Quest. VIII. Are there more Gods than one?

Answ. There is but one only, the living and true God.

I. In this answer, God is described as the living and true God. As life is the greatest excellency belonging to the nature of any finite being, upon which account some have concluded that the lowest degree thereof renders a creature more excellent in itself, than the most glorious creatures that are without it; and inasmuch as intelligent creatures have a superior excellency to all others, because that which gives life to them, or the principle by which they act as such, is most excellent; so the life of God is that whereby he infinitely excels all finite beings; therefore, when he is called the living God, this is not one single perfection of the divine nature, but it is expressive of all his divine perfections. Thus when God represents himself, in scripture, as giving his people the highest assurance of any thing which he designs to do, he useth the form of an oath, and sweareth by his life, As I live; or, as truly as I live, Isa. xlix. 18. and Numb. xiv. 21. which imports the same thing, as when he says, I have sworn by myself, Gen. xxii. 16. so that when he is called the living God, his glory is set forth, as a God of infinite perfection: but this has been considered under the last answer.

Therefore we may farther observe, that when God is styled the living God, it connotes the display of all his perfections, as life is a principle of action; and hereby he is distinguished from lifeless idols, who were reputed gods by their stupid and profane worshippers. Thus the apostle lays down both the terms of opposition, when he speaks to some, as having turned from idols, or false gods, to serve the living and true God, 1 Thess. i. 9. Here we might consider the origin and progress of idolatry, as men were inclined to worship the creature more than the Creator, Rom. i. 25. or to do service to them, who, by nature, are no gods, Gal. iv. 8. and shew how some seemed to have been destitute of common sense, as they were of true religion, when they not only worshipped God by idols, of their own making, but prayed to them, and said, Deliver us, for ye are our gods; this the prophet takes notice of, Isa. xliv. 17. and exposes their unaccountable stupidity, by observing to them that these gods were first growing among the trees of the forest, then cut down with their own hands, and fashioned into their designed form, and part thereof cast into the fire, as destined for common uses. These were lifeless gods, without a metaphor, and their senseless worshippers but one remove from them, as the Psalmist says, They that make them are like unto them, and so is every one that trusteth in them, Psal. cxv. 8. But this we shall have occasion to insist on in a following part of this work^[65], and therefore shall pass it over at present, and consider,

II. The unity of the Godhead. Scripture is very express in asserting this: thus it is said, The Lord our God is one Lord, Deut. vi. 4. and, I, even I, am he; and there is no God with me, chap. xxxii. 39. and, The Lord he is God; there is none else besides him, chap. iv. 35. and elsewhere, Thou art God alone, Psal. lxxxvi. 10. And this is a truth, not barely founded on a few places of scripture that expressly assert it, but it may be deduced from every part thereof; yea, it is instamped on the very nature of man, and may be as plainly proved, from the light of nature, as that there is a God; and every one of the divine perfections, which were particularly considered under the last answer, will supply us with arguments to confirm our faith therein: but that this may farther appear, let it be considered,

1. That the idea of a God implies that he is the first cause of all things, in which respect he is opposed to the creature; it follows, therefore, that he was from all eternity. Now there can be no more than one being, who is without beginning, and who gave being to all other things, which appears from the very nature of the thing; for if there are more Gods, then they must derive their being from him, and then they are a part of his creation, and consequently not gods, for God and the creature are infinitely opposed to each other: and since there is but one independent being, who is in and of himself, and derives his perfections from no other, therefore there can be but one God.

