflict on an impenitent, incorrigible people; these are expressed, by adding iniquity to iniquity, not as though he designed to infuse any habit of sin into them, for that is inconsistent with the holiness of his nature; but that he would reject, and leave them to themselves, in a judicial way, as a punishment inflicted on them for their iniquities, the consequence whereof would be their own adding iniquity to iniquity. Thus, in different respects, the purpose of God, in passing by a part of mankind, may be considered, either as the result of his sovereign pleasure, or as an act of justice. 2. We shall now proceed to consider the other branch of reprobation, which some call pre-damnation, or (to use the scripture-expression before referred to) God’s fore-ordaining those who shall not be saved, to that condemnation, which they shall fall under, as exposing themselves to it by their own wickedness; which is nothing else but his determining, from all eternity, to punish those, as a judge, who should, by their own crimes, deserve it, and thereby to vindicate the holiness of his nature and law. Here let it be observed, that when this doctrine is reproached or misrepresented, it is described as an act of divine sovereignty, but that we are as ready to deny and oppose as they are, since, according to the description we have given of it, it can be no other than an act of justice; for, if to Here let it be considered, that God, in his actual providence, is not the author of sin, though he suffer it to be committed in the world. And, since his permitting, or not hindering it, cannot be said to be the cause of its being committed, there being no cause thereof, but the will of man; it follows, from hence, that God’s punishing sin, is not to be resolved into his permission of it, as the cause thereof, but into the rebellion of man’s will, as refusing to be subject to the divine law; and thus God considered men, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to condemn those, whose desert of this punishment was foreseen, by him, from all eternity. And is this a doctrine to be so much decried? I cannot but wonder the learned author, whom I have before referred to, as opposing this doctrine, There is another scripture, which is generally cited by those who treat on this subject, that we are to use the utmost caution in explaining, lest we give just occasion, to those who oppose it, to express their abhorrence of it, as inconsistent with the divine perfections, namely, what the apostle says concerning those that were not elected, whom he calls the rest of the Jewish nation, in Rom. xi. 7-10. that they were blinded, and that God had given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; and he speaks of their table And shall this doctrine be judged of hereby, when it is very hard to find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called, A spirit of slumber as it is connected with the idea of their being rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this, that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state, (as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature, avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without any impeachment of There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness; the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who, in the following verse, are represented as not receiving the love of the truth; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof, which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And as for that mode of speaking here used, that God shall send them strong delusions, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design to delude them. There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own counsels; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves, and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired, conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, brought forth sin, chap i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will, or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously with the sinful creature. And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John xii. 39, 40. Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil; from whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the world that we infer this from it; I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning, which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this quotation, is, God ordained to bring forth into the world the non-elect, in their corrupt mass, that is, that persons, who are every day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it; therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says, “That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s decrees, to be merely Apex Logicus, as he calls it, a logical nicety;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely, that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully committed, and contumaciously But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said to have made the wicked for the day of evil, the meaning is not that man’s damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have made all things for himself, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked, who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is, that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will, notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question, which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of election and reprobation, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed, VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly, 1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine. Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of by 2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to infer a mutability in God’s purpose which is all one as to suppose, that he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as these, namely, that God will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour’s words, How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your house is left unto you desolate, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but to assert him to be dependent and mutable? 3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, Rom. ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and when it is said, We love him, because he first loved us, 1 John iv. 19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said, He loved us, because we first loved him; and that humbling question, which the apostle proposes, Who maketh thee to differ, 1 Cor. iv. 7. should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ. 4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God’s purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be denied, there would not be so VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state; and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God’s purpose to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto, depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so perfect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation, there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts, which are often brought in defence thereof. One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4. Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9. The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; and several others, from whence they argue the universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind, or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God’s will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is to be exploded, as contrary hereunto. That the sense of these scriptures cannot be, that God designed There are many instances of the like nature in scripture, which justify this sense of the word all; and it seems plain, from the context, that it is to be so taken in the former of the scriptures, but now referred to, when it is said, God will have all men to be saved; for he exhorts, in ver. 1. that prayer and supplication should be made for all men, that is, for men of all characters and conditions in the world, and, in particular, for kings, and all that are in authority, and thereby he takes occasion to resolve a matter in dispute among them, whether those kings that were tyrants and oppressors, ought to be prayed for, when he tells them, that all sorts of men are to be prayed for; and the reason of this is assigned, namely, because God will have all men, that is, all sorts of men, to be saved. Moreover, they whom God will save, are said to be such as shall come, that is, as he will bring to the knowledge of the truth. Now it is certain, that God never designed to bring every individual to the knowledge of the truth; for, if he did, his purpose is not fulfilled, or his providence runs counter to And as for the latter, in which the apostle Peter says, that God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; there the word all is expressly limited, in the context, as referring only to those who are elect and faithful; and therefore he says, including himself among them, that the Lord is long-suffering to us-ward. Now if we observe the character which he gives of the church, to which he writes, in the beginning of both his epistles, (which, as he says, in ver. 1. of this chapter, were directed to the same persons) it is as great as is given of any in scripture; and they are distinguished from those profane scoffers, who walked after their own lusts, and other ungodly men, whose perdition he speaks of, as what would befal them in the dissolution of the world, by fire, in the day of Judgment; and they are described not only as elect unto obedience, and as having obtained like precious faith with the apostles, but they were such as God would keep, through faith, unto salvation; therefore the apostle might well say, concerning them, that God determined that none of them should perish, without advancing any thing that militates against the doctrine we are maintaining. Object. The apostle, in this verse, speaks of God, as willing that all should come to repentance; therefore they are distinguished from that part of the church, who had obtained like precious faith, and were included in the character that he gives of some of them, in both his epistles, which infers their being then in a state of salvation; therefore the word, all, in this text, is not subject to the limitation before mentioned, but must be applied to all the world, and consequently the meaning is, that God is not willing that any of mankind should perish, but that all should come to repentance. Answ. The apostle, in this text, speaks of God’s deferring the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and so exercising his long-suffering towards the world in general; not There are other arguments, which they bring in defence of their sense of the doctrine of election, as supposing that it is not peremptory, determinate, or unchangeable, and such as infers the salvation of those who are the objects thereof, taken from those scriptures, which, as they apprehend, ascribe a kind of disappointment to God; as when he says, in Isa. v. 4. concerning his vineyard, to wit, the church of the Jews, Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? and our Saviour’s words, in Luke xiii. 6. that he sought fruit on the fig-tree, meaning the church of the Jews in his day, but found none; and, speaking concerning Jerusalem, he says, in Matth. xxiii. 37, 38. How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate; therefore they conclude, that God’s purpose, or design of grace, may be defeated; so that these, and many other scriptures, not unlike to them, are inconsistent with the doctrine of election, as ascertaining the event, to wit, the salvation of those who are chosen to eternal life; which leads us, particularly to consider the sense thereof. As to the first of them, in which God says, by the prophet, What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes? He condescends therein to speak of himself after the manner of men, as he often does in scripture, and is said to look for what might reasonably have been expected, as the consequence of all the means of grace, which he had vouchsafed to them; the reasonableness of the thing is called his looking for it, as though he should say, it might have been expected, from the nature of the thing, that they, who had been laid under such obligations, should express some gratitude for them, and so have brought forth some fruit, to the glory of God. And those words, which seem to attribute disappointment to him, when it is said, I looked, &c. signifying nothing else but the ingratitude of the people, that they did not walk agreeably to the obligations they were under; not that God was really disappointed, for that would militate against his omniscience. He knew, before he laid these obligations on them, what their behaviour would be; therefore, had he eyes of flesh, or seen as man seeth, their behaviour would have tended to disappoint him; but there is no As for that other scripture, in which it is said, that he sought fruit on the fig-tree, but found none, that is to be explained in the same way, he sought fruit, that is, it might reasonably have been expected, but he found none, that is, they did not act agreeably to the means of grace which they enjoyed. Therefore neither this, nor the other scripture, does in the least argue, that the purpose of God was not concerned about the event, or that he did not know what it would be; for, as his providential dispensation gives us ground to conclude, that he determined to leave them to themselves, so he knew beforehand that this, through the corruption of their nature, would issue in their unfruitfulness, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore it follows, that neither of these scriptures have the least tendency to overthrow the doctrine of the certainty and peremptoriness of the divine purpose. As to what our Saviour says, relating to his willingness, to have gathered Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but they would not, it may be taken, without the least absurdity attending the sense thereof, as referring to the end and design of his ministry among them; and it is as though he should say, your nation shall be broken, and you scattered, as a punishment inflicted on you for your iniquities, and this destruction would have been prevented, had you believed in me; so that all that can be inferred from hence, is, that Christ’s ministry and doctrine were attended with that convincing evidence, being confirmed by so many undoubted miracles, that their unbelief was not only charged on them as a crime, but was the occasion of their ruin; or (as it is said in the following words) of their houses being left unto them desolate. And this might have been prevented, by their making a right improvement of that common grace, which they had; for though it be not in man’s power, There are many other scriptures, which they bring to the like purpose, which I pass over, because the sense they give of them differs not much from that, in which they understand the scriptures before-mentioned, and their reasoning from them, in opposition to this doctrine is the same, and the same answer may be given to it. However, I cannot but observe, that as, from some scriptures, they attribute disappointment to God, they represent him, from others, as wishing, but in vain, that it had happened otherwise, and as being grieved at the disappointment; so they understand those words, in Psal. lxxxi. 13, 14. Oh! that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries; and that, in Luke xix. 42. If, or, Oh! that thou hadst known, even thou at least, in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes. As for the sense of these, and such-like scriptures, it is no more than this, that the thing which they refused to perform, was, in itself, most desirable, or a matter to be wished for, and not that God can be said to wish for a thing that cannot be attained. And when our Saviour laments over Jerusalem, as apprehending their destruction near at hand, whether the words are to be considered in the form of a wish, that it had been otherwise, or an intimation, that if they had known the things of their peace, their destruction would not have ensued, it is Again, when the Spirit is said to be grieved, Eph. iv. 30. or resisted, Acts vii. 15. nothing else is intended hereby, but that men act in such a way, as that, had the Spirit of God been subject to human passions, it would have been matter of grief to him. But far be it from us to suppose that the divine nature is liable hereunto, or that any disappointment can attend his purposes, which has a tendency to excite this passion in men. And when he is said to be resisted, it is not meant as though his will, or design, could be rendered ineffectual, but it only implies, that men oppose what the Spirit communicated by the prophets, or in his word. This a person may do, and yet it may be truly said, that the counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations, Psal. xxxiii. 11. VIII. We shall proceed to consider several objections that are made against the doctrine we have endeavoured to maintain, and what reply may be given to them. Some have been occasionally mentioned under several foregoing heads, and there are others which require a distinct reply. Object. 1. That the doctrine of absolute Election and Reprobation was altogether unknown by the Fathers in the three first centuries, and that it was first brought into the Christian world by Augustin; before whose time, the only account we have of it, is, that God foreknowing who would live piously, or believe and persevere to the end, accordingly predestinated them to eternal life, or determined to pass them by, and so is said to have rejected them. Answ. This objection, were it literally true, cannot have any tendency to overthrow this doctrine, in the opinion of those, who depend not on the credit of Augustin, as defending it, on the one hand, nor are staggered by the opposition made to it by some of the Fathers, who lived before his time, on the other; and therefore we might have passed it by, without making any reply to it. However, since it contains a kind of insult, or boast, which will have its weight with some, it may be expected that a few things should be said, in answer to it. We will not deny but that the Fathers, before the Pelagian heresy was broached in the world; expressed themselves, in many parts of their writings, in so lax and unguarded a manner And indeed, Augustin himself, before he took occasion to enquire more diligently into the state of this controversy, gave into the same way of expressing his sentiments about the power of nature, or the grace of God, as some others of the Fathers had done, and concluded that faith was in our power, as well a duty incumbent on us, but afterwards retracted such modes of speaking as the result of more mature deliberation. But if it be said, that this is a very desirable thing as doubtless it is, we might consider this doctrine, as obtaining very much in, and after Augustin’s time, being examined and defended by very considerable numbers of men, who have transmitted it down to posterity, throughout the various ages of the church. Notwithstanding, by whomsoever it is defended, or opposed, we lay no great stress on human authority, as a judicious divine well observes Object. 2. To the doctrine of God’s purpose’s ascertaining all events, it is objected that he has not determined the bounds of the life of man, but that it may be lengthened, or shortened, by the intervention of second causes. This is nothing else but the applying one branch of this controversy, relating to the decrees of God, to a particular instance. And it was very warmly debated in the Netherlands, towards the beginning of the last century. They therefore thus argue, that if the term of life be immoveably fixed by God, then it is a vain thing for any one to use those means that are necessary to preserve it, and the skill of the physician, as well as the virtue of medicine, is altogether needless; and the good advice which is often given to persons, to take heed that they do not shorten their lives by intemperance, will be to no purpose; for they have a reply ready at hand, namely, that they shall live their appointed time, do what they will. And that, which is still more absurd, is, that if a person attempts to lay violent hands upon himself, it will be to no purpose, if God has determined that he shall live longer; or if he has determined that he shall die, then he is guilty of no crime, for he only fulfils the divine purpose. They add, moreover, that this not only renders all our supplications to God to preserve our lives, or to restore us from sickness, when we are in danger of death, needless; but our conduct herein is a practical denial of the argument we maintain; for what is this, but to suppose that the bounds of life are unalterably fixed. As to what concerns the countenance, which they suppose, scripture gives to this objection, they refer us to those places in which the life of man is said to be lengthened or shortened; accordingly, there are promises of long life given to the righteous who love God, and keep his commandments, Exod. xx. 12. Deut. iv. 40. 1 Kings iii. 14. and Solomon says expressly, The fear of the Lord prolongeth days; but the years of the wicked shall be shortened, Prov. x. 27. and elsewhere he speaks of the wicked’s dying before their time, Eccl. vii. 17. and the Psalmist says, that bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days, Psal. lv. 23. They also refer to that scripture in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with her brother Lazarus, before his death, he had not died, John xi. 21. which either contradicts the argument we are maintaining, or else Martha was mistaken; which, had she been, our Saviour would have reproved her, for asserting that which was false. Moreover, they add, that when the old world was destroyed in the deluge, and so died before their time, they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented in that space of time, wherein Noah as a preacher of righteousness, gave them warning of this desolating judgment, and Christ, by his Spirit, in him, preached to them, as the apostle says, 1 Pet. iii. 20. which, doubtless, was with a design to bring them to repentance, and save them from this destruction. And when Abraham pleaded with God in the behalf of Sodom, And lastly, they refer to that scripture, in which God first told Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live, and afterwards, that he would add to his days fifteen years, Isa. xxxviii. 1. compared with 5. Answ. To prepare our way for a reply to this objection, let us consider that the contrary side of the question, which we are maintaining, is equally supported by express texts of scripture: thus it is said His days are determined, the number of his months are with thee; thou hast appointed him bounds that he cannot pass, Job xiv. 5. than which, nothing can be more express, where he speaks concerning that decree of God, which respects all mankind, without exception, and sets forth his absolute sovereignty, and the irreversibleness of his purpose herein; and the apostle Paul, in reasoning with the Athenians concerning the decree and providence of God in whom we live, move, and have our being says, that he hath determined the times before appointed, and fixed the bounds of their habitation, Acts xvii. 26. As he has placed men upon the earth, by his decree and providence, so he has determined not only the place where they should live, but the time of their continuance in the world. This was no new doctrine; for the heathen had been instructed in it by their own philosophers and therefore the apostle speaks their sense, especially that of the stoicks, about this matter. Moreover, if the providence of God is conversant about all the actions of men, and the hairs of their head are all numbered, Matt. x. 30. so that the smallest changes in life do not come by chance, but are subject thereto; then certainly the time of This being premised we return to the arguments laid down against it, and the scriptures cited to give countenance to them. It is certain, that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true in the same sense; and the scriptures, which are exactly harmonious, as well as infallibly true, no where contradict themselves. Therefore we must consider what answer may be given to the objections before-mentioned; and, that our work herein may be shortened, we may observe, that the bounds of life are twofold; either such as men might have lived to, according to the common course of nature if nothing had intervened to ruin the constitution, or no disease, or violent death, had broken the thread of life before; or that time which God has ordained that men shall live, whether it be longer or shorter: the former of these respects the lengthening or shortening of life, by the influence of second causes; and, in this respect, we do not suppose that the terms of life are immoveably fixed, but that in some, it is longer, and, in others shorter; for it is certain, that by intemperance, or other methods, men may shorten their days; or, by laying violent hands on themselves, not live the time that otherwise they would have done. But if we consider the over-ruling, or disposing providence of God, as conversant about this matter, there is nothing happens without the concurrence thereof. Therefore persons, who shorten their days by intemperance, do this by the permissive providence of God; though he be not the author of their intemperance, which is sinful, yet he permits, or determines not to hinder it, and consequently though he has fixed the bounds of life, which can neither be lengthened or shortened, yet knowing what men will do, in a natural way, to shorten them, he determines that this shall put an end to their lives. These things being premised, we proceed more particularly to answer the arguments brought against this doctrine. And, 1. When it is said, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, renders all means for the preservation thereof unnecessary, that depends upon a false supposition, namely, that God does not ordain the means as well as the end. If God had determined that persons shall live, he has determined to give them the supports of life, and to prevent every thing that might tend to destroy it; so, on the other hand, when he takes them away, by a disease, this is ordained by him, as a means conducive thereunto. If health is to be supported, or recovered, by means, and thereby life preserved, God has ordained that these means shall be used, as well as the end attained. 2. As to persons shortening their lives by intemperance, this has a natural tendency to do it; so that, though God be not the author of the sin, he certainly knows, before-hand, what methods the sinner will take to hasten his end, and leaves him to himself; so that, though the sin be not from God, the punishment, which is the consequence thereof, may truly be said to be from him, and therefore this was determined by him. And when it is farther objected, that they, who destroy their health, or lay violent hands on themselves, cannot be said to sin in so doing, because they do that which tends to fulfil the divine will, provided God has determined the fatal event; herein they oppose this doctrine, without taking the words in the same sense in which it is maintained; for it is well known, that the will of God is sometimes taken for that prescribed rule that he has given us, which is the matter of our duty, in which sense we readily allow, that he that fulfils it, cannot be said to sin. But, besides this, it is sometimes taken for his purpose to permit sin; or, to give the sinner up to his own heart’s lusts, to act that which he hates, and is resolved to punish. In this sense, the sinner is said to do that which God would not have suffered him to do, had he willed the contrary; but it is a very groundless insinuation, to suppose that this exempts him from the guilt of sin. 3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise than by the 4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced, whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of life. As for those promises, which God has made of a long life, to those that love him, and keep his commandments, the meaning thereof is this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in which it is said, that godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose, then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him. As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s dying before their time, or not living half their days, these are to be understood agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand? As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented, we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof, but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them. The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells Hezekiah, that he should die, and not live; notwithstanding which, fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live, he gave Hezekiah to understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense, otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he says, I will add to thy days fifteen years, the meaning is only this, though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life fifteen years. Object. 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events. Answ. 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has determined. Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, 2. As to the scripture’s speaking concerning the uncertainty of future events, in those places mentioned in the objection, these, and all others of the like nature, in which such a mode of speaking is used, may be explained, by distinguishing between what might reasonably have been expected to be the event of things, supposing men had not been given up to the blindness of their mind, and hearts, to act below the dictates of reason, without consulting their own safety and happiness, or expressing their gratitude to God; and what would be the real event of things, which God was not pleased to reveal, and therefore was unknown to them. Thus, when the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel represented the repentance and reformation of Israel as an uncertain event, as well as their forgiveness, and deliverance from the captivity, connected with it, in such dubious terms, It may be they will consider and return, every man from his evil way; it implies, that this was what might have been reasonably expected by men, though it was no matter of uncertainty to the heart-searching God, who knoweth the end from the beginning, and perfectly foresees what will be the event of things, which, in various respects, are under the direction of his providence. Though it could hardly be thought, by men, that such an admonition should be treated with such contempt, yet God knew how they would behave themselves; there was no peradventure with respect to his judgment thereof; he knew that they would not repent, otherwise he would have inclined their wills, and effectually have persuaded them to exercise this grace, and thereby have prevented his expectation, or determination, from being disappointed, or frustrated. To this it may be replied, that the great God is not bound to decline the asserting his right to man’s obedience, or requiring that which is a just debt to him, though he knew that they would not comply with his demand thereof; and, indeed, this objection cannot be maintained, without supposing, that, when the gospel is preached to man, the glory of the divine wisdom and goodness therein cannot be secured, unless we conclude either that God doth not know whether man will embrace it, or no, which is contrary to his omniscience; or that he determines, that all, to whom the gospel is preached, shall embrace it, which is contrary to matter of fact. But there may be a medium between both these, which vindicates the divine perfections, in ordering that the gospel should be preached, and thereby asserting his sovereignty, and unalienable right to their obedience; accordingly, there might be a small remnant among them, in whom God designed that this message should take effect. And will any one say, that because the goodness of God was not herein demonstrated to all, that therefore no glory was brought to that perfection? And if it be farther said, that supposing there were some who turned from their evil ways, the captivity, which was threatened, was not hereby prevented, and therefore the promise, relating thereunto, did not take place; to this it may be replied; that as God did not give them ground to expect this blessing, unless this repentance should be more universal, than it really was, so he had various ways to testify his regard to those who should receive advantage by this message, for whose sake it was principally intended. As for that other scripture, in which God advises his people to seek righteousness and meekness, and, as the consequence hereof, says, it may be ye may be hid in the day of the Lord’s fierce anger; the meaning is, that they, who were enabled to exercise these graces, should either have some instances of temporal deliverance vouchsafed to them; or if not, that they should have no reason to complain that the exercise thereof was altogether in vain. As for that scripture, in which the apostle bids Timothy to exhort those that oppose the gospel, if, peradventure, God would give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; the meaning is, that it was uncertain to Timothy whether God would give this grace or no; and therefore he must preach the Object. 4. Another objection, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, is, that it is altogether inconsistent with the preaching of the gospel; for if God has determined the final state of man, so that his purpose cannot be altered, then it is a preposterous thing, not to say illusory, for grace to be offered to the chief of sinners, which must certainly argue, that it is impossible to be attained by them; and, since the overture is universal, we must conclude that God has put all mankind into a salvable state, and consequently not excluded any from salvation by his peremptory and unchangeable decree. To what purpose are the promises of the gospel held forth, to all that sit under the sound thereof, if it be impossible for them to attain the blessings promised therein? Or what regard could men be supposed to have to the promises, if they were not a declaration of God’s purpose? And, on the other hand, the threatnings denounced would be as little regarded, as an expedient to deter men from sinning, if their state were unalterably fixed by God, according to this doctrine of election, as it has been before considered. Answ. That we may proceed with greater clearness in answering this objection, we shall first shew what we mean by preaching the gospel, which is nothing else but a declaration of God’s revealed will, and our duty pursuant thereunto, which is to be made known, particularly what is contained in the word of God, relating to the salvation of men, and the way which he has ordained in order to their attaining it. Therefore, 1. When this salvation is said to be offered in the gospel, we intend nothing else thereby, but that a declaration is made to sinners, that there are many invaluable privileges which Christ has purchased for, and will, in his own time and way, apply to all those whom God has purposed to save; and, since we cannot describe them by name, and no unregenerate person has ground to conclude that he is of that number, therefore there is a farther declaration to be made, namely, that God has inseparably connected this salvation, which he has chosen them to, with faith and repentance, and the exercise of all other graces, which, as they are God’s gift, and to be prayed for, and expected, in a diligent attendance on all his ordinances; so they are to be considered as the mark and evidences of their being chosen to salvation, without which, it is certainly a vain and presumptuous thing for any one to pretend that he has a right to it, as the object of God’s eternal election. 3. All, who sit under the sound of the gospel, ought to look upon it as a declaration of God’s design to save a part of mankind, under the preaching thereof, and among them the chief of sinners, which they have a sufficient ground to conclude themselves to be; but yet a door of hope is so far opened hereby, that they have no reason to conclude that they are rejected, any more than that they are elected; and, while they wait on God’s instituted means of grace, they have, at least, this encouragement, that, peradventure, they may be of the number of God’s elect; and, when they find in themselves that faith, which is the evidence thereof, then they may determine their interest in, and lay claim to this privilege, when they are enabled to make their calling, and thereby their election sure. And as for the promises and threatnings, these are to be considered by unregenerate persons, without determining their right to the one, or falling under the other, as elected or rejected; for that is still supposed to be a secret; therefore they are to regard the promise, as a declaration of God’s purpose, relating to the connexion that there is between faith and salvation, as an inducement to perform the one, in expectation of the other. And as for the threatnings, though they determine the present state of impenitent sinners to be such, in which they are undone and miserable, yet they are not to be extended to those events, which are hid in the purpose of God, so as to give any one ground to conclude that he is thereby finally excluded from salvation, since such an exclusion as this is inseparably connected with final impenitency and unbelief. Object. 5. It is farther objected, that this doctrine is, in many instances subversive of practical religion. And, 1. That it is inconsistent with the duty of prayer; for if God has determined to save a person, what need has he to ask a blessing, which is already granted? and, if he has determined to reject him, his prayer will be in vain. 2. It is farther supposed, that it leads to presumption, on the one hand, or despair, on the other; election, to presumption; reprobation, to despair. And, 3. They add, that it leads to licentiousness, as it is inconsistent Answ. This objection is, beyond measure, shocking; and it is no wonder, that a doctrine, that is supposed to have such consequences attending it, is treated with the utmost degree of detestation: but as the greatest part of the objections against it, are no other than misrepresentations thereof, so it is no difficult matter to reply to them, to the conviction of those who are disposed to judge impartially of the matter in controversy between us. We shall therefore proceed to reply to the several branches of this objection. And, 1. As to what concerns the duty of prayer; when we are engaged in it, we are not to suppose that we are to deal with God, in such a way, as when we have to do with men, whom we suppose to be undetermined, and that they are to be moved, by intreaties, to alter their present resolutions, and to give us what we ask for; for that is to conceive of him as altogether such an one as ourselves; accordingly, we are not to conclude, that he has not determined to grant the thing that we are to pray to him for; for that would be presumptuously to enter into his secret purpose, since he has no where told us we shall be denied the blessings we want; but rather that there is forgiveness with him, and mercy for the chief of sinners, as an encouragement to this duty; and, besides this, has given us farther ground to hope for a gracious answer of prayer, where he gives a heart to seek him. Therefore we are to behave ourselves, in this duty, as those who pretend not to know God’s secret purpose, but rather desire to wait for some gracious intimation or token for good, that he will hear and answer our prayer; therefore his secret purpose is no more inconsistent with this duty, than if, with those that deny the doctrine we are maintaining, we should conclude that this matter is not determined by him. 2. As to this doctrine’s leading to presumption, or despair, there is no ground to conclude that it has a tendency to either of them. It cannot lead to presumption, inasmuch as election is not discovered to any one till he believes; therefore an unconverted person has no ground to presume and conclude, that all is well with him, because he is elected; for that is boldly to determine a thing that he knows nothing of; the objection therefore, with respect to such, supposes that to be known, which remains a secret. And, on the other hand, they have no ground to despair, on a supposition that they are finally rejected; for And as for those that are in a converted state, this doctrine is far from having a tendency, either to lead them to presumption, or despair; but, on the other hand, to thankfulness to God, for his discriminating grace, which, when persons experience, they are not only encouraged to hope for farther blessings, but to perform those duties whereby they may express their gratitude to him. As for presumption, which is the only thing that election is pretended to lead them to, that cannot be the natural consequence or tendency thereof; for if they presume that they shall be saved, this is not to be reckoned a crime in them; for that presumption which is supposed to be so in the objection consists in a person’s expecting a blessing without reason; but this is contrary to the supposition that he is a believer; and it would be a strange method of reasoning to infer, that he, who has ground to conclude that he has a right to eternal life, from those marks and evidences of grace, which he finds in himself, is guilty of a sinful presumption, when he is induced hereby to lay claim to it; and therefore the sense of the objection, must be this, that a believer having been once enabled to conclude himself elected, may, from hence, take occasion, supposing that his work is done, and his end answered, to return to his former wicked life, and yet still presume that he shall be saved; whereas that would be a certain indication that he had no ground to conclude this, but was mistaken, when he thought that he had; so that this doctrine cannot lead a believer, as such, to presumption, and consequently the objection, in which it is supposed that it does, is founded on one of these two mistakes, viz. that every one, who is elected to salvation, knows his interest in this privilege, as though it were immediately revealed to him, without inferring it from any marks and evidences of grace that he finds in himself; or else, that it is impossible for any one, who thinks that he believes, and, from thence, concludes that he is elected, to appear afterwards to have been mistaken in the judgment, which he then passed upon himself; but either of these contain a misrepresentation of the consequences of the doctrine of election; neither is there any regard had to that necessary distinction that there is, between a person’s 3. It cannot, in the least, be proved that this doctrine has any tendency to lead persons to licentiousness; nor is it inconsistent with our using the utmost endeavours to attain salvation. If it be said, that many vile persons take occasion, from hence, to give the reins to their corruption; that is not the natural, or necessary consequence thereof; since there is no truth but what may be abused. The apostle Paul did not think the doctrine of the grace of God, which he so strenuously maintained, was less true, Or glorious, because some drew this vile consequence from it, Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound, Rom. vi. 1. And as for those means, which God has ordained to bring about the salvation of his people, we are obliged to attend upon them, though we know not, before-hand, what will certainly be the event thereof; and if through the blessing of God accompanying them, we are effectually called and sanctified, and thereby enabled to know our election, this will (agreeably to the experience of all true believers,) have a tendency to promote holiness. Object. 6. It is farther objected, that more especially against the doctrine of reprobation, that it argues God to be the author of sin; and particularly in such instances as these, viz. with respect to the first entrance of sin into the world, and in God’s imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, and afterwards suffering it to make such a progress as it has done ever since; and, most of all, when it is supposed that this is not only the result of the divine purpose, but that it also respects the blinding men’s minds, and hardening their hearts, and so rendering their final impenitency and perdition unavoidable. Answ. To this it may be answered, 1. As to what concerns the first entrance of sin into the world, it cannot reasonably be denied, that the purpose of God was concerned about it, before it was committed, in the same sense as his actual providence was afterwards, namely, in permitting, though not effecting it; notwithstanding this was not the cause of the committing it, since a bare permission has no positive efficiency in order thereunto; the not hindering, or restraining a wicked action, does not render him the author of it. It is true, God knew how man would behave, and particularly, that he would mis-improve and forfeit that original righteousness, in which he was created, and that, by this means, he 2. As to that part of the objection, which respects the imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, that is more frequently brought against this doctrine than any other; and it is generally represented in the most indefensible terms, without making any abatements as to the degree of punishment that was due to it; and, accordingly, they think that we can hardly have the front to affirm, that our arguments, in defence hereof, are agreeable to the divine perfections, as we pretend those others are, which have been brought in defence of this doctrine. But, I hope, we shall be able to maintain the doctrine of original sin, in consistency with the divine perfections, as well as scripture, in its proper place, to which we shall refer it. 3. As to the progress of sin in the world, and the proneness of all mankind to rebel against God; this, as before was observed, concerning sin in general, is the object of his permissive, but not his effective will; though there is this difference between God’s suffering sin to enter into the world at first, and his suffering the continuance, or increase of it therein, that, at first, he dealt with man as an innocent creature, and only left him to the mutability of his own will, having before given him a power to retain his integrity. But the fallen creature is become weak, and unable to do any thing that is good in all its circumstances, and afterwards is more and more inclined to sin, by contracting vicious habits, and persisting therein. Now, though God’s leaving man to himself at first, when there was no forfeiture made of his preventing grace, must be reckoned an act of mere sovereignty, his leaving sinners to themselves may be reckoned an act of justice, as a punishment of sin before committed, and neither of these argue him to be the author of it; neither does the purpose of God, relating thereunto, give the least occasion for such an inference. 4. As to what is farther objected, relating to the purpose of God, to blind the minds, and harden the hearts of men, and that final impenitency, which is the consequence thereof, God forbid that we should assert that this is a positive act in him; and, so far as it contains nothing else but his determining to deny that grace, which would have had the contrary effect, or his providence relating thereunto, this does not give any countenance to the objection, or weaken the force of the arguments that we have before laid down, which is very consistent therewith. Object. 7. There is another objection, which is generally laid down in so moving a way, that, whether the argument be just or no, the style is adapted to affect the minds of men with prejudice against this doctrine, and that is taken from the inconsistency thereof with God’s judicial proceedings against the wicked in the day of judgment, and that it will afford the sinner a plea, in which he may say to this effect: Lord, I sinned by a fatal necessity; it was impossible for me to avoid that which thou art now offended with me for; it was what thou didst decree should come to pass. I have been told, that thy decrees are unalterable, and that it is as impossible to change the course of nature, or to remove the mountains, which thou hast fixed with thy hand, as to alter thy purpose; wilt thou then condemn one, who sinned and fell pursuant to thy will? Dost Answ. This objection supposes that the decree of God lays a necessary constraint on, and enforces the will of man to sin; which, if they could make it appear that it does, no reply could be made to it. But this is to represent the argument we are maintaining in such a way, in which no one, who has just ideas of this doctrine, would ever understand it, and it is directly contrary to the foregoing method of explaining it. We have already proved, in our answer to the third objection, that sin is not necessary in that sense, in which they suppose it to be, or that, though the decree of God renders events necessary, yet it does not take away the efficiency of second causes, and therefore the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is not to be pleaded, as an excuse for it, or as a ground of exemption from punishment. We read of the Jews, that, with wicked hands, they crucified our Saviour; the crime was their own; but this is expressly said to have been done by, or, in pursuance of, the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God, Acts ii. 23. He fore-knew what they would do, and purposed not to prevent it; but yet he did not force their will to commit it. And elsewhere God says, concerning Israel, Thou heardest not; yea, thou knewest not; from that time thine ear was not opened; and then he adds, I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously, Isa. xlviii. 