Although the great bulwark of Protestantism had fallen, Richelieu did not have his hands entirely free. The obstinate Rohan, by great exertions, prevented the Huguenot party from dissolving beneath this staggering blow; and it was decided by a General Assembly which met at NÎmes not to submit unless their rights were preserved to them by a treaty guaranteed by the King of England. However, the continued resistance of the Huguenots of the South was not a matter of urgent importance, since the Royal troops already engaged there were well able to hold Rohan in check, until such time as the Cardinal was at leisure to undertake a vigorous offensive against him; and he therefore decided to bend all his energies to the more pressing task of relieving Casale.

The duchy of Mantua had not been seriously attacked, the Spaniards and the Piedmontese having concentrated their efforts on the conquest of Montferrato. Charles Emmanuel had promptly seized upon his share of the spoil; but the governor of Milan, Don Gonzalez de Cordoba, had shown little skill and less energy in the conduct of his operations, and had been unable to prevent Casale, gallantly defended by the French volunteers, from being revictualled on several occasions. However, the town was now being closely besieged, and though the garrison, ably seconded by the citizens, could be trusted to offer a stubborn resistance, it was imperative that help should arrive with as little delay as possible.

Richelieu had, however, to gain a new victory at the Court before being able to go to the succour of the allies of France beyond the Alps. The Queen-Mother, who hated the Gonzaga family, and had an old grudge against the Duc de Nevers, now become Duke of Mantua, strenuously opposed the intervention of France in the affairs of Italy. Indifferent to the fact that neither the honour nor the interest of France would permit the sacrifice of such old allies as the Gonzagas, she urged that the King ought to permit the aggrandisement of the House of Savoy, the heir of which was the husband of his sister. The High Catholic party in the Council, indignant that Richelieu, instead of devoting himself to crushing the remnant of the Huguenots, proposed to make war on the King of Spain, supported her warmly; and it is not improbable that their combined efforts might have been successful, had not the astute Cardinal had recourse to an expedient which he had already employed with success on more than one previous occasion.

First, he presented to the King a memorial, in which he outlined the policy, foreign and domestic, which he considered it essential that his Majesty should follow for his own glory and the welfare of his realm. Then, in his character of priest, he pointed out, with audacious frankness, the grave defects in his Majesty’s character: his idleness, his inconstancy, his neglect of even his most faithful and devoted servants, and so forth, which it was most necessary he should endeavour to remedy if he

desired to be a great king. And, finally, he tendered his resignation, on the pretext that his health was no longer equal to the cares of office.

Richelieu had little doubt what the answer would be. Louis, aware of his personal incapacity, and unwilling to renounce the power and glory which his great Minister had promised him, and which, as he well knew, he alone was capable of securing for him, accepted his advice and refused his resignation.

Marie de’ Medici, finding herself unable to prevent the Italian expedition, demanded for Monsieur the command of the army, under the pretext of saving the King from the hardships and dangers of a winter campaign in the Alps. Richelieu did not see his way to oppose the Queen-Mother’s request, and Louis consented; but his jealousy of his brother soon asserted itself, and, to the intense mortification of Marie and Monsieur, the arrangement was cancelled.

On January 15, 1629, Louis XIII, having entrusted to Marie de’ Medici the task of pursuing the negotiations for peace with England, left Paris for Grenoble, where the army with which he proposed to enter Italy was assembled.

This might seem an act of great munificence on the part of Louis XIII, did we not remember that the royal donor had been the guest of the recipient of his bounty for several weeks during the siege of La Rochelle, and had thereby put the latter to an expense which must have far exceeded the cost of the cider.

At Grenoble the King remained for some three weeks to negotiate with the Duke of Savoy. Charles Emmanuel was unable to believe that Louis really intended to cross the Alps while the Huguenots of the South were still unsubdued, and, esteeming himself the arbiter between France and Spain, he refused to abandon the Spaniards, unless the King would undertake to assist him to conquer the Milanese or Genoa or sacrifice to him Geneva.

The King and the Cardinal thereupon resolved to descend into Piedmont by way of Mont-GenÈvre and Susa. The Duc de Guise, Governor of Provence, was directed to create a diversion by way of Nice and Liguria, an operation which he executed very slowly and inefficiently. At Grenoble, however, the utmost activity prevailed, and though, when Richelieu arrived there, the army was deficient in artillery, munitions, transport and, in short, nearly everything required for a campaign, thanks to his unwearying exertions, in a surprisingly short time it was ready to take the field, and on February 22 the advance began. On March 1 the army passed Mont-GenÈvre, notwithstanding the severity of the weather, and on the 3rd the advance-guard, some 10,000 to 12,000 strong, under Bassompierre and CrÉquy, encamped at Chaumont, the last village on the French side of the frontier, at the entrance to the Pass of Susa.