2. There is but one being, who is the ultimate end of all things, which necessarily follows from his being their Creator; for he that produced them out of nothing must be supposed to have designed some valuable end hereby, which, ultimately considered, cannot be any thing short of himself, for that is inconsistent with the wisdom and sovereignty that is contained in the idea of a Creator; therefore he is said to have made all things for himself, Prov. xvi. 4. and consequently the glory that results from thence is unalienable, and so cannot be ascribed to any other God; therefore to suppose that there are other gods, is to ascribe a divine nature to them, divested of that glory which is essential to it. And to this we may add, that if God be the ultimate end of all things, he is to be glorified as such, and all worship is to terminate in him; and we must proclaim him to be our chief good, and only portion and happiness, which is plainly inconsistent with a plurality of gods. Besides, he that is the object of adoration must be worshipped, and loved with all our heart, soul, strength, and mind, Luke x. 27. our affections must not be divided between him and any other. Therefore since man is under a natural obligation to give supreme worship to him, it follows that there is no other God that has a right to it, and therefore that he is the only true God.

3. Infinite perfection being implied in the idea of a God, as has been proved under the last answer, it is certain that it cannot belong to more than one; for as it implies that this perfection is boundless, so it denotes that he sets bounds to the perfections of all others; therefore, if there are more Gods than one, their perfections must be limited, and consequently that which is not infinite is not God. And as infinite perfection implies in it all perfection, so it cannot be divided among many, for then no being, that has only a part thereof, could be said to be thus perfect; therefore, since there is but one that is so, it follows that there is no other God besides him.

4. Since omnipotency is a divine attribute, there can be but one almighty being, and therefore but one God; which will farther appear, if we consider, that if there were more Gods than one, all of them must be said to be able to do all things, and then the same individual power, that is exerted by one, must be exerted by another, than which nothing is more absurd. And it will also follow, that he, who cannot do that which is said to be done by another, is not almighty, or able to do all things, and consequently that he is not God.

5. There is but one being, who has an absolute sovereign will, who, though he can controul all others, is himself subject to no controul; who has a natural right to give laws to all who are his subjects, but is subject to none himself; for absolute dominion and subjection are as opposite as light and darkness. Two persons may as well be said to give being to each other, as to have a right to give laws to each other. Moreover, if there were more Gods than one, then there would be a confusion in the government of the world; for whatever one decrees, another may reverse; or whatever is done by one, the contrary might be done by the other, for that is the consequence from a sovereignty of will. And as there might be opposite things commanded, or forbidden, pursuant to the different wills of a plurality of gods, so the same thing, with respect to those who are under an obligation to yield obedience, would be both a sin and a duty, and the same persons would be both condemned and justified for the same action.

6. There is but one being, who is, as God is often said to be, the best and the greatest; therefore, if there were more Gods than one, either one must be supposed to be more excellent than another, or both equally excellent. If we suppose the former of these, then he, who is not the most excellent, is not God; and if the latter, that their excellencies are equal, then infinite perfection would be divided, which is contrary to the idea thereof, as was before hinted; as well as to what is expressly said by God, To whom will ye liken me, or shall I be equal? saith the Holy One, Isa. xl. 25. From these, and several other arguments to the same purpose, which might have been taken from every one of the divine attributes, and from all essential and relative glory which belongs to him, the unity of the divine essence appears, even to a demonstration. And indeed to assert that there are more Gods than one is, in effect, to say that there is no God; so the apostle deems it, when he tells the church at Ephesus, that, before their conversion, when they worshipped other gods, they were without God in the world, which implies as much as that they were atheists therein, as the words a?e?? ?? t? ??s? may, with equal propriety, be rendered.^[66]

Having considered the unity of the Godhead, not only as evinced from scripture, but as it may be demonstrated by the light of nature, it will be necessary that we obviate an objection that may be brought against this latter method of proving it, viz.

Object. If the unity of the Godhead might be known by the dictates of nature, or demonstrated by other arguments, besides those which are matter of pure revelation, how comes it to pass that the heathen owned, and worshipped, a plurality of gods? and as it was not one particular sect among them that did so, but this abominable practice universally obtained, where revealed religion was not known, therefore, though this be an undoubted truth, yet it is not founded in the light of nature.