8. Israel might as well have pleaded, that God knew, before-hand, how they would behave themselves, and so have thrown the blame on him, for not preventing this foreseen event, but suffering them to go on in this destructive way, with as much reason, as the sinner is supposed, in the objection, to have, when taking occasion so to plead, as he is represented, as having ground to do, in the day of judgment, as a consequence from the doctrine we are maintaining. Again, whatever has been said concerning the immutability of the divine purpose, yet this does not give the least countenance to any one’s charging his sin on God; as we have, in answer to the last objection, proved that it does not render him the author of sin; and therefore man’s destruction must lie at his own door. It is one thing to say, that it is in the sinner’s power to save himself, and another thing to say, that the sin he commits is not wilful, and therefore that guilt is not contracted thereby; and, if so, then this affords no matter of excuse to the sinner, according to the import of the objection. IX. We are now to consider some things that may be inferred from the doctrine we have been insisting on, and how it is to be practically improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual advantage. And, 2. We may infer from it, that as it is agreeable to the divine perfections, so it has the greatest tendency to promote practical godliness. For, (1.) Since God has fore-ordained whatever comes to pass; this should lead us to an humble submission to his will, in all the dispensations of his providence. When we consider that nothing, in this respect comes by chance; this should have a tendency to quiet our minds, and silence all our murmuring and uneasy thoughts, whatever afflictions we are exposed to. We are too apt to complain sometimes of second causes, as though all our miseries took their rise from thence; and, at other times, to afflict ourselves beyond measure, as apprehending that those proper means have not been used, which might have prevented them; as Martha tells our Saviour, If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died, John xi. 21. whereas we ought rather to consider, that all this befalls us in pursuance of God’s purpose: had he designed to have prevented the affliction, he would have directed to other means conducive to that end, or would have attended those that have been used, with their desired success. We use the means as not knowing what are the secret purposes of God, with respect to the event of things; (2.) When we cannot see the reason, or understand the meaning of the dispensations of divine providence, and are not able to pass a judgment concerning future events, whether relating unto ourselves, or others; and, when all things look with a very dismal aspect, as to what concerns the interest and church of God in the world, we must be content to wait till he is pleased to discover them to us; what he oftentimes does, we know not now, but shall know hereafter, as our Saviour said to one of his disciples, John xiii. 7. It is no wonder that we are at a loss, as to God’s purposes, since secret things belong to him; and therefore all that we are to do, in such a case, is, to rest satisfied, that all these things shall, in the end, appear to have a tendency to advance his own perfections, and bring about the salvation of his people. (3.) Since the purpose of God respects the means, as well as the end, this should put us upon the use of those proper means, in which we may hope to obtain grace and glory; and therefore this doctrine does not lead us to sloth, and indifference in religion; for that is to suppose, that the ends and means are separated in God’s purpose: and when, through his blessing attending them, the ordinances, or means of grace, are made effectual for the working of faith, and all other graces, these being connected, in God’s purpose, with glory, it ought to encourage our hope relating to the end of faith, even the salvation of our souls. (4.) Let us take heed that we do not peremptorily, without ground conclude ourselves elected unto eternal life, on the one hand, or rejected on the other. To determine that we are chosen to salvation, before we are effectually called, is presumptuously to enter into God’s secret counsels, which we cannot, at present, have a certain and determinate knowledge of; but to lay this as a foundation, as to what concerns the conduct of our lives, is oftentimes of a very pernicious tendency. If, as the result of this conclusion made, we take encouragement to go on in sin, this will cut the sinews of all religion, and expose us to blindness of mind, and hardness of heart, and a greater degree of impenitency and unbelief, as the consequence of this bold presumption and affront to the divine Majesty. Neither, on the other hand, are we to conclude that we are not elected; for though we may be in suspense about the event of things, and not know whether we are elected or rejected, this is not inconsistent with our using endeavours to attain a good hope, through grace; yet to determine that we are not elected, is to conclude, against ourselves that all endeavours will be to no purpose; which we have no ground to do, since (5.) Let us, according to the apostle’s advice, Give diligence to make our calling and election sure, 2 Pet. i. 10. It is certainly a very great privilege for us, not barely to know, that some were chosen to eternal life, but to be able to conclude that we are of that happy number; and, in order hereunto, we must not expect to have an extraordinary revelation thereof, or to find ourselves described by name in scripture, as though this were the way to attain it; for the rule by which we are to judge of this matter, is, our enquiring whether we have those marks, or evidences thereof, which are contained therein; and therefore we are, by a diligent and impartial self-examination, to endeavour to know whether we are called, or enabled, to perform the obedience of faith, which God is said to elect his people to; or whether we are holy, and without blame, before him in love? whether we have the temper and disposition of the children of God, as an evidence of our being chosen to the adoption of children, and as such, are conformed to the image of Christ? (6.) If we have ground to conclude that we are chosen to eternal life, this ought to be improved to the glory of God, and our own spiritual advantage; it ought to put us upon admiring and adoring the riches of discriminating grace, which is herein eminently illustrated; and such are under the highest obligation to walk humbly with God, as well as thankfully; for it is owing to his grace, not only that they are chosen to eternal life, but that they are enabled to discern their interest in this privilege. END OF THE FIRST VOLUME. Footnotes 1.And besides the above-mentioned Indexes there are now added to this edition an alphabetical index to the whole matters contained in the work. 2.And the same reason may be assigned why this third is now offered to the public. 3.“Christianity,” it hath been said, “is not founded in argument.” If it were only meant by these words, that the religion of Jesus could not, by the single aid of reasoning, produce its full effect upon the heart; every true Christian would cheerfully subscribe to them. No arguments unaccompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God; though even to such conversion, arguments are, by the agency of the Spirit, rendered subservient. Again, if we were to understand by this aphorism, that the principles of our religion could never have been discovered, by the natural and unassisted faculties of man; this position, I presume would be as little disputed as the former. But if, on the contrary, under the cover of an ambiguous expression, it is intended to insinuate, that those principles, from their very nature, can admit no rational evidence of their truth, (and this, by the way, is the only meaning which can avail our antagonists) the gospel, as well as common sense, loudly reclaims against it. “The Lord Jesus Christ, the author of our religion, often argued, both with his disciples and with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason, without this faculty, he well knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law. He argued from prophecy, and the conformity of the event to the prediction. Luke xxiv. 25, &c. John v. 39, & 46. He argued from the testimony of John the Baptist, who was generally acknowledged to be a prophet. John v. 32, & 33. He argued from the miracles which he himself performed, John v. 36. x. 25, 37, 38. xiv. 10, 11. as uncontrovertible evidences, that God Almighty operated by him, and had sent him. He expostulates with his enemies, that they did not use their reason on this subject. Why, says he, even of yourselves judge ye not what is right? Luke xii. 57. In like manner we are called upon by the apostles of our Lord, to act the part of wise men and judge impartially of what they say. 1 Cor. x. 15. Those who do so, are highly commended, for the candour and prudence they discover, in an affair of so great consequence. Acts xvii. 11. We are even commanded, to be always ready to give an answer to every man that asketh us a reason of our hope; 1 Pet. iii. 15. in meekness to instruct them that oppose themselves; 2 Tim. ii. 25. and earnestly to contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints. Jude 3. God has neither in natural nor revealed religion, left himself without a witness; but has in both given moral and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to render inexcusable the atheist and the unbeliever. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine. We must prove all things, as we are expressly enjoined in holy writ, if we would ever hope to hold fast that which is good. 1 Thess. v. 21.” Campbell. 4.He who glorifies God intentionally, thereby promotes his own happiness. Our enjoying God is glorifying him. The two objects coalesce. Vide note on page 19. 5.The answer connected with this question makes the glorifying and enjoyment but one end; and thus the enjoyment is supposed to consist in the glorifying God. 6.It is not probable that the idea of a book of life, which is not to be understood literally, was at all in use in the days of Moses. The term ?????? used by Paul is not hypothetical, but affirmative, and in the past tense, I did wish, or rather I was wishing to be separated from Christ. The truth of this assertion no one, who is acquainted with his history, can doubt; for he had been a persecutor. Such a wish, made after he was a subject of saving grace, would have been unnatural, irrelevant, impious and impossible. It has been nevertheless, zealously contended by some learned and pious modern divines that, “the benevolent person is disposed, and willing to give up, and relinquish his own interest and happiness, when inconsistent with the public good, or the greatest good of the whole.” True holiness consists in a disposition, and suitable expressions of it, in conformity to the revealed will of God; so far as this accords with the good of the whole, such benevolence will run parallel with holiness; but every attempt to substitute any other rule of action or ground of obligation than the authoritatively expressed will of God, approaches the crime of idolatry. It is certainly a very high stand we assume, when we profess to pass by all the amiableness, and excellency of the divine character; and all his goodness, and mercy to us; and to love his being only together with created existences, with the same independent, and dignified love of benevolence, which he exercises towards his helpless creatures. All the displays of his perfections and compassions seem designed rather to elicit the affections of complacency and gratitude. That the advantages of religion in this world, and the next may be sought from selfish, and mercenary views is a lamentable truth; but because carnal minds may find their own destruction in aiming at the blessings which the spiritual only can enjoy, this is no reason wherefore the saints should not find their ultimate interest to accompany their duty in every instance. Accordingly, for their encouragement, the blessings of peace, and spiritual consolations here, and of eternal happiness, are exhibited to their view in glowing colours. But this would not have been done if it were essential to the character of their love, that they should be willing to be separated from Christ. That we have by nature a fearful propensity to earthly good, which is vain, illusory, disgusting and debasing, must be acknowledged; and that we are therefore required to deny our natural selves is known unto every Christian. But it by no means results, that because we must turn away from the temptations of temporal things, we may not aspire to those blessings which are spiritual and eternal. God himself is eternally happy in his own self complacency, and has encouraged us to expect everlasting happiness from the same source. Jesus Christ, whose benevolence towards us is an eternal appeal to our gratitude, which supposes a regard to our own interest; in suffering death had respect also to the joy which was set before him, and shall see of the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied. Love is essential to duty, without which it is forced, and cannot be deemed obedience in the view of him who searches the heart. This has been noticed by the Saviour, but he has omitted those distinctions, which are accounted so important in modern times; yet his doctrines are not less spiritual, than ours after we have sublimated the gospel to the highest pitch of refinement. 7.Dr. Hopkins. 8.President Edwards. 9.“As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence; I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me, than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or, if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being, and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.”—— “In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity, had a beginning, and what had a beginning, must be produced by something else. “Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must also be the source and original of all power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful. “Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world. “There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all understanding: I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones. “Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this idea duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If, nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully, l. 2. de leg. to be considered at his leisure. “What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?” Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in coelo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quÆ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? “From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.” Locke. 10.“In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet, why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed, and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use, that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result: We see a cylindrical box, containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but, in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood,) the inference, we think, is inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer, or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use. “I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed: all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of some ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist’s skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubts in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time, and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all, the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing, in some respects, a different nature. “II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to shew with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all. “III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case; if, by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance: and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment; these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before. “IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as of a different structure. “V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his enquiry more satisfaction to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watch-maker. “VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear, that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so. “VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative, cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expression, ‘the law of metallic nature,’ may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as ‘the law of vegetable nature,’ ‘the law of animal nature,’ or indeed as ‘the law of nature’, in general, when assigned as the cause of phÆnomena, in exclusion of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these. “VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument. He knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.”—— “Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch, should, after some time, discover, that, in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing, in the course of its movement, another watch like itself; (the thing is conceivable;) that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustment of laths, files, and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us enquire, what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion! “I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether he regarded the object of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible, mechanism by which it was carried on, he would perceive, in this new observation, nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done; for referring the construction of the watch to design, and to supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it; still more strong would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this further property, the crown and perfection of all the rest. “II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, in some sense, the maker of the watch, which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that, in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second: in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order, either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn: but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair, is neither more nor less than this: by the application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it, and arranged by intelligence, an effect is produced, viz. the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary, for any share which the water has in grinding the corn: yet is this share the same, as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Therefore, “III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch which our observer had found, was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the inference that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now, than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of different properties. We may ask for the cause of the colour of a body, of its hardness, of its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are now asking for the cause of that subserviency to an use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a contriver; order without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to an use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it; could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before. “IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty further back, i. e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced by another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by this supposition, nor dispensed with. If the difficulty were diminished the further we went back, by going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, there, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained: but where there is no such tendency or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question, (whatever there may be as to many points) between one series and another; between a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain composed of an infinite number of links, can no more support itself, than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured, (though we never can have tried the experiment) because, by increasing the number of links, from ten for instance to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, &c. we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect (yet there may be a great difference in several respects) between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is indefinite. This very much resembles the case before us. The machine, which we are inspecting, demonstrates, by its construction, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver; design, a designer; whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine, or not. That circumstance alters not the case. That other machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor does that alter the case: contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from one preceding it: no alteration still: a contriver is still necessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every succession of these machines; a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one series as with another; a series which is finite, as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other respects they may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and design are unaccounted for. “The question is not simply, How came the first watch into existence? which question, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the series of watches thus produced from one another to have been infinite, and consequently to have had no such first, for which it was necessary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been nearly the state of the question, if nothing had been before us but an unorganized unmechanised substance, without mark or indication of contrivance. It might be difficult to shew that such substance could not have existed from eternity, either in succession (if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring from one another,) or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether we had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place; for, in the watch which we are examining, are seen contrivance, design; an end, a purpose; means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question, which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts, is, whence this contrivance and design? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number or succession of substances, destitute of these properties; nor the more, by increasing that number to infinity. If it be said, that, upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other’s movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, viz. the watch from which it proceeded, I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to an use (all which we discover in the watch,) we have any cause whatever. It is in vain, therefore to assign a series of such causes, or to allege that a series may be carried back to infinity; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all of the phÆnomena, still less any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver; proofs of design, but no designer. “V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the maker of the watch before him, was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it; there being no difference (except that the latter manifests a more exquisite skill) between the making of another watch with his own hands by the mediation of files, laths, chisels, &c. and the disposing, fixing, and inserting, of these instruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made, in such a manner, as to form a new watch in the course of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of tools, instead of another. “The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A second examination presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found in the course of its movement to produce another watch similar to itself: and not only so, but we perceive in it a system of organization, separately calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond measure, our admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite conclusion, viz. that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained without absurdity? Yet this is atheism.” Paley. 11.“The works of nature want only to be contemplated. When contemplated, they have every thing in them which can astonish by their greatness; for, of the vast scale of operation, through which our discoveries carry us, at one end we see an intelligent Power arranging planetary systems, fixing, for instance, the trajectory of Saturn, or constructing a ring of a hundred thousand miles diameter, to surround his body, and be suspended like a magnificent arch over the heads of his inhabitants; and, at the other, bending a hooked tooth, concerting and providing an appropriate mechanism, for the clasping and reclasping of the filaments of the feather of a humming-bird. We have proof, not only of both these works proceeding from an intelligent agent, but of their proceeding from the same agent: for, in the first place, we can trace an identity of plan, a connexion of system, from Saturn to our own globe; and when arrived upon our own globe, we can, in the second place, pursue the connexion through all the organized, especially the animated, bodies, which it supports. We can observe marks of a common relation, as well to one another, as to the elements of which their habitation is composed. Therefore one mind hath planned, or at least hath prescribed a general plan for, all these productions. One being has been concerned in all. “Under this stupendous Being we live. Our happiness, our existence, is in his hands. All we expect must come from him. Nor ought we to feel our situation insecure. In every nature, and in every portion of nature, which we can descry, we find attention bestowed upon even the minutest parts. The hinges in the wings of an earwig, and the joints of its antennÆ, are as highly wrought, as if the Creator had had nothing else to finish. We see no signs of diminution of care by multiplicity of objects, or of distraction of thought by variety. We have no reason to fear therefore, our being forgotten, or overlooked, or neglected. “The existence and character of the Deity, is, in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of Revelation. It is a step to have it proved, that there must be something in the world more than what we see. It is a further step to know, that, amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an intelligent mind, concerned in its production, order, and support. These points being assured to us by Natural Theology, we may well leave to Revelation the disclosure of many particulars, which our researches cannot reach, respecting either the nature of this Being as the original cause of all things, or his character and designs as a moral governor; and not only so, but the more full confirmation of other particulars, of which, though they do not lie altogether beyond our reasonings and our probabilities, the certainty is by no means equal to the importance. The true Theist will be the first to listen to any credible communication of divine knowledge. Nothing which he has learnt from Natural Theology, will diminish his desire of further instruction, or his disposition to receive it with humility and thankfulness. He wishes for light: he rejoices in light. His inward veneration of this great Being, will incline him to attend with the utmost seriousness, not only to all that can be discovered concerning him by researches into nature, but to all that is taught by a revelation, which gives reasonable proof of having proceeded from him. “But, above every other article of revealed religion, does the anterior belief of a Deity, bear with the strongest force, upon that grand point, which gives indeed interest and importance to all the rest—the resurrection of the human dead. The thing might appear hopeless, did we not see a power under the guidance of an intelligent will, and a power penetrating the inmost recesses of all substance. I am far from justifying the opinion of those, who ‘thought it a thing incredible that God should raise the dead;’ but I admit that it is first necessary to be persuaded, that there is a God to do so. This being thoroughly settled in our minds, there seems to be nothing in this process (concealed and mysterious as we confess it to be,) which need to shock our belief. They who have taken up the opinion, that the acts of the human mind depend upon organization, that the mind itself indeed consists in organization, are supposed to find a greater difficulty than others do, in admitting a transition by death to a new state of sentient existence, because the old organization is apparently dissolved. But I do not see that any impracticability need be apprehended even by these; or that the change, even upon their hypothesis, is far removed from the analogy of some other operations, which we know with certainty that the deity is carrying on. In the ordinary derivation of plants and animals from one another, a particle, in many cases, minuter than all assignable, all conceivable dimension; an aura, an effluvium, an infinitesimal; determines the organization of a future body: does no less than fix, whether that which is about to be produced, shall be a vegetable, a merely sentient, or a rational being; an oak, a frog, or a philosopher; makes all these differences; gives to the future body its qualities, and nature, and species. And this particle, from which springs, and by which is determined a whole future nature, itself proceeds from, and owes its constitution to, a prior body: nevertheless, which is seen in plants most decisively, the incepted organization, though formed within, and through, and by a preceding organization, is not corrupted by its corruption, or destroyed by its dissolution; but, on the contrary, is sometimes extricated and developed by those very causes; survives and comes into action, when the purpose, for which it was prepared, requires its use.—Now an oeconomy which nature has adopted, when the purpose was to transfer an organization from one individual to another, may have something analogous to it, when the purpose is to transmit an organization from one state of being to another state: and they who found thought in organization, may see something in this analogy applicable to their difficulties; for, whatever can transmit a similarity of organization will answer their purpose, because, according even to their own theory, it may be the vehicle of consciousness, and because consciousness, without doubt, carries identity and individuality along with it through all changes of form or of visible qualities. In the most general case, that, as we have said, of the derivation of plants and animals from one another, the latent organization is either itself similar to the old organization, or has the power of communicating to new matter the old organic form. But it is not restricted to this rule. There are other cases, especially in the progress of insect life, in which the dormant organization does not much resemble that which incloses it, and still less suits with the situation in which the inclosing body is placed, but suits with a different situation to which it is destined. In the larva of the libellula, which lives constantly, and has still long to live, under water, are descried the wings of a fly, which two years afterwards is to mount into the air. Is there nothing in this analogy? It serves at least to shew, that, even in the observable course of nature, organizations are formed one beneath another; and, amongst a thousand other instances, it shews completely, that the Deity can mould and fashion the parts of material nature, so as to fulfil any purpose whatever which he is pleased to appoint. “They who refer the operations of mind to a substance totally and essentially different from matter, as, most certainly, these operations, though affected by material causes, hold very little affinity to any properties of matter with which we are acquainted, adopt, perhaps, a juster reasoning and a better philosophy; and by these the considerations above suggested are not wanted, at least in the same degree. But to such as find, which some persons do find, an insuperable difficulty in shaking off an adherence to those analogies, which the corporeal world is continually suggesting to their thoughts; to such, I say, every consideration will be a relief, which manifests the extent of that intelligent power which is acting in nature, the fruitfulness of its resources, the variety, and aptness, and success of its means; most especially every consideration, which tends to shew, that, in the translation of a conscious existence, there is not, even in their own way of regarding it, any thing greatly beyond, or totally unlike, what takes place in such parts (probably small parts) of the order of nature, as are accessible to our observation. “Again; if there be those who think, that the contractedness and debility of the human faculties in our present state, seem ill to accord with the high destinies which the expectations of religion point out to us, I would only ask them, whether any one, who saw a child two hours after its birth, could suppose that it would ever come to understand fluxions; “Upon the whole; in every thing which respects this awful, but, as we trust, glorious change, we have a wise and powerful Being, (the author, in nature, of infinitely various expedients for infinitely various ends,) upon whom to rely for the choice and appointment of means, adequate to the execution of any plan which his goodness or his justice may have formed, for the moral and accountable part of his terrestrial creation. That great office rests with him: be it ours to hope and prepare; under a firm and settled persuasion, that, living and dying, we are his; that life is passed in his constant presence, that death resigns us to his merciful disposal.” Paley. 12.See Search’s Light of Nature, passim. 13.The theory of a nervous fluid, or animal spirits, is generally abandoned. 14.See this doubtful doctrine discussed post Quest. 60. 15.He who has created all things, with all their relations, and who is the universal Sovereign, has a right to the allegiance of his rational creatures, and they are under obligation to obey his laws, because it is his will that they should do so. He has connected our interest with our duty, as a motive to obedience, and because he is good; but if we should substitute utility for his authority, and conform to his laws, merely because they are advantageous, we rebel against our Sovereign, and renounce his authority, that we may pursue our own advantage. Virtue is amiable for its intrinsic rectitude. If we choose to practice it merely because beautiful, we please ourselves; and though the excellency of virtue is intended as a motive, and it is well for the man who is charmed by it, yet, if this be the only inducement, he has lost sight of the Divine authority, and his virtue is no obedience to the laws of God. If the obligation of virtue be founded solely on its utility, or beauty, we are at liberty to forego our advantage, or pleasure without guilt, and remorse of conscience will be unaccountable. It is also fit and proper, that we should practice virtue, but this is no more to be substituted for the Divine authority, than the other motives of advantage or pleasure. If it be objected, that the fitness of moral good is eternal, and a rule even to Deity, and so may be deemed a foundation of the obligation of human virtue. It is conceded that the fitness of virtue is eternal, for God is eternal, and has been always holy, and just; in the same manner also the beauty of virtue is eternal; but to suppose these to have existed anterior to thought and action, and to be independent of an eternally and immutably holy God is to indulge the mind in speculations, which, to say the least of them, are groundless. We may as well assign a cause to eternal existence, as to eternal holiness. When the Creator formed the Universe of intelligent creatures, he gave them, with their existence, the various relations and circumstances which sprang up with them: and their obligations with respect to him and his works originated at the same time, and from the same source; which could be no other than the Divine pleasure; and the positive express appointments, which have been since super-added, rest upon the same basis, the will of God. That we might discern his will and conform to it, he has set before us his own character, which in all things is good. He has given us reason, or active intellectual powers capable of pursuing the truth, and discovering his character, as a rule of our conduct. And because reason is matured by slow degrees, and the advantages for its improvement are unequal, he has given us a sense susceptible of the impressions of good and evil, by which we can distinguish between moral good and evil almost as easily, as by our natural senses we discern the differences between light and darkness, sweetness and bitterness; and thus has he rendered the judgment upon our own actions almost always unavoidable. The light of nature has been confirmed by express revelation; and because the law of nature identifies itself with the written law of God, the obligation of both rests upon the same foundation, the Sovereign will. 16.Where a covenant is, there should be the death of the devoted victim. 17.PROPHETS BEFORE THE CAPTIVITY. With the order and times of their Prophecies.
PROPHETS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE, DURING THE CAPTIVITY.
PROPHETS AFTER THE CAPTIVITY UNDER THE SECOND TEMPLE.
Dr. Taylor. 18.??s?? is the unregenerate world, John vii. 7. and ????sa?, is to receive kindly, 2 Cor. vii. 2. 19.Vid. Philo. Jud. de Vit. Mosis; & eund. citat. ab Euseb. in PrÆp. Evang. l. viii. c. 6. & Joseph, contr. App. l. ii. 20.“Since God has been pleased to leave us the Records of the Jewish Religion, which was of old the true religion, and affords no small testimony to the Christian religion, it is not foreign to our purpose, to see upon what foundation the credibility of these is built. That these books are theirs, to whom they are ascribed, appears in the same manner as we have proved of our books. And they, whose names they bear, were either Prophets, or men worthy to be credited; such as Esdras, who is supposed to have collected them into one volume, at that time, when the Prophets Haggai, Malachi, and Zacharias, were yet alive. I will not here repeat what was said before, in commendation of Moses. And not only that first part, delivered by Moses, as we have shewn in the first book, but the latter history is confirmed by many Pagans. Grotius. 21.(Thus the Phoenician Annals, &c.) See what Josephus cites out of them, Book VIII. Chap. 2. of his Ancient History; where he adds, “that if any one would see the Copies of those Epistles which Solomon and Hirom wrote to each other, they may be procured of the public Keepers of the Records at Tyrus.” (We must be cautions how we believe this; however, see what I have said upon 1 Kings v. 3.) There is a remarkable place concerning David, quoted by Josephus, Book VII. Ch. 6. of his Ancient History, out of the IVth of Damascenus’s History. 22.“The enquiries of learned men, and, above all of the excellent Lardner, who never overstates a point of evidence, and whose fidelity in citing his authorities has in no one instance been impeached, have established, concerning these writings, the following propositions: “I. That in the age immediately posterior to that in which St. Paul lived, his letters were publicly read and acknowledged. “Some of them are quoted or alluded to by almost every Christian writer that followed, by Clement of Rome, by Hermas, by Ignatius, by Polycarp, disciples or cotemporaries of the apostles; by Justin Martyr, by the churches of Gaul, by IrenÆus, by Athenagoras, by Theophilus, by Clement of Alexandria, by Hermias, by Tertullian, who occupied the succeeding age. Now when we find a book quoted or referred to by an ancient author, we are entitled to conclude, that it was read and received in the age and country in which that author lived. And this conclusion does not, in any degree, rest upon the judgment or character of the author making such reference. Proceeding by this rule, we have, concerning the First Epistle to the Corinthians in particular, within forty years after the epistle was written, evidence, not only of its being extant at Corinth, but of its being known and read at Rome. Clement, bishop of that city, writing to the church of Corinth, uses these words: ‘Take into your hands the Epistle of the blessed Paul the apostle. What did he at first write unto you in the beginning of the gospel? Verily he did by the Spirit admonish you concerning himself and Cephas, and Apollos, because that even then you did form parties “Arguing in like manner from citations and allusions, we have, within the space of a hundred and fifty years from the time that the first of St. Paul’s Epistles was written, proofs of almost all of them being read, in Palestine, Syria, the countries of Asia Minor, in Egypt, in that part of Africa which used the Latin tongue, in Greece, Italy, and Gaul “Nothing of the works of Marcion remains. Probably he was, after all, a rash, arbitrary, licentious critic (if he deserved indeed the name of critic,) and who offered no reason for his determination. What St. Jerome says of him intimates this, and is beside founded in good sense: speaking of him and Basilides, ‘If they had assigned any reasons,’ says he, ‘why they did not reckon these epistles,’ viz. the first and second to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus, ‘to be the apostle’s, we would have endeavoured to have answered them, and perhaps might have satisfied the reader: but when they take upon them, by their own authority, to pronounce one epistle to be Paul’s, and another not, they can only be replied to in the same manner “II. They, who in those ages disputed about so many other points, agreed in acknowledging the Scriptures now before us. Contending sects appealed to them in their controversies with equal and unreserved submission. When they were urged by one side, however they might be interpreted or misinterpreted by the other, their authority was not questioned. ‘Reliqui omnes,’ says IrenÆus, speaking of Marcion, ‘falso scientiÆ nomine inflati, scripturas quidem confitentur, interpretationes vero convertunt “III. When the genuineness of some other writings which were in circulation, and even of a few which are now received into the canon, was contested, these were never called into dispute. Whatever was the objection, or whether, in truth, there ever was any real objection to the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third of John, the Epistle of James, or that of Jude, or to the book of the Revelations of St. John, the doubts that appear to have been entertained concerning them, exceedingly strengthen the force of the testimony as to those writings, about which there was no doubt; because it shows, that the matter was a subject, amongst the early Christians, of examination and discussion; and that, where there was any room to doubt, they did doubt. “What Eusebius hath left upon the subject is directly to the purpose of this observation. Eusebius, it is well known, divided the ecclesiastical writings which were extant in his time into three classes; the ‘a?a?t????ta, uncontradicted,’ as he calls them in one chapter; or ‘scriptures universally acknowledged,’ as he calls them in another; the ‘controverted, yet well known and approved by many;’ and ‘the spurious.’ What were the shades of difference in the books of the second, or in those of the third class; or what it was precisely that he meant by the term spurious, it is not necessary in this place to enquire. It is sufficient for us to find, that the thirteen epistles of St. Paul are placed by him in the first class without any sort of hesitation or doubt. “It is further also to be collected from the chapter in which this distinction is laid down, that the method made use of by Eusebius, and by the Christians of his time, viz. the close of the third century, in judging concerning the sacred authority of any books, was to enquire after and consider the testimony of those who lived near the age of the apostles “IV. That no ancient writing, which is attested as these epistles are, hath had its authenticity disproved, or is in fact questioned. The controversies which have been moved concerning suspected writings, as the epistles, for instance, of Phalaris, or the eighteen epistles of Cicero, begin by showing that this attestation is wanting. That being proved, the question is thrown back upon internal marks of spuriousness or authenticity; and in these the dispute is occupied. In which disputes it is to be observed, that the contested writings are commonly attacked by arguments drawn from some opposition which they betray to ‘authentic history,’ to ‘true epistles,’ to ‘the real sentiments or circumstances of the author whom they personate “V. It cannot be shown that any forgeries, properly so called “Nor when they did appear were they much used by the primitive Christians. ‘IrenÆus quotes not any of these books. He mentions some of them, but he never quotes them. The same may be said of Tertullian: he has mentioned a book called “Acts of Paul and Thecla:” but it is only to condemn it. Clement of Alexandria and Origen have mentioned and quoted several such books, but never as authority, and sometimes with express marks of dislike. Eusebius quotes no such books in any of his works. He has mentioned them indeed, but how? Not by way of approbation, but to show that they were of little or no value; and that they never were received by the sounder part of Christians.’ Now, if with this, which is advanced after the most minute and diligent examination, we compare what the same cautious writer had before said of our received scriptures, ‘that in the works of three only of the above-mentioned fathers, there are more and larger quotations of the small volume of the New Testament, than of all the works of Cicero in the writers of all characters for several ages;’ and if, with the marks of obscurity or condemnation, which accompanied the mention of the several apocryphal Christian writings, when they happened to be mentioned at all, we contrast what Dr. Lardner’s work completely and in detail makes out concerning the writings which we defend, and what, having so made out, he thought himself authorized in his conclusion to assert, that these books were not only received from the beginning, but received with the greatest respect; have been publicly and solemnly read in the assemblies of Christians throughout the world, in every age from that time to this; early translated into the languages of divers countries and people; commentaries writ to explain and illustrate them; quoted by way of proof in all arguments of a religious nature; recommended to the perusal of unbelievers, as containing the authentic account of the Christian doctrine; when we attend, I say, to this representation, we perceive in it, not only full proof of the early notoriety of these books, but a clear and sensible line of discrimination, which separates these from the pretensions of any others. “The Epistles of St. Paul stand particularly free of any doubt or confusion that might arise from this source. Until the conclusion of the fourth century, no intimation appears of any attempt whatever being made to counterfeit these writings; and then it appears only of a single and obscure instance. Jerome, who flourished in the year 392, has this expression: ‘Legunt quidam et ad Laodicenses; sed ab omnibus exploditur;’ there is also an Epistle to the Laodiceans, but it is rejected by every body “When we take into our hands the letters which the suffrage and consent of antiquity hath thus transmitted to us, the first thing that strikes our attention is the air of reality and business, as well as of seriousness and conviction, which pervades the whole. Let the sceptic read them. If he be not sensible of these qualities in them, the argument can have no weight with him. If he be; if he perceive in almost every page the language of a mind actuated by real occasions, and operating upon real circumstances, I would wish it to be observed, that the proof which arises from this perception is not to be deemed occult or imaginary, because it is incapable of being drawn out in words, or of being conveyed to the apprehension of the reader in any other way, than by sending him to the books themselves.”