Two or three days were occupied in pourparlers between Richelieu, who had left the King at Oulx, and the Prince of Piedmont, who had hurried to Susa on receiving the news that the French had crossed the mountains. The Cardinal, however, recognised that the prince and his father sought only to gain time to enable them to fortify the Pass of Susa and to allow of the arrival of the Piedmontese and Spanish troops whom they had summoned in all haste. The negotiations were accordingly broken off, and at two o’clock in the morning of the 6th the King arrived from Oulx, accompanied by Longueville, Soissons, the Comte de Moret, Henri IV’s son by Jacqueline de Beuil, and Schomberg, and the army crossed the frontier and advanced towards the head of the pass.

The Pass of Susa was a defile about a quarter of a league in length and in places less than twenty paces wide, obstructed here and there by fallen rocks. The enemy had not been idle and had erected three formidable barricades, strengthened by earthworks and ditches, while the rocky heights on either side were crowned with soldiers and protected by small redoubts. On a neighbouring mountain stood a fort called by the French the Fort de Gelasse, from the name of a little watercourse hard by, and the cannon of this fort commanded the open space between Chaumont and the entrance to the pass. It was one of those positions which a handful of resolute men might successfully defend against an entire army; and, as the Piedmontese had already between 3,000 and 4,000 men there, the probability of the invaders being able to force a passage through the defile, unless at a heavy sacrifice of life, seemed very slight.

The French troops before the pass consisted of seven companies of French Guards, six of the Swiss, the greater part of the Regiments of Navarre, the Baron d’Estissac and the Comte de Sault, and the Musketeers of the Guard. The Musketeers, who had dismounted from their horses, were under command of the Seigneur de TrÉville, the erstwhile private soldier of the French Guards who, it will be remembered, had so distinguished himself at the siege of Montauban.[120] The Comte de Sault’s regiment was detached from the main body, and, guided by peasants of the neighbourhood, sent to make a dÉtour through the mountains, which would bring it to a spot overlooking the town of Susa, whence it could descend and take the enemy in the rear; while the rest of the troops were drawn up just out of range of the guns of Fort de Gelasse.

At dawn the Sieur de Cominges was sent forward with a trumpeter to demand, in the name of the King, passage for his Majesty’s person and army from the Duke of Savoy. To his request the Count of Verrua, who commanded the Piedmontese, replied that the French did not come as people who desired to pass as friends; that he was fully prepared to resist them, and that if they endeavoured to force a passage, “they would gain nothing but blows.”

The three marshals of France, CrÉquy, Bassompierre, and Schomberg, had come to an arrangement by which each in turn commanded the army for three days at a time; and, when Cominges returned with this bellicose answer, Bassompierre, who happened to be in command that day, approached the King, who had taken up his position a little way behind the storm troops, and said to him: “Sire, Sire, the company is ready; the musicians have come in to demand permission to begin the fÊte; the masks are at the door. When it pleases your Majesty, we will dance the ballet.” The King replied sharply that the marshal knew very well that they had only light guns with them, which would have no effect upon the barricades, and that they must wait until their heavy artillery came up.

Somewhat reluctantly Louis XIII yielded, and Bassompierre forthwith gave the order for the troops to advance. He and CrÉquy dismounted and, sword in hand, led the French Guards and the regiments of Navarre and d’Estissac against the barricades. At the same time, with irresistible Élan, the Musketeers, under TrÉville, and the Swiss, under ValenÇay, escaladed the heights on either side of the gorge, dislodged the enemy, gained the top of the rocks, poured a withering flanking-fire into the defenders of the barricades, and then charged down upon them. Finding themselves attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, the Piedmontese were seized with panic; the three barricades were carried almost without resistance, and the enemy pursued almost to the gates of Susa, being badly cut up on the way by Sault’s regiment, who fell upon them as they were retreating. The Duke of Savoy and the Prince of Piedmont were within an ace of being made prisoners, and only contrived to escape through the bravery of a Spanish officer, who, with a small body of men, threw himself between them and the Musketeers who were about to seize them and was wounded and taken.[121] The victory only cost the French some fifty men. Amongst the wounded were ValenÇay and Schomberg. The latter received a musket-shot in the abdomen, but the wound was not a dangerous one, and the marshal was soon convalescent.

As the pursuing French came within range of the cannon of the citadel of Susa, they were heavily fired upon. “But,” says Bassompierre, “we were so excited by the combat and so joyous at having obtained the victory, that we paid no attention to these cannon-shots.”

In the course of the day the King sent to felicitate Bassompierre and CrÉquy on the victory they had won, but blamed them for having charged at the head of the troops, since, if they had been killed, not only would he have been deprived of the services of two of his most distinguished officers, but the army would have lost its leaders, and the effect on its morale might have been disastrous. The marshals replied that they had judged this to be an occasion when it was necessary to stake everything on a single cast, and to inspire their men to the utmost courage and resolution by placing themselves at their head, since if the first attack had been repulsed, it was most improbable that subsequent attempts would have succeeded.

The town of Susa surrendered the next day, and the King and the Cardinal established themselves there; while Bassompierre and CrÉquy, pushing on with the advance-guard of the army, took Bussolongo