Answ. That they did so is beyond dispute, especially after idolatry had continued a few ages in the world, and so had extinguished those principles of revealed religion, which mankind, before this, were favoured with; yet it must be considered, that though the ignorant and unthinking multitude, among them, believed every thing to be a God, which the custom of the countries where they lived had induced them to pay divine adoration to, yet the wiser sort of them, however guilty of idolatry, by paying a lower kind of worship to them, have, notwithstanding, maintained the unity of the Godhead, or that there is one God superior to them all, whom they often call the father of gods and men; to whom probably the Athenians erected that altar, as the apostle Paul observes, with this inscription, To the unknown GOD; because he says, in the words immediately following, Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you, Acts xvii. 23.

This appears from what they assert to the same purpose, whereby they plainly discover their belief of but one supreme God, who has all the incommunicable perfections of the divine nature, however, in other instances, their conduct seemed to run counter to their method of reasoning: thus it appears, by their writings, that many of them assert that there is a God, who is the first cause, or beginning, of all things; and that he was from eternity, or in the beginning, and that time took its rise from him; that he is the living God, the fountain of life, and the best of all beings^[67]: Also, that this God is self-sufficient, and therefore it is absurd to suppose that he stands in need of, or can receive advantage from, any one^[68]; and that he is the chief good, or contains in himself whatever is good, and that by him all things consist; and that no one hath enough in himself to secure his own safety and happiness, which is to be derived from him^[69].

And there are others also, who plainly assert the unity of God in as strong terms, as though they had learned it from divine revelation, calling him, the beginning, the end, and author of all things; who was before, and is above all things, the Lord of all, the fountain of life, light, and all good, yea, goodness itself; the most excellent being; and many other expressions to the like purpose. I could multiply quotations for the proof of this, from Proclus, Porphyry, Iamblicus, Plotinus, Plutarch, Epictetus, and several others; but this has been already done by other hands^[70]; by which it appears, that though they mention other gods, they suppose them to be little more than titular or honorary gods; or at least persons, who were the peculiar favourites of God, and admitted to the participation of divine honours, as well as employed in some part of the government of the world. They frequently speak of them as having derived their being from God, whom they call the cause of causes, the God of gods. Some of them speak of God in the singular number, throughout the greatest part of their writings, and only make mention of the gods occasionally, especially when they treat of those works that become a God, or the greatest honours that are due to him; thus Seneca and Plato, and, in particular, the latter of them says, concerning himself^[71], that when he wrote any thing in a grave and serious manner, his custom was, to preface his epistles with the mention of one God; though, it is true, when he wrote otherwise, he used the common mode of speaking, and talked of other gods; and it is observed, in his writings, that he sometimes uses this phrase; If it please God, or by the help of God, not the gods.

But, notwithstanding this, they were all idolaters, for they joined in the rites of worship performed to the false gods of their respective countries; yea, Socrates himself, who fell under the displeasure of the Athenians, for asserting the unity of the Godhead, which cost him his life, did not refuse to pay some religious honour to the heathen gods. So that it is plain they paid some religious worship to them, but it was of an inferior and subordinate nature, not much unlike to that which the Papists give to saints and angels: but they are far from setting them upon a level with God; for they confess they were but men, who formerly lived in this world; they give an account of their birth and parentage; where they lived and died; write the history of their lives, and what procured them the honour they suppose them after death advanced to^[72]; how some of them obtained it, as the reward of virtue, or in commemoration of the good they had done to the world in their life: as some were advanced to this honour, who were the inventors of arts, beneficial to mankind, or were successful in wars, or a public blessing to the country where they lived, others had this honour conferred upon them, especially among the Romans, at the request of their surviving friends; and this was done after Julius CÆsar’s time, by the decree of the senate, who, at the same time, when they ranked them among the number of their gods, appointed also the rites of worship that should be paid to them; and some of the Roman emperors obliged the senate to deify them while they were alive. These things are very largely insisted on, by many ancient and modern writers^[73]; so that, upon the whole, it plainly appears, that, whatever they say of a plurality of gods, the wiser sort among the heathen did not deny the unity of the divine essence, in the highest and most proper sense; and, inasmuch as they received the knowledge hereof from the light of nature, we may from hence conclude that this truth might be known that way, as well as by divine revelation.