—— “If it be true that we are in possession of the very letters which St. Paul wrote, let us consider what confirmation they afford to the Christian history. In my opinion they substantiate the whole transaction. The great object of modern research is to come at the epistolary correspondence of the times. Amidst the obscurities, the silence, or the contradictions of history, if a letter can be found, we regard it as the discovery of a land mark; as that by which we can correct, adjust, or supply the imperfections and uncertainties of other accounts. One cause of the superior credit which is attributed to letters is this, that the facts which they disclose generally come out incidentally, and therefore without design to mislead the public by false or exaggerated accounts. This reason may be applied to St. Paul’s Epistles with as much justice as to any letters whatever. Nothing could be further from the intention of the writer than to record any part of his history. That his history was in fact made public by these letters, and has by the same means been transmitted to future ages, is a secondary and unthought-of effect. The sincerity therefore of the apostle’s declarations cannot reasonably be disputed; at least we are sure that it was not vitiated by any desire of setting himself off to the public at large. But these letters form a part of the muniments of Christianity, as much to be valued for their contents, as for their originality. A more inestimable treasure the care of antiquity could not have sent down to us. Beside the proof they afford of the general reality of St. Paul’s history, of the knowledge which the author of the Acts of the Apostles had obtained of that history, and the consequent probability that he was, what he professes himself to have been, a companion of the apostle’s; beside the support they lend to these important inferences, they meet specifically some of the principal objections upon which the adversaries of Christianity have thought proper to rely. In particular they show, “I. That Christianity was not a story set on foot amidst the confusions which attended and immediately preceded the destruction of Jerusalem; when many extravagant reports were circulated, when men’s minds were broken by terror and distress, when amidst the tumults that surrounded them enquiry was impracticable. These letters show incontestably that the religion had fixed and established itself before this state of things took place. “II. Whereas it hath been insinuated, that our gospels may have been made up of reports and stories, which were current at the time, we may observe that, with respect to the Epistles, this is impossible. A man cannot write the history of his own life from reports; nor, what is the same thing, be led by reports to refer to passages and transactions in which he states himself to have been immediately present and active. I do not allow that this insinuation is applied to the historical part of the New Testament with any colour of justice or probability; but I say, that to the Epistles it is not applicable at all. “III. These letters prove that the converts to Christianity were not drawn from the barbarous, the mean, or the ignorant set of men, which the representations of infidelity would sometimes make them. We learn from letters the character not only of the writer, but, in some measure, of the persons to whom they are written. To suppose that these letters were addressed to a rude tribe, incapable of thought or reflection, is just as reasonable as to suppose Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding to have been written for the instruction of savages. Whatever may be thought of these letters in other respects, either of diction or argument, they are certainly removed as far as possible from the habits and comprehension of a barbarous people. “IV. St. Paul’s history, I mean so much of it as may be collected from his letters, is so implicated with that of the other apostles, and with the substance indeed of the Christian history itself, that I apprehend it will be found impossible to admit St. Paul’s story (I do not speak of the miraculous part of it) to be true, and yet to reject the rest as fabulous. For instance, can any one believe that there was such a man as Paul, a preacher of Christianity in the age which we assign to him, and not believe that there were also at the same time, such men as Peter and James, and other apostles, who had been companions of Christ during his life, and who after his death published and avowed the same things concerning him which Paul taught? Judea, and especially Jerusalem, was the scene of Christ’s ministry. The witnesses of his miracles lived there. St. Paul, by his own account, as well as that of his historian, appears to have frequently visited that city; to have carried on a communication with the church there; to have associated with the rulers and elders of that church, who were some of them apostles; to have acted, as occasions offered, in correspondence, and sometimes in conjunction with them. Can it, after this, be doubted, but that the religion and the general facts relating to it, which St. Paul appears by his letters to have delivered to the several churches which he established at a distance, were at the same time taught and published at Jerusalem itself, the place where the business was transacted; and taught and published by those who had attended the founder of the institution in his miraculous, or pretendedly miraculous, ministry? “It is observable, for so it appears both in the Epistles and from the Acts of the Apostles, that Jerusalem, and the society of believers in that city, long continued the centre from which the missionaries of the religion issued with which all other churches maintained a correspondence and connexion, to which they referred their doubts, and to whose relief, in times of public distress, they remitted their charitable assistance. This observation I think material, because it proves that this was not the case of giving our accounts in one country of what is transacted in another, without affording the hearers an opportunity of knowing whether the things related were credited by any, or even published, in the place where they are reported to have passed. “V. St. Paul’s letters furnish evidence (and what better evidence than a man’s own letters can be desired?) of the soundness and sobriety of his judgment. His caution in distinguishing between the occasional suggestions of inspiration, and the ordinary exercise of his natural understanding, is without example in the history of enthusiasm. His morality is every where calm, pure, and rational: adapted to the condition, the activity, and the business of social life, and of its various relations; free from the over-scrupulousness and austerities of superstition, and from, what was more perhaps to be apprehended, the abstractions of quietism, and the soarings and extravagancies of fanaticism. His judgment concerning a hesitating conscience; his opinion of the moral indifferency of many actions, yet of the prudence and even the duty of compliance, where non-compliance would produce evil effects upon the minds of the persons who observed it, is as correct and just as the most liberal and enlightened moralist could form at this day. The accuracy of modern ethics has found nothing to amend in these determinations.” “Broad, obvious, and explicit agreements prove little; because it may be suggested, that the insertion of such is the ordinary expedient of every forgery; and though they may occur, and probably will occur, in genuine writings, yet it cannot be proved that they are peculiar to these. Thus what St. Paul declares in chap. xi. of 1 Cor. concerning the institution of the eucharist, ‘For I have received of the Lord that which I also delivered unto you, that the Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed, took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is my body, which is broken for you; this do in remembrance of me,’ though it be in close and verbal conformity with the account of the same transaction preserved by St. Luke, is yet a conformity of which no use can be made in our argument; for if it should be objected that this was a mere recital from the Gospel, borrowed by the author of the epistle, for the purpose of setting off his composition by an appearance of agreement with the received account of the Lord’s supper, I should not know how to repel the insinuation. In like manner, the description which St. Paul gives of himself in his epistle to the Philippians (iii. 5.)—‘Circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, an Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee; concerning zeal, persecuting the church; touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless’—is made up of particulars so plainly delivered concerning him, in the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistle to the Romans, and the Epistle to the Galatians, that I cannot deny but that it would be easy for an impostor, who was fabricating a letter in the name of St. Paul, to collect these articles into one view. This, therefore, is a conformity which we do not adduce. But when I read, in the Acts of the Apostles, that ‘when Paul came to Derbe and Lystra, behold a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus, the son of a certain woman which was a Jewess;’ and when, in an epistle addressed to Timothy, I find him reminded of his ‘having known the Holy Scriptures from a child,’ which implies that he must, on one side or both, have been brought up by Jewish parents: I conceive that I remark a coincidence which shews, by its very obliquity, that scheme was not employed in its formation.” “An assertion in the Epistle to the Colossians, viz. that ‘Onesimus was one of them,’ is verified by the Epistle to Philemon; and is verified, not by any mention of Colosse, any the most distant intimation concerning the place of Philemon’s abode, but singly by stating Onesimus to be Philemon’s servant, and by joining in the salutation Philemon with Archippus, for this Archippus, when we go back to the Epistle to the Colossians, appears to have been an inhabitant of that city, and, as it should seem, to have held an office of authority in that church. The case stands thus. Take the Epistle to the Colossians alone, and no circumstance is discoverable which makes out the assertion, that Onesimus was ‘one of them.’ Take the Epistle to Philemon alone, and nothing at all appears concerning the place to which Philemon or his servant Onesimus belonged. For any thing that is said in the epistle, Philemon might have been a Thessalonian, a Philippian, or an Ephesian, as well as a Colossian. Put the two epistles together and the matter is clear. The reader perceives a junction of circumstances, which ascertains the conclusion at once. Now, all that is necessary to be added in this place is, that this correspondency evinces the genuineness of one epistle, as well as of the other. It is like comparing the two parts of a cloven tally. Coincidence proves the authenticity of both.” Paley. 23.See Lardner, vol. xii. p. 22. 24.Lardner, vol. ii. p. 598. 25.See Lardner’s Recapitulation, vol. xii, p. 53. 26.See Lardner’s Recapitulation, vol. xii. p. 53. 27.Lardner, vol. ii. p. 808. 28.Lardner, vol. xiv. p. 455. 29.Lardner, vol. xiv. p. 458. 30.Lardner, vol. i. p. 313. 31.Iren. advers. Haer. quoted by Lardner, vol. xv. p. 425. 32.Lardner, vol. viii. p. 106. 33.See the tracts written in the controversy between Tunstal and Middleton upon certain suspected epistles ascribed to Cicero. 34.I believe that there is a great deal of truth in Dr. Lardner’s observations, that comparatively few of those books, which we call apocryphal, were strictly and originally forgeries. See Lardner, vol. xii. p. 167. 35.Lardner, vol. x. p. 103. 36.Lardner, vol. xi. p. 88. 37.?? ??? ???? are wanting only in 85 and 112 of Kennicott. 38.See Ques. 154. 39.??pe?a?? a?t??. 40.[?? ?] e? oftentimes signifies, Cum, ad, prope, juxta, as well as in. 41.“The most ancient tradition among all nations, is exactly agreeable to the relation of Moses. For his description of the original of the world is almost the very same as in the ancient Phoenician histories, which are translated by Philo Biblius from Sanchoniathon’s Collection; and a good part of it is to be found among the Indians and Egyptians; whence it is that in Linus, Hesiod, and many other Greek writers, mention is made of a Chaos, (signified by some under the name of an Egg) and of the framing of animals, and also of man’s formation after the divine image, and the dominion given him over all living creatures; which are to be seen in many writers, particularly in Ovid, who transcribed them from the Greek. That all things were made by the Word of God, is asserted by Epicharmus, and the Platonists; and before them, by the most ancient writer (I do not mean of those Hymns which go under his name, but) of those Verses which were of old called Orpheus’s; not because Orpheus composed them, but because they contained his doctrines. And Empedocles acknowledged, that the sun was not the original light, but the receptacle of light, (the storehouse and vehicle of fire, as the ancient Christians express it.) Aratus, and Catullus, thought the divine residence was above the starry orb; in which Homer says, there is a continual light. Thales taught from the ancient schools, that God was the oldest of beings, because not begotten; that the world was most beautiful, because the workmanship of God; that darkness was before light, which latter we find in Orpheus’s Verses, and Hesiod, whence it was, that the nations, who were most tenacious of ancient customs, reckoned the time by nights. Anaxagoras affirmed, that all things were regulated by the supreme mind: Aratus, that the stars were made by God; Virgil, from the Greeks, that Life was infused into things by the Spirit of God; Hesiod, Homer, and Callimachus, that man was formed of clay; lastly, Maximus Tyrius asserts, that it was a constant tradition received by all nations, that there was one supreme God, the cause of all things. And we learn from Josephus, Philo, Tibullus, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Lucian, (for I need not mention the Hebrews) that the memory of the seven days’ work was preserved, not only among the Greeks and Italians, by honouring the seventh day; but also amongst the CeltÆ and Indians, who all measured the time by weeks; as we learn from Philostratus, Dion Cassius, and Justin Martyr, and also the most ancient names of the day. The Egyptians tell us, that at first men led their lives in great simplicity, their bodies being naked, whence arose the poet’s fiction of the Golden Age, famous among the Indians, as Strabo remarks, Maimonides takes notice, that the history of Adam, of Eve, of the tree, and of the serpent, was extant among the idolatrous Indians in his time: and there are many witnesses in our age, who testify that the same is still to be found amongst the heathen dwelling in Peru, and the Philippine islands, people belonging to the same India; the name of Adam amongst the Brachmans; and that it was reckoned six thousand years since the creation of the world, by those of Siam. Berosus in his history of Chaldea, Manethos in his of Egypt, Hierom in his of Phoenicia, HistÆus, HecatÆus, Hillanicus in theirs of Greece, and Hesiod among the Poets; all assert that the lives of those who descended from the first men, were almost a thousand years in length; which is the less incredible, because the historians of many nations (particularly Pausanias and Philostratus amongst the Greeks, and Pliny amongst the Romans) relate, that men’s bodies, upon opening their sepulchres, were found to be much larger in old time. And Catullus, after many of the Greeks, relates, that divine visions were made to men before their great and manifold crimes did, as it were, hinder God, and those Spirits that attend him, from holding any correspondence with men. We almost every where, in the Greek and Latin historians, meet with the savage life of the Giants, mentioned by Moses. And it is very remarkable concerning the deluge, that the memory of almost all nations ends in the history of it, even those nations which were unknown till our forefathers discovered them: so that Varro calls all that the unknown time. And all those things which we read in the poets, wrapped up in fables (a Liberty they allow themselves) are delivered by the ancient writers according to truth and reality; that is, agreeable to Moses; as you may see in Berosus’s History of Chaldea, Abydenus’s of Assyria, who mentions the dove that was sent out of the ark; and in Plutarch from the Greeks; and in Lucian, who says, that in Hierapolis of Syria, there was remaining a most ancient history of the ark, and of the preserving a few not only of mankind, but also of other living creatures. The same history was extant also in Molo and in Nicolaus Damascenus; which latter names the ark, which we also find in the history of Deucalion in Apollodorus; and many Spaniards affirm, that in several parts of America, as Cuba, Mechoacana, Nicaraga, is preserved the memory of the deluge, the saving alive of animals, especially the raven and dove; and the deluge itself in that part called Golden Castile. That remark of Pliny’s, that Joppa was built before the Flood, discovers what part of the earth men inhabited before the Flood. The place where the ark rested after the deluge on the GordyÆan mountains, is evident from the constant tradition of the Armenians from all past ages, down to this very day. Japhet, the father of the Europeans, and from him Jon, or, as they formerly pronounced it, Javon of the Greeks, and Hammon of the Africans, are names to be seen in Moses, and Josephus and others observe the like footsteps in the names of other places and nations. And which of the poets is it, in which we do not find mention made of the attempt to climb the heavens? Diodoris Siculus, Strabo, Tacitus, Pliny, Solinus, speak of the burning of Sodom. Herodotus, Diodorus, Strabo, Philo Biblius, testify the ancient custom of Circumcision, which is confirmed by those nations descended from Abraham, not only Hebrews, but also IdumÆans, Ismaelites, and others. The history of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, agreeable with Moses, was extant of old in Philo Biblius out of Sanchoniathon, in Berosus, HecatÆus, Damascenus, Artapanus, Eupolemus, Demetrius, and partly in the ancient writers of the Orphic Verses; and something of it is still extant in Justin, out of Trogus Pompeius. By almost all which, is related also the history of Moses, and his principal acts. The Orphic Verses expressly mention his being taken out of the water, and the two tables that were given him by God. To these we may add Polemon; and several things about his coming out of Egypt, from the Egyptian writers, Menetho, Lysimachus, ChÆremon. Neither can any prudent man think it at all credible, that Moses, who had so many enemies, not only of the Egyptians, but also of many other nations, as the IdumÆans, Arabians, and Phoenicians, would venture to relate any thing concerning the creation of the world, or the original of things, which could be confuted by more ancient writings, or was contradictory to the ancient and received opinions: or that he would relate any thing of matters in his own time, that could be confuted by the testimony of many persons then alive, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, and Pliny, Tacitus, and after them Dionysius Longinus (concerning loftiness of Speech) make mention of Moses. Besides the Talmudists, Pliny and Apuleius, speak of Jamnes and Mambres, who resisted Moses in Egypt. Some things there are in other writings, and many things amongst the Pythagoreans, about the Law and Rites given by Moses, Strabo and Justin, out of Trogus, remarkably testify concerning the religion and righteousness of the ancient Jews; so that there seems to be no need of mentioning what is found, or has formerly been found of Joshua and others, agreeable to the Hebrew books; seeing, that whoever gives credit to Moses (which it is a shame for any one to refuse) cannot but believe those famous miracles done by the hand of God; which is the principal thing here aimed at. Now that the miracles of late date, such as those of Elija, Elisha, and others, should not be counterfeit, there is this further argument; that in those times JudÆa was become more known, and because of the difference of religion was hated by the neighbours, who could very easily confute the first rise of a lie. The history of Jonah’s being three days in the whale’s belly is in Lycophron and Æneus Gazeus, only under the name of Herculus; to advance whose fame, every thing that was great and noble used to be related of him, as Tacitus observes. Certainly nothing but the manifest evidence of the history could compel Julian (who was as great an enemy to the Jews as to the Christians) to confess that there were some men inspired by the divine Spirit amongst the Jews, and that fire descended from heaven, and consumed the sacrifices of Moses and Elias. And here it is worthy of observation, that there was not only very severe punishments threatened amongst the Hebrews, to any who should falsely assume the gift of prophecy, but very many kings, who by that means might have procured great authority to themselves, and many learned men, such as Esdras and others, dared not to assume this honour to themselves; nay, some ages before Christ’s time, nobody dared to do it. Much less could so many thousand people be imposed upon, in avouching a constant and public miracle, I mean that of the oracle, which shined on the High Priest’s breast, which is so firmly believed by all the Jews, to have remained till the destruction of the first temple, that their ancestors must of necessity be well assured of the truth of it.” Grotius. 42.Vid. Joseph Antiq. 43.Reason will affirm that every effect speaks a cause; then we ask how it should happen that a dozen illiterate fishermen and mechanicks of Galilee, after the wisdom of the philosophers had left the world in darkness, should have introduced so much light of knowledge, that our children and servants are wiser than the ancient philosophers? Let no one say, that they only began, what the wisdom of after ages have carried on towards perfection. The writings of the apostles are the same to this day; as is proved by the earliest versions, quotations, and manuscripts. So perfect was the system of morals they left, that no error has been detected in it, and all attempts to build upon or add to it, have only exposed the ignorance of the individuals who have essayed to do so. How has it happened that whilst learned men have ever been at discord about the nature, and true foundation of the obligation of virtue, these despised fishermen, have shown the true foundation and nature of duty, and have erred in no particular? Is it not strange that whilst the wisdom of the philosophers made their purest virtue but a more refined pride, these poor men laid the ax to the root of that pride, and taught the world that even their virtues brought them under additional obligations to Divine grace? Is it not remarkable that the system taught by these unlearned men should so perfectly coincide with what is discovered in the works of God, that whilst it aims to eradicate sin, it represents it as in every instance eventually productive of the glory of that God, who brings good out of the evil, and light out of the darkness? How is it to be accounted for, that when the most learned rabbies perverted the law, and knew not its meaning, that a few crude and uninstructed fishermen should remove their false constructions of that law, explain the types, shadows, promises and prophecies, show how the truth and justice of God might be clear in the pardon of sin, and set the labouring conscience at rest? How came the fishermen of Galilee to discover to the wise and learned what they had never conjectured, and truths, which only attentive minds at the present time can acquiesce in, that all things are certain, because foreknown, and foreknown because Divine knowledge must be infinite and eternal, and yet that rational creatures may be capable of choosing and refusing, though they must be wholly dependent? Is it not passing strange that the wisdom of Philosophers, the learning of Rabbies, the power of Kings and Emperors, the influence of thousands of priests, the prejudices of the world, and the malice of the wicked should be overcome by twelve poor fishermen? How is it to be accounted for that these twelve poor illiterate men should have effected such surprising changes, that modern infidels are ashamed of the evidence of their ancient predecessors, and are obliged to borrow from the fishermen of Galilee a portion of the knowledge they have introduced, without which the opposers of the Gospel must fall into contempt? Is any man so credulous as to imagine men of no better education and opportunities, possessed of themselves all this knowledge? when or where has the natural world produced such a phÆnomenon? they declared that it was not of themselves, but, that such feeble instruments were chosen, that the power might appear to be what it really was, from God. This testimony they confirmed by miracles, and sealed with their blood. 44.Vide Dodd. Expos. 3 vol. app.—Dick on Insp.—Parry’s Enq.—Hawker, &c. 45.This description of the Spirit’s witness resembles sensible assurance; that there may be such an immediate suggestion, or impression is possible; but the Spirit’s witness is the image of God, and is of adoption.—Vide Edwards’s works, vol. 4. p. 161. 46.What we are to believe reaches to Qu. 91. the rest is of practice. 47.That is unto the 91st Quest. 49.There is not succession in His ideas, but he exists in every point of time. 50.Effects spring from power, not laws, and prove a virtual, or influential, revelation, an essential ubiquity. 51.Quest. xv. and xviii. 52.Quest. lxvii. 53.Vide Edwards on Free-will, part I. sect. IV. 54.The Divine knowledge is as undeniable as the Divine existence, and as certain as human knowledge. “He that formed the eye doth he not see? He that planted the ear doth he not hear? He that teacheth man knowledge doth he not know?” But though human knowledge proves the Divine, as the effect does its cause, it by no means follows, that they are similar. Our knowledge principally consists of the images of things in the mind, or springs from them; but if the Divine knowledge were such, it would result that things were prior to his knowledge, and so that he is not the Creator of them; all things must therefore be the representations of his ideas, as an edifice represents the plan of the skilful architect. On this account our knowledge is superficial, extending only to the external appearances of things; but their intimate natures are known to him, who made them conformed to his original ideas. Our knowledge is circumscribed, extending only to the things which are the objects of our senses, or which have been described to us; but the universe, with all its parts, the greatest and the smallest things, are all known to him, who called them into existence, and moulded them according to his own plan. Our knowledge embraces only the things which are, or have been; with respect to the future, we can know nothing, except as he, upon whom it depends, shall reveal it to us; or as we may draw inferences from his course of action in former instances. But the Creator knows not only the past and the present, but the future. He knows the future, because it wholly depends on him; and nothing can take place without him, otherwise it is independent of God, but this is incompatible with his supremacy. If he know not the future, his knowledge is imperfect; if he is to know hereafter what he does not now know, he is increasing in knowledge, this would argue imperfection; if his knowledge be imperfect, he is imperfect; and if he be imperfect, he is not God.—But all things to come are to be what he designs they shall be; there accompanies his knowledge of the future, also a purpose, that the thing designed shall be effectuated; and his wisdom and power being infinite guarantee the accomplishment of his purposes. To be the subjects of foreknowledge, such as has been mentioned, implies the absolute certainty of the things, or occurrences, thus foreknown. A failure in their production, would not less prove imperfection, than a defect of the foreknowledge of them. Contingency belongs not to the things in futurity, but to the defective knowledge of imperfect beings, and is always proportional to our ignorance. That the future is categorically certain with God, appears by the invariable succession of effects to their causes in the natural world; miracles themselves may not be exceptions; but would always, it is probable, flow from the same causes, which are occult from us. The voluntary actions of moral agents, how uncertain soever to themselves, are also not exceptions from the Divine knowledge and purposes; “He doth his will in the army of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth”; “The wrath of man praises him, and the remainder he doth restrain.” Every prophecy, which has been fulfilled, so far as it was accomplished by the voluntary actions of men, proves the certainty of the divine foreknowledge, the absolute certainty of the then future event, and that the will of man is among the various means, which God is pleased to make use of to accomplish his purposes. If there be such certainty in God’s foreknowledge, and in the events themselves in the Kingdom of Providence, we may reasonably expect his conduct will be similar in the Kingdom of Grace; and the more especially if man’s salvation from first to last springs from, and is carried on, and accomplished by him. 55.As knowledge is a faculty of which wisdom is the due exercise, the proofs of divine wisdom are so many evidences of the knowledge of God. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and the selection of means most suitable to attain them. The testimonies of the wisdom of God must therefore be as numerous and various, as the works of his creation. The mutual relations and subserviency of one thing to another; as the heat of the sun, to produce rain; both, to produce vegetation; and all, to sustain life; ensation, digestion, muscular motion, the circulation of the fluids, and, still more, intelligence, and above all, the moral faculty, or power of distinguishing good and evil, are unequivocal proofs of the wisdom, and consequently of the knowledge, of God.—He that formed the eye, doth he not see: he that planted the ear, &c. Mortal artificers are deemed to understand their own work, though ignorant of the formation of the materials and instruments they use: but the Creator uses no mean or material which he has not formed. He therefore knows, from the globe to the particle of dust or fluid, and from the largest living creature to the smallest insect. He has knowledge equally of the other worlds of this system, and every system; of all things in heaven, earth, and hell. Our knowledge is conversant about his works; he knows all things which are known to us, and those things which have not come to our knowledge. He formed and sustains the human mind, and knows the thoughts: this is necessary to him as our Judge. He knows equally all spiritual creatures, and sustains his holy spirits in holiness. Our knowledge springs from things; but things spring from his purposes: they are, because he knows them; otherwise they existed before his knowledge, and so independently of him. We know but the external appearances, he the intimate nature of things. We inquire into the properties of things by our senses, by comparing them, by analizing, &c: but nothing possesses a property which he did not purpose and give; otherwise his hands have wrought more than he intended. We look up through effects unto their causes: he looks down through intermediate causes, and sees them all to be effects from him. We are furnished with memories to bring up ideas, being only able to contemplate a part at a time; but his comprehension embraces all things. He never changes; his purposes of the future embrace eternity: all things that are really future are certain, because his purposes cannot fail of accomplishment. But all future things to us are contingent, except as he has revealed their certainty. That the future is known to him, also appears by the accomplishment of every prophecy. But man’s sin receives hereby no apology. He gives the brutal creation the capacity of deriving pleasure from gratification of sense, and provides for such appetites. He offers to man, pleasures which are intellectual: he has tendered him the means, and requires man to seek his spiritual happiness in God. When he refuses and withholds his return of service from God, man is alone to blame. And the more numerous and powerful the motives which he resists, the guilt is the greater. The divine foreknowledge of this is no excuse for man. When the Lord overpowers man’s evil with good, the glory of man’s salvation belongs to God. 56.See Ray’s Wisdom of God in the Works of Creation, and Derham’s Physico-Theology. See also Fenelon, Newenlyle, Paley, and Adams’s Philosophy. 58.See Quest. clvi. and clvii. 59.Quest. xvi. xvii. xxi. and xxx. 60.The Quest. xliv. and lxxi. 61.Quest. xxix. and lxxix. 62.All the good which we behold in Creation, Providence, and redemption, flows from goodness in God, and are the proofs of this attribute. If all the evil, which we discover, springs from the liberty given to creatures to conform, or not, to the revealed will; or if all moral evil be productive of good, the remainder being restrained; then the evil, which exists, is no exception to the proofs of Divine goodness. What Deity now is, he always was; he has not derived his goodness; he is not a compounded being; his goodness therefore belongs to his essence. His goodness has been distinguished into immanent and communicative. The latter discovers to us the former, but his communicative goodness, though flowing in ten thousand streams, and incalculable, is less than his immanent, which is an eternal fountain of excellency. Infinite knowledge discerns things as they are, and a perfect being will esteem that to be best, which is so; God therefore discerns, and esteems his own immanent goodness as infinitely exceeding all the good, which appears in his works, for the excellency in these is but an imperfect representation of himself. The happiness of Deity must consist consequently in his own self-complacency; he made all things for his pleasure, or glory, but they are only so far pleasing, as they reflect his own picture to himself. Yet when we suppose Deity to be the subject of motives, we are ever in danger of erring. Divine communicative goodness has been termed benevolence when in intention, beneficence when carried into effect. This is nearly the same as moral rectitude, because the government of the Universe must, that it may produce the good of the whole, be administered in righteousness. The correct administration of justice in rewarding every good, if there be merit in a creature, and punishing every evil is no less an effect of benevolence, than the conferring of benefits, which are purely gratuitous. In like manner the punishment of offenders in civil society has for its object general utility, whether we imagine the power which judges and inflicts, to spring from the social compact, or to have been ordained of God. The cutting off of flagrant offenders, as by the deluge, the destruction of Sodom, &c. has been obviously designed to prevent the spreading contagion of sin. But there is a time appointed, unto which all things are tending, and unto which men generally refer the wrongs they sustain, in which perfect justice shall be administered. Some attributes of Deity seem to be ground of terror, and others of love; but God is one; he is subject to no perturbation of mind; his wrath and indignation are but other terms for his steady and unchangeable goodness, bearing down the evil, which sinful creatures oppose to his purposes of general advantage. Those acts of justice which are accounted by the guilty to be unnecessary severity, are deemed, by glorified saints and angels, the effects of that goodness, which they make the subject of their Hallelujahs. Thus the highest proof of God’s goodness consisted in his not sparing his own Son, nor abating any thing from the demands of his law. After this all hopes that Divine goodness shall favour the finally impenitent must be utterly vain. 63.“Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Luke viii. 28; and Mat. viii. 29. These extraordinary personages in the New Testament, are not called devils, ??a????, in the original; that word never occurring in the Christian scriptures, but in the singular number, and as applied to one Being alone. They are called dÆmons, ?a???e? or ?a????a. Yet they are plainly devils in fact; being called Unclean Spirits, though sometimes only Spirits (Mark ix. 20; and Luke x. 20;) and showing themselves to be devils, by their whole history. In Mat. xii. 24 and 26 particularly, the Pharisees say ‘our Saviour casts out devils, (dÆmons) by Beelzebub the prince of the devils (dÆmons);’ and our Saviour replies, that then ‘Satan casts out Satan.’ See also Luke x. 17-18; where the apostles rejoicing declare, ‘even the devils (dÆmons) are subject unto us;’ and our Saviour says unto them, ‘I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.’ So very false in itself, and directly contradicted by the very words of our Saviour, is that hypothesis of Dr. Campbell’s in his new translation of the Gospels; which asserts these possessions of the New Testament to be nowhere attributed to the devil, and which avers the dominion or authority of the devil to be nowhere ascribed to the dÆmons! Beelzebub is expressly called the prince of the dÆmons, the dÆmons are expressly denominated Satan with him, and these are only inferior devils subordinate to the great one. And though the word dÆmons (as Dr. Campbell urges) might critically be more exact in a translation; yet the word devils better accords, with the usages of our language and the course of our ideas. Exactness therefore has been properly sacrificed to utility.” WHITAKER. 64.See Quest. xx. 65.See Quest. cv. 66.“As gravity is the common quality of all bodies, arising not from the nature and properties of matter, nor to be explained without the agency of a foreign cause, yet producing numberless uniform effects in the corporeal system, it is in all reason to be attributed to one contrivance, rather than the different designs of two or more partial independent causes. What a vast variety of appearances in nature depend on this one? The self-balanced earth hangs upon its centre; the mountains are set fast; there is a perpetual flux and reflux of the sea; vapours continually arise; the clouds are balanced till by their own weight they descend in rain; animals breathe and move; the heavenly bodies hold their stations, and go on in their constant course, by the force of gravity, after the ordinance of that wisdom which appointed them this law. Now when we see a multitude of effects proceeding from one Cause, effects so various in their kind and so important, a Cause simple and unvaried in all the diversity produced by it, can we avoid ascribing this to an unity of intelligence, if there be intelligence in it all? For could we suppose different independent beings, acting with different designs, and by distinct operations to have formed the several parts of the world, and the several species of creatures which are in it, what reason can be imagined why they should all be governed by, and all necessarily depend upon, one law? The Maker of the sun, or, if a partial cause of nature could be supposed to have an understanding large enough for it, the Contriver of the whole visible heavens, must, one would think, have finished his scheme independently on any other, without borrowing aid from the work of another God. In like manner the Gods of the seas and of the dry land, and the Creator of animals, would have completed their several systems, each by itself, not depending on any other for its order and preservation. Whereas, on the contrary, we see in fact they are none of them independent, but all held together by the common bond of gravity. The heavens and the earth continue in their situations at a proper distance from each other by the force of this law; the sea keeps within its channels; and animals live and move by it. All which lead us to acknowledge one directing Counsel in the whole frame. For what but an understanding which comprehends the whole extent of nature, reaching from the utmost circuit of heaven to the centre of the earth, could have fixed such a common law, so necessary to all its parts, that without it not one of them could subsist, nor the harmony of the whole be preserved? The strict cohesion of the parts which constitute particular bodies requires a peculiar cement, different from that of the gravitating force; and as it can never be explained by the nature and properties of matter itself, and is absolutely necessary to the forms and the uses of bodies in the several far distant regions of the world, it must in like manner be attributed to the contrivance of an understanding, and the agency of a power, which takes in the whole corporeal system, not to a partial cause, limited in its intelligence and operation. “2dly, The beautiful order and harmony of the universe, since it must be acknowledged to be the work of understanding, has all the appearance which is necessary to satisfy any fair inquirer, of its being formed under the direction of one governing wisdom. Disconcerted counsels can never produce harmony. If a plurality of intelligent causes pursue each his separate design, disunion will continually cleave to their works; but when we see an intire piece made up of many parts, all corresponding to each other, and conspiring together so as to answer one common end, we naturally conclude unity of design. As a work of art is formed according to the preconceived idea of a designing artificer, without which it has not its necessary intireness and uniformity, the same may be observed in the works of nature. A tree is as much one as a house; an animal as complete a system in it self, (only much more curiously framed,) as a clock. If we carry our views farther into nature, and take in whole regions of the universe, with all their contents, the same characters of unity are still visible. The earth itself is not a confused mass, or a medley of incoherent and unrelated parts, but a well contrived fabric, fitted and plainly designed for use. If we consider what a multitude of living creatures are in it, of different kinds and degrees of perfection, each sort having proper apartments assigned them, where they dwell conveniently together, with suitable provision made for them, and instincts directing them to the use of it; if we consider the interests of the several kinds, not interfering in the main, but rather serviceable to each other, furnished with necessary defences against the inconveniences to which they are liable, either by the preventing care of nature, which without any thought of their own has provided for their safety, by the appointed advantages of their situation, or by an implanted wisdom directing them to find out the means of it; and if we consider the constant interposition of the same liberal intelligent nature, appearing by the daily new productions from the same fertile womb of the earth, whereby the returning wants of animals are relieved with fresh supplies, all the species of living things having the common benefit of the air, without which they could not subsist, and the light of the sun, which cannot at once illuminate the whole globe, being dispensed among them with so good oeconomy, that they have every one what is sufficient to guide them in the exercise of their proper functions, that they may fulfil the purposes of their beings;—when we consider all this, can we doubt but the earth is disposed and governed by one intending Cause? If in a large house, wherein are many mansions, and a vast variety of inhabitants, there appears exact order, all from the highest to the lowest continually attending their proper business, and all lodged and constantly provided for suitably to their several conditions, we find ourselves obliged to acknowledge one wise oeconomy. And if in a great city or commonwealth there be a perfectly regular administration, so that not only the whole society enjoys an undisturbed peace, but every member has the station assigned him which he is best qualified to fill; the unenvied chiefs constantly attend their more important cares, served by the busy inferiors, who have all a suitable accommodation, and food convenient for them, the very meanest ministering to the public utility and protected by the public care; if, I say, in such a community we must conclude there is a ruling Counsel, which if not naturally, yet is politically one, and, unless united, could not produce such harmony and order, much more have we reason to recognize one governing Intelligence in the earth, in which there are so many ranks of beings disposed of in the most convenient manner, having all their several provinces appointed to them, and their several kinds and degrees of enjoyment liberally provided for, without encroaching upon, but rather being mutually useful to each other, according to a settled and obvious subordination. What else can account for this but a sovereign Wisdom, a common provident nature, presiding over, and caring for the whole? “But the earth, as great as it appears to us, complicated in its frame, and having such a variety in its constitution, sustaining and nourishing so many tribes of animals, yet is not an intire system by itself, but has a relation to, and dependence on, other parts of the universe, as well as the beings it contains have upon it. It owes its stability to the common law of gravitation; it derives its light and its heat from the sun, by which it is rendered fruitful and commodious to its inhabitants. In short, a bond of union runs through the whole circle of being, as far as human knowledge reaches; and we have reason to make the same judgment concerning the parts of the world which we do not know, and to conclude that they all together compose one great whole, which naturally leads us to acknowledge one supreme uniting Intelligence. To object against this the possibility of wild confusion reigning in worlds unknown is to feign, and not to argue; and to suppose disorder prevalent in an infinity of being which we are unacquainted with, which is the Atheistic hypothesis, is to take away all rational foundation for regularity any where, though we see it actually obtains every where, as far as our observation can reach. But confining our speculations on this subject within the compass of known existence, as we ought to do in a fair inquiry, the apparent order of the effects is a strong evidence of unity in the Cause. For if different independent causes produced, each, a part, why are there no footsteps of this in the whole extent of nature? Why does not so much as one piece appear, as the separate monument of its author’s power and wisdom? From divided counsels one would naturally expect interfering schemes; but, on the contrary, we see an universal harmony. Men indeed from a sense of their indigence, and by the direction of instincts, which must be attributed to the designing author of their constitution, join in societies; which, though composed of many, are governed by one counsel: but that is only an artificial union, a submission to the majority, or to those who have the supreme power delegated to them, rather than an agreement in design. But this cannot be the case of independent beings, self-existent, and each complete in itself, without relation to any other. And yet we see in nature a perfect harmony, from whence it is plain there must be an agreement at least in counsel and design, if we could suppose a plurality of independent causes. But whence comes this agreement? To say by chance, is atheistically, and very unreasonably, to attribute the most perfect of all effects, universal order, to no cause at all. If we say by design, it must be one comprehensive design forming the whole scheme of nature and providence, which directly brings us to what we are looking for, one sovereign commanding Intelligence in the universe, or one God. This was the argument by which some of the ancient philosophers proved that there is one only eternal and independent Principle, the Fountain of being and the Author of all things. Pythagoras called it a Monad; and Aristotle argued from the phÆnomena that all things are plainly co-ordered, to one, the whole world conspiring into agreeing harmony: Whereas, if there were many independent principles, the system of the world must needs have been incoherent and inconspiring; like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent intersertions. And he concludes that things are well administered, which they could not be under the government of many, alluding to the verse in Homer, ??? a?a??? ????????a???, e?? ????a??? est?. “3dly, The condition and order of inferior, derived, and evidently dependent intelligent agents shew not only intelligence, but unity of intelligence, in the Cause of them. Every man, a single active conscious self, is the image of his Maker. There is in him one undivided animating principle, which in its perceptions and operations runs through the whole system of matter that it inhabits; it perceives for all the most distant parts of the body; it cares for all, and governs all, leading us, as a resemblance, to form an idea of the one great quickening Spirit, which presides over the whole frame of nature, the spring of motion and all operation in it, understanding and active in all the parts of the universe, not as its soul indeed, but as its Lord, by whose vital directing influence it is, though so vast a bulk, and consisting of so many parts, united into one regular fabric. Again, the general apparent likeness which there is among all the individuals of the human kind is a strong evidence of their being the children of one Father. I do not mean principally the similitude of the exterior form, (though even that, in reason, should be attributed to the direction of one intelligent Cause,) but that whereby we are especially God’s offspring, our intellectual capacities, which as far as we can judge are very nearly alike. A great difference there may be, no doubt there is, in the improvement of them; but the powers themselves, and all the original modes of perception, in the different individuals of mankind, seem to resemble each other, as much as any real distinct things in nature. Now from a multitude, or a constant series of similar effects which do not arise from necessity, we infer unity of design in the Cause. So great a number of rational beings as the whole human race, disposed of in the same manner, endued with like faculties and affections, having many, and those principal things in their condition, common, provided for out of the same fund, and made for the same purposes, may reasonably be supposed to belong to one family, to be derived from the same origin, and still under the same paternal care. “Above all, the moral capacity of mankind, which is a most important part of their constitution, tending to the highest perfection of their nature, and the principal bond of regular society among them, as it proceeds from a wise intending Cause, shews unity of wisdom in the Cause; and the government over the moral, as well as the natural, world evidently appears to be a monarchy.” ABERNETHY 67.See Arist. Metaphys. Lib. I. Cap. 2. & Lib. XII. Cap. 7. 