We shall conclude with some practical inferences from the doctrine contained in this answer.

1. Since he, who is the object of our worship, is the living God; this reproves that lifeless formal way, in which many address themselves to him, in the performance of religious duties, without that reverence and due regard to the divine perfections, which are contained in this character of the Godhead. It is also a very great aggravation, not only of apostacy, but of any degree of backsliding, in those who have made a profession of religion; that it is a departure from the living God, Heb. iii. 12. Is he the God and giver of life, and shall we forsake him, who has the words of eternal life, John vi. 68. whose sovereign will has the sole disposal thereof?

Again, this consideration, of his being the living God, renders his judgments most terrible, and his wrath insupportable; as the apostle says, It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God, Heb. x. 31.

2. From his being the true God, we infer, that all hypocrisy, both in heart and life, is to be avoided; and we should draw nigh to him with a true heart and faith unfeigned; and not like those whom the prophet reproves, when he says, God was near in their mouth, and far from their reins, Jer. xii. 2.

Moreover, let us take heed that we do not set up an idol in our hearts, in opposition to him as the true God: whatever has a greater share in our affections than God, or is set up in competition with him, that is, to us, a god, and is therefore inconsistent with our paying that regard which is due to him; as our Saviour says, Ye cannot serve God and mammon, Mat. vi. 24. and, upon this account, covetousness is styled idolatry, Col. iii. 5. as the world is loved more than him; and we read of some whose God is their belly, Phil. iii. 19. who make provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof, as though this was their chief good. And when we confide in any thing below him, in a religious way, or expect that from the creature which is only to be found in him; or when we esteem men as lords of our faith; or when his sovereignty, or right to govern us, is called in question, while we presumptuously, or wilfully, rebel against him; this is, in effect, a dethroning, or denying him to be the true God: but more of this when we consider the sins forbidden in the first commandment^[74].

3. From the unity of the Godhead, we may infer, that we ought to take heed that we do not entertain any conceptions of the divine Being, which are inconsistent herewith; therefore, as we are not to assert a plurality of gods, so we are not to think or speak of God in such a way as tends to overthrow the simplicity of the divine nature; therefore we must not conceive that it is compounded of various parts, all which, being taken together, tend to constitute the divine essence; which gives occasion to that known aphorism, generally laid down by those who treat of this subject, that whatever is in God, is God; which we must reckon as one of the incomprehensibles of the divine Being, which when we attempt to speak of, we only give an evident proof of the imperfection of our finite understandings, and that we cannot order our words, by reason of darkness: however, it is necessary, when we lay down this proposition, that we signify what we intend hereby, that so we may not be supposed to use words without ideas; and especially that we may, in some measure, account for those modes of speaking, which are agreeable to scripture, which so often describes God as having a plurality of perfections, and those, in some respects, distinct; and yet, at the same time, that we may not hereby be led to infer a plurality of gods. Here let it be considered,

(1.) That we have not the least similitude, or resemblance, of this in any finite being. Every thing below God is composed of parts, some of which we call integral, as all the parts of matter taken together constitute the whole; others are called essential, as when we say an intelligent being has various powers or properties which are essential to it; so that it would not be complete without every one of them; and that these are all of them distinct, so that we cannot say whatever is in the soul of man is the soul, but every one of those powers, or properties, taken together, constitute the man; but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being; therefore,

(2.) When we conceive of God, as holy, powerful, just, good, &c. we must not suppose that these perfections are so many ingredients in the divine Being, or that, when taken together, they constitute it, as the whole is constituted of its parts; for then every one of them would have no other than a partial perfection, and consequently the essential glory of one of those attributes would not be equal to the glory of the divine Being, which is supposed to consist of them all; and therefore there would be something in God less than God, or a divine perfection less than all the divine perfections taken together, which we are not to suppose. These are the properties of composition; and therefore, when we speak of God as a simple or uncompounded Being, we cannot forbear to mention them as what are inconsistent with his perfection as such.

Neither are the divine perfections distinct or different from one another, as the various parts of which the whole is constituted are said to be distinct; which follows from the former, since the divine essence has no parts; therefore we are not to suppose, that the divine attributes, considered as they are in God, are so distinguished, as one thing, or being, is from another; or as wisdom, power, justice, mercy, &c. are in men; for that would be to suppose the divine Being as having several distinct, infinitely perfect beings contained in it, which is contrary to its simplicity or unity; or, at least, if we call it one, it would be only so by participation and dependence, as a general or complex idea is said to be one, which partakes of, and depends on, all those particular or simple ideas that are contained in it; or, to illustrate it by numbers, as one hundred is one, as it contains such a number of units in it, as are, all taken together, equal to a hundred; this is not what we mean, when we say God is one.

Moreover, when we speak of the divine perfections, as being in God, we suppose them all essential to him, as opposed to what is accidental. Now an accident is generally described, as what belongs, or is superadded, to a being or subject, which it might have existed without, or have been destitute of, and yet sustained no loss of that perfection, which is essential to it: thus, wisdom, holiness, justice, faithfulness, are accidents in men; so that they who have them not, do not cease to be men, or to have the essential perfection of the human nature: but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being and attributes; for to suppose God to be destitute of any of them, is as much as to say that he is not infinitely perfect, or that he is not God. This, I think, is generally intended, when it is said, whatever is in God, is God; which, because it may be reckoned by some to be a metaphysical speculation, I should have avoided to mention, had it not been, in some respects, necessary, since the unity of God cannot well be conceived of, unless his simplicity be defended; and I do not see how that can be maintained, if this proposition be not duly considered. If I have used more words than are needful, or repeated the same ideas too often, in attempting to explain it, I have done it to avoid some scholastic modes of speaking, or with a design to render what has been said more intelligible; but to this we may add,

(3.) That when we speak of the divine perfections as many, or distinct from one another, as we often do, and have scripture warrant to justify us therein, namely, when we speak of the justice of God, as different from his mercy, or these, from his power, wisdom, faithfulness, &c. this must not be deemed inconsistent with what has been said concerning the divine simplicity: and therefore let it be considered, that the nature and perfections of God are incomprehensible; and therefore all the ideas which we have of them are taken from our comparing them with some small resemblance that there is thereof in intelligent creatures, and, at the same time, separating from them whatever argues imperfection.

And from hence it follows, that we are not supposed to know, or be able to describe, what God is in himself, and, as I humbly conceive, never shall: such knowledge as this is too great for any but a divine person; therefore our conceptions of him are taken from and conformed to those various ways, by which he condescends to make himself visible, or known to us, namely, by various acts conversant about certain objects, in which he is said to manifest his perfections: thus, when an effect is produced, we call that perfection that produces it his power; or as the divine acts are otherwise distinguished with respect to the objects, or the manner of his glorifying himself therein, these we call his wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. And this is what we mean, when we speak of various perfections in God; though some suppose that they express themselves more agreeably to the nature of the subject, or to the simplicity of God, in that, whenever they speak of any of the divine perfections, they speak of them in such a way, as that they are denominated from the effect thereof; as when they take occasion to mention the power of God, they call it God acting powerfully; or of his justice or faithfulness, they express those perfections by, God acting justly or faithfully^[75]. But however we express ourselves, when we speak of the distinct perfections of the divine nature, this is what we principally intend thereby: and here our thoughts must stop, and make what is too great for a finite mind to conceive of the subject of our admiration, and adore what we cannot comprehend: such knowledge is too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain to it.