68.Vid. ejus. Mag. Moral. Lib. II. Cap. 15. 69.Vid. ejus. De Moribus, Lib. IX. Cap. 4. & De Mundo, Cap. 6. 70.Vid. MornÆi de Verit. Relig. Christ. cap. 3. 71.Epist. XIII. ad Dionys. 72.See Cicero de Natura Deorum. 73.See Tertull. Apol. Lactant. de falsa Relig. Arnob. contra Gentes; Minut. Fel. Herodian. Hist. Lib. IV. See also Mede’s apostasy of the latter times, chap. 3, 4. 74.Quest. cv. 75.See de Vries Exercitat. Rational. 76.“God is One: a most pure, most simple, and most perfect Being. “The absolute unity and simplicity of this glorious Being is strictly exclusive of any division of perfections. Yet, as human knowledge is not intuitive but discursive, we find it necessary to form and communicate our conceptions, by referring them to distinct and infinite attributes. Such are independence, spirituality, eternity, immutability, power, knowledge, rectitude, and benevolence. “It is absurd to say, that either the abstract essence, or any of the infinite perfections of God, in themselves, or in their exercise, can be grasped, included, or comprehended (or whatever equivalent term be used) by a limited intellect. ‘A part of His ways, a little portion of Him,’ we know; for He has unveiled it. The knowledge of the best and greatest finite mind can only be, to immortality, an approximation; and therefore must for ever be infinitely small. God alone is CAPABLE of COMPREHENDING His own nature, mode of existence, and perfections. “The only questions, therefore, that we have to ask, are, Has Deity, in fact, communicated to man any information concerning HIMSELF? And what has He communicated? Whatever such revelation may be, it is impossible that it should be self-contradictory, or any other than most becoming to infinite wisdom and purity. “This revelation authorizes us, by a variety of inductive proofs, to conclude, that, with regard to the mode of existence of the ONE Divine Essence, the Unity of the Godhead includes a Trinity of Persons (so denominated for want of any better terms) who are scripturally styled the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: Distinct, not in essence or in perfections, but only personally: One, not personally, but in the common possession of the same identical nature and attributes. “No contradiction or absurdity is involved in this doctrine, because the unity refers to one respect, and the trinity to another. But we make no difficulty in professing our incapacity to include in our knowledge, or express by any possible terms, the respect in which the Trinity of persons subsists in the perfect Oneness of the Deity. Such pretension would imply a contradiction.” Smith’s Letters to Belsham. 77.“That which is taught in the scriptures concerning the incomprehensible and spiritual essence of God ought to suffice, not only to overthrow the foolish errors of the common people, but also to confute the fine subtilties of profane philosophy. One of the old writers seemed to have said very well, ‘That God is all that we do see, and all that we do not see.’ But by this means he hath imagined the Godhead to be diffused into all the parts of the world. Although God, to the intent to keep men in sober mind, speak but sparingly of his own essence, yet, by those two names of addition that I have rehearsed, he doth both take away all gross imaginations, and also repress the presumptuous boldness of man’s mind. For surely his immeasurable greatness ought to make us afraid, that we attempt not to measure him with our sense: and his spiritual nature forbiddeth us to imagine any thing earthly or fleshly of him. For the same cause he often assigneth his dwelling place to be in heaven. For though, as he is incomprehensible, he filleth the earth also: yet because he seeth our minds by reason of their dulness to lie still in the earth, for good cause he lifteth us up above the world, to shake off our sloth and sluggishness. And here falleth to ground the error of the Manichees, which, in appointing two original beginnings, have made the devil in a manner equal with God. Surely, this was as much as to break the unity of God, and restrain his unmeasurableness. For where they have presumed to abuse certain testimonies, that sheweth a foul ignorance, as their error itself sheweth a detestable madness. And the Anthropomorphites are also easily confuted, who have imagined God to consist of a body, because oftentimes the scripture ascribeth unto him a mouth, ears, eyes, hands, and feet. For what man, yea, though he be slenderly witted, doth not understand that God doth so with us speak as it were childishly, as nurses do with their babes? therefore such manner of speeches do not so plainly express what God is, as they do apply the understanding of him to our slender capacities. Which to do, it behoved of necessity that he descended a great way beneath his own height. “2. But he also setteth out himself by another special mark, whereby he may be more nearly known. For he so declareth himself to be but one, that he yet giveth himself distinctly to be considered in three persons: which, except we learn, a bare and empty name of God without any true God fleeth in our brain. And that no man should think that he is a threefold God, or that the one essence of God is divided in three persons, we must here seek a short and easy definition, to deliver us from all error. But because many do make much about this word Person, as a thing invented by man, how justly they do so, it is best first to see. The apostle naming the Son the engraved form of the hypostasis of his Father, he undoubtedly meaneth, that the Father hath some being, wherein he differeth from the Son. For to take it for essence (as some expositors have done, as if Christ like a piece of wax printed with a seal did represent the substance of the Father) were not only hard, but also an absurdity. For since the essence of God is single or one, and indivisible, he that in himself containeth it all, and not by piece-meal, or by derivation, but in whole perfection, should very improperly, yea, foolishly, be called the engraved form of him. But because the Father, although he be in his own property distinct, hath expressed himself wholly in his Son, it is for good cause said, that he hath given his hypostasis to be seen in him. Wherewith aptly agreeth that which by and by followeth, that he is the brightness of his glory. Surely by the apostle’s words we gather, that there is a certain proper hypostasis in the Father, that shineth in the Son: whereby also again is easily perceived the hypostasis of the Son, that distinguisheth him from the Father. The like order is in the holy Ghost. For we shall by and by prove him to be God, and yet he must needs be other than the Father. Yet this distinction is not of the essence, which it is unlawful to make manifold. Therefore, if the apostle’s testimony be credited, it followeth that there be in God three hypostasis. This term seeing the Latins have expressed by the name of Person, it were too much pride and frowardness to wangle about so clear a matter. But if we list word for word to translate, we may call it subsistance. Many in the same sense have called it substance. And the name of Person hath not been in use among the Latins only, but also the Grecians, perhaps to declare a consent, have taught that there are three Prosopa, that is to say Persons, in God. But they, whether they be Greeks or Latins that differ one from another in the word, do very well agree in the sum of the matter. “3. Now howsoever the hereticks cry out against the name of Person, or some overmuch precise men do carp that they like not the word feigned by the device of men; since they cannot get of us to say, that there be three, whereof every one is wholly God, nor yet that there be many gods: what unreasonableness is this, to dislike words, which express none other thing but that which is testified and approved by the scriptures? It were better (say they) to restrain not only our meanings but also our words within the bounds of scripture, than to devise strange terms, that may be the beginnings of disagreement and brawling: so do we tire ourselves with strife about words: so the truth is lost in contending: so charity is broken by odiously brawling together. If they call that a strange word, which cannot be shewed in scripture, as it is written in number of syllables; then they bind us to a hard law, whereby is condemned all exposition that is not pieced together, with bare laying together of texts of scripture. But if they mean that to be strange, which, being curiously devised, is superstitiously defended, which maketh more for contention than edification, which is either improperly, or to no profit, used, which withdraweth from the simplicity of the word of God, then with all my heart I embrace their sober mind. For I judge that we ought with no less devout reverence to talk of God than to think of him, for as much as whatsoever we do of ourselves think of him is foolish, and whatsoever we speak is unsavoury. But there is a certain measure to be kept. We ought to learn out of the scriptures a rule both to think and speak, whereby to examine all the thoughts of our mind, and words of our mouth. But what hindereth us, but that such as in scripture are to our capacity doubtful and entangled, we may in plainer words express them, being yet such words as do reverently and faithfully serve the truth of the scripture, and be used sparingly, modestly, and not without occasion? Of which sort there are examples enough. And whereas it shall by proof appear that the church of great necessity was forced to use the names of Trinity, and Persons, if any shall then find fault with the newness of words, shall he not be justly thought to be grieved at the light of the truth, as he that blameth only this, that the truth is made so plain and clear to discern? “4. Such newness of words, if it be so called, cometh then chiefly in use, when the truth is to be defended against wranglers that do mock it out with cavils. Which thing we have at this day too much in experience, who have great business in vanquishing the enemies of true and sound doctrine. With such folding and crooked winding, these slippery snakes do slide away, unless they be strongly gripped and holden hard when they be taken. So the old fathers, being troubled with contending against false doctrines, were compelled to shew their meanings in exquisite plainness, lest they should leave any crooked byeways to the wicked, to whom the doubtful constructions of words were hiding-holes of errors. Arius confessed Christ to be God, and the Son of God, because he could not gainsay the evident words of God, and, as if he had been so sufficiently discharged, did feign a certain consent with the rest. But in the meanwhile he ceased not to scatter abroad that Christ was created, and had a beginning, as other creatures. But to the end that they might draw forth his winding subtilty out of his den, the ancient fathers went further, pronouncing Christ to be the eternal Son of the Father, and consubstantial with the Father. Hereat wickedness began to boil, when the Arians began to hate and detest the name Omoousion, consubstantial. But if in the beginning they had sincerely and with plain meaning confessed Christ to be God, they would not now have denied him to be consubstantial with the Father. Who dare now blame these good men as brawlers and contentious, because, for one little word’s sake, they were so keen in disputation, and disturbed the peace of the church? But that little word shewed the difference between the true believing Christians, and the Arians, who were robbers of God. Afterwards rose up Sabellius, who accounted in a manner for nothing the names of the Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost, saying in disputation that they were not made to shew any manner of distinction, but only were several additions of God, of which sort there are many. If he came to disputation, he confessed that he believed the Father God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God. But afterwards he would readily slip away with saying, that he had in no otherwise spoken than as if he had named God, a powerful God, just God, and wise God: and so he sung another song, that the Father is the Son, and the Holy Ghost is the Father, without any order, without any distinction. The good doctors who then had care of godliness, to subdue his wickedness, cried out on the other side, that there ought to be acknowledged in one God three properties: and to the end to fence themselves against the crooked winding subtilties with plain and simple truth, they affirmed, that there did truly subsist in one God, or (which is the same thing) that there did subsist in the unity of God, a Trinity of Persons. “5. If then the names have not been without cause invented, we ought to take heed, that in rejecting them we be not justly blamed of proud presumptuousness. I would to God they were buried indeed, so that this faith were agreed of all men, that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, be one God: and yet that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghost the Son, but distinctly, by certain property. Yet I am not so precise, that I can find in my heart to strive for bare words. For I observe, that the ancient fathers, who otherwise spake very religiously of such matters, did not every where agree one with another, nor every one with himself. For what forms of speech used by the councils doth Hillary excuse? To how great liberty doth Augustine sometimes break forth? How unlike are the Greeks to the Latins? But of this disagreement one example shall suffice for this time. When the Latins wanted to express the word Omoousion, they called it Consubstantial, declaring the substance of the Father and the Son to be one, thus using the word substance for essence. Whereupon Hierom to Damasus saith, it is sacrilege to say, that there are three substances in God: and yet above a hundred times you shall find in Hillary, that there are three substances in God. In the word hypostasis, how is Hierom difficulted? for he suspecteth that there lurketh poison in naming three hypostasis in God. And if a man do use this word in a godly sense, yet he plainly saith that it is an improper speech, if he spake unfeignedly, and did not rather wittingly and willingly seek to charge the bishops of the East, whom he sought to charge with an unjust slander. Sure this one thing he speaketh not very truly, that in all profane schools, Ousia, essence, is nothing else but hypostasis, which is proved false by the common and accustomed use. Augustine is more modest and gentle, who, although he says, De trint. li. 5. cap. 8, 9. that the word hypostasis in that sense is strange to Latin ears, yet so far is it off, that he taketh from the Greeks their usual manner of speaking, that he also gently beareth with the Latins who had followed the Greek phrase. And that which Socrates writeth in the fifth book of the Tripartite history tendeth to this end, as though he meant that he had by unskilful men been wrongfully applied unto this matter. Yea, and the same Hillary himself layeth it as a great fault to the heretics charge, De trin. li. 2. that by their frowardness he is compelled to put those things in peril of the speech of men, which ought to have been kept in religiousness of minds, plainly confessing that this is to do things unlawful, to speak what ought not to be spoken, to attempt things not licensed. A little after, he excuseth himself with many words, for that he was so bold to utter new names. For after he had used the natural names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he addeth, that whatsoever is sought further is beyond the compass of speech, beyond the reach of sense, and beyond the capacity of understanding. And in another place he saith, that happy are the bishops of Gallia, who had not received, nor knew any other confession but that old and simple one, which from the time of the apostles was received in all churches. And much like is the excuse of Augustine, that this word was wrung out of necessity, by reason of the imperfection of men’s language in so great a matter: not to express that which is, but that it should not be unspoken, how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are three. This modesty of the holy men ought to warn us, that we do not forthwith so severely, like censors, brand them with infamy, who refuse to subscribe and swear to such words as we propound them: so that they do not of pride, or frowardness, or of malicious craft. But let them again consider, by how great necessity we are driven to speak so, that by little and little they may he enured with that profitable manner of speech. Let them also learn to beware, lest since we must meet on the one side with the Arians, on the other side with the Sabellians, while they be offended that we cut off occasion from them both to cavil, they bring themselves in suspicion, that they be the disciples either of Arius or of Sabellius. Arius saith that Christ is God, but he muttereth that he was created, and had a beginning. He saith Christ is one with the Father, but secretly he whispereth in the ears of his disciples, that he was made one as the other faithful be, although by singular prerogative. Say once that Christ is consubstantial with his Father, then pluck you off his visor from the dissembler, and yet you add nothing to the scripture. Sabellius saith, that the several names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify nothing in God severally distinct. Say that they are three, and he will cry out that you name three gods. Say that there is in one essence a Trinity of persons, then shall you in one word both say what the scripture speaketh, and stop their vain babbling. Now if any be holden with so curious superstition, that they cannot abide these names, yet is there no man, though he would never so fain, that can deny but that when we hear of one, we must understand an unity of substance: when we hear of three in one essence, that, it is meant of the persons of the Trinity. Which thing being without fraud confessed, we stay no longer upon words. But I have long ago found, and that often, that whosoever do obstinately quarrel about words, do keep within them a secret poison: so that it is better willingly to provoke them, than for their pleasure to speak darkly.” Calvin. 78.“There are some doctrines in the gospel the understanding could not discover; but when they are revealed, it hath a clear apprehension of them upon a rational account, and sees the characters of truth visibly stampt on their forehead: as the doctrine of satisfaction to divine justice, that pardon might be dispensed to repenting sinners. For our natural conception of God includes his infinite purity and justice; and when the design of the gospel is made known, whereby he hath provided abundantly for the honour of those attributes, so that He doth the greatest good without encouraging the least evil, reason acquiesces, and acknowledges. This I sought, but could not find. Now, although the primary obligation to believe such doctrines ariseth from revelation, yet being ratified by reason, they are embraced with more clearness by the mind. “2. There are some doctrines, which as reason by its light could not discover; so when they are made known, it cannot comprehend; but they are by a clear and necessary connexion joined with the other that reason approves: as the mystery of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Son of God, which are the foundations of the whole work of our redemption. The nature of God is repugnant to plurality, there can be but one essence; and the nature of satisfaction requires a distinction of persons: For he that suffers as guilty, must be distinguished from the person of the judge that exacts satisfaction; and no mere creature is able by his obedient sufferings to repair the honour of God: So that a divine person, assuming the nature of man, was alone capable to make that satisfaction, which the gospel propounds, and reason consents to. Now, according to the distinction of capacities in the Trinity, the Father required an honourable reparation for the breach of the divine law, and the Son bore the punishment in the sufferings of the human nature; that is peculiarly his own. Besides, ’tis clear that the doctrine of the Trinity, that is, of three glorious relations in the Godhead, and of the Incarnation, are most firmly connected with all the parts of the christian religion, left in the writings of the apostles, which as they were confirmed by miracles, the divine signatures of their certainty, so they contain such authentic marks of their divinity, that right reason cannot reject them. “3. Whereas there are three principles by which we apprehend things, Sense, Reason and Faith; these lights have their different objects that must not be confounded. Sense is confined to things material; Reason considers things abstracted from matter; Faith regards the mysteries revealed from heaven: and these must not transgress their order. Sense is an incompetent judge of things about which reason is only conversant. It can only make a report of those objects, which by their natural characters are exposed to it. And reason can only discourse of things, within its sphere: supernatural things which derive from revelation, and are purely the objects of faith, are not within its territories and jurisdiction. Those superlative mysteries exceed all our intellectual abilities. ’Tis true, the understanding is a rational faculty, and every act of it is really or in appearance grounded on reason. But there is a wide difference between the proving a doctrine by reason, and the giving a reason why we believe the truth of it. For instance, we cannot prove the Trinity by natural reason; and the subtilty of the schoolmen, who affect to give some reason of all things, is here more prejudicial than advantageous to the truth: For he that pretends to maintain a point by reason, and is unsuccessful, doth weaken the credit which the authority of revelation gives. And ’tis considerable, that the scripture, in delivering supernatural truths, produces God’s authority as their only proof, without using any other way of arguing: But although we cannot demonstrate these mysteries by reason, yet we may give a rational account why we believe them. “Is it not the highest reason to believe the discovery that God hath made of himself, and his decrees? For he perfectly knows his own nature and will; and ’tis impossible he should deceive us: this natural principle is the foundation of faith. When God speaks, it becomes man to hear with silence and submission. His naked word is as certain as a demonstration. “And is it not most reasonable to believe that the Deity cannot be fully understood by us? The sun may more easily be included in a spark of fire, than the infinite perfections of God be comprehended by a finite mind. The angels, who dwell so near the fountain of light, cover their faces in a holy confusion, not being able to comprehend Him. How much less can man in this earthly state, distant from God, and opprest with a burthen of flesh? Now from hence it follows; “1. That ignorance of the manner how divine mysteries exist is no sufficient plea for infidelity, when the scripture reveals that they are. For reason that is limited and restrained cannot frame a conception that is commensurate to the essence and power of God. This will appear more clearly by considering the mysterious excellencies of the divine nature, the certainty of which we believe, but the manner we cannot understand: As that his essence and attributes are the same, without the least shadow of composition; yet his wisdom and power are to our apprehensions distinct, and his mercy and justice in some manner opposite. “The obedience of faith is, to embrace an obscure truth with a firm assent, upon the account of a divine testimony. If reason will not assent to revelation, till it understands the manner how divine things are, it doth not obey it at all. The understanding then sincerely submits, when it is inclined by those motives, which demonstrate that such a belief is due to the authority of the revealer, and to the quality of the object. To believe only in proportion to our narrow conceptions is to disparage the divine truth, and debase the divine power. We can’t know what God can do; he is omnipotent, though we are not omniscient: ’Tis just we should humble our ignorance to his wisdom, and that every lofty imagination, and high thing, that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, should be cast down, and every thought captivated into the obedience of Christ; 2 Cor. x. 5. ’Tis our wisdom to receive the great mysteries of the gospel in their simplicity: for in attempting to give an exact and curious explication of them, the understanding, as in an hedge of thorns, the more it strives, the more ’tis wounded and entangled. God’s ways are far above ours, and his thoughts above ours as heaven is above the earth. To reject what we can’t comprehend, is not only to sin against faith, but against reason, which acknowledges itself finite, and unable to search out the Almighty to perfection; Job xi. 7. “2. We are obliged to believe those mysteries that are plainly delivered in scripture, notwithstanding those seeming contradictions wherewith they may be charged. In the objects of sense, the contrariety of appearances doth not lessen the certainty of things. The stars to our sight seem but glittering sparks, yet they are immense bodies. And it is one thing to be assured of a truth, another to answer to all the difficulties that encounter it: a mean understanding is capable of the first; the second is so difficult, that in clear things the profoundest philosophers may not be able to untie all the intricate and knotty objections which may be urged against them. ’Tis sufficient the belief of supernatural mysteries is built on the veracity and power of God; this makes them prudently credible: this resolves all doubts, and produces such a stability of spirit, as nothing can shake. A sincere believer is assured, that all opposition against revealed truths is fallacious, though he cannot discover the fallacy. Now the transcendent mysteries of the Christian religion, the Trinity of persons in the divine nature, the incarnation of the Son of God, are clearly set down in the scripture. And although subtile and obstinate opponents have used many guilty arts to dispirit and enervate those texts by an inferior sense, and have rackt them with violence to make them speak according to their prejudices, yet all is vain, the evidence of truth is victorious. A heathen, who considers not the gospel as a divine revelation, but merely as a doctrine delivered in writings, and judges of its sense by natural light, will acknowledge that those things are delivered in it: And notwithstanding those who usurp a sovereign authority to themselves, to judge of divine mysteries according to their own apprehensions, deny them as mere contradictions, yet they can never conclude them impossible: for no certain argument can be alledged against the being of a thing without a clear knowledge of its nature: Now, although we may understand the nature of man, we do not the nature of God, the oeconomy of the persons, and his power to unite himself to a nature below him. “It is true, no article of faith is really repugnant to reason; for God is the author of natural, as well as of supernatural, light, and he cannot contradict himself: They are emanations from him, and though different, yet not destructive of each other. But we must distinguish between those things that are above reason and incomprehensible, and things that are against reason and utterly inconceivable: Some things are above reason in regard of their transcendent excellency, or distance from us; the divine essence, the eternal decrees, the hypostatical union, are such high and glorious objects, that it is an impossible enterprise to comprehend them: the intellectual eye is dazzled with their overpowering light. We can have but an imperfect knowledge of them; and there is no just cause of wonder that supernatural revelation should speak incomprehensible things of God. For he is a singular and admirable Being, infinitely above the ordinary course of nature. The maxims of philosophy are not to be extended to him. We must adore what we cannot fully understand. But those things are against reason, and utterly inconceivable, that involve a contradiction, and have a natural repugnancy to our understandings, which cannot conceive any thing that is formally impossible: and there is no such doctrine in the Christian religion. “3. We must distinguish between reason corrupted, and right reason. Since the fall, the clearness of the human understanding is lost, and the light that remains is eclipsed by the interposition of sensual lust. The carnal mind cannot, out of ignorance, and will not from pride and other malignant habits, receive things spiritual. And from hence arises many suspicions and doubts, (concerning supernatural verities) the shadows of darkened reason, and of dying faith. If any divine mystery seems incredible, it is from the corruption of our reason, not from reason itself; from its darkness, not its light. And as reason is obliged to correct the errors of sense, when it is deceived either by some vicious quality in the organ, or by the distance of the object, or by the falseness of the medium, that corrupts the image in conveying of it. So it is the office of faith to reform the judgment of reason, when either from its own weakness, or the height of things spiritual, it is mistaken about them. For this end supernatural revelation was given, not to extinguish reason, but to redress it, and enrich it with the discovery of heavenly things. Faith is called wisdom and knowledge: it doth not quench the vigour of the faculty wherein it is seated, but elevates it, and gives it a spiritual perception of those things that are most distant from its commerce. It doth not lead us through a mist to the inheritance of the saints in light.” Bates. 79.Infinitus, immensus & soli sibi tantus, quantus est notus, nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, & ideÒ sic cum dignÈ estimamus, cÙm inaestimabilem dicimus. Min. Fel. 80.He who has marked the differences between truth and error, good and evil, made them discoverable, and formed human minds susceptible of their impressions, thereby discovers his will that we should attend to them, and has made it our duty to do so. With this sentiment sacred revelation is expressly accordant; “prove all things, hold fast that which is good.” The Gospel requires not faith without evidence, it demands no more assent than is proportioned to the weight of probability, and charges as a crime only our refusing to attend to the evidence, or our coming to it with hearts prejudiced against, and therefore insensible to, its evidence. The exercise of reason is essential to faith, for how sudden soever our convictions, still it is the judgment which is convinced. Yet reason has her due province; she may and ought to ascertain the genuineness, authenticity, and divine authority of the scriptures. When this is done, she cannot correctly delay her assent, because she may not fully comprehend the promises or works of God, for this would require wisdom no less than Divine. But suppose she should presume to try them, by what balances shall she weigh them? To what shall she compare them? To the reasons and fitness of things? what are these but circumstances and relations springing from the works of God? His creation originated from his wisdom and power, and is ever dependent on them. This is therefore to circumscribe infinite wisdom by what has been already discovered of it; it is to limit infinite power from effecting any thing which it has not hitherto accomplished. Such judgment is not the work of reason, it is irrational. Reason can only make an induction, where there exists premises from which a conclusion can be drawn; but here her limits are exceeded, she has no standard by which she can measure infinity. By reasoning we justly infer from the works of God, many of his glorious moral, as well as natural, perfections; we gather that he is holy, just, true, and good, and we may fairly say that he will never depart from such rectitude, but that all his works will be conformed to such principles. We can go no farther than unto generals, we have no right to question any word or act of his, and say it is not conformed to such perfections, because this would suppose that we possess infinite wisdom. He may have ways of solving our difficulties and objections, with which we are not acquainted. Such judgment is not only irrational, but arrogant, as it is an extension of the claims of reason beyond her just limits. Our duty in such case is exemplified in the father of the faithful. At God’s command we must, like him, sacrifice our Isaacs, and leave to him both to accomplish his promises and to justify the action. It is evident that the doctrine of the Trinity is but partially revealed to man, but sufficiently to let him into a competent knowledge of the plan of redemption. 81.Vid. Epist. 2. ad Dionys. 82.Vid. Euseb. PrÆp. Evang. Lib. XIII. cap. 12. 83.Vid. Huet. Concord. Ration. & Fid. Lib. II. cap. 3. 84.See Dr. Berriman’s Historical account, &c. page 94. 85.“Philo uses not the name for his derivative Being in the Godhead, which we see the other Jews of the time using in the Gospels. He speaks not of him, by his natural appellation of the Son of God. No! He takes up another title for him, which indeed was known equally to other Jews, or Philo could not possibly have adopted it; which was known equally to the Gentiles, as I shall show hereafter; but which was known only to the scholars of either. He calls him ‘the Logos of God.’ This is a name, that can be borrowed, together with the idea annexed to it, only from the Jews, or from the common ancestors of them and of the Gentiles; that answers exactly to the Dabar of Jehovah in the Hebrew Scriptures, and to the Memra of Jehovah in the Chaldee paraphrasts upon them; and signifies merely ‘the Word of God.’ This name has been since introduced into our religion, by one of the inspired teachers of it. And notwithstanding the ductility of the Greek language in this instance, which would allow it to be rendered either the Word or the Reason of God; yet the English Bible, with a strict adherence to propriety, and in full conformity to the ancient Christians and ancient Jews, has rejected the accidental signification, and embraced only the immediate and the genuine. Yet, even now, the name is confined in its use to the more improved intellects among us. And it must therefore have peculiarly been, in the days of Philo, the philosophical denomination of Him, who was popularly called the Son of God. “The use of the name of Logos, or Word, by Philo and by St. John in concurrence, sufficiently marks the knowledge of the name among the Jews. But the total silence concerning it, by the Jewish writers of the three first Gospels; the equal silence of the introduced Jews concerning it, in all the four; and the acknowledged use of it through all the Jewish records of our religion, merely by St. John himself; prove it to have been familiar to a few only. It is indeed too mysterious in its allusion, and too reducible into metaphor in its import, to have ever been the common and ordinary appellation for the Son of God. Originating from the spiritual principle of connexion, betwixt the first and the second Being in the Godhead; marking this, by a spiritual idea of connexion; and considering it to be as close and as necessary as the Word is to the energetick Mind of God, which cannot bury its intellectual energies in silence, but must put them forth in speech; it is too spiritual in itself, to be addressed to the faith of the multitude. If with so full a reference to our bodily ideas, and so positive a filiation of the Second Being to the First, we have seen the grossness of Arian criticism endeavouring to resolve the doctrine into the mere dust of a figure; how much more ready would it have been to do so, if we had only such a spiritual denomination as this, for the second? This would certainly have been considered by it, as too unsubstantial for distinct personality, and therefore too evanescent for equal divinity. “St. John indeed adopted this philosophical title, for the denomination of the Son of God; only in one solemn and prefatory passage of his Gospel, in two slight and incidental passages of his Epistles, and in one of his Book of revelations. Even there, the use of the popular instead of the philosophical name, in the three Gospels antecedent to his, precluded all probability of misconstruction. Yet, not content with this, he formed an additional barrier. At the same instant in which he speaks of the Logos, he asserts him to be distinct from God the Father, and yet to be equally God with him. ‘In the beginning,’ he says, ‘was the Word; and the Word was with God; and the Word was God.’ Having thus secured the two grand points relating to the Logos, he can have nothing more to say upon the subject, than to repeat what he has stated, for impressing the deeper conviction. He accordingly repeats it. His personality he impresses again, thus; ‘THE SAME was in the beginning with God.’ His divinity also he again inculcates, thus: ‘ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM, and WITHOUT HIM WAS NOT ANY THING MADE THAT WAS MADE.’ Here the very repetition itself, of enforcing his claim to divinity, by ascribing the creation to him; is plainly an union of two clauses, each announcing him as the Creator of the universe, and one doubling over the other. And the uncreated nature of his own existence is the more strongly enforced upon the mind, by being contrasted with the created nature of all other existences. These were MADE, but he himself WAS; made by Him, who was with God, and was God. Nor would all this precaution suffice, in the opinion of St. John. He must place still stronger fences against the dangerous spirit of error. He therefore goes on to say, in confirmation of his personality and divinity, and in application of all to our Saviour: ‘He was in the world, and THE WORLD WAS MADE BY HIM, and the world knew him not; He came unto HIS OWN [PROPER DOMAINS,] and HIS OWN [PROPER DOMESTICKS] received him not.’ And he closes all, with judiciously drawing the several parts of his assertions before into one full point; and with additionally explaining his philosophical term, by a direct reference of it to that popular one which he uses ever afterwards: ‘and the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.’ “Yet, when such guards were requisite, what induced St. John to use this philosophical title at all? The reason was assuredly this. The title was in high repute, and in familiar use, among the refined spirits of the age; and his Gospel was peculiarly calculated for the service of such. The almost perpetual recurrence of the appellation in Philo’s works shows evidently the use and the repute in which it was, among the more spiritualized of the Jews. St. John therefore adopted it himself, for the more easy access to their conviction. It was also congenial, probably, of itself to the spiritualized state of St. John’s mind. He, who has dwelt so much more than the other Evangelists upon the doctrines of our Saviour; and who has drawn out so many of them, in all their spiritual refinement of ideas; would naturally prefer the spiritual term of relationship for God the Son and God the Father, before the bodily, whenever the intellect was raised enough to receive it, and whenever the use of it was sufficiently guarded from danger. These were two reasons, I suppose, that induced St. John to use it a few times. And these were equally (I suppose) the reasons, that induced him, with all his guards, to use it only a few. “Nor let us be told, in the rashness of Arian absurdity, that we misunderstand St. John in this interpretation of his words. If reason is capable of explaining words, and if St. John was capable of conveying his meaning in words to the ear of reason; then we may boldly appeal to the common sense of mankind, and insist upon the truth of our interpretation. Common sense indeed hath already determined the point, in an impartial person, in an enemy, in a Heathen. I allude to that extraordinary approbation, which was given by a Heathen of the third century to this passage of St. John. ‘Of modern philosophers,’ says Eusebius, ‘Amelius is an eminent one, being himself, if ever there was one, a zealot for the philosophy of Plato; and he called the Divine of the Hebrews a Barbarian, as if he would not condescend to make mention of the Evangelist John by name.’ Such is Eusebius’s account of our referee. But what are the terms of his award? They are these. ‘And such indeed was the Logos,’ he says, ‘by whom, a perpetual existence, the things created were created, as also Heraclitus has said; and who by Jupiter, the Barbarian says, being constituted in the rank and dignity of a Principle, is with God and is God, by whom all things absolutely were created; in whom the created living thing, and life, and existence, had a birth, and fell into a body, and putting on flesh appeared a man; and, after showing the greatness of his nature, and being wholly dissolved, is again deified and is God, such as he was before he was brought down into the body and the flesh and a man. These things, if translated out of the Barbarian’s theology, not as shaded over there, but on the contrary as placed in full view, would be plain.’ In this very singular and very valuable comment upon St. John’s Gospel in general, and upon his preface in particular, we may see, through the harsh and obscure language of the whole, some circumstances of great moment. The bold air of arrogance in the blinded Heathen over the illuminated Divine must strike at once upon every eye. But the Logos appears, from him, to have been known to the philosophers of antiquity later than the Gospel; and known too as a perpetual Existence, and the Maker of the world. St. John also is witnessed by a Heathen, and by one who put him down for a Barbarian, to have represented the Logos as the Maker of all things, as with God, and as God; as one likewise, ‘in whom the created living Thing,’ or the human soul of our Saviour, ‘and’ even ‘Life and Existence’ themselves, those primogenial principles of Deity, ‘had a birth, and fell into a body, and putting on flesh appeared a man,’ who was therefore man and God in one; who accordingly ‘showed the greatness of his nature’ by his miracles, was ‘wholly dissolved,’ and then ‘was again DEIFIED, and is God,’ even ‘SUCH AS HE WAS, before he was brought down into the body and the flesh and a man.’ And St. John is attested to have declared this, ‘not even as shaded over,’ but ‘on the contrary as placed in full view.’ We have thus a testimony to the plain meaning of St. John, and to the evident Godhead of his Logos, a Godhead equally before and after his death; most unquestionable in its nature, very early in its age, and peculiarly forcible in its import. St. John, we see, is referred to in a language, that shows him to have been well known to the Grecian cotemporaries of Amelius, as a writer, as a foreigner, and as a marked assertor of Divinity for his Logos.” Whitaker. 86.Vid. Forbes. Instruct. Hist. Theol. Lib. I. cap. 2 §. 8. 87.Vid. Curcell in Quattern. Dissert. de Voc. Trinit. personÆ ge. 88.Vid. Calv. Institut. Lib. I. cap. 13. §. 5. 89.“The doctrine of a plurality appears in the very first words of inspiration. God would not record the history of creation, without informing the Church that the character of Creator was by no means to be confined to one person. It has often been observed, that this is taught in the words rendered God created, where we have a noun in the plural joined with a verb in the singular number, plainly expressing a plurality in unity. That this is the genuine sense of the passage appears from the work ascribed, in the next verse, to the Spirit of God, who is said to have ‘moved on the face of the waters.’ By modern Jews, whom some Christians have followed, this expression has been rendered, ‘a wind of God,’ or ‘a mighty wind.’ But the firmament, or expanse, was not created till the second day. This includes the atmosphere which surrounds our earth: for the fowl is said to ‘fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven.’ Now, it cannot reasonably be supposed that there could be a mighty wind, or any wind at all, before the existence of an atmosphere. “If we turn to the gospel-history, we find a third person mentioned as engaged in the work of creation. ‘All things were made by’ that Word, who ‘in the beginning existed with God.’ “This plurality appears still more expressly, when the sacred historian gives an account of the creation of man: ‘And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.’ But it is a plurality in unity: ‘So God created man in his own image.’ It has been justly observed, that to this the language of Elihu, and of the royal Preacher, agrees: ‘None saith, Where is God my Makers;’ and, ‘Remember now thy Creators.’ Nothing can be more absurd than the various attempts which have been made to shew, that this language may be otherwise understood. God could never speak in this manner to angels, or to any second causes. For to whomsoever these words were addressed, they must have been co-operators with God in this divine work. They must have assisted him in making man. Philo the Jew expressly says that these words, Let us make, declare a plurality. That the Jewish writers in general view this language as including a mystery, not to be made known to the vulgar, and indeed studiously concealed by them, from their abhorrence of Christianity, has been elsewhere demonstrated. It is therefore unnecessary to enlarge here. I shall only add, that the modern Jews are so fully convinced that the doctrine of a plurality is contained in these words, as to wish to alter the reading. Instead of Let us make man, they incline to read, Let man be made; although the Samaritan text, the Septuagint, the Talmudists, and all their translations, whether ancient or modern, express the language in the same manner with our version. “The same important doctrine is introduced in the history of the Fall. That three-one God, who said, ‘Let us make man after our image,’ in the same character laments the loss of this image. ‘Jehovah God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us;’ or, as some read the passage, ‘Behold the man, who was as one of us!’ Here Philo observes; ‘These words, as one of us, are not put for one, but for more than one.’ The learned Allix has remarked that the ancient Jewish writers maintain, that God ‘speaks not this to the angels, who had no common likeness to the unity or essence of God, but to Him who was the celestial Adam, who is one with God.’ To whom this character applies, we learn from the Targum of Jonathan on the place, who here speaks of ‘the only begotten in heaven.’ “This doctrine is also taught in the history of the Confusion of Tongues. ‘Jehovah said,—Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language.’ Here the Jews repeat their contemptible subterfuge, that God addresses his ‘house of judgment,’ that is, created angels. For it is an established doctrine with them, that ‘God does nothing without previously consulting with his family above.’ But it has justly been observed, that these words, if spoken to angels, would imply that God were one of them, or that he descended in the same manner with them, by a real change of place. Besides, in a moment to change one language into many, and to infuse these into the minds of men, who were utter strangers to them before, so that they should entirely forget their former modes of speech, is a work that far surpasses the power of angels, and can be accomplished by no being but that God, with whom to will and to do is the same. “It must be evident to every one, who reads the history of the Old Testament with any degree of attention, that an Angel is often introduced as speaking the language, performing the works, and accepting the worship, which exclusively belong to the Supreme Being. In other words, one, who is undoubtedly a divine person, often appears in a delegated character. Now, while it was the will of God in this manner constantly to remind his Church of the economy of redemption, he at the same time taught her a distinction of persons in the divine essence. It was this Angel who appeared to Abraham on different occasions, to Hagar, to Jacob, to Moses, to Joshua, to the Israelites at Bochim, to Gideon, to Manoah and his wife. But I enter not into a particular consideration of these appearances, having endeavoured to illustrate the character of this divine Messenger in another place. There it has also been proved, that the law was given to the Israelites at Mount Sinai by the second person of the adorable Trinity, in the character of the Angel of Jehovah. It deserves particular attention, that at the very time that the God of Israel gave his people a law, by which they were to be distinguished from all the idolatrous nations around, one special design of which was to preserve the doctrine of the divine unity;—at the very time that he pronounced that leading precept, ‘Thou shalt have no other gods before me;’ he, according to the Sacred History, viewed in its connexion, sustained the character of an Angel, and was pleased to communicate the knowledge of this fact to his people. How can these apparent contradictions be reconciled, but by admitting that it was the will of God to reveal himself to his church, as at the same time possessing essential unity and personal plurality? “The more ancient Jewish writers declare, that two persons were engaged in promulgating the law. They say; ‘The two first precepts were spoken by the Supreme Spirit, but he spoke all the rest by his Glory, who is called El Shaddai, known to the fathers; by whom the prophets foretold future events; who is called Jah: in whom the Name of God is; the Beloved of God who dwelt in the temple; and the Mouth of the Lord; and the Face of the Lord; and the Rock; and that Goodness which Moses saw, when he could not see God.’ Elsewhere they call him ‘the Schechinah, by whom we draw near to God, and present our supplications to him; who is that Angel in whom the name of God is, who is himself called God and Jehovah.’ The change of person, in the promulgation of the law, asserted by these writers, is evidently a mere fancy. But their language deserves attention; as it shews how fully they were convinced of the doctrine of a plurality in unity, when they introduced it in this manner. “It has been universally admitted by the friends of revelation, that the great end which God hath in view in the work of Redemption is the display of his own adorable perfections. But there is doubtless another, although less attended to, nowise incompatible with this, nay, itself an eminent branch of the supreme end. This is the manifestation of the mystery of the Trinity, and of the mode of subsistence peculiar to each person in the divine essence. This must undoubtedly be viewed as included in the one great design of the all-wise God in our redemption; and it is evident that he hath still kept it in eye, in the revelation given to the Church, and especially in the history of that work, as it is recorded in the gospels. We may trace the doctrine of a Trinity in the accounts given of the old creation; but it appears with far superior evidence in the history of the new. This corresponds to the superior greatness of the work, and to the brighter and more extensive display of divine perfection. “Such was the state of the Church, as to admit of a more full manifestation of this mystery. It was more obscurely revealed to the patriarchs, and under the Mosaic economy. This was analogous to the general character of the revelation then made; as well as to the state of the Church, yet in her infancy, and exposed to constant temptations to polytheism, from the situation of all the surrounding nations. But ‘when the fulness of the time was come,’ that the gospel should be preached to every creature, and the kingdom of Satan fall as lightning from heaven, in the overthrow of heathen darkness; there were no such impediments to the more clear revelation of this mysterious doctrine. The rest of the divine conduct indeed rendered this necessary. God had now ‘sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law.’ The ends of this mission could not be accomplished, without a full revelation of the character of this illustrious Messenger. He could not otherwise receive that homage from the Church, which he merited as her Redeemer, and which was necessary, in order to her salvation. Now, his character, as essentially the Son of God, and at the same time a divine Messenger, could not be properly unfolded, without a declaration both of the paternity of the First Person, and of that wonderful dispensation, according to which the Second, although equal in power and glory, voluntarily ‘emptied himself.’ Nor could the unity of the work of redemption, as pervading all the dispensations given to the Church, and the beautiful harmony of the law and the gospel, be otherwise displayed. Without a full revelation of this mystery, how could it have been known that he, who appeared in the end of ages as sent of God, was the very same person who had formerly led the Church, as the Angel of his face; that He, who now brought spiritual redemption to his folk, was no other than that Angel-Redeemer, who had already so frequently delivered them from temporal calamities? “If this mystery be unknown or disbelieved, there can be no faith in Christ as the Mediator between God and men. For he who believes not that the Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son, as to identity of essence, while at the same time there is a distinction of persons, denies the voluntary subjection of the Son to the Father in the eternal covenant, and thus the whole foundation of his merit and of our salvation. In relation to the work of our redemption, and in the history given of it, are revealed various internal actings of the divine persons towards each other, as well as those of an external nature. The Father appoints, gives, sends, prepares a human nature for his Son; the Son undertakes, gives himself, comes, assumes this nature. “From the history given of the conception of Christ, we find that three divine persons were engaged in the creation of this ‘new thing in the earth.’ The Father appears in the character of ‘the Highest;’ the Third Person, as ‘the Holy Ghost,’ and ‘the Power of the Highest;’ and the Second, as ‘the Son of God.’ When this wonderful Person, the incarnate Word, was to be manifested to Israel at his baptism, each divine Person concurred in the work. The Father testified his presence and approbation by a voice from the excellent glory, announcing Jesus as his beloved Son; and the Holy Ghost descended like a dove, and rested on him. The history of his death, viewed in its connexion, affords a proof of a similar kind. As ‘it pleased Jehovah,’ in the person of the Father, sustaining the character of Judge, to bruise the Son as our Surety; and as he, having power over his own life, commended his spirit into the hands of his Father, thus presenting unto him a sacrifice of a sweet-smelling savour; he did so ‘through the Eternal Spirit.’ The same thing appears from the resurrection of Jesus. He was ‘powerfully declared to be the Son of God in his resurrection from the dead;’ for he had ‘power to take again’ that which no one could take from him. This work is frequently ascribed to God, where the term evidently denotes the First Person. ‘God hath raised up Jesus again; as it is also written in the second psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.’ As he was ‘put to death in the flesh, he was quickened by the Spirit,’ by that Spirit of holiness, ‘by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison.’ Nor is this less evident from the account given of the effusion of the Spirit. This is undoubtedly a divine work; and it is described as belonging to each adorable Person. Jesus had foretold that the Comforter should come, that himself should send him, and that he should at the same time be sent by the Father. Accordingly, from the account given of this wonderful event by the apostle Peter, which is left on record for the instruction of the Church, we find that each divine Person was engaged in accomplishing it: ‘Jesus, having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear.’ “It is undeniable, that one special end, which Christ had in view in his miraculous works, was to confirm his doctrine with respect to his equality with the Father. When he gave thanks at the tomb of Lazarus, before raising him from the dead, it was because of the people who stood by, that they might believe that the Father had sent him; and sent him as a Messenger invested with divine power, because essentially possessing divine perfection. For he had previously said to his disciples: ‘This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God might be glorified thereby;’ and taught Martha, that if she ‘would believe, she would see the glory of God,’ in seeing the manifestation of that power which essentially belonged to himself, as ‘the Resurrection and the Life.’ When he cured the man sick of the palsy, it was in order to prove that he had ‘power on earth to forgive sin;’ while he admitted the principle held by the scribes, that no one could forgive sins but God only. On different occasions he refers to his miraculous works, as irrefragable evidences of his having the same essence with the Father; and of the mutual inexistence, as some have expressed it, of the Father in the Son, and of the Son in the Father, in respect of this essential unity, while there is at the same time a real distinction of persons. When his enemies accused him of blasphemy, because he said, ‘I am the Son of God,’ ‘making himself God;’ he replied, ‘If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him.’ To Philip, when desiring to see the Father, he said, ‘Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me; or else believe me for the very work’s sake.’ The Evangelist John, when referring to the signs recorded in the preceding history, subjoins this declaration; ‘These are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Son of God.’ That he appropriates this character to Jesus, as expressive of supreme deity, is evident from the uniform tenor of the gospel which bears his name. “The doctrine of the Trinity is peculiarly elucidated by the history of redemption; as it does not merely exhibit all the adorable Persons as engaged in this work, but ascribes a peculiar operation to each Person. The contrivance of our redemption is ascribed to the Father; the purchase of it to the Son; and the effectual application of this purchased redemption to the Holy Spirit. The Father sends his Son as our Surety; the Son cheerfully comes in this character; and the Holy Spirit is sent by both. The purpose of election is more immediately ascribed to the Father; the objects of his love are all chosen in Christ; and they, who were thus chosen from eternity, are in time chosen out of the world, and separated for himself, by the renewing and sanctifying work of the Spirit. “Nor is this all. The peculiar operation of each Person, in the work of our salvation, is perfectly analagous to the order of subsistence in the Holy Trinity; and thus beautifully illustrates the mutual relations of the divine Persons. All the external works of God, indeed, are common to each Person; as the divine nature is the same indivisible principle of operation. Yet these works are distinctly ascribed to the three Persons, because each Person operates according to the order of subsistence. In the old creation, the Father called all things into being by his co-essential Word, communicating life immediately by the Spirit, as exercising a generating power on the unformed mass. When God created man, the First Person formed him by the Second, as his essential Image, giving him life, both natural and moral, by the Third, as ‘the Spirit of life.’ Yet this implies no inferiority, or mere instrumentality, in any of the adorable Persons; but only the most perfect order and harmony. The case is the same in the new creation. It seems most consistent with divine wisdom, that he who is first in the order of subsistence should rather send than be sent; that the Son, who is ‘the image of the invisible God,’ should procure the restoration of that blessed image lost by sin; and that he, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, should be sent by both, to quicken those who are spiritually dead. This distinct operation indeed, as it corresponds with the order of subsistence, beautifully harmonizes with the distinguishing character belonging to each Person. He, who is essentially the Father, assumes the character of paternity, in a federal respect, towards those who are orphans and aliens. The only begotten Son of God is sent forth, made under the law, that they may ‘receive the adoption of sons,’ and appears as ‘the first-born among many brethren.’ The adorable Spirit, ‘the breath of Jehovah,’ breathes on the slain, that they may live; giving them a new heart and a right spirit. He, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, unites the sinner to both. “Is it ‘life eternal to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent?’ Hath no one the Father, who ‘denieth the Son?’ Can no one honour the Father, ‘who honoureth not the Son?’ Is it the Spirit alone who quickeneth, and who teacheth us to ‘know the things that are freely given us of God?’ Can no man ‘say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost?’ Is it through Christ that ‘we have access by one Spirit unto the Father?’ Let us bless God for the revelation of the mystery of a Trinity in unity; and especially because he hath revealed it so clearly in the history of our redemption, in relation to that work in which a peculiar operation belongs to each adorable Person, in which the love of a three-one God is so wonderfully displayed, in which we discern so blessed a harmony, not only of divine perfections, but of divine Persons! In all our worship, let us view God according to this revelation, ascribing glory to him ‘who is, and who was, and who is to come, and to the Seven Spirits which are before his throne, and to Jesus Christ, who is the faithful witness, and the first-begotten from the dead, and the prince of the kings of the earth.’ Let us earnestly desire communion with this three-one God; with the Father, in his love as the spring of our salvation; with the Son, in all that grace which he hath purchased by his blood; and with the Holy Ghost, in the whole extent of his efficacious operation. In order to this, let us press after union with Christ, that in him we may be united to the Father by that one Spirit who proceeds from both, and who is conferred by both as the Spirit of adoption. Let us cultivate love to the brethren, as members of the same mystical body, desiring to be ‘one heart and one soul;’ that although many, we may be one, and thus be assimilated, in our weak measure, to the blessed Trinity in respect of unity; as Jesus prays in behalf of his Church;—‘That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us.—I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me.’” Jamieson. 90.See Le Clerc’s Supplement to Dr. Hammond on the New Testament, preface to John i. 91.See Biddle’s Confession of Faith, touching the holy Trinity, Article VI. 92.Some have thought, that e?e???? being of the masculine gender, because it refers immediately to p?e?a, which is of the neuter, implies, that the Spirit is taken personally, which is the reason of this grammatical construction; but if it be said that the reason why it is masculine is, because it agrees with pa?a???t??, it, notwithstanding, proves the Personality of the Holy Ghost, since a Comforter is a personal character. The same thing is observed in the grammatical construction of that scripture, Eph. i. 13, 14. speaking concerning the Holy Spirit of promise, t? p?e?a t?? epa??e??a?; it is said, ?? est?? a??a??, which denotes the personal character of the Spirit, otherwise it would have been ? est?? a??a??, unless you suppose ?? agrees with a??a??, which seems to be a more strained sense of the grammatical construction than the other, which proves his personality. 93.“THAT the Holy Scriptures make mention of Three by way of great eminence and distinction may appear from many passages, out of which I shall only produce some. At the Prediction of the blessed Virgin’s conception, which was to be without the concurrence of a man, the divine message is delivered in these words: The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; Therefore, also that Holy Thing, that shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God. Here are plainly distinguished from each other, the Holy Ghost, or Power overshadowing; the Highest, whose Power that Spirit is; and the Holy Thing, or Person, who is called the Son of God, because born of a mother, impregnated by that Divine Power. At our Blessed Lord’s Baptism, the Spirit of God, we read, descended like a dove and rested upon him, and a voice from Heaven declared him to be the Son of God: Nothing can be plainer than three Personalities in this transaction; the Father speaking from Heaven, the Son coming out of Jordan, and the Spirit descending from above. In the Promise, which our blessed Saviour makes his disciples, to comfort their hearts against what was coming upon them, I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another comforter, that he may abide with you forever, even the Spirit of Truth; and when the comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of Truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me, there are manifestly Acts, and Persons, and capacities, different. The Father, from whom the Spirit proceeds, whom the Son prays, and by whom, at the Son’s Request, the Comforter was given: The Son, praying the Father; sending the Comforter from the Father, and testified of by the Spirit so sent: And the Spirit, given by the Father, sent by the Son, testifying of the Son, and, upon the Son’s Departure, abiding for ever with the Disciples. “The great Apostle of the Gentiles, to enforce the Doctrine of the resurrection, tells the Romans, that if the Spirit of him, who raised Jesus from the dead, dwelt in them, he that raised Christ from the dead would also quicken their mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelled in them; where he evidently refers to Jesus, the Son of God; raised from the Dead; to the Spirit of God, by which he was raised; and to him that raised Jesus, and at the last great day shall raise all others, in whom his Spirit dwells. The same apostle, to satisfy the Corinthians of the benefits of their conversion, after having enumerated several ranks of sinners, and such were some of you, says he, but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and by the Spirit of our God, i. e. God the Father. It cannot be denied that Sanctification and Justification are the gifts of God alone; for none can absolve us from the Guilt and pollution of sin, but he only: But then the Apostle tells the Corinthians, that this benefit they received not only from God the Father, but from the Lord Jesus likewise, and from the Holy Spirit: Analogous to which is that other Passage in the same epistle; There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit, (there is the third Person in the Trinity) there are differences of Administration, but the same Lord, (there is the second Person) and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God, (or first person in the Trinity) that worketh all in all. Once more, the same Apostle, in his prayer for the Thessalonians, directs his devotion to the ever blessed Trinity: Now God himself, even our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ, direct our way unto you, and the Lord, (i. e. the Holy Ghost) make you to increase and abound in love one towards another: For that by the Lord we are here to understand the Holy Ghost, I think is very plain from the next verse; ‘to the end, that he may establish your hearts unblameable in holiness before God, even our Father, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ with all his saints;’ since he is the Sanctifier, and to establish our hearts in holiness is his proper work and office: And if so, then is there a plain enumeration of the three Persons of the Trinity in this passage. “The great Apostle of the Jews begins his first Epistle general to his dispersed Brethren with a declaration of the same article, when he calls them elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through Sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus; for there we may observe, that the three Persons are not only expressly named, but their distinct employments, with reference to man’s salvation, are particularly specified, while the Father is said to elect, the Spirit to sanctify, and the holy Jesus to shed his blood. The beloved Apostle St. John, in his Salutation to the Churches, Grace, and Peace from him, which is, and which was, and which is to come, and from the seven spirits which are before his Throne, and from Jesus Christ has given us a distinct enumeration of the three Persons in the Deity, if we will but admit, (as most interpreters have done) that by the Seven Spirits, which was a sacred number among the Jews, that one Person (viz. the Holy Ghost) is to be understood, from whom all that variety of gifts and operations, which were then conspicuous in the Christian Church, did proceed. But however this be, ’tis certain, that the passage in his Epistle of the Three which bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are as full and plain a Testimony and declaration of this Mystery, as can be cited in words; and though some have endeavoured to invalidate the authority of this passage, as not extant in some ancient copies, and seldom appealed to by the first defenders of the catholick faith against the Arians and Macedonians, yet the contrary to this is most evident. Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and Fulgentius quote it in their writings: Athanasius made use of it in the council of Nice against Arius; and the reason why it was left out in some ancient copies Socrates acquaints us with in his Ecclesiastical history, when he tells us, ‘That the Christian Church had all along complained, that the Epistle of St. John had been corrupted by the first adversaries of the doctrine of Christ’s divinity.’ ’Twas by their artifice therefore that it was omitted; for several learned pens, both of our own and other churches, have made it very manifest, that it was “But we need not be so tenacious of one text, when, besides these already mentioned, and many more that might be produced upon a farther enquiry, the very form of our admission into the Christian covenant is in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; the form of our prayers is thus directed, that through the Son we have an access by one Spirit to the Father; and the form of our dismission from them is, every day, with this benediction, The grace of the Lord Jesus, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, be with us all evermore; as if the Wisdom of God had intended to inculcate this notion of the Trinity, and, in every act of our religious worship, to remind us of the manner of his subsistence. “Thus it appears that there are Three, very often occurring in scripture, under the different appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: and that these three are not one and the same Being, under different respects and considerations, but three real and distinct persons, with a peculiar manner of subsisting, is plain from the very names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, if we understand them in a proper and natural sense; because these are opposite relations, which can never meet in the same subject: for a Father cannot be Father to himself, but to his Son; nor can a Son be Son to himself, but to his Father; nor can the Holy Ghost proceed from himself, or (in this sense) be his own Spirit, but the Spirit of the Father, and Son, from whom he proceeds: and therefore the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit; nor the Son the Father, or Holy Spirit; nor the Holy Spirit either Father or Son. The only question is, whether these names, when spoken of the Trinity have a proper and natural, or only an allusive and metaphorical signification. “The divine nature and perfections indeed, (as they are far exalted above our conception) may be brought down by metaphors, taken from some things, that are analagous in creatures; in which sense we may allow Father and Son to be metaphorical names, when applied to God: not that God the Father is not, in the highest and most perfect sense, a Father, and his Son a most proper, natural, and genuine Son; but because the divine generation is so perfect a communication of the divine nature and being from Father to Son, that human generations are but obscure and imperfect images and resemblances of it. The truth is, when any thing is spoken metaphorically of God, the metaphor and image are always in the creatures; the truth, perfection, and reality of all, in God: and if so, then if God be a Father, and have a Son, an only-begotten Son, begotten eternally of himself; though this eternal generation be infinitely above what we can imagine or conceive, yet it is evident, that God the Father is more properly and perfectly a Father, and God the Son more properly and perfectly a Son, than any earthly fathers or sons ever were. And if God the Father and his Son be truly and perfectly Father and Son, they must be truly and perfectly distinct beings; for the Father cannot be the Son whom he begets; nor the Son the Father that begat him; nor the Holy Ghost either the Father or the Son, from whom he proceeds: consequently, they must be distinct, and real, and proper persons; for he that begets, and he that is begotten, and he that proceeds from both, cannot be one and the same person. “And as this difference of relations makes a manifest distinction between the three persons; so the different offices and employments, that are ascribed to them in scripture, is a farther note of discrimination. For who sees not, that the work of creation of all things at first, and ever since the just, and wise, and merciful disposal of them, are attributed to the Father; that the great undertaking of our redemption is the care and employment of the Son; and the business of enlightening and sanctifying those, whom the Son redeemeth, the particular province of the Holy Ghost? Without supposing them to be three distinct persons, I say, no satisfactory solution can be given, why, in the great work of man’s salvation, a distinct office and operation should be proper to each of them; why the Father only should be said to elect; the Son only to have shed and sprinkled his blood; and the Holy Ghost only to sanctify us unto obedience. So far then as a diversity of names, offices, and operations, distinguishes one being from another, there is plainly a distinction of persons subsisting in the Godhead. But this is not all. Those, who pretend to state “The only valid objection (and to which all others are reducible) against these personalities, so often occurring in scripture, is taken from the simplicity of the divine nature, which, in the opinion of some, will not admit of any distinction. But though the simplicity of God excludes all mixture, i. e. all composition of things heterogeneous in the Godhead, (there being nothing in God but what is God) yet, notwithstanding this, there may be a distinction of hypostases in the Godhead, provided they are homogeneous, and of the same nature. Nay, the simplicity of the divine nature, if rightly considered, is so far from excluding, that it necessarily infers a distinction of hypostases in the Godhead: for, since the simplicity of the Godhead consists chiefly in this, that God is a pure eternal Mind, free from the mixture of all kind of matter whatever; an eternal Mind must needs have in it, from all eternity, a notion or conception of itself, which the schools call verbum mentis; nor can it, at any time, be conceived without it. Now this word cannot be in God, what it is in us, a transient vanishing accident; for then the divine nature would be compounded of substance and accident, which would be repugnant to its simplicity; and therefore must be a substantial subsisting word, and though not divided, yet distinct from the eternal Mind, from whence it proceeds. This is no novel subtlety of the schools, but a notion, that Stackhouse. 94.To confirm this we may add, that, if the difference of copies happened by the negligence of transcribers, such a mistake is much more easily made by omitting a clause, than by inserting one, especially when the same words occur twice very near together, which is the present case: and that, without this clause, the next verse is maimed, and hardly good sense, the words, in earth, standing disjointed by themselves; whereas the words, in heaven, (as we now read them) make a clear, strong, and elegant antithesis: and for these reasons, those copies, in which this passage is found, are more likely to be true, than those in which it is wanting.—Trapp’s Doctrine of the Trinity. 95.A late learned author has given us this definition of a single person, “That it is an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters of I, thou, and he, and not divided or distinguished into more intelligent agents, capable of the same characters.” [Waterland’s second Defence,] and thereupon he thus argues in another place, “Our ideas of person are plainly taken from our conceptions of human persons, and from them transferred to other subjects, though they do not strictly answer in every circumstance. Properly speaking, he and him, are no more applicable to a divine person, than she or her;” but we have no third way of denoting a person, and so, of the two, we choose the best, and custom familiarizes it.—His Sermons at Lady Moyer’s Lectures. 96.It has, with good reason, been supposed by the Catholick writers, that the design of the word ????? was to intimate, that the relation of Father and Son hears some resemblance and analogy to that of thought, viz. that as thought is co-eval with the mind, so the Son is co-eval with the Father; and that as thought is closely united to, proceeds from, and yet remains in the mind, so also may we understand that the Son is in the bosom of the Father, proceeding from him, and yet never divided or separate, but remaining in him and with him.—Waterland’s Sermons at Lady Moyer’s Lectures. 97.Some, who take delight in darkening this matter, by pretending to explain it, call the former a t? ???, stans; the latter, fluens. 98.“In the Saviour’s exalted relation to his Father, the name Son of God comes chiefly under observation. It is known that in the sacred word, rational creatures are often dignified with the honorary title of Sons or Children of God; and that in various respects, and for obvious reasons. But certainly that name in Christ signifies something higher. John x. 35-38. He is not only a Son of God, but the Son, by way of eminence above all ? ????: So that he is by this, as a peculiar and proper denomination, distinguished from other subjects. We know, that the Son of God is come. 1 John v. 20. John viii. 36.—He is God’s only-begotten Son. John i. 14, 18. iii. 16. God’s own Son. Rom. viii. 32. ‘To which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee?’ Heb. i. 5. When Christ spoke to his disciples concerning the Father, he never said, our Father, (as he had taught them to pray;) but always with an express distinction my Father. Luke ii. 48, 49. John ii. 16. chiefly John xx. 17.——From the prophetic doctrine, that name was known in Israel, as in its full force applicable to the Messias; which can be clearly evinced from various passages. Mat. xvi. 15, 16. xxvi. 63. Mark iii. 11. John vi. 69. xi. 27. x. 36. Amidst all the confusion of their apprehensions, they found so much emphasis in it, that the acknowledgment of it was among them a ground of adoration, Mat. xiv. 33. John ix. 35-38.; so that when Jesus, with the distinction and appropriation of the divine works, called God his Father, they thence concluded, which the Saviour did not contradict, that he held God for his own Father, and thus made himself equal to God. John v. 18. x. 33-36. Indeed, however intimate the connexion is betwixt being the Messias, the Christ, and being the Son of God, this last signifies still something different, something more original. For Paul preached Christ, that he was the Son of God Wynpersse. 99.Acts ix. 20.; see also chap. viii. 37. In both these places, however, there is a different reading in the Greek. But compare Jesus’ first accusation before Pilate, that he said he was the Christ. (Luke xxiii. 2.) with a new and a later, that he made himself the Son of God. (John xix. 7. 100.Unity of nature with the Father. In the original it is equality of his nature. But apprehending that, by an error of the press, gelykheid is put for eenigheyd, I have adventured to translate the passage as above; and that in the fullest consistency with the design of the worthy author, in the whole of this treatise, and with his express words in the close of the second paragraph of this very section, where he says, “we dare not esteem Christ less than ????s???, that is, of the same nature or essence with God.” 101.“The meaning of the terms, Son of God, only-begotten Son of God, must needs be of importance, inasmuch as the belief of the idea signified by them was made a leading article in the primitive professions of faith. John vi. 69. iii. 18. xx. 31. Acts xviii. 37. 1 John iv. 15. Whatever disputes have arisen of late among christians, there seems to have been none on this subject in the times of the apostles. Both Jews and Christians appear to have agreed in this: the only question that divided them was, whether Christ was the Son of God, or not? If there had been any ambiguity in the term, it would have been very unfit to express the first article of the christian faith. “It has been frequently suggested, that the ground of Christ’s sonship is given us in Luke i. 35, and is no other than his miraculous conception: The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God. “It is true that our Lord was miraculously conceived of the Holy Spirit, and that such a conception was peculiar to him; but it does not follow that by this he became the Son, or only-begotten Son of God. Nor does the passage in question prove any such thing. It has been thought that the phrase Son of God, in this place, is used in a peculiar sense, or that it respects the origin of Christ’s human nature, as not being by ordinary generation of man, but by the extraordinary influence of God; and that he is here called the Son of God in the same sense as Adam is so called, (Luke iii. 38.) as being produced by his immediate power. If this be the meaning of the term in the passage in question, I should think it will be allowed to be peculiar, and therefore that no general conclusion can be drawn from it, as to the meaning of the term in other passages. But granting that the sonship of Christ, in this place, is to be understood in the same sense as it is commonly to be taken in the new testament, still it does not follow that the miraculous conception is the origin of it. It may be a reason given why Christ is called the Son of God; but not why he is so. Christ is called the Son of God as raised from the dead, and as exalted at the right hand of God. Acts xiii. 33. Heb. i. 4, 5. Did he then become the Son of God by these events? This is impossible; for sonship is not a progressive matter. If it arose from his miraculous conception, it could not for that reason arise from his resurrection, or exaltation: and so on the other hand, if it arose from his resurrection, or exaltation, it could not proceed from his miraculous conception. But if each be understood of his being hereby proved, acknowledged, or, as the scriptures express it, declared to be the Son of God with power, all is easy and consistent. “Whether the terms, Son of God, and only-begotten Son of God, be not expressive of his divine personality, antecedent to all consideration of his being conceived of the holy Spirit, in the womb of the Virgin, let the following things determine. “First: The glory of the only-begotten of the Father, and the glory of the Word, are used as convertible terms, as being the same: but the latter is allowed to denote the divine person of Christ, antecedent to his being made flesh; the same therefore must be true of the former. The Word was made flesh, and we beheld his glory; that is, the glory of the Word, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. John i. 14. It is true, it was by the Word being made flesh, and dwelling amongst us, that his glory became apparent; but the glory itself was that of the eternal Word, and this is the same as the glory of the only-begotten of the Father. “Secondly: The Son of God is said to dwell in the bosom of the Father; that is, he is intimately acquainted with his character and designs, and therefore fit to be employed in making them known to men. The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. John i. 18. If this be applied to his divine person, or that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested to us, 1 John i. 2. it is natural and proper; it assigns his omniscience as qualifying him for making known the mind of God: but if he became the only-begotten of the Father by his miraculous conception, or by any other means, the beauty of the passage vanishes. “Thirdly: God is frequently said to have sent his Son into the world: John vii. 17. x. 36. 1 John iv. 9, 10. but this implies that he was his Son antecedent to his being sent. To suppose otherwise, is no less absurd than supposing that when Christ is said to have sent forth his twelve disciples, they were not disciples, but in consequence of his sending them, or of some preparation pertaining to their mission. “Fourthly: Christ is called the Son of God antecedently to his miraculous conception, and consequently he did not become such by it.—In the fulness of time God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law—God sent his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh. Gal. iv. 4. Rom. viii. 3.—The terms, made of a woman, made under the law, are a parenthesis. The position affirmed is, that God sent forth his Son to redeem the transgressors of the law. His being made of a woman, and made under the law, or covenant of works, which man had broken, expressed the necessary means for the accomplishment of this great end; which means, though preceding our redemption, yet follow the sonship of the Redeemer. There is equal proof that Christ was the Son of God before he was made of a woman, as that he was the Word before he was made flesh. The phraseology is the same in the one case as in the other. If it be alleged that Christ is here called the Son of God on account of his being made of a woman, I answer, If so, it is also on account of his being made under the law, which is too absurd to admit of a question.—Moreover: To say that God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, is equal to saying that the Son of God assumed human nature: he must therefore have been the Son of God before his incarnation. “Fifthly: Christ is called the Son of God antecedent to his being manifested to destroy the works of the devil: but he was manifested to destroy the works of the devil by taking upon him human nature; consequently, he was the Son of God antecedent to the human nature being assumed. There is equal proof from the phraseology of 1 John iii. 8. that he was the Son of God antecedent to his being manifested to destroy the works of the devil, as there is from that of 1 Tim. iii. 16. that he was God antecedent to his being manifested in the flesh; or from 1 John i. 2, that that eternal life, which was with the Father, was such antecedent to his being manifested to us. “Sixthly: The ordinance of baptism is commanded to be administered in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Matt. xxviii. 19. The terms, Father and Holy Spirit, will be allowed to denote divine persons; and what good reasons can be given for another idea being fixed to the term Son? “Seventhly: The proper deity of Christ precedes his office of Mediator, or High Priest of our profession, and renders it an exercise of condescension. But the same is true of his sonship: He maketh the Son a High Priest—Though he was a Son, yet learned he obedience. Heb. vii. 28. v. 8. His being the Son of God, therefore, amounts to the same thing as his being a divine person. “Eighthly: It is the proper deity of Christ which gives dignity to his office of Mediator: but this dignity is ascribed to his being the Son of God. We have a GREAT High Priest; Jesus, the Son of God. Heb. iv. 14. His being the Son of God, therefore, amounts to the same thing as his being a divine person. “Lastly: It is the proper deity of Christ which gives efficacy to his sufferings—By HIMSELF he purges our sins. Heb. i. 3. But this efficacy is ascribed to his being the Son of God—The blood of Jesus Christ, his Son, cleanseth us from all sin. 1 John i. 7. His being the Son of God therefore amounts to the same thing as his being a divine person. “Those who attribute Christ’s sonship to his miraculous conception, (those however to whom I refer,) are nevertheless constrained to allow that the term implies proper divinity. Indeed this is evident from John v. 18, where his saying that God was his own Father is supposed to be making himself equal with God. But if the miraculous conception be the proper foundation of his sonship, why should it contain such an implication? A holy creature might be produced by the over-shadowing of the Holy Spirit, which yet should be merely a creature; i. e. he might, on this hypothesis, profess to be the Son of God, and yet be so far from making himself equal with God, as to pretend to be nothing more than a man. “It has been objected, that Christ, when called the Son of God, is commonly spoken of as engaged in the work of mediation, and not simply as a divine person antecedent to it. I answer; In a history of the rebellion in the year 1745, the name of his Royal Highness, the commander in chief, would often be mentioned in connexion with his equipage and exploits; but none would infer from hence that he thereby became the king’s son. “It is further objected, that sonship implies inferiority, and therefore cannot be attributed to the divine person of Christ.—But, whatever inferiority may be attached to the idea of Sonship, it is not an inferiority of nature, which is the point in question: and if any regard be paid to the Scriptures, the very contrary is true. Christ’s claiming to be the Son of God was making himself, not inferior, but as God, or equal with God. “Once more: Sonship, it is said, implies posteriority, or that Christ, as Son, could not have existed till after the Father. To attribute no other divinity to him, therefore, than what is denoted by sonship, is attributing none to him; as nothing can be divine which is not eternal. But if this reasoning be just, it will prove that the divine purposes are not eternal, or that there was once a point in duration, in which God was without thought, purpose or design. For it is as true, and may as well be said, that God must exist before he could purpose, as that the Father must exist before he had a Son: but if God must exist before he could purpose, there must have been a point in duration in which he existed without purpose, thought, or design; that is, in which he was not God! The truth is, the whole of this apparent difficulty arises from the want of distinguishing between the order of nature and the order of time. In the order of nature, the sun must have existed before it could shine; but in the order of time, the sun and its rays are coeval: it never existed a single instant without them. In the order of nature, God must have existed before he could purpose; but in the order of time, or duration, he never existed without his purpose: for a God, without thought or purpose, were no God. And thus in the order of nature, the Father must have existed before the Son; but, in that of duration, he never existed without the Son, The Father and the Son therefore are properly eternal.” Fuller. 102.?a? pe? is used six times in the New Testament; in two or three of which places it might be rendered, without deviating from the sense of the respective texts, & quidem, as well as quamvis; and I see no reason why the enclitic particle pe?, being added to ?a?, should always, without exception, alter the sense thereof, any more than when it is joined to ??, ea?, or e?. And whereas I render ?a?, in ver. 9. But, instead of And, that may be justified by several scriptures, where it is so rendered; as Luke vii. 35. Matth. xii. 39. Acts x. 28. 1 Cor. xvi. 12. 103.Dr. Ridgley differs from the most of his brethren on the Sonship of Christ as Mediator. The following note, and the two preceding, represent, it is presumed, the orthodox doctrine on this important head. “The Redeemer is the Son of God, in a peculiar and appropriated sense, and by which he is distinguished from every other person in the universe. He is therefore called the first begotten, or first born son of God: his only begotten son, his own son; and eminently The Son, and The Son of the Father. His dear Son; or, as it is in the original, The Son of his love; His beloved Son, in whom he is well pleased. ‘For he received from God the Father, honour and glory, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.’ 2 Pet. i. 17. He is ‘The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father.’ John i. 18. Who only knows the Father; and none does or can reveal and make him known but the Son. Matt. xi. 27. John i. 18. He being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person; he that hath seen the Son, hath seen the Father, John xiv. 9. Heb. i. 3. Which epithets and declarations distinguish him from all other sons; as much as his Father is distinguished from all other fathers. He is mentioned as the Son of God above an hundred times in the New Testament; and fifty times by the apostle John. And the Father of Jesus Christ, the Son, is mentioned above two hundred and twenty times; and more than one hundred and thirty times in the gospel and epistles of St. John. Jesus Christ often makes use of the epithets, The Father, My Father, &c. This character is represented as essential to the Redeemer and peculiar to him, and is an essential article of the Christian faith. This confession Peter made as the common faith of the disciples of Christ. ‘We believe, and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God,’ John vi. 69. Matt. xvi. 16. This was the Eunuch’s faith, required in order to his being baptized. ‘I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.’ And he who believes with all his heart, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, hath the Son, and with him eternal life. When Peter made this confession, ‘Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God,’ Christ said to him, ‘Blessed art thou; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.’ Matt. xvi. 16, 17. ‘He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life, and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life.’ John iii. 36. And John says, ‘Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God. Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God! He that hath the Son, hath life; and he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life. These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God: that ye may know ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God.’ 1 John iv. 15. v. 5, 12, 13. “It must be farther observed, that this title, the Son of God, is the highest title that is given to the Redeemer, and denotes his divinity, or that he is himself God, and therefore equal with the Father, if his divinity be any where expressed in the Bible; and that it is there abundantly declared, we have before shewed. He styles himself, and is called The Son of Man, more than eighty times in the New Testament, by which epithet his humanity is more especially denoted, but not excluding his divinity. And, on the contrary, he is called the Son of God, more particularly to express his infinitely superior character, his divinity or godhead. In this view, let the following passages be considered. When the angel, who declared to the virgin Mary that she should be the mother of the Messiah, expressed to her the greatness of this her Son, he does it by saying that he should be called the Son of the Highest, the Son of God. ‘He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Highest. Therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God.’ Luke i. 32, 35. If this were not his greatest, his highest title and character, he most certainly would have given him a higher, and one that did fully express divinity. This, therefore, did express it in the fullest and strongest manner. And no one, who believes in the divinity of Christ, can, consistently, have any doubt of it. And when the Father gives him the highest encomium, and recommends him to men, as worthy of their highest regards, implicit obedience, and unlimited trust and confidence, and commands them thus to regard, love, trust in, and obey him, this is the highest character he gives him, by which his divinity is expressed, ‘This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased: Hear ye him.’ If this does not express his divinity, we may be sure divinity is no part of his character; and that he is not God. So, when Peter undertakes to express the idea he had of the high and glorious character of his Lord and Master, he does it in the following words, ‘Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.’ If Peter believed the divinity of Christ, he certainly expressed this in these words; for he did not conceive of any higher character, that could be given in any other words. This also appears by Nathaniel’s using this epithet, when he was struck with wonder and surprise at the omniscience of Christ. ‘Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel.’ John i. 49. When our Lord Jesus Christ proposed himself to the man whom he had restored to sight, as the proper object of his faith and trust, he said to him, ‘Dost thou believe on the Son of God?’ And when he told the man that he himself was the person, he said, ‘Lord, I believe. And he worshipped him.’ John ix. 35, 38. It appears from this, that Son of God was the highest title which Jesus assumed, and that this had special reference to, and expressed his divinity; and therefore in this character, and as the Son of God, this pious man paid him divine honour, and worshipped him. When the disciples of our Lord, and all that were in the ship with them, had seen him walking upon the sea, in the midst of a terrible storm, and reducing the boisterous winds, and raging waves, to a calm, by his word and presence, they were struck with a fresh and affecting conviction of his divinity, that he was God, and expressed it by coming to him, falling down and worshiping him, ‘saying, of a truth, thou art the Son of God.’ Matt. xiv. 33. In which words they expressed his divinity, and gave a reason for their worshipping him, as their Lord and their God, viz. that they were sure from clear and abundant evidence, that he was the Son of God. The apostle John, when he would represent Jesus Christ in his highest and most glorious character, gives him this title, and adds, ‘This is the true God.’ He says, ‘We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true: And we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life.’ 1 John v. 20. “It is to be farther observed, that when our Lord said to the Jews, ‘My Father worketh hitherto, and I work,’ the Jews, therefore sought the more to kill him, because he said that God was his Father, (his own proper Father, as it is in the original) ‘MAKING HIMSELF EQUAL WITH GOD.’ This is to be understood as the sense which St. John the Evangelist puts upon the words of Christ, ‘My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.’ For this was making himself equal with God the Father, as doing the same work with him: And this is represented as implied in God’s being his own Father; or in his being the Father’s own Son, the Son of God. But if we understand it as the sense which the Jews put upon the words of Christ, and that they said this was making himself equal with God, it amounts to the same thing; for it appears that their inference was just; and our Saviour is so far from denying it to be true, that in his reply to them, he confirms it, and asserts that whatsoever the Father does, the Son does the same; and instances in his raising the dead, and judging the world, and having all things, and all power in his hands. ‘That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father.’ John v. 13-17. Thus he makes the Son equal with the Father. Hence it appears that to be the Son of God, and God’s own Son, is the same with a divine person, and denotes one who is truly God; and that this title is used to express the divinity, rather than the humanity of Jesus Christ. “The same appears from what passed between our Lord and the Jews at another time. He said to them, ‘I and my Father are One.’ This, they said, was blasphemy, because being a man, he made himself God. It is plain from the answer which he makes to them that they considered him as a blasphemer, because he claimed to be the Son of God, by calling God his Father. ‘Say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?’ This was the blasphemy with which they charged him; because they considered his saying, that he was the Son of God, by calling God his Father, as an assertion that he was God. John x. 30, 33, 36. And it appears, not only from this passage, but from others, that the Jews, and others, did affix the idea of divinity to the Son of God, and considered this title as expressing a character infinitely above a mere creature. When Jesus was arraigned before the Jewish council, the High Priest charged him with the solemnity of an oath, saying, ‘I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us, whether thou be the Christ, the Son of the living God.’ And when Jesus answered in the affirmative, he with all the members of the council, charged him with blasphemy; and pronounced him worthy of death for making this claim. Matt. xxvi. 64, 65, 66. And they brought this accusation against him to Pilate, ‘We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God. When, therefore, Pilate heard that saying, he was the more afraid.’ John xix. 7, 8. By this, it is evident that Pilate considered the Son of God, to imply divinity. When the Centurion, and the guard who were with him, saw the earthquake and the other supernatural events which attended the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, ‘they feared greatly, saying, Truly this was the Son of God.’ Matt, xxvii. 54. From this, it is evident that they considered the Son of God to be more than a man, at least, if not really God. “There was some idea and belief propagated among other nations, as well as the Jews, of an extraordinary personage, a divinity, who was denominated The Son of God, and who was to make his appearance in the world. To this, Nebuchadnezzar doubtless had reference, when he said, that in a vision, he saw a fourth person, walking in the midst of the fire of the furnace into which he had cast three men; and that none of them had been hurt by the fire; and the form of the fourth was like the Son of God. Dan iii. 25. And who but this divine person can be meant by Agur, when he says, ‘Who hath ascended up into heaven, or descended? Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? Who hath established all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and what is his Son’s name, if thou canst tell?’ Prov. xxx. 4. “This epithet and character we find expressly mentioned by David, the divinely inspired king of Israel, in the second Psalm. And he is there introduced and described, as a divinity, who claims divine homage, trust, and worship, as the Omnipotent heir, possessor and ruler of the world. ‘I will declare the decree. The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art MY SON, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter’s vessel. Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little. Blessed are all they that put their trust in him.’ “All this will be of no weight, indeed, and as nothing with the Anti-trinitarians, the Sabellians; and with all those who deny the divinity of Jesus Christ, the Arians and Socinians. But they who believe in a Trinity of persons in the Deity, and that Jesus Christ is God, the second person of the Trinity, must be sensible that he is called the Son of God, the Son of the Father, with a special reference to his divine nature, and to denote his Godhead, as the second person in the Triune God.—The Arians and Socinians hold that he is the Son of God, considered as a mere creature, being by this distinguished from all other creatures; and consequently that there was no Son of God before this creature did exist. The latter, or Trinitarians, believe that the sonship of Jesus Christ, necessarily includes his divinity; but are not all agreed as to the foundation of his sonship, and in what it consists. It has been generally believed, and the common doctrine of the church of Christ, from the beginning of the fourth century, and so far as appears from the days of the apostles to this time, that Jesus Christ is the eternal Son of God: That his Sonship is essential to him, as the second person in the Trinity, and that in this sense, he is the only begotten Son of the Father, antecedent to his incarnation, and independent on it, even from eternity. But there are some who think that the Sonship of the Redeemer consists in an union of the second person of the Trinity, or the Word, with the human nature; and that he became the Son of God by becoming man; and therefore before the incarnation, there was no Son of God, though there were a Trinity of persons in the Godhead. This opinion seems to be rather gaining ground, and spreading, of late. “Those on each side of this question differ in their opinion of the importance of it, and of the bad tendency of either of these opposite sentiments. Some suppose that the difference is of little or no importance, as both believe the Redeemer to be God and man, in one person, and that he is the Son of God, and that this implies his divinity, though they differ in opinion respecting the time and manner of his filiation. Others think this is a difference so great and important, and attended with such consequences; and that those who are opposed to them on this point embrace such a great and dangerous error, that they ought to be strenuously opposed: and consequently do not desire an accommodation, or think it possible. “Though it be needless and improper here to undertake the labour of entering into all the arguments which have been produced, or may be mentioned in support of each side of this question; yet the following observations may not be altogether useless; but may be of some help to form a judgment upon this point, agreeable to the scriptures. “1. As this question respects the character of the Redeemer, it may justly be considered as an important one; as every thing relating to his character is very important and interesting. Who would be willing to be found at last taking the wrong side of this question; and always to have entertained so unbecoming ideas and conceptions of the Redeemer, which his must be, if on this point he embraces and contends for that which is directly contrary to the truth? Though such an error should not be fatal to him who embraces it, but be consistent with his being a real Christian; yet it must be a very criminal mistake, and dishonourable to Jesus Christ; as every idea of him must be, which is contrary to his true character: For that is so perfect and glorious, that nothing can be taken from it, or added to it, which will not mar and dishonour it. His character, as it respects the question before us, is without doubt properly and clearly stated in divine revelation, and if we embrace that which is contrary to the truth, it must be wholly our own fault, and a very criminal abuse of the advantages which we enjoy, to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ his Son, whom he has sent. Those considerations ought to awaken our attention to this subject, and excite a concern and earnest desire to know and embrace the truth; which will be attended with a modest, humble, diligent enquiry, sensible of the danger in which we are, through prejudice, or from other causes, of embracing error; and earnestly looking to the great Prophet to lead us into the truth. “2. What has been observed above, and, it is believed, made evident, viz. that the term, Son of God, so often given to Christ, is used to denote his divine nature, and to express his divinity, rather than his humanity, seems naturally, if not necessarily, to lead us to consider this character as belonging to him independent of his union to the human nature, and antecedent to his becoming man; and therefore, that it belongs to him as God, the second person in the Trinity. For if his sonship consists in his union to the human nature, and he became a son, only by becoming a man; then this character depends wholly upon this union, and is derived from his being made flesh: Therefore this epithet could not be properly used to denote his divinity, independent of his humanity, or what he is as a divine person, antecedent to his incarnation; or to express his divine, rather than his human nature. And Son of God, would be no higher a character, and express no more than Son of man; which is contrary to the idea which the scripture gives us on this head, as has been shown. “This may, perhaps, be in some measure illustrated by the following instance. The son of a nobleman of the first honour and dignity, came from Europe, and married the daughter of a plebian in America, by which he became his son: But as his honour and dignity did not consist in his marrying this woman, or in his being the son of the plebian, by this union with his daughter, but in his original character; no man thought of expressing his highest and most dignified character by which he was worthy of the greatest respect, by using an epithet which denoted only his union to that woman, and which was not applicable to him in any other view; or by calling him son, as expressing this new relation: But the highest title which they gave him, was that which had a special respect to, and expressed his original character, which he sustained antecedent to this union; and in which his highest dignity consisted. And he being the son of a nobleman and a lord, in which all his honour and dignity did consist, they used this phrase, My noble Lord, to express their highest respect, and his most worthy character. This epithet was always used to express his original and highest character and relation, and could not, with propriety, be used to express any thing else. He was often called, indeed, the son of the plebian, when they designed particularly to express his union to his wife, and speak of him as standing in this relation. “3. The Son of God is spoken of in many instances, if not in every one where this term is used, so as will naturally lead the reader to consider him as sustaining this character and relation antecedent to his incarnation, and independent of it. ‘God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son.’ John iii. 16. Do not these words seem to express this idea, viz. that there existed an only begotten son, antecedent to his being given; that God gave this his Son to the world by his becoming flesh, and being united to the human nature; and not that he became his Son by this union? ‘In this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be a propitiation for our sins.’ 1 John iv. 9, 10. If God sent his only begotten Son into the world, does not this suppose he had a Son to send, antecedent to his sending him; and that he did not become his Son by his sending him into the world, or only in consequence of this! This is expressed in the same manner by St. Paul. ‘But when the fulness of time was come God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law.’ Gal. iv. 4. The Son was sent forth. Does not this seem at least to imply that there was a Son to be sent forth antecedent to his being made of a woman, and that he was not made a Son, by being made of a woman or becoming man? ‘No man hath seen God at any time: The only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.’ John i. 18. Do not these words naturally lead us to conceive of the only begotten Son as existing in the nearest union with the Father as his Son, independent of the human nature? “It is said, ‘God was manifested in the flesh.’ 1 Tim. iii. 16. It would be unnatural and absurd to suppose, from this expression, that Jesus Christ was not God, antecedent to his being manifested in the flesh, and that by his becoming man, he became a God. Directly the contrary to this is asserted, viz. that he who is God from eternity, did in time appear in the human nature, and manifested himself to be God, independent of the flesh, in which he appeared. It is also said, ‘For this purpose, the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.’ 1 John iii. 8. These two passages appear to be parallel. God manifested in the flesh, and the Son of God manifested, are two expressions of the same thing. From this it may be inferred, that the Son of God, and God, are synonymous here, and of the same import. This serves to confirm what has been said above of the use and meaning of the term, Son of God. And may it not with equal certainty be inferred from these two passages, compared together, that the Son of God existed in this character as the Son of God, antecedent to his manifestation in the flesh, and independent of it; and that he did not become the Son of God by being made flesh? If God be manifested in the flesh, there must be a God to be manifested antecedent to such a manifestation, and independent of it. And is it not equally certain that if the Son of God be manifested, he must have existed the Son of God, antecedent to such manifestation, and independent of it? Consequently he did not become the Son of God by his being manifested in the flesh: His Sonship does not consist in the union of the divine and human natures in one person. His personality existed before this union with the human nature; and he was the Son of God before this: This same Son of God, this same person who existed without beginning, assumed the human nature, not a human person, into a union with himself, his own person, and so appeared, was manifested in the flesh. “When David speaks of the Son of God, and represents the Father as saying, ‘Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee,’ so long before his incarnation, the idea which most naturally arises in the mind from this is, that there was then such a person as the Son, who did at that time declare the decree, by the mouth of David; and not, that there should in some future time be a Son begotten, who should then declare the decree. ‘I will declare the decree: The Lord said unto me, thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.’ It is very unnatural, and contrary to all propriety of speech to suppose, ‘this day have I begotten thee,’ means I will beget thee in some future time; and that the Son should be made to declare the decree, long before any such person existed; and when there was in fact no such Son. The decree which the Son declares is not that declaration, ‘Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee;’ but what follows, ‘ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron, &c.’ ‘This day,’ that is, now, not in time which is passed, or which is to come; for with God there is no succession, no time passed or to come; but he exists, as we may say, in one eternal, unsuccessive NOW. Therefore, when we speak of an eternal, immanent act, it is most properly expressed thus, ‘This day, or NOW, have I begotten thee.’ This therefore is the sense in which the best divines have generally understood it. “St. Paul cites this passage as being illustrated and verified in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Acts xiii. 33. But he cannot mean that he by the resurrection became the Son of God, and was then begotten: for he had this title before that. His meaning is explained by himself in his epistle to the Romans. ‘Declared to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead.’ Rom. i. 4. That is, this was a fresh and open manifestation and declaration that he was indeed what had been often asserted of him, and what he always was: The only begotten Son of God. “What the angel said to the virgin Mary, ‘He shall be great, and shall he called the Son of the Highest—The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God,’ cannot reasonably be understood as a declaration that his sonship consisted in his miraculous conception, or in the union of the second person of the Trinity with the human nature, thus conceived: But that this child, conceived in this manner, and born of a virgin, should appear, and be known to be the Son of God, that very person who had been spoken of and known in all past ages by this title; of whom Isaiah had particularly spoken, when he said, ‘Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a Son, and shall call his name Immanuel. Unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder: And his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God:’ Isaiah vii. 14. ix. 6. That this Son was now to be born of the virgin Mary: the long expected Messiah, who is considered and spoken of by the people of God, by the title of the Son of God, which title he shall bear, as he is indeed the mighty God. “We are naturally lead to consider the Son of God as existing in this character before his incarnation, and the same with the Word, by what is said of him in the first chapter of John. ‘The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory as of the only begotten of the Father. No man hath seen God at any time. The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. John bare witness of him, and cried, saying, this was he of whom I spake, he that cometh after me, is preferred before me: For he was before me. And I saw, and bear record that this is the Son of God.’ Here John is represented as asserting that the Son of God, concerning whom he bore witness, did exist before him, which therefore must be before his incarnation; for John was conceived before the incarnation of Jesus. But how can this be true, if there were no Son of God, before John existed? But if we consider the Word and the Son of God as synonymous, who was in the beginning with God, and who was God, and created all things, this whole chapter will be plain and easy to be understood; and we shall see John bearing witness to the Son of God, who existed before him in this character, and was now come in the flesh. “We find the same representation made in the epistle to the Hebrews. ‘God, who spake in time past unto the fathers, by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things; by whom also he made the worlds. Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power,’ &c. How could God make the worlds by his Son, four thousand years before he had a Son; and on this supposition, where is the propriety or truth of this assertion? And how could the Son be said to uphold all things by the word of his power, thousands of years before any Son existed? ‘And again, when he bringeth the first begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him.’ This expression naturally suggests the idea that God the Father had a first-begotten Son to bring into the world, whom he commanded the angels to worship. How can he be said to bring his first begotten Son into the world, when he had no such Son to bring into the world; and indeed never did bring this his Son into the world, if he was begotten and received his sonship in this world, when he took the human nature in the womb of the virgin, and was not a son before? “Again, speaking of Melchisedec, he says, he was ‘Without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days, nor end of life; but made like unto the Son of God.’ Heb. vii. 3. If there were no Son of God till the human nature of Christ existed, then the Son of God did begin to exist; consequently there was a beginning of his days; and Melchisedec was not made like him, but unlike to him, by having no beginning of days. “Since there are so many passages of scripture, (and there are many more than have now been mentioned) which seem to represent the Redeemer as the Son of God, antecedent to his incarnation, and independent of it, which will naturally lead those who attend to them to this idea of him; and some of them cannot be easily reconciled to the contrary opinion; this will fully account for the generally received doctrine in the Christian world from the earliest ages to this time, viz. That the Redeemer of man is the second person in the Trinity, the eternal Son of God, who in the fulness of time was made flesh, by a personal union with the human nature. “4. It is worthy of consideration, whether the contrary opinion, viz. That the Redeemer is the Son of God, only by the second person in the Trinity being united to human nature, and becoming man, does not naturally lead to dangerous and evil consequences; and what good end is to be answered by it? If it be not agreeable to scripture, we know it must be dangerous and hurtful in a greater or less degree, (as all errors respecting the person and character of the Redeemer are) and naturally tends to lead into other mistakes, still greater, and of worse consequence. And if it be agreeable to scripture, it certainly has no bad tendency. If, therefore, it does appear from reasoning upon it, or from fact and experience, that this opinion tends to evil consequences, and has a bad effect; we may safely conclude that it is wrong, and contrary to divine revelation. “1. Does not this sentiment tend to lower our ideas of the Redeemer, and lead into a way of thinking less honourably of him? It has been observed that it appears from scripture, that this title, Son of God, was used to express the highest and most honourable idea which his friends had of his person and character. But if we understand by it, nothing but what takes place by his union to man, by taking flesh upon him, and consider it as signifying nothing but what took place by his becoming man, nothing is expressed by it more than by Son of man: And we are left without any epithet or common scripture phrase, whereby to express the divinity, the Godhead of the Redeemer, and his equality with the Father. Thus, instead of raising our conceptions of the Redeemer, does it not tend to sink them? Does not the sonship of Christ become an infinitely less and more inconsiderable matter, upon this plan, than that which has always been esteemed the orthodox sentiment on this point, which considers his sonship, as wholly independent of the whole creation, as eternal, and altogether divine? “We live in an age when the enemies of the Redeemer lift up their heads, and are suffered to multiply and prevail. The deists attempt to cast him out as an impostor. Arians and Socinians strip him of his divinity: And the careless, ignorant, immoral and profane, treat him with contempt, or neglect. This is agreeable to his great enemy, Satan; who seems now to be let loose in an unusual degree, and has uncommon power among men, to lead them into gross errors, and those especially which are dishonourable to Christ, and injurious to his character. And if this sentiment now under consideration, concerning the Sonship of the Redeemer, should spread and prevail now, this would be no evidence in favour of it; but, considering what has been now observed, concerning it, would it not give reason to suspect, at least, that it is dishonourable to the Son of God, and leads to other errors yet more dishonourable to him? “This leads to observe, “2. It is worthy of consideration, whether this doctrine of the filiation of Jesus Christ, does not tend to reject the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been held by those who have been called the orthodox in the christian church, and leads to what is called Sabellianism; which considers the Deity as but one person, and to be three only out of respect to the different manner or kind of his operations. “This notion of the Sonship of Christ, leads to suppose that the Deity is the Father of the Mediator, without distinction of persons; and that by Father so often mentioned in the New Testament, and generally in relation to the Son is commonly, if not always, meant Deity, without distinction of persons. If this be so, it tends to exclude all distinction of persons in God, and to make the personality of the Redeemer to consist wholly in the human nature; and finally, to make his union with Deity no more, but the same which Arians and Socinians admit, viz. the same which takes place between God and good men in general; but in a higher and peculiar degree. But if there be no tendency in this doctrine of the sonship of Christ, to the consequences which have been now mentioned; and it can be made evident that none of those supposed evils do attend it, or can follow from it; yet it remains to be considered what advantage attends it, and the good ends it will answer, if it were admitted to be true. None will say, it is presumed, that it is more agreeable to the general expressions of scripture relating to this point, than the opposite doctrine; who well considers what has been observed above. The most that any one can with justice say with respect to this is, that the scripture may be so construed and understood, as to be consistent with the sonship of Christ, commencing at the incarnation, however inconsistent with it some passages may appear at first view. “It may be thought, perhaps, that this notion of the sonship of the Redeemer is attended with two advantages, if not with more, viz. It frees the doctrine of the Trinity from that which is perfectly incomprehensible, and appears a real contradiction and absurdity; that the second person should be Son of the first, who is the Father; the Son being begotten by the Father from eternity; than which nothing can be more inconceivable, and seemingly absurd. And this appears inconsistent with the second person being equal with the first; for a son begotten of a father, implies inferiority, and that he exists after his father, and consequently begins to exist, and is dependent. Both these difficulties are wholly avoided, it is thought, by supposing that the second person in the Trinity became a son by being united to the human nature, and begotten in the womb of the virgin. And it is probable that these supposed advantages have recommended this scheme of the Sonship of Christ, to chose who embrace it, and led them to reject the commonly received opinion; and not a previous conviction that the former is most agreeable to the scripture. This therefore demands our serious and candid attention. And the following things may be observed upon it. “1. If we exclude every thing from our creed, concerning God, his existence, and the manner of his existence, which to us is incomprehensible and unaccountable, we must reject the doctrine of the Trinity in unity, and even of the existence of a God. The doctrine of three persons in one God is wholly inconceivable by us, and Unitarians consider it as the greatest contradiction and absurdity imaginable. And those Trinitarians, who have undertaken to explain it, and make it more intelligible, have generally failed of giving any light; but have really made it absurd and even ridiculous, by ‘darkening counsel by words without knowledge.’ If we reasoned properly on the matter, we should expect to find in a revelation which God has made of himself, his being and manner of subsistence, mysteries which we can by no means understand, which are to creatures wonderful, and wholly unaccountable. For the being of God, and the manner of his existence, and of his subsisting, must be infinitely above our comprehension: God is infinitely great, and we know him not. And if we attempt to search out these mysteries by reason, we are prone to think they are contradictions and absurdities, merely because our reason cannot fathom them; and they appear more unintelligible, the more we try to understand them. ‘Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.’ Job ii. 7, 8, 9. ‘Teach us what we shall say unto him, (and what we shall say concerning him;) for we cannot order our speech by reason of darkness. Shall it be told him that I speak?’ and attempt to comprehend and explain the mysteries that relate to his existence? ‘If a man speak, surely he shall be swallowed up.’ Job xxxvii. 19, 20. If a man undertake thus to speak, instead of giving any light, he will be involved and overwhelmed in impenetrable darkness. “They, therefore, who do not believe the eternal sonship of Jesus Christ, because it is mysterious and incomprehensible, and to some it appears to be full of contradiction, will, if they be consistent with themselves, for the same reason, reject the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in one God. “2. If the doctrine of the eternal generation and sonship of the second person in the Trinity be soberly and modestly considered in the light of the foregoing observation, and with a proper sense of our own darkness and infinite inferiority to the divine Being, and how little we can know of him; we shall not be forward to pronounce it inconsistent with reason, and absurd; but be convinced, that to do thus, is very bold and assuming; and that it may be consistent and true, notwithstanding any thing we may know; though it be mysterious and incomprehensible. This is a divine generation, infinitely above any thing that takes place among creatures, and infinitely different. It is that of which we can have no adequate idea, and is infinitely out of our reach. What incompetent judges are we then of this matter? What right or ability have we to pronounce it absurd or inconsistent, when we have no capacity to know or determine what is true, consistent, or inconsistent in this high point, any farther than God has been pleased to reveal it to us? There may be innumerable mysteries in the existence and manner of subsistence of the infinite Being, which are, and must be, incomprehensible, by a finite understanding. God has been pleased, for wise ends, to reveal that of the Trinity, and this of the eternal generation and sonship of the second person: And he has done it in a manner, and in words best suited to convey those ideas of it to men, which it is necessary they should have: And we ought to receive it with meekness and implicit submission, using our reason in excluding every thing which is contrary to, or below infinite perfection, and absolute independence; without pretending to comprehend it, or to be able to judge of that which is infinitely high and divine, by that which takes place among creatures, with respect to generation, and father and son. “God is said in scripture, to repent and be grieved at his heart; to be angry, and to have his fury to come up in his face; and hands, feet, eyes, mouth, lips and tongue, &c. are ascribed to him. These words are designed and suited to convey useful ideas, and important instruction to men. But if we should understand these expression as meaning the same thing in the Divine Being, that they do when applied to men; we must entertain very unworthy, and most absurd notions of God, and wholly inconsistent with other declarations in the sacred Oracles. But if we exclude every thing that is human, or that implies any change or imperfection from these expressions when applied to the Deity, they will convey nothing absurd or inconsistent, or that is unworthy of God. And it will doubtless be equally so in the case before us; if it be constantly kept in mind that the only begotten Son of God denotes nothing human, but is infinitely above any thing which relates to natural, or creature generation, and does not include any beginning, change, dependence, inferiority, or imperfection. This will effectually exclude all real absurdity and contradiction. “It will be asked, perhaps, when all this is excluded from our ideas of generation, of Father and Son, what idea will remain in our minds, which is conveyed by these words? Will they not be without any signification to us, and altogether useless? To this, the following answer may be given: From what is revealed concerning this high and incomprehensible mystery, we learn, that in the existence of the Deity, there is that which is high above our thoughts, as the heavens are above the earth, infinitely beyond our conception, and different from any thing which takes place among creatures, which is a foundation of a personal distinction, as real and great as that between father and son among men, and infinitely more perfect: which distinction may be in the best manner conveyed to us by Father and Son, to express the most perfect union and equality; that the Son is the brightness of the Father’s glory, and the express image of his person, and that there is infinite love and endearment between them; and that in the economy of the work of redemption, the Son is obedient to the Father, &c. All this, and much more, our minds are capable of conceiving from what is revealed on this high and important subject; which is suited to impress our hearts with a sense of the incomprehensible, infinite, adorable perfection and glory of the Father and the Son; and is necessary in order to give us a right understanding of the gospel; of the true character of the Redeemer, and of the work of redemption. “What has been now said under this second particular, may serve to remove the other supposed difficulty in admitting the eternal filiation of the second person in the Trinity, viz. that it represents the Son as inferior to the Father, and as existing after him, and therefore his existence had a beginning. This is obviated by the above observations; and particularly by this, that it is a divine filiation, and therefore infinitely unlike that which is human; and above our comprehension. Besides, to suppose eternal generation admits of before or after, or of a beginning, is inconsistent. It may be further observed, “3. That the opinion that Jesus Christ is the first and only begotten Son of God, by the second person in the Trinity becoming incarnate, and united to the human nature, is, perhaps, attended with as great difficulties as the other which has been considered, if not greater. If so, the inducement to embrace it, and reject the other, which we are examining, wholly ceases. “If the Son was begotten by the miraculous formation of the human nature; then the Holy Ghost begot the Son and is the Father, as much as the first person in the Trinity. For the angel said to the virgin, ‘The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God.’ If we take these words as referring only to the production of the human nature, and if it be granted that by the highest, is meant the first person in the Trinity, of which there does not appear to be any evidence, yet the third person, the Holy Ghost, is represented as doing as much, and being as active in this production as the first person. But if this were no difficulty, and the first person of the Trinity be supposed to produce the human nature, and in this sense to be the Father of Jesus Christ; yet this will make him his Father in no other and higher sense than he is the Father of angels, and of Adam; and Jesus Christ will be the Son of God in no other, or higher sense than they; for they were created and formed in an extraordinary, miraculous way. “If the Son was begotten by uniting the second person of the Trinity with the human nature, and the filiation of the Son is supposed to consist wholly in being thus united to man; this is attended with the following difficulties, as great, perhaps, if not greater, than those which attend the eternal Sonship of the second person. “1. This is as different in nature and kind from natural or creature generation, as eternal divine generation; and the one bears no analogy or likeness to the other. “2. This union of God with the creature so as to become one person, is as mysterious and incomprehensible, as the eternal Sonship of the second person of the Trinity; and as inexplicable: so that nothing is gained with respect to this, by embracing this scheme. “3. It is not agreeable to scripture to suppose that the first person of the Trinity only, united the second person to the human nature, and so became a Father by thus begetting a Son. The third person, the Holy Ghost, is represented as doing this, or at least, being active in it; and there is nothing expressly said of the first person doing any thing respecting it as such. ‘The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also, that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God.’ ‘Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise. When his mother, Mary, was espoused to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost.’ And the angel of the Lord said unto Joseph, ‘Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: For that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.’ Matt. i. 18, 20. And this uniting the divine nature with the human, is expressly ascribed, not to the first, but to the second person. ‘For as much as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself took part of the same. For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham.’ Heb. ii. 14, 16. Do not they speak not only without scripture, but contrary to it, who say that the first person of the Trinity became a Father by uniting the second person to the human nature, in the womb of the virgin Mary; by which the latter became the only begotten Son of the Father? That the relation of Father and Son began in the incarnation of Christ, and consists wholly in this? And do they by this supposition avoid any difficulty, and render the filiation of the Redeemer more consistent, intelligible, or honourable to him? Let the thoughtful, candid discerning reader judge.” Hopkins. 104.This is an incontestable proof that the Son is God, even JEHOVAH. The Psalmist often says, “Blessed are they, blessed is the man who trusteth in the Lord.” And here he says, Blessed are all they who trust in the Son of God, and yet forbids us to put our trust in any but God. “Put not your trust in princes, or in the son of man, in whom there is no help. Happy is he that hath the God of Jacob for his help, whose hope is in the Lord his God.” Psalm cxlvi. 3, 5. And he says, “My soul, wait thou only upon God; for my expectation is from him.” Psalm lxii. 5. They only are blessed, who trust in God; and all others are cursed. “Thus saith the Lord, Cursed be the man that trusteth in man. Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is.” Jer. xvii. 5, 7. They are blessed, who trust in the Son of God. Therefore he is the Lord. 105.It has been before observed, that the denial of the eternal sonship of Christ seemed to have a tendency to a rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity; and in what way. But what is here observed, shews how the denial of the former tends, another way, to the rejection of the latter. For if the former be rejected, because it is incomprehensible, and appears inconsistent, it may be expected that when the doctrine of the Trinity is more particularly considered, it will appear equally unintelligible; and therefore be rejected, for the same reason. Is it not probable, that Sabellius, the ancient Anti-trinitarian, was in this way led to give up the doctrine of the Trinity? 106.See Dr. Owen against Biddle, p. 362. 107.???a a?e?f???t??. 108.Antiq. Lib. III. Cap. 5. 109.This the Holy Ghost has condescended, for what reason I know not, to give countenance to, in all those quotations in the New Testament, where the name Jehovah, is referred to from the Old. 110.In two places, indeed, it is rendered by Te??, God, Gen. iv. 1. and Isa. liv. 13. And there is one place in which some think they attempt a literal translation of it, 2 Sam. i. 11. where, instead of the people of the Lord, they translate the text, ep? t?? ?a?? ???da, in which, some think, ???da, is put for ???a, or ???a, through the mistake of some amanuensis; but it seems rather to be an explication than a literal translation of the words; and whereas some think, the reason of this method used by them in their translation, is, because the Hebrew letters, of which that name consists, cannot well be expressed by the letters of the Greek alphabet, so as to compose a word like it, that does not seem to be the reason of it, inasmuch as they attempt to translate other names equally difficult; as in Gen. x. 2. ???a?, for Javan; and 2 Kings xii. 2. ??dae for Jehoiada. 111.See Dr. Allix’s judgment of the Jewish church against the Unitarians, chap. xiii. to xvi. 112.Vid. Catech. Racov. ad Quest. lix. 113.It is elsewhere said concerning him, 1 John iii. 5. that he was manifested, &c. efa?e????, as also in ver. 8. And as for what is said in the last clause of the verse we are considering, that he was received up into glory, it is a very great strain on the sense of these words, to apply it to a mystery, or to the gospel, since the words, a?e??f?? e? d???, plainly intimate a person’s meeting with a glorious reception when ascending into heaven; a?a?aa???a? signifies sursum recipere, therefore we render it, received up; and so it is often applied to our Saviour, Acts i. 2, 11, 22. and his ascension is called, Luke ix. 51. ?e?a t?? a?a???e??, the time in which he should be received up. 114.See Whitby in loc. 115.See Dr. Clarke’s reply to Nelson, page 86. 116.Thus they are four times, Luke i. 68. 2 Cor. i. 5. Eph. i. 3. and 1 Pet. i. 3. wherein e?????t?? is put before Te??. 117.Dr. Owen against Biddle, page 256. 118.See Dr. Clarke’s reply to Nelson, page 97. 120.It is certain, that ?a? is oftentimes exegetical, as well as copulative; and it appears to be so, by a great many instances in the New Testament; when it is put between two nouns, the first whereof has an article, and the other none; thus it will be acknowledged by all, that it is taken, in 2 Cor. i. 3. Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, ? Te?? ?a? ?at??; so in Eph. i. 3. 2 Thes. ii. 16. 1. Pet. i. 3. Rom. xv. 6. Phil. iv. 20. 2 Cor. xi. 31. and in Col. ii. 2. In these scriptures, and others of the like nature, the Arians themselves allow that this rule holds good, though they will not allow it, when it proves our Saviour’s Deity, because it militates against their own scheme; as in Eph. v. 5. where the apostle speaks of the kingdom of Christ, and of God, as we render it; but, I think, it ought to be rendered, even of God; for it is, t?? ???st?? ?a? Te?? so in 2 Thess. i. 12. The grace of our God, and, or even, of the Lord Jesus Christ, the words are, t?? Te?? ??? ?a? ?????? ??s?? ???st??. See among many other scriptures to the like purpose, 1 Tim. v. 21. and chap. vi. 13. 2 Pet. i. 2. It is true there are several exceptions to this rule, though they are generally in such instances, in which it is impossible for the latter word to contain an explication of the former, though, in other instances, it, for the most part, holds good; and therefore it will, at least, amount to a probable argument, that the words in this text, t?? e?a??? Te?? ?a? s?t???? ??? ??s?? ???st?? ought to be rendered, of the great God, even our Saviour Jesus Christ. Vide Granville Sharp on the Greek article, and Middleton on the same subject. 121.See Dr. Clark’s reply to Nelson, page 85. 122.The words, ? ?????? and ? Te?? are in the nominative case, which denotes that they are not spoken in a way of exclamation. 123.See reply to Nelson, page 67. 124.Acts vii. 43. chap. xiv. 11. 125.See Matt. xix. 26. compared with Mark x. 27. 126.See Scripture-doctrine, &c. page 67, 68, and in many other places. 127.This is the sense of Dr. Clarke’s first section in Part 2, on which the whole scheme seems to be founded; and he speaks to the same purpose in several other places; and, in particular, in his reply to Nelson, page 67, 68, he concludes the word Te??, God, absolutely taken to import the same, as ? pa?t???at?? or ? ep? pa?t?? Te??, by which he always intends the Father. 128.See Scripture-doctrine, page 3. 130.See Dr. Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine, page 176. 131.Whitby is very particular in laying down this sense of the text, with the defence thereof, in his annotations on this scripture, from Heliodorus, where he finds the words, ??pa?a p??e??, which he renders, to snatch at; and ??pa?a ??e?s?a?, which, he supposes, signifies to pursue, or covet, a thing that is desirable, but, however, the words going before, or following, in that author, may determine that to be his sense thereof, as the sense of particular words is oftentimes greatly varied thereby; yet this will not justify the rendering them in the same sense, in other instances, very foreign thereunto, as certainly the text we are explaining must be reckoned to be; besides, the word is not the same, for it is ??pa?a, which properly signifies a prey, or the thing stolen; and therefore though ??pa?a p??e?? ???t???a? may signify, to catch an opportunity, as a person catches at what he thinks for his advantage, yet if the word ??pa??? had been used instead of it, it would very much have altered the sense thereof; also though ??pa?a ??e?s?a? signifies, to esteem a thing worthy to be pursued, or catched at, as a prey, yet ??pa??? ??e?s?a?, which are the words in the text we are considering, signify no such thing, but rather to reckon a thing unlawful to be pursued, as what he has no right to; and that is the sense thereof in our text, q. d. He did not think it unlawful to pursue, or lay claim to that divine honour, of being equal with God, or, as we render it, thought it not robbery, &c. For the justifying of this sense, every one, that observes the acceptation of the Greek words, will find that ??pa??? signifies, the action of robbing, and ??pa?a the thing stolen, as may be observed in many other words, where the former construction signifies the act; the latter the effect: as in ????s?? and ????sa, ??pas??, and ??pasa, ???as?? and ???asa, ???s?? and ???sa, ?p??s?? and ?p??sa, st??as?? and st??asa; and, in the New Testament, apt?s?? signifies the action of baptizing, and apt?sa the ordinance in which it is performed. See Mark vii. 8. compared with Matt. iii. 7. and chap. xxi. 25. Multitudes of instances might have been given, but these are sufficient. 132.Grotius in loc. 133.“It may readily be granted that any tract published by an apostolick man, in the early Christian church, would be circulated among the Christians of those times, with great dispatch, immediately on its publication. This is a natural and indefeasible position, since it arises from a principle in human nature itself. It is natural, too, that, in those times, it should be copied without delay in such churches as were then extant. And this first edition would be circulated to the widest extent, of course. Churches that were established afterwards were more likely to receive the second edition of such a writer’s works; especially, if they had intercourse with the town where he resided in his latter days, and drew their copies from thence, immediately. But I think we may say, that for one copy of the second edition that was circulated, there would be 20, or 50, or 100 copies of the first edition; since not only would it have the advantage of priority, but not one reader in a hundred would think of the second as different from the first. And this has led our translators to mark, as doubtful, the first quotation which I selected from the first Epistle of John, in my last; chap. ii. 23. I have no doubt of the genuineness of the addition; but possibly there may be 50 copies without it to one which contains it. “Admitting, then, the residence of St. John be at Ephesus, or any part of Asia Minor, for the last thirty years of his life, for which we have the testimony of ancient history, we may date his first epistle, early in that period: or even before he came to live there. This would spread first, among the neighbouring churches in Asia Minor: secondly, eastward, to those countries which professed Christianity, Antioch, for certain: Syria, Cilicia, Pontus, Cappadocia, Galatia, Babylonia, &c. Toward these countries, there are caravans which go every month, or six weeks, from Asia Minor: there is a regular intercourse maintained, between Smyrna, and the internal parts of Asia Minor, and on through Tarsus to Antioch:—from Ephesus to Smyrna was easy. We have every reason to affirm, that it was the same anciently, and therefore, there was an immediate conveyance of such addresses as the apostle John published for the general use of all Christians, from Ephesus, eastward to the oriental provinces of the Roman empire, where Christianity was settled and flourished. In these churches his writings would be in request. Moreover, these churches would be the first to translate his writings into their current language, for the use of the natives of these provinces, who did not understand Greek (which, however prevalent the Greek language was, must have been many) because here was a great number of professing Christians, who desired to be acquainted with their contents. “It is evident, therefore, that these translations, having for their basis the first edition, can be no evidences of what the apostle thought proper to add in his second addition. The Syriac version, for instance, if we suppose that to be the earliest of all, would represent the first edition, as would also, all versions made from it, and all copies made from those, at that time, received in those parts. Whereas, the Armenian version, because it is much later, would at least stand the chance of obtaining (and being made from) the second edition. The Syriac version, therefore, is no evidence against an addition. The Armenian version is an evidence for it. This version contains 1 John v. 7. “Also, the churches in Africa were not planted till many years after those of Asia; their intercourse with Ephesus, being by sea, was irregular, and could only take place, occasionally, if it was direct. If we suppose it to be, on the subject before us, through Italy, then it was subject to the same circumstances as attended the intercourse between Ephesus and Rome. I say Rome, because we have no reason to think that there was any number of Christians, worth mentioning, in any other city of Italy. The apostle Paul, when travelling from Rhegio upward was met by brethren from Rome; which when he saw, he thanked God, and took courage. Certainly, then, he had not met with many friends in places that he passed through, and his courage had been somewhat cast down, for that reason. We find no trace of Christianity in Herculaneum, one of the cities of Italy, of the second size, which was destroyed A. D. 79, though we meet with traces of Judaism there; and in short, it must be admitted, that, compared with Asia, the western provinces had but few Christians. We have no reason to think that Rome sent out missionaries early. The south of France was christianized from Asia, though so much further off than Rome. The natural inference is, that these parts would receive later copies of any apostolick writing, published in Asia Minor, than those parts which had a regular intercourse, half a dozen times in a year, at least, but probably much oftener, with Ephesus. And whatever versions were extant in the west, would represent the second edition with its variations, whatever they might be. “As to Rome itself, I infer, that that capital of the empire had, if any place had, both editions. Suppose, for a moment, that the first edition had reached Rome, when Aristobulus quitted that city for Britain, or that it was sent to Aristobulus, in Britain, from Rome, it will follow, that the ancient British copies would not contain those additions which the apostle John inserted in the second edition. And to this agrees the fact: for Pelagianism could hardly have been repressed by any text more effectually than by the one in question. Yet that errour rose in Britain, and it was not so decidedly opposed then, as it is now, minus the testimony of this text. Moreover, the text is not quoted by the venerable Bede, in a passage of his works, where we should expect to find it, at least, alluded to. He, therefore, might have the first edition. “In short, almost all the arguments employed against the authenticity of the text may be admitted. They cease to have any great force, after it is once conceded to those who use them, that the first edition, together with all its representatives, in the first century, suppose, had not the words in debate. They are reduced to the infirmity of a negative argument, at best. “I must now observe, that the African churches being planted long after the Asiatick, they, no doubt, would obtain the best transcripts of the works of any inspired writer, which could be procured about the time of their being founded; i. e. the second edition of the letter under consideration. To this agrees the fact; the African bishops quote the passage. Tertullian, Cyprian, Eucherius, Eugenius, with his consistory of 400 bishops, Vigilius, Fulgentius, &c. &c. so that it was undeniably extant in their copies from the second century downwards. The argument, then, is reduced to a point: either these divines found the passage in their copies, or they put it there. The latter alternative is so dishonourable to Christians and to Christianity, that one is willing to accept of any hypothesis which may vindicate professors and teachers from such enormous guilt.—But further: “I have said, that Rome might be expected to procure whatever was most excellent in Christian literature, as well as in other studies. It had, then, the first edition, because that was the earliest which could be procured; and the second because the influx of persons to Rome from all parts was so great, that every thing which was portable of a literary nature, might be expected to be brought there. Rome had an ancient version of the scriptures, known under the name of the old Italic version. It is not of any consequence to our argument, whether this version contained the text of the heavenly witnesses, since it was made very early; but if the revised Roman version of the New Testament contained it, we are reduced to the same dilemma as before, in reference to the African bishops—The reviser of this edition (Jerom) either found it, or forged it. The same arguments that relieve the characters of the African bishops, relieve the character of this father. The accusation is incredible. It is loading the party with a crime so far beyond ordinary culpability, that the mind revolts at the charge. It is admitted, then, that the Latin version reads this verse; that St. Jerome adopted it; that it was adopted by the learned after him; as by our own famous Alkwin, at the time, and in the court of Charlemagne, and has so continued ever since. The inference is, that St. Jerome preferred the authority and text of the second edition, and followed it. “These, moreover, are independent witnesses; for, the African bishops, who wrote before Jerom, could not receive this passage from his revised version: or, if any choose to affirm that the African bishops received this passage from the old Italic version, then the authenticity of the passage follows of course, in proportion to whatever importance is attached to this increased antiquity.” SELECT REVIEWS. 134.Mr. Abraham Taylor, in his true Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity, Part. I. chap. 2. in which we have his own method of reasoning in defence thereof, which is, at least, sufficient to remove the boasts and insults of those who wonder that we should not give up the cause entirely to them. 135.See Histoire Crit. du. Nouv. Testam. chap. 18. page 204. 136.See this conjecture of Father Simon learnedly opposed in Smith. Miscellan. contra Simon. 137.Vid. Epist. lxxiii. ad Jubaianum, & de Unitate Eccl. § v. 138.See true Scripture-doctrine, &c. page 53. 139.Contra Praxeam, cap. 25. 140.See the Author before referred to, in the true scripture-doctrine, &c. as also Trigland de tribus in cÆlo testibus. 141.Vide Abbadie on the Divinity of Christ, per totum. 142.See Quest. vii. 143.See Dr. Clarke’s Scripture doctrine, page 127. 144.Reply to Nelson, page 169. 145.See a parallel scripture, Prov. xxx. 2, 3. 146.? ?? e? t? ???a??, is admitted by Griesback into his text. 147.By the wisdom of God seems here to be meant the wisdom of God essentially considered. But see Matt. xxiii. 34. 148.See Dr. Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine, page 63. 150.Dr. Waterland, Serm. III. in defence of Christ, page 106. 151.“That Christ was not a mere instrument which God used in the work of creation, as the Arians pretend, is plain from this, that the Scriptures not only teach, that Christ was the very supreme God himself that created all things; Psal. cii. 25. Heb. i. 10. but also that no instrument was used in that work. It was wrought immediately by God himself. As it is written, ‘God himself formed the earth and made it.’ Isa. xlv. 18. (This, all grant, was the supreme God: And this God was Jesus Christ.) ‘He alone spread out the heavens.’ Job ix. 8. Not by an instrument, but by himself alone, Isa. xliv. 24. with his own hands. Isa. xlv. 12.” Bellamy. 152.d?a ??s?? ???st?? are omitted by Griesbach. 153.Vid. Bez. in loc. Unus Deus omnes populos condidit, sic etiam nunc omnes ad se vocat; condidit autem per Christum, sic per Christum instaurat. 154.See Matt. xii. 32. 1 Cor. x. 11. Eph. i. 21. and chap. ii. 7. Heb. vi. 5. and chap. ix. 26. the apostle speaking of the foundation of the world, meaning the first creation, uses the word ??s??; but when, in the following words, he speaks of Christ’s appearing in the end of the world, to put away sin, &c. he uses the words t?? a?????. 156.See Quest. lxvii. and lxxv. 157.“The Father, saith he, is greater than I. John xiv. 28. As Christ is the head of the church, so the head of Christ is God. 1 Cor. iii. 23. xi. 3. He calleth the Father his God. Matt, xxvii. 46. John xx. 17.—The Father raised him to Israel; Acts xiii. 23. anointed him with the Holy Ghost and with power; Acts x. 38. spared him not, but delivered him up for us all; Rom. viii. 32. and raised him from the dead. Acts ii. 24.—God had appointed him to execute his saving designs, sent him into this world, and gave him commandments. John iii. 16, 17. vi. 38-40. The work given him he finished, and in it he was faithful to the Father. John iv. 34. xvii. 4. Heb. iii. 2. x. 9.—Therefore, God hath also exalted him above measure; Phil. ii. 9. set him at his own right hand in heaven; Eph. i. 20. and gave him all power. Matt, xxviii. 18. He hath made him Lord and Christ; Acts ii. 36. exalted him to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give to Israel repentance and remission of sins. Acts v. 31. He hath also ordained him to judge the world in righteousness; Acts xviii. 31. and to him, Christ shall then be subject, and deliver up the kingdom. 1 Cor. xv. 24-28. “To be the true God, and to be under God, to be the Infinite, and to be the subject, are, according to all reason, and the scripture itself, inconsistent properties. By undeniable authority, however, they are ascribed to the same subject; and therefore, there must be a way to solve the difficulty. How often do we meet with particulars in the system of truth, which seem to oppose one another; but when well considered, agree, and even support one another. The human constitution itself, exhibits a clear instance. The grand inquiry is, upon what foundation every different truth is established, and how to reconcile seeming contradictions. Now, while they who attack the Godhead of Jesus, can never in our opinion, answer the multitude of proofs in its favour; there is on the contrary, for the confessors of that doctrine, the greatest store of solutions, as often as something not divine, something beneath the nature and authority of his Father, and something finite are testified concerning him. ‘He who was in the form of God, and counted it not robbery to be equal with God, took upon him the form of a servant.’ Phil. ii. 6, 7. ‘The Word who was with God, and who was God, became flesh; but in that flesh, manifested a glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.’ John i. 1, 14.—According to the infallible testimony, he is therefore true God and true man; and his saving mediatory performances are inseparably founded on both natures. While the value of these, the power to save his people forever, and to direct all things in heaven and on earth to that end, as also the fitness to be the object of their grateful confidence, and his capacity for conducting the general judgment, are founded on, and give an invincible proof of his divine perfection; it is at the same time his finite nature, wherein he finished the human ministrations of his teaching office, and of his priestly sacrifice.—And thus it is intelligible, how the glory and majesty with which he governs the kingdom of God, to the mighty ingathering and defence of his people, and to the destruction of all opposition, occur as an exaltation; in as far as the human nature, according to its capacity shared therein, obtained the fruit and reward of its labour, and the Lamb that was slain, deserves and receives everlasting honour, because of the works of salvation in both natures. This appears, because every where, his obedience and deepest humiliation are assigned as the reason of his exaltation.—‘I was dead and behold I am alive for evermore, Amen! and have the keys of hell and of death.’ Rev. i. 18. ‘To this end Christ died, and rose, and revived, that he might be Lord over the dead and the living.’ Rom, xiv. 9. See also Phil. ii. 7-10. Heb. i. 3. John v. 27. Rev. i. 5, 6. v. 12-14.” Wynpersse. 158.See Quest. vii. 159.Creatures are said to be believed, as our Saviour speaking concerning John the Baptist, in Mark xi. 31. says, Why did ye not believe him? d?at? ??? ??? ep?ste?sate a?t?; and, in Acts viii. 12. the Samaritans believed Philip, ep?ste?sa? t? F???pp?; and, in John v. 46. Moses is described as a person who ought to be believed; Had ye believed Moses, &c. says our Saviour, e? ?a? ep?ste?ete ??s?; but it is never said that a creature is believed in. This was Augustin’s observation; upon which occasion he says, In Exposit. Evangel. Johan. Tract. 29. “Though we may be said to believe Paul and Peter, yet we are never said to believe in them.” But as for our Saviour, we are not only to believe him, namely, what he has spoken, but p?st?e?? e?? a?t??, to believe in him. 160.The words are, e??p??? t?? Te?? t?? ?stt?? ??p?????t?? ta pa?ta ?a? ???? t?? ??s??; where ?a? seems to be exegetical, according to the rule laid down, page 318. and therefore I would render the words, God, who quickeneth all things even Jesus Christ; and, if this be a just rendering, then the Father is not mentioned in the context; and therefore this doxology is not ascribed to him but to our Saviour. 161.See Dr. Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine, page 58, 77. 162.The chief opposers of Christ’s being the object of worship, were Jacobus PalÆologus, Franciscus Davidus, Christianus Franken, Simon BuduÆus; and, on the other hand, it was defended by Socinus, and several others, though not in the same sense in which we maintain it. 163.See Dr. Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine, page 132. 165.See Dr. Waterland’s defence of the divinity of Christ, serm. iv. pag. 127. & seq. where he proves, that the exclusive terms of One, only, &c. do not except the Son, so as to deny him to have the same Godhead with the Father: this he proves from several scriptures, viz. Mat. xi. 27. No one knoweth the Son, but the Father; nor any one the Father, save the Son; it does not follow from hence, that the Father does not know himself nor the Son himself: and when it is said, in 1 Cor. ii. 11. The things of God knoweth no one, but the Spirit of God; this does not exclude the Son, for that would contradict the scripture but now mentioned; no more than the Son’s only knowing the Father excludes the Holy Ghost, which would be contrary to this scripture; so in Rev. xix. 12. it is said, that the Son had a name written which no one knew but he himself: none ever thought that the Father was excluded by this exclusive term; so when God the Father saith, in Isa. xliv. 24. I am he that maketh all things, that stretcheth forth the heavens alone, that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself: this would contradict many other scriptures, which speak of the Son as the Creator of all things, if he were to be excluded by it. Again, when the Psalmist saith, concerning the Father, in Psal. lxxxiii. 18. that his name alone is Jehovah, we must set aside all those scriptures in which our Saviour is called Jehovah, if he is contained in this exclusive term. See more to this purpose in the said sermon, in which this argument is managed with a great deal of judgment. I shall only take leave farther to cite what is well observed in page 33. “That, perhaps the word God in those places, namely, such in which there are these exclusive terms, is to be understood in the indefinite sense, abstracting from the particular consideration of this or that person, in like manner as the word man often stands not for any particular human person, but the whole species, or human nature; as when we say, man is frail; man is mortal, or the like.” 166.?? e e??ta? pe?? t?? a?a???. Beza speaks of two or three of the most ancient copies in which this reading is found; and Grotius also adheres to it, from the credit, as he says, of the most ancient and correct copies; and it is also observed, that the vulgar Latin version renders it so; and Augustin read it so in the copy that he made use of: and whereas the evangelists, Mark and Luke, read it, Why callest thou me good, he endeavours to reconcile this different reading therewith as supposing there was a seeming contradiction between them which he might better have done, by referring to some copies which had it, as we read it, why callest thou me good; from whence, it is probable, he saw none that so rendered it in his time. Vid. Agust. de Consensu. Evan. lib. ii. cap. 63. It is also thus translated in the ancient Hebrew version of the gospel of Matthew. 167.“If Dr. Priestley, in his celebrated efforts to establish the Unitarianism of the primitive church against Dr. Horsley, fell so short of ‘complete victory;’ it may be presumed, that the failure would, in some degree, affect his greater work, The History of Early Opinions concerning Jesus Christ. Many parts of that elaborate performance are merely a republication of the Letters, excluding the personalities. Their merits and their fate must, therefore, be closely, interwoven. “This large and capital work was given to the world under circumstances which appeared very promising for bringing the controversy to a satisfactory issue. With great and long continued diligence the indefatigable author collected his materials. He digested and arranged them, with that lucid perspicuity for which he was so justly distinguished. He tried every method to call forth into the field of preparatory discussion, some learned and able Trinitarians and Arians. He waited for some years after the publication of the work; and then renewed his public challenge, affording an additional period for the fate of the question. It was, of course, implied, and the obligation was frankly avowed by the Doctor; that he would in proper time duly notice what any fair and candid opponents should produce. “It is to be lamented, however that the expectations thus excited have not been completely answered; and the decease of Dr. Priestly excludes every hope that they will be so. “Early in the year 1790, a mild and amiable writer, Dr. Williams, “In 1794, Dr. Jamieson published a professed and minute examination of the History of Early Opinions. This elaborate and learned work was the very performance which Dr. Priestley had so long desired and challenged. It surely, then, had a just claim on his particular and public notice. At the time of this work’s appearance, Dr. Priestley was occupied in the important measure of emigration to America. But when that step was accomplished, he enjoyed, for the remaining years of life, a calm and undisturbed retreat. We have, however, yet to be informed of the reason why his former pledge was not fulfilled. “As the controversy has been thus left open, it cannot be deemed illiberal in me to mention the result of personal observation in reading this large work of Dr. Priestley’s. I am the more inclined to do so, since what I have remarked may be of use in answering a question of some importance; What degree of reliance can be placed on Dr. Priestley’s care and accuracy in his citations of the fathers? “You, Sir, are well aware of the importance which Dr. Priestley attaches to the position, that the doctrines of the pre-existence and divinity of Christ were acknowledged by the orthodox fathers to have been most cautiously concealed, in the earlier preaching of the apostles, and not to have been clearly divulged, till John taught them at the close of the apostolic age. “Dr. Jamieson appears to me to have solidly refuted this assertion. “The instances of this kind which I have observed have given me much astonishment. If they concerned merely the literary reputation of this truly eminent character, to drag them into public notice could only be the work of a petulant and little mind. But they become cases of a very different nature, when conclusions of prime importance on a very interesting subject are inferred from egregious misconstructions of an author’s meaning. In such cases regard to truth must supersede personal delicacies. “This duty becomes the more urgent when we are told, from high and respectable authority, that, ‘in all the most important controversies in which’ Dr. Priestley ‘was engaged, he had studied the subject thoroughly, and was a complete master of the whole question:’ and that, in his reasoning, ‘there was nothing artificial and ambiguous; no design to slur over difficulties and objections, or to lay greater stress upon a topic than it would well bear.’ “The doctor has selected Chrysostom as the father whose evidence is most ample in support of the opinion, that John first taught the divinity of Christ. ‘Chrysostom,’ says Dr. Priestley, ‘represents all the preceding writers of the New Testament as children, who heard, but did not understand things, and who were busy about cheese-cakes and childish sports, but John,’ he says, ‘taught what the angels themselves did not know before he declared it.’ “At the bottom of the page, Dr. Priestley faithfully transcribes the Greek of this passage, and no one can say that his translation is materially unfair, so far as it goes. The sentence is exactly thus: ‘All the rest, like little children, hear indeed, yet do not understand what they hear, but are captivated with cakes and childish sports.’ The omission of the clause ‘all the rest,’ (?? ?e a???? pa?te?) does not appear of much consequence. The insertion of it would only have led the reader to inquire for the antecedent, and Dr. Priestley has provided a ready answer: ‘all the preceding writers of the New Testament.’ “Do me the favour, my dear Sir, to take down the volume of Chrysostom, and turn to the passage. Will you find the antecedent to this relative clause to be any ‘writers of the New Testament,’ or any persons at all connected with the New Testament? No, Sir. You will find it to be the effeminate and dissipated spectators of athletic games, and the auditors of musicians and oratorial sophists! Smith’s Letters to Belsham. 168.Letter to Dr. Priestley, in vol. i. of Dr. Williams’ edition of Owen on the Hebrews. 169.Dr. Williams refers only to Chillingworth by name. I would take the liberty of adding, that M. Daille’s admirable work On the Use of the Fathers in Determining Religious Controversies, is deserving of the most careful perusal with reference to this subject. 170.See his valuable work, Vindication of the Primitive Faith, &c. in Reply to Dr. Priestley’s Hist. of Early Opinions: vol. i. p. 284-313. 171.Mr. Belsham’s Disc. p. 24, 25. 172.Hist. of Early Op. vol. iii. p. 128, 129. 173.Mr. Belsham denies that these characters are the antecedent to the exceptive clause in question, and conceives that it refers to the mass of unlearned Christians, who are placed in opposition to “the spectators and auditors of John, men that are become angels, or are desirous of becoming such.” But the Greek fathers give some additional features of their character. “These,” he says, “are devoted to merriment and luxuriousness, living in riches, honours, and gluttony.” The candid reader will judge whether this description be more applicable to plain and honest christians, than to the gay and dissipated persons mentioned in a preceding part of the discourse. 174.In this they agree with those who were formerly called Macedonians, from Macidonius, bishop of Constantinople, who lived about the middle of the fourth century, who entertained such sentiments of the Holy Ghost, and had a considerable party that adhered to him, who were also called Pneumatomachi. 176.See Woltzogen, and other Socinian writers, in loc. and Dr. Clarke’s Scripture-doctrine, page 13. where he inserts this among those scriptures; in all which he supposes that the word God is applied to the Father. 178.Several of the Post Nicene Fathers have taken the words, ?a?ape? ap? t?? p?e?at??, in the same sense as by the Lord, the Spirit; and, in particular, Basil. de Spirit. Sanct. ad Amphiloc. Cap. 21. & Chrysost. in loc. 181.See Dr. Clarke’s Scripture-doctrine, page 198. 182.See Quest. lix. lxvii. lxxii. lxxv. 183.“Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense, that He does, all that is done. ‘Far be it from God,’ says Elihu, ‘that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity.’ Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident blasphemy. “Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God makes his creatures do, whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of blame. “Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God creates, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral evil. “But this must not be taken for granted, nor hastily passed over: because, however indisputable, it is disputed. There are some among us, and some who are deservedly in reputation for wisdom, and general soundness in the faith; who appear to be of opinion, that God is the direct Author—the immediate Cause—the proper Creator, of all evil, as well as of all good—of all sin, as well as holiness, in heart and life—in thought, word, and deed. “This opinion, however, notwithstanding my high esteem and particular friendship for some of the holders of it, I am not yet ready to adopt, for several reasons. “1. To suppose that the actions of men, whether virtuous or vicious, are created, seems to confound all distinction between creation and Providence; or rather, wholly to exclude the latter. “The work of creation, we used to think, was God’s making creatures and things, at first; or giving the beginning of existence to matter and minds, with their various properties, instincts and organizations. And that God’s works of Providence, were his preserving things already made, and governing all their operations. But according to this new philosophy, creation is all; Providence is nothing. For what preserving and governing of creatures or actions can there be, when every creature and every action, is every moment created anew? An action, a thought, or volition, whether good or evil, is a new and strange kind of creature, or created thing. But, in a theological view, the question before us is of chief importance, as it respects moral evil. I add, therefore; “2. It appears to me, that to suppose God the Creator of sin, whether in principle or action, is hardly reconcilable with his perfect holiness. ‘Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet waters and bitter?’ Can darkness proceed from Him, as its proper source, in whom there is no darkness at all? “It is true, God has created many things which are of a different nature from himself; as the bodies of men and beasts, and all parts of the world of matter: but nothing, I conceive, directly opposite to his own nature; as is sin. The sun is the immediate cause of the growth of vegetables; though these are essentially different from the sun itself: but it is not thus the cause of ice and darkness; which are no more of a contrary nature to it, than sin is to the nature of God. “I am sensible it has been said, there is no more inconsistency with the holiness of God, in supposing him the efficient, immediate cause of sin, for necessary good purposes; than in supposing he only permits it, for wise ends, and so orders things that he knows it will be committed. “But these two ways of accounting for the existence of moral evil, appear to me materially different. There are supposable cases in which it would be right for a man, not to hinder another from sinning, when he could hinder him; and also to place him in circumstances of temptation, expecting that he would sin. For instance, a parent may leave money in the way of a child suspected of being given to theft; and may conceal himself and let the child steal it; with a view to correct him, in order to reclaim him, or as a warning to his other children. All this might be perfectly right in the parent; however certainly he might know, that the child would be guilty of the expected crime. But I question whether any case can be supposed in which it would not be wrong, directly to influence another to do evil, that good might come. Exciting one to sin by power or persuasion; and placing one in circumstances of trial, wherein he would be tempted to sin, without restraining him from it, are surely different things, although the certainty of his sinning may be the same. “3. I dare not think that God creates sin, and all kinds of evil, because this seems plainly contrary to the general current of the holy scriptures. “In the first chapter of Genesis, it is said, ‘God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.’ Of his making two great lights, we are told; and that he made the stars also: but no account is there given of his creating darkness. Respecting our own species, the inspired historian particularly informs us, that ‘God created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them.’ Nor do we find in that book, or in all the Bible, that he hath since ever created them otherwise. Solomon three thousand years after the fall, having made diligent search among men and women, to find out their true character, and the cause of their so universal depravity, says; ‘Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.’ Wicked practices, and deceitful inventions to conceal their criminality, are ever ascribed in scripture to mankind themselves, or to other fallen creatures, and never to God, as their efficient cause. “In the New-Testament, christians are said to be ‘created unto good works:’ and we read of ‘the new man, which after God, is created in righteousness and true holiness’. But no where do we read of any one that was created unto evil works; or after Satan in unrighteousness and sin. It is written, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, ‘God is not the author of confusion, but of peace.’ And James i. 13-17, ‘Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is tempted when he is led away of his own lust and enticed.—Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights.’ Can any thing be more express to teach us, that a distinction ought carefully to be made between the origin of good and evil; and that we should not conceive them both alike to come from God? “For scripture proof that God is not the efficient author of sin, I will only add, that the fruits of the Spirit, and works of the flesh, are set in contrast and spoken of as diametrical opposites: whereas, did God create sinful propensities in men, or directly influence them to evil actions, the works of the flesh would be as real and immediate fruits of the divine Spirit, as the holiest exercises of the best saints. “4. I see no occasion for the supposition of God’s being thus the author of all evil: nor any good ends that it can answer. “Could it be seen how evils might be accounted for, without supposing them any part of the creation of God; and how God might have an absolute dominion over all events, without being the immediate cause of bad things; no good man, I conclude, would wish to conceive of Him as being thus the proper source of darkness and evil. And indeed, were it so, that our weak minds were unable to comprehend how God can work all things after the counsel of his own will, or how natural and moral evil could ever have been, without believing that God is as much, and as immediately, the cause of evil as of good; yet it might be more modest, and more wise, to leave these among other incomprehensibles, than to have recourse to so bold an hypothesis for the solution of them. But, I apprehend, there is no need of this hypothesis in order to account for the existence of evil, or in order to an understanding belief of the universal government of the Most High. “Evils, of most if not all kinds, are such negative things—such mere defects, in their origin at least, as do not need creation, or require a positive omnipotent cause. This is the case, evidently, with respect to natural darkness: it is only the want of light. This is the case, also, with respect to natural death: it is only the cessation, the loss, the want of life. And this may be the case, with respect to spiritual darkness, and spiritual death. It has heretofore been the orthodox opinion, that all moral evil consists radically in privation; or, that unholiness, at bottom, is the mere want of holiness. And, notwithstanding all the floods of light, from various quarters, which have come into the world in this age of new discoveries, possibly this one old opinion may yet be true. ‘God made man upright.’ That is, He formed him with a disposition impartially just and good: He created in him a principle of universal righteousness. When man fell, by eating the forbidding fruit, this principle had not been preserved in perfect strength and exercise. In consequence of that disobedience, the divine internal influence was so withdrawn, that this principle was entirely lost. But we are not told, nor need it be supposed, that any opposite principle was then created in him. Our first parents had, I believe, in their original formation, all the radical instincts of nature which they had after the fall; or which any of their posterity now have. Such as a principle of self-preservation, a desire of self-promotion, and a propensity to increase and multiply; together with all the more particular appetites and passions, subservient to these purposes. All these are innocent in themselves, though not in themselves virtuous. But these private instincts, when left to operate alone, without the governing influence of a public spirit, or a just regard for other beings, will naturally lead to all manner of iniquity, in heart and life. To avarice and ambition; to envy and malice; to intemperance and lewdness; to frauds and oppressions; to wars and fightings. “There is no need of supposing any other divine agency, than only to uphold in existence creatures that have lost their virtue, amidst surrounding temptations, in order to account for all the evil affections which we ever feel, and for all the external wickedness that is ever committed. Nor, in order to the holiest creatures losing their virtue, need any thing more be supposed on God’s part, than only his leaving them to themselves; or not upholding in them, and constantly invigorating, a virtuous disposition. “And as, in this way, we can account for the existence of all manner of evil; so we can thus understand how it is possible for God to bring about whatsoever comes to pass, without his being the actor, or maker, or instigator, of any thing that is not perfectly good. When He does not cause light, there will be darkness. When He does not make peace, there will be evil. The darkness takes place according to his appointment, with the same exactness and certainty, as if He actually created it; and so does evil of every kind. What He determines to permit, knowing perfectly the circumstances and dispositions of every agent concerned, will as infallibly come to pass, as what he determines to do himself, or to effect by his own positive influence. The king’s heart, and the rivers of water; the waves of the sea, and the tumults of the people, are in the hand of the Lord, to all important intents and purposes, if it be only true that He restrains them, or lets them run; stilleth them, or suffereth them to rage, just as he sees fit. “In this sense, I conceive, it is to be understood, that God forms the light, and creates darkness; makes peace, and creates evil. He has the absolute government—the perfect control—the entire superintendency, of all these things. “When any folly has been committed or any mischief has been done, some are ready to say, It was so ordered; as if therefore nobody was to be blamed. But this is a false inference, from just premises. True, it was so ordered of God; and ordered righteously and wisely: but it was so ordered by the doer of the mischief also; and ordered carelessly, perhaps, or wickedly. You will say, It must have been so, and the actor could not have done otherwise: but, I say, he might have done otherwise, if he would. It is true, there is a kind of necessity in the actions of men. They necessarily act according to their own choice; and they necessarily choose to act according to their own disposition. Under this kind of necessity God himself acts. It is impossible for him to do, because it is impossible for him to will that which is contrary to his own nature. He necessarily wills and does, what is agreeable to his moral perfections. But such a necessity as this, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it is essential to all free agency. Actions which can and do take place, contrary to the inclination of the agent, are not his actions. He has no command over them; and therefore can deserve no praise or blame for them. “The necessity of acting according to our own minds, is all the necessity which need be supposed, when we suppose that all our actions were decreed, and are ordered of God. A creature that acts according to any laws of nature, and not at perfect random, without any self-government, acts in such a manner that He who knows what is in him, may fore-know all his actions; and in such a manner that He in whose hand his times are, may govern all his volitions. Men follow their several courses, as freely as the rivers of water, and with a higher kind of freedom; yet, since they run agreeably to their own inclination, and cannot do otherwise, a Being omniscient and omnipotent, can calculate before hand all their motions; can keep them in the channels decreed for them, and can turn them whithersoever he will. If any do not comprehend this, yet let them not think they so fully comprehend the contrary, as to feel certain, that either man cannot be free, or God cannot govern the world. Certainly the providential government of God, over the hearts and ways of men, though most absolute, is not such but that, if they do well, they are praise-worthy; and if they do not well, the sin lieth at their own door. “Neither let it be imagined that the criminality of a bad action is taken away, or at all extenuated, because it will be over-ruled for good. Actions are good or evil, according to the nature of them, and the intention of the agent, and not according to undesigned consequences. When we act wickedly, and with a wicked mind, its being productive of happy effects, alters nothing in regard to our blame-worthiness. In the divine decrees, and in the divine providence, ‘Whatever is, is right:’ but in the conduct of creatures, many things that are, are not at all the less wrong. God’s governing all things, so as to make them subserve his wise and holy designs, should not lead us to think any more favourably of our own, or of our neighbour’s foolish and sinful actions.” Smalley’s Sermons. 184.“There is a vast difference between the sun’s being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and of the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by its motion whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but not the proper cause, efficient, or producer of them.—No more is any action of the divine Being, the cause of the evil of men’s wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred that the sun itself is dark and cold: but from its being the cause of these, no otherwise than by its absence, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary. It may justly be argued that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, in as much as sin is not the fruit of any positive influence of the Most High, but on the contrary, arises from the withdrawment of his action and energy, and under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence, this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil; but on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves; and necessarily sin when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when he is present, that therefore darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must be black.” Edwards on the Will. Page 259. Boston Ed. 1754. 185.Dr. Whitby, in his discourse of election, &c. 186.See his discourse concerning election, page 36. 37. &c. 187.See the contrary opinion defended by Whitby in loc. 188.See Whitby’s discourse, &c. page 40, & seq. 189.See Twiss. Vind. Grat. & de PrÆdest. and his riches of God’s love, against Hord; and also that part of the writings of some others, in which they treat of predestination, viz. Beza, Gomarus, Piscator, Maccovius, Rutherford, Whitaker, and Perkins. 190.Among these were bishop Davenant, and other divines, who met in the synod of Dort; also Calvin, P. Du Moulin, Turrettin, and, indeed, the greater number of those who have defended the doctrine of predestination; and there are many others, who, when they treat of it, seem to wave the particular matter in controversy, as thinking it of no great importance or that this doctrine may be as well defended, without confining themselves to certain modes of speaking, which have been the ground of many prejudices against it, whose prudence and conduct herein cannot be justly blamed. 191.?? ???? e? ???da???. non solum ex JudÆis; that is, those who are called from among the Jews, as distinguished from the rest of them that were rejected. 192.?????? 193.See Questions lxvii, lxviii, lxxii, lxxv, lxxvi. 194.e??a? ?a? ??????. 195.See Prov. viii. 23. 196.e??a?. 197.Vid. Grot. in loc. 198.?eta?e???. 199.Vid. Whitby in loc. 200.Vid. Beza in loc. 201.The principal text that Dr. Whitby refers to, as justifying his sense of the word, is in Acts xx. 13. We went to Assos, there intending to take in Paul, for so had he appointed, minding himself to go afoot; the words are, ??t? ?a? ?? d?ateta?e??? e???? a?t?? pe?e?e??; which he understands as though the meaning was, that the apostle was disposed, in his own mind, to go afoot; but that sense is not agreeable to the scope of the text, for the meaning of it seems to be this: That it was determined, ordered, or preconcerted by them, before they set sail; that Paul should be taken in at Assos, since he was to go there afoot; so that this makes nothing to that author’s purpose, but rather to the sense that we have given of the word. 202.See Grot. in loc. 203.See Dr. Whitby in loc. 204.See Quest. xliv, lxviii. 205.See Dr. Goodwin, vol. 2. of election. 206.p??e?et?. 208.This is what is meant by that axiom, used by the school-men, Decretum Dei, nihil ponit in esse. 209.Thus the school-men distinguish between necessitas consequentis, and consequentiÆ; so that that, which is not in itself necessary, is rendered eventually so, as the consequence of God’s purpose, that it shall be. 210.“There is no necessity for supposing a predestination to death, in the same sense as unto life, that is to the means and the consequent end: For the occurrence of sin may be satisfactorily accounted for on other principles; though without pretending to the removal of every difficulty in a subject the entire comprehension of which is probably unsuited to our present state and faculties.” Smith’s Letters to Belsham. 211.It is acknowledged that this view of the subject is different from that which most Calvinistic writers have given. Yet several eminent divines have laid down the fundamental principles, at least, of this sentiment, and have opened the way to it: particularly Augustine, Theophilus Gale, and a class of German Theologians who may be termed the school of Leibnitz. A short time ago an attempt was made to excite the attention of thinking men to his doctrine, by a Sermon on the Divine glory, displayed by the Permission of Sin. But, since the publication of that pamphlet, the subject has been more ably and fully treated by my reverend tutor, the Rev. Dr. Williams, in his Discourse on Predestination to Life, published very lately. 212.ad?????. 213.See Whitby’s Paraphrase, &c. on Jude, ver. 4. 214.Thus Beza in loc. calls them vessels, because, as creatures, they are the workmanship of God, the great potter, but vessels prepared for destruction by themselves, and therefore adds, Exitii veras causas minime negem in ipsis vasis hÆrere juxta illud perditio, tua ex te est. 215.It ought to be observed, that the word, here used, is ?at??t?se?a e?? ap??e?a?, and not p???at??t?se?a; nor is there any thing added to the word, that signifies, that this preparation thereunto was antecedent to their being; or as though it took its rise from God, as the cause of that sin for which he designed to punish them; whereas, on the other hand when the apostle in the following verse, speaks of God’s making known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, to wit, the elect, they are described as those whom he had afore prepared unto glory, ? p???t??ase? e?? d??a?. What should be the reason that the apostle alters the phrase, but that we may hereby be led to consider, that when God chose the elect to glory they are considered in his purpose as those whom he designed, by his grace, to make meet for it! So that the vessels of wrath are considered as fitting themselves for destruction; the vessels of mercy, as persons whom God would first prepare for, and then bring to glory. 216.See Whitby’s Discourse, &c. page 10. 217.See his Riches of God’s love, against Hord. Part II. page 50. 218.See Bishop Patrick in loc. 219.This agrees with the sense given of it by Grot. in loc. and Whitby in his discourse, &c. page 11. and it agrees very well with the sense of the Hebrew words, ??? ?????? which does not so much signify to make, as to dispose, and adapt one thing to another, which the lxx. render, f??asseta? ? ase??, &c. the wicked is reserved to the day of evil. 220.See Quest. xliv. 221.The words are, pa?ta tet?ap?da, that is, all four-footed beasts. 222.Matt. iv. 23. The words are, ?e?ape??? pasa? ??s?? ?a? pasa? a?a??a?, every sickness, and every disease; and so the same words are translated, in Matt. ix. 35. 223.It is improper to say we have no power, when we can do the thing if we will; and criminal to take the glory, which is God’s. 224.See Whitby of Election, Chap. 5. Limborch. Amic. Collat. page 242. 225.Vid. Sixt Senens. Bibliothec. Lib. V. Annotat 101. Annotavit quidam Chrytostomum interdum naturÆ nostrÆ vires plus Æquo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum ManichÆis & Gentilibus, qui hominem asserebant, vel natura malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum compelli. 226.Vid. Aug. Retrac. I. Cap. 25. 227.Vid. Aug. de PrÆdest. Sanet. Cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est, ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui prius quam ista hÆresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quÆstione versari: quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur. 228.Vid. Forbes. Instruct. Historico-Theol. Lib. VIII. Cap. 28. § 16, &c. & Joh. Jacobi Hottingeri, Fata DoctrinÆ de PrÆdestinat. Lib. I. § 35, &c. 229.Vid. G. J. Vossii Hist. Pelag. Lib. VI. Thes. 8, 9, 10. 230.Vid. Calv. Instit. Lib. III. Cap. 22. § 1. Certior est hic Dei veritas, quam ut concutiatur, clarior quam ut obruatur hominum authoritate. 231.See the epistles that passed between Berevov, a physician at Dort, and several divines at that time, in Lib. de Term vitÆ. 232.Seneca de Consol. ad Marciam, cap. 20. Nemo nimis cito moritur, qui victurus diutius quam vixit non fuit, fixus est cuique terminus, manebit semper ubi positus est, nec illum ulterius diligentia aut gratia promovebit. Et Cicero de Senect. Quod cuique temporis ad vivendum datum, eo debet contentus esse. Virg. Æn. X. Stat sua cuique dies. Serv. Fixum est tempus vitÆ. 233.Evil as well as good actions are links in the chain of providence, and yet do not impeach Divine holiness. 234.Vid. Senac. de Prov. cap. 5. August, de Civ. Dei, Lib. V. cap. 1, & 8. Lips Phys. Stoic. Lib. J. Diss. 12. 235.See Quest. XVIII. 236.See Quest. XXI, XXII. 237.When we contend for this doctrine as a truth, it should be viewed in connexion with its real importance. These two objects are extremely different in things natural, civil, and religious. There are many things true in history, in philosophy, in politics, and even in theology, which no sober person deems important. There are other things hypothetically important, whether actually true or not. And of this kind is the subject before us. Such is the nature, the connexion, and consequences of it, that if it be true, it cannot fail of being of the first importance. But how are we more particularly to estimate the importance of this subject? By the influence which the admission or the denial of it has on the very foundations of religion. For instance, if it be NOT true, either man himself or mere chance has the principal share in effecting our actual salvation, and investing us with eternal glory. Some indeed are so lost to modesty and self-knowledge, and so unacquainted with the leading truths of christianity, that they do not scruple to ascribe the eventual difference in our future state, whether good or bad, to man himself, but attended with some verbal, unmeaning compliment to divine mercy. Such persons should first learn the rudiments of christianity, before they have a right to expect any deference shewn to their opinions. On the other hand, if this BE true, its utility is plain; it will hide pride from man; it will exclude chance from having any share in our deliverance; it will exalt the grace of God; it will render salvation a certain, and not a precarious thing; and, in a word, it will secure to them who have the Spirit of Christ the greatest consolation. This was the view which our episcopal reformers had of the doctrine, both as to its truth, and the importance of it. ‘Predestination to life’ say they, ‘is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour.—The godly consideration of Predestination and our election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God.’—Another observation I would make is, 2. That it is highly proper, in order to investigate the present subject with success, to keep it perfectly distinct, and free from all impure mixtures. This is what some of our early reformers, and many of the modern defenders of this doctrine have not done. For want of this, many bitter enemies have opposed it. Dr. Whitby, for instance, and most who have written on the same side of the question since his time, place predestination to death, or reprobation to misery, as the very foundation of Calvinism, and inseparable from predestination to life. But so far is predestination to death from being true, that nothing can be more untrue. It is but an arbitrary assumption; a foreign, impure mixture, having no foundation either in the real meaning of holy writ, or in the nature of things; except indeed we mean by it, what no one questions, a determination to punish the guilty. In fact, sin and holiness are not only different, but opposite effects, and their causes equally opposite; but as God is the sole cause, the sole exclusive cause of holiness, the creature, in some way, must be the sole and exclusive cause of sin. If you ask how? I reply, by exercising his liberty, which is a mere natural instrument, on himself, rather than on God. But how came he to do that? By his passive power. What is passive power? In general, it is that which distinguishes the creature from the Creator. But more particularly, it is that tendency to nothing as to being, and to defection as to well being, which is essential to every created existence. If every creature have, and must of necessity have this passive power, you will ask, how came the holy angels, and the spirits of the just, not to sin? The answer is, because divine grace upholds them. These things duly considered, though briefly stated, will shew, that as God is not the author of sin, so neither has he predestinated sin. He is the author and cause of good only. He is the author of our liberty; but that in itself is not evil. And he is the author of our nature as limited; that also of itself is no moral evil. But when our liberty unites with this limited nature, or terminates on passive power, when this latter is not controuled by grace, their offspring is imperfect, or sinfulness attaches to our moral acts. Hence you may learn, that sin and future misery are events perfectly certain, though not predestinated. It has been often assumed, but without propriety or truth, that an event is foreknown only because it is decreed. In reality all good is foreknown, because it is decreed; for there is no other ground of its existence. But sin, as before shewn, has another ground of existence, namely, passive power, which can no more be an object of divine predestination or decree than its perfect opposite, the all-sufficiency of Jehovah. Yet, observe attentively, this has its proper nature, and God sees all things, and all essences, in their proper nature. What! Does not God foreknow the sinfulness of any event in its deficient cause, as well as the goodness of another in that which is efficient? Beside, passive power in union with liberty is an adequate, a fully adequate ground of sin and death; and therefore to introduce a predestination of sin and death, is to ascribe to God what is equally impious and needless. 3rd Observation, that is, When the end is maintained to be infallibly certain, the means to promote that end are included. Thus you may suppose a chain suspended from a great height, and to the lowest link a weight is fixed, which is borne by it. You do not suppose that this link is unconnected with the next, and so on till you come to the highest. Every one of the links is equally necessary with that which is next the weight; and the whole is connected with something else which is stronger than the weight, including that of the chain also, however long and heavy. Thus also in the cultivation of our land, though it is decreed that on such a field there shall be this very season a crop of wheat, this was not independent of providential virtue giving the increase, the genial showers, the solar warmth, and the vivifying air. It is not unconnected with the proper seed sown, needful tillage, plowing and harrowing, and the quality of the soil. And the same holds true as to the health of the body, and the prolongation of life to an appointed period. He who dies must first have life; he who grows to manhood must arrive at it through the previous stages of youth, childhood and infancy. So likewise an the education of our children; if learning be the end, that supposes the previous means of application; and if it is determined who shall be the first scholar of the age in which he lives, it is equally determined that he shall begin with the rudiments of letters, and diligently prosecute his literary studies. And respecting religious attainments the matter is equally plain; if life or eternal glory be the end predestinated, the previous steps of purity of heart, justification and a new birth unto righteousness, preservation in Christ, and every individual event and circumstance preceding, is included in the decree, as far as there is any goodness in them. As to the evil with which any events or circumstances are blended, that has been already accounted for on another principle. Nothing can be more true or plain, God had predestinated an everlasting righteousness to be brought in by the Lord Jesus Christ. But is it not equally true and plain that the birth of Jesus, and of his virgin mother, the existence of David, the call of Abraham, the preservation of Noah, and the creation of Adam and Eve were predestinated?—Let us therefore guard against separating the end and the means; and what God joins together in his predestinating care and love, let no man put asunder.—We now come II. To consider some proofs of this doctrine.—That the scriptures, especially those of the New Testament, appear, at least, to maintain the doctrine in question, no person of common modesty will deny. Thus, for instance, Rom. viii. 29, 30. “Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.” Again, Eph. i. 4-6. “According as he hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love; having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace.” And again, ver. 11. “In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” Believers are said to be “called according to God’s purpose;” and certain discriminations are made between man and man, between nation and nation, “that the purpose of God according to election, might stand, not of works but of him who calleth.” “The election hath obtained it.” “So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” “Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?”—“I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.” These are some of the many passages of holy writ which at least seem to hold this doctrine. But it is of importance to observe, that to establish this very doctrine is the main drift of the apostle Paul’s elaborate argument in a considerable part of his epistle to the Romans. See Rom. ix.-xi.—But more particularly, 1. It is evidently inconsistent with God’s infinite perfection to suppose that he has no purposes, designs, or aims in his operations; or, which is virtually the same thing, to suppose that he decrees or predestinates nothing. Wherein would he then differ from blind, unmeaning chance, which hath neither wisdom, power, nor properties? An intelligent spirit without any plan or purpose, is inconceivable; much less is the infinitely perfect Jehovah such a being. But if he purposes any thing, what can be conceived of in this world of higher importance, or more worthy of his predestinating care, than the salvation of his people, that is, of those who are eventually saved? Shall he purpose from eternity to give his Son to appear in the form of a servant, to suffer an ignominious death, and to be head over all things to the church, at an uncertainty? Does he bestow his Holy Spirit without knowing, or without intending, who shall be ultimately changed into the divine image from glory to glory, and made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light? Truly, if in time he draws with loving-kindness, it is because he has loved with an everlasting love. 2. What scripture and experience teach of man’s condition as a sinner, utterly excludes every other cause of salvation but God’s predestinating love. From our very birth we are sinful, guilty, and without strength. The carnal mind is enmity against God. The graceless heart is a heart of stone; in spiritual concerns unfeeling and impenetrable. Well may our Lord say to his disciples, Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. If then those who were dead in trespasses and sins have been quickened, if persecutors have been arrested and alarmed, if those who were fully bent on rebellion have been instantly rendered humble, meek, loving and obedient, to what can we rationally ascribe it but to the discriminating and sovereign pleasure of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will? If such are not predestinated, how came they to be called, converted, and regenerated? Consult the good man’s experience. Will he coolly and deliberately arrogate any thing to himself? Follow him to the throne of grace; what is his language before God? Listen to his most holy, happy, and animated praises in the church. Attend to him in his happiest frames—or, when emerging from the deep waters of affliction—when restored from backslidings—or with faltering speech on the brink of eternity; and you will find him steady to one point; “Behold, God is my salvation.” My recovery from sin and woe is all of grace. Yea, follow him to heaven, when he joins the noble army of martyrs, and the countless myriads of the redeemed from among men, and there he shouts aloud in chorus, “Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen.”—“Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.” If we search eternally into the origin and cause of our deliverance from sin, and our exaltation to happiness and glory, none can be found but God’s predestinating love. 3. Nothing short of eternal predestination could secure that which is demonstrably the most worthy, the most glorious, the most real end of God in the salvation of man, that is, the praise of the glory of his grace. No end can be compared to this in excellence; it is expressly the end which God has proposed to himself in the salvation of his people; “having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace.” If there be no predestination, how can such an end ever be proposed, and how infallibly secured? Can there be any effect without an adequate cause? Or can the invention of men or angels discover any other cause than predestination? On any other supposition, how can divine love, grace, and mercy be glorified, infallibly glorified? Is the honour of these glorious and blessed perfections of Jehovah to be suspended on a feeble peradventure? Or is the spiritual temple constructed of some materials which come by chance, or approach of themselves, while others are brought forth by a divine hand out of the quarry of nature, and placed on the living foundation? Is the glory of the Creator to depend upon the precarious will of man? The supposition is too absurd to admit a thought.—Again, 4. Predestination to life is essentially necessary to secure the full end of the death of Christ and the efficacy of divine influence. What though he laid down his life for his sheep, if after all he do not bring them into his fold? For him to lay down his life a ransom for many, and then leave it to them whether they should come for life, and all the benefits of his death, righteousness and grace, is to suppose them possessed of more power than Adam had before the fall. For the power he needed was only that which might keep him from falling; but the power which fallen man requires is that by which he may rise from his fallen state, and enter into the favour of God, into union with Christ, into spiritual sensibility and life, into wisdom, righteousness and holiness, and into eternal glory. Now what can be adequate to this but omnipotent power helping our infirmities? If it be said, Though we cannot of ourselves do this, may we not through Christ and his holy Spirit assisting us? I reply, assistance is of two kinds; it is either affording us proper means, such as the holy scriptures, the ministry of the word, ordinances of religion, and precious promises by way of encouragement;—or, it is actually to influence the mind by supernatural agency. If this latter assistance be afforded, the event is secured; for nothing is requisite to secure the volitions, and all the exercises of the will, in faith, repentance, love, hope, and even perseverance therein unto the end, but this kind of influence to a certain degree. But does God impart any gracious influence without purposing to do so? And does he not know what influence is necessary to secure the end? Without predestination to life, what security can there be, that the death of Christ will not prove abortive and unavailing? The notion that a sufficient degree of grace is given to all, but that a degree more than sufficient is given to the elect; that all the elect are certainly and infallibly saved, but the others left at uncertainty, with a perhaps that some of them may be saved in addition to the elect—this notion is neither founded in revealed truth, nor capable of rational consistency. Without predestination to life, the influences of the Holy Spirit, which, it is confessed, are given to some, might be given in vain, or without effecting any saving purpose in any one of the human race. Where then could be the wisdom of a dispensation of the Spirit, or of communicating the influence of grace? Does God foresee that some will be so good and pliable as to improve a common favour in such a way and to such a degree as to constitute the difference between them and others that perish? But where is this divinity taught, and by whom is it sanctioned? It is not sanctioned by the patriarchs and prophets, by Christ and his apostles, nor is it contained in the words of inspiration, or even in the tablet of unsophisticated reason. 5. Setting aside this doctrine, or supposing it not true, what room is left for a covenant of grace between the Father, Son, and Spirit? Has not the Father given to the Son a people for whom he should be obedient unto death, for whom he should give his life a ransom, for whom he should rise, live, and reign till all his enemies be subdued, and to whom Christ has engaged to give eternal life? If we reject predestination to life, what meaning is there in his office of surety? Is not Jesus a surety for his people? But what is a surety? It is one who undertakes for another. What does Jesus undertake to do? He undertakes not only to become incarnate for them, to obey the law, to endure the contradiction of sinners and cope with the rigid demands of equity, but also to justify many, to give them life, to keep them from every rapacious hand, to purify them by his blood, to save them from sin and hell, and to bring them to the beatific vision of his glory. In a word, take away this doctrine, and you take away the foundation of God—the foundation of his covenant—the foundation of his temple, the church—the foundation of the saints’ hope and joy. But, blessed be God, his foundation standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his. Known unto God are all his ways, and all his people from the beginning. Blind chance and impotent free will shall never be the partners of his throne. We next come to notice III. Some objections which may be, and often are, made to this doctrine. And 1. If this doctrine be true, it is urged by some, God would then be an arbitrary and partial being. This objection supposes that God has no right to be so; but on the contrary, nothing appears more worthy of him than to exercise arbitrary power, and to manifest partiality. No such right is vested in man, as to do what he pleases, while he disdains to consult any other will than his own. But whose will beside his own can the infinitely perfect God consult? Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or, who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Let us appeal to facts. Are there not marks of high sovereignty and holy partiality through universal nature? Are they not visible in the heavens above, and in this lower world? Is there not a greater light that rules the day, and the lesser lights that rule the night? And does not one star differ from another star in glory? Are not these marks visible in the operations of providence, in the persons of men, their corporeal forms and mental endowments? Are they not constantly seen in the history of nations, the changes of empires, and the dispensations of grace to different tribes of men? How conspicuous is this in God’s conduct towards Abraham and his posterity for a series of ages, and afterwards in the calling of the Gentiles? And how becoming in us to adopt the same language with the apostle Paul on that occasion: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!” And is not the same partiality visible at this very day? Yet is he holy in all his works, and righteous in all his ways. 2. It is objected, If this doctrine be true, then is man reduced to a mere machine. No, a mere machine has no sensibility, no consciousness, no reason, and no will. But he is acted upon, they say, and therefore not an agent. Is it then essential to an agent not to be acted upon? Then there is but one agent in the universe; for every thing but the first cause is acted upon more or less. The fact is, there is no contrariety in these two things. Angels and men are acted upon, yet they are moral agents. The holy agency upon them respects chiefly their disposition itself, but the agency they exert is the exercise of their faculties, will, and disposition. Whether their disposition be good or bad, still they are agents. If this be made good, it must be by sovereign influence; and then the agency and choice will be good: but if this be bad, the agency is bad too. But granting to the objector that the objects of predestination are, in the sense now mentioned, machines, or instruments in the hand of divine sovereignty; what then? I fain would know what better lot can be assigned us than to be instruments in the hand of a predestinating God? I solemnly protest that I desire no better, no other lot. And who can describe the nature of this high privilege! This people have I formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise. O the blessedness of being entirely passive in the hand of that God who predestinates nothing but good? Was Paul obliged to the Lord, or was he not, for arresting him in the midst of his wicked career? Has that man any reason to complain, who is restrained from wickedness, but compelled to embrace happiness? Then, say some, his will would be forced. O no! this by no means follows. My people, saith the Lord, shall be willing in the day of my power. Surely God can put his Holy Spirit in either man or child without forcing the will. And let there be but the active, regenerating renewing presence of this divine agent, the choice of good will be no more compelled, or the will no more forced, than in the most free acts of which the human mind is capable. 3. This doctrine, it is said, tends to licentiousness.—This is an assertion which has been often made, but, I apprehend, never fairly proved; for it is contrary to universal experience. Turn your eyes to a vast army, headed by experienced officers—what is the language of nature and experience? You uniformly find great generals anxious to impress the sentiment on the minds of their troops that they are destined to victory. What gives rise to this kind of oratory? What is the philosophy of such rhetoric? It is founded in the nature of man, and confirmed by the experience of ages, that confidence in a favourable issue animates exertion. Consult a serious christian, who, through a long pilgrimage, has believed this doctrine. Will he deliberately tell you that it has this tendency, or that he has found this effect in his own experience? No, he will tell you nothing gives him more courage and vigour against sin.—It is not when in a dry, backsliding frame of mind, or when verging to licentiousness, that he can rest in this doctrine; but when he is most resolved for God and heaven—when most diligent in the high way of holiness. Then, indeed, he can say, I know that all things work together for my good—my predestination includes conformity to Christ, my calling, my justification, and warfare against sin. If God be for me, who can be against me? Who shall lay any thing to my charge? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, is risen, and maketh intercession. Who shall separate me from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or famine, or persecution, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in all these things I am more than conqueror through him that loved me. For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate me from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus my Lord. 4. Some would insinuate, that though this doctrine be true, yet it should not be preached, because it is a secret in the mind of God. But I hope it has been proved, that as a doctrine it is not a secret, but is revealed in the holy scriptures, and supported by the soundest arguments. The objects, indeed, or the persons who are predestinated, are known to God only before they bear fruit, By their fruits WE can come to know them, in the ordinary course of things; nor is it any part of the doctrine asserted, that it belongs to man to ascertain the individual objects any farther than by character. But there are other ends to be answered by this doctrine.—To be in the way to eternal glory is an unspeakable privilege; and it is the proper part of a christian to enquire into the cause of it. His own humility and gratitude are involved in it. The honour of God, the wisdom of his counsel, and the lustre of his grace; the offices of Christ, the surety of a better covenant, and the good Shepherd of the sheep; his powerful intercession, and his government over all things to the church—all are involved in the proper declaration of this truth.—Once more, 5. This doctrine, it may be said, is dangerous, in proportion as it is insisted upon, in that it prevents the more needful enquiry, “Am I born again!” Yes, there would be danger, if all the attention of ministers and people, or even a disproportionate share of it were confined to this. But, thou mistaken objector, because there are some who will take the bread of children and cast it away, are the children not to be fed? Because there were corrupt men disposed to turn the grace of God into lasciviousness, would you rob any child of God of this holy triumph. He will choose our inheritance for us! The Lord will not cast off his people, neither will he forsake his inheritance. For the Lord is our defence, the Holy One of Israel is our King. I will trust and not be afraid, for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and my song, he also is become my salvation.——For the same reason that we ought not to be ashamed of the gospel of Christ, we need not, we ought not to be ashamed of this doctrine. I would now offer IV. A few practical uses of the subject. And, 1. This doctrine is a source of great comfort, when contrasted with the fickleness of men, and the perpetual vicissitudes of the world. The lot may be cast, but the Lord is the disposer of it. He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. His counsel shall stand, and he doeth, and will do, all his pleasure. The wrath of man shall praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain. All things work together for good to them who love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. He doeth all things well. After viewing the present perturbed state of the world, the revolutions of empire, the devastations of war, the alarms of invasion, the degradation of some, and the exaltation of other characters—how pleasing and consolatory to view a steady hand over-ruling, guiding, and influencing all! Providence is “as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel.”—As for their rings, they are so high that they are dreadful, and are full of eyes round about them. But how delightful to reflect, that within these perpetually revolving wheels there is an immoveable centre! God’s aim is steady, he is of one mind, who can turn him? 2. As the predestination for which we contend is only to good, it affords the most pleasing view of the divine character. God is love. In him is no such inconsistency as is but too frequently found among men. He is not a fountain sending forth at the same place both sweet water and bitter, yielding both salt water and fresh. With the utmost safety and confidence may a humble soul commit itself into the arms of such a being. No one has any thing to fear from God but the proud and rebellious, the unbelieving and impenitent. And surely bad must be the doctrine that speaks peace to the wicked. 3. As in the present case the end, and the way leading to it, are inseparable; every reason and argument, every alarming topic, every scriptural exhortation, and every obligation to duty, are in full force. They who represent these things as inconsistent with predestination, either have a wrong view of the subject, or care not what they say nor whereof they affirm. Obligation to duty is founded on widely and totally different considerations. God sustains, with respect to man, a twofold character, the one is that of an equitable governor, the other that of a sovereign disposer. Answerably to this, man sustains a twofold character also; that of an accountable agent, and that of a disposable subject. As passive in the hand of a sovereign God, he is necessitated to good, in proportion as goodness attaches to him; and in the heirs of salvation this is predestination to life. As active, or a moral agent, man is treated according to the rules of reason and equity, yet mingled with undeserved favours. So that every man is, in these different respects, at once the subject of liberty and necessity. Equally vague and unprofitable, therefore, is all controversy on the subject now alluded to while one side contends for liberty and the other for necessity to the usual exclusion of the opposite. Neither can be wholly right. For, as sure as God disposes of a man for final good, the doctrine of necessity is true; and as sure as a man is a transgressor of divine law, and thus is fitted for destruction, he is free from all decretive necessity. Therefore, 4. Here is no room for the impious inference, that when we do evil we are predestinated to it. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for as God cannot be tempted with evil, so neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not err, my beloved brethren; every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.—But evil, in whatever person, in whatever place, at whatever time, in whatever form or degree, is from a quarter diametrically opposite.—On the contrary, 5. When at any time we are engaged in the work of God, in any thing whatever that is morally good, then are we employed in the execution of the divine purposes; for there is no good done in time but was decreed to be done, in all its circumstances, from eternity. Even all the actions of the wicked, except the deformity or sinfulness which is in them, are also worthy of God to predestinate. This consideration, every one must allow, is a great incentive to virtue and holiness. This remark is applicable both to ministers and people. Are ministers engaged in preaching the law for conviction, the promises for encouragement, and the unsearchable riches of Christ for consolation; are they urging, according to scripture commands and example, repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; do they enforce christian duties, teaching the disciples all things whatsoever our Lord and lawgiver has commanded; do they warn sinners to flee from the wrath to come, or invite the burdened and heavy laden to seek rest in the meek and lowly, the merciful and loving Saviour? They are in all this only the instruments of a sovereign God, or the appointed means whereby he executes his eternal purposes. Again, has God enjoined the necessity of repentance, faith, holiness, obedience, and perseverance; poverty of spirit, holy mourning, purity of heart, love to enemies, &c? our personal compliance, which is evermore of grace, is only the decreed method of bringing us to that eternal glory which is the end. Once more, 6. This doctrine properly guarded, and rightly understood, shews with peculiar force the true ground of repentance, and the obligations of gratitude and holiness.—If the sinfulness of no action is decreed, but proceeds wholly from that in us which is opposite to God and his will, whether secret or revealed, rectoral or decretive, what can be more binding and reasonable than repentance toward God? And if all good, whether natural, supernatural, moral or spiritual, in ourselves and others, in time and to eternity proceed from God’s predestination, what a foundation is there laid for gratitude! Put on, therefore, as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering. Give all diligence to make your calling and election sure. And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body, and be ye thankful. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. Amen. Dr. Williams. 238.Predestination to Death or misery, as the end, and to sin as the means, I call “an impure mixture;” a mixture, because its connexion with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character. St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley, Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his avowal of the sentiment, that sin and misery are decreed in the same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions, must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This cause must be the divine decree determining their future existence, or it must be in the future existences themselves. But the future existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be nothing but divine decree, determining their future existence, without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo. especially Vol. i p. 110-217. On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the following strictures: 1. It is a mere assumption, that sin, which the above proposition avowedly includes, has no possible cause of its futurition but either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to divine causation, will constitute sin. Nor yet is it true that sin is the cause of itself; for then sin would be self-existent. It follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the divine decree or its own existence. 2. It is equally plain that the cause of sin is not itself morally evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is related to good, but not as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor evil.—Therefore, 3. We assert, that the origin of moral evil is to be found in the union of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes of a moral character. These two principles are Liberty and Passive Power. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be termed a natural good of which God is the author and decreer. On the contrary, Passive Power is a natural evil of which God is not the author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term, being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By ‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of unavoidable necessity found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other words, It is that tendency to nihility, physically considered, and to defection, morally considered, which of absolute necessity belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or of will; for it is stated to be of absolute or unavoidable necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or produces, any thing the existence of which stands in direct contrariety to himself. That it is not a moral evil is plain, for the holiest creatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt. 4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, to good only; and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent, unites with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this question, Whence cometh moral evil? If any person shall think proper candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be paid to them, 5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between decreeing and permitting sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the one would be an act of injustice, the other is doing nothing. So that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think, demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction antecedently to desert—to annihilate the sinfulness of any act, making its evil nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences of good and evil. Whereas to permit, or to suffer to take place without prevention, is not to act not to decree. To ‘decree to permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms. 6. But, it has been said, the event is the same to the sinner, whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the happiness of the creature were the only, or even the principal end of God in creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To illustrate this we may suppose, that the event of a man’s execution is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no difference to the sufferer, for the event of his execution was certain! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’s actual dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose. And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the happiness of the Creature is not the chief end of creation, or that the permission of sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no injustice in the permission of sin. 7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this enquiry, we must distinguish between having the principle, and being under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just, and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The object of divine support is the disposition, or the seat of moral action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence, 8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in mere equity with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty, or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the certainty of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its production.—If it be asked, why the exercise of equity is assigned as the occasion of this union, rather than sovereignty; or, why leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By equity then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by sovereignty, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a two-fold deviation from equity, viz. giving more than is due, or less than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil, must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may be called a gracious deviation. Without it, there would be no room for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is due, is properly called injustice, and is such a deviation from equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to do us good beyond our claim is an act of sovereignty; but to give us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us in pure equity. 9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in sovereignty, according to the definitions, he does them good beyond their claim. But to make this to be the immediate cause of the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give them less good and more evil than is their due; and therefore this cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall into sin when dealt with in pure equity. In the act of defection, or becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour. COROLLARIES. 1. All the good and happiness in the universe of created beings are the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree. 2. All the moral evil and misery in the universe are the offspring of liberty, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united to passive power, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle, which may be called analogically the heart. 3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God, as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain futurition. 239.It is allowed that there is a difference between the cause of sin, as a principle, and being a sinner; but when applied to an agent, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense whatever can it be said that he is the author of sin.—“If by the author of sin is meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or a not hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv. Sect. xi. But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the phrase, he no where assigns the true ground why it should not be used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any alternative between the certain futurition of sin and its being decreed. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief, is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is not willing evil. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is not doing evil.” It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but here certainly he does fail. The phrases willing evil, and doing evil, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises, from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor can it be said that this is arguing against fact, without begging the question, that God has appointed the evil which is blended with the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be considered: 1. If choosing and willing a system in which sin is a decreed part is not willing evil, because the system is good and best, all things considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a part of that system is not an evil. But, it may be said, It is willing it for a good end. Does then a good end or intention destroy the nature of sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saint anihilated because he sincerely aimed at the Glory of God? Or has any design, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, the least tendency to alter the nature of sin? 2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself is decreed, or is any part of divine appointment. For not to hinder sin, is extremely different from being the cause or author of it. The one is perfectly consistent with equity, the other would be an act of injustice. 3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, to do evil that good may come, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr. Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes the principle, that every event comes to pass from decretive necessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that opinion, in order to establish his theory of hypothetical necessity; for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid. 4. In reality, the certain futurition of good, and that of evil, arises from different, yea from diametrically opposite causes. The one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained, which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yet this is the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite prescience the event must appear with equal certainty as if decreed. 240.“Equally impious and needless.” Needless, because the existence of sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle; impious, because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of men is worthy of him; and equally so that he does not hinder the existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says, that “the attempt to distinguish between the sinful volitions or actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of the depravity and sin which is in them, is, it is believed, unintelligible—unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined, it is probable they will not be wholly “unintelligible.” 1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is of absolute necessity—the self-existent, independent, and all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but of the same necessity. 2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views all possibles with all their positive and privative tendencies. That all possibles have their positive tendencies is as plain as that two added to three make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that there are privative tendencies in all beings but that one who exists of absolute necessity. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to suppose that a creature may be made independent, and all-sufficient. But that is, every reasonable being must allow, absolutely impossible, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in every created nature which I call Passive Power. Yet. 3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to give each his due; but to prevent sin is not due to the subject of it, otherwise no one could ever sin but on condition of injustice in God. 4. After all, it may be objected, that the scriptures ascribe to God the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the import of such representations may be, no interpretation which is unworthy of God can be the true meaning—that the idioms of the sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denote making, doing, causing, and the like, often denote a declaration of the thing done, or that shall take place; or a permission of it. Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hath cleansed,” means, what God hath declared to be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive not;” and he is ordered to “make the heart of this people fat, to make their ears heavy, and to shut their eyes.” And what can this mean more than to declare a fact, either what they then were, or what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’s declaration of what should be, is called his rooting out pulling down, &c.—Ezek. xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came to destroy the city;” his meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy or declare that the city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thou evil entreated this people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thou permitted them to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou hast greatly deceived this people;” that is, permitted or not hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I the Lord have deceived that prophet.” Can any thing else be meant than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hast hid these things” i. e. not revealed.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom he will he hardeneth,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “God gave them a spirit of slumber,” i. e. permitted them to slumber. 2 Thes. ii. 11. “God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie;” i. e. shall permit them to be deluded so that they shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart,” i. e. I will suffer it to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I am not come to send peace, but a sword; For I am come to set a man at variance against his father,” That is, my coming shall be the innocent occasion of wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of old ordained to this condemnation;” i. e. foretold, or forewritten, as the word signifies; announced in the sacred pages, and proscribed by divine law. But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the notion, that God is the cause of sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed.” i. e. unto which thing, their stumbling, they were appointed because disobedient. The Greek participle includes the cause of their falling; as Heb. ii. 3. Neglecting so great salvation, how shall we escape? To which not escaping, they were appointed, for neglecting so great salvation. A striking contrast to this we have, John vii. 17. “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine;” but the disobedient shall, according to an awful but equitable appointment, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter into his rest, but to them that believe not?” i. e. Who were appointed to destruction? The answer is, the disobedient; for the original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter in because of unbelief.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The rest were blinded, or hardened;” i. e. were suffered to be blind or hard. And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “Because of unbelief they were broken off.” Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his gospel. Their end is what might be expected, as foretold by the prophets, according to God’s righteous government, and his eternal appointment, or determination, respecting all such offenders. Their habitual unbelieving disobedience was the cause, but their actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the righteous, the appointed effect. To this they were appointed, placed, or set forth (as Pharaoh was raised up) by the righteous judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personally appointed to exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiastical builders; they were suffered to reject Christ, in pure equity; and thus were deservedly constituted awful warnings to others. 241.This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termed Baxterianism, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit, and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power and way as shall infallibly convert and save them.” He moreover says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question, whether any or how many are ever converted or saved by that mere grace which we call sufficient, or rather necessary, and common to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes. 242.The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him, form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail; and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render useless God’s reasoning with sinners, his exhortations to repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end, and form a part of the decree itself. Transcriber’s Notes: Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic punctuation and spellings have been retained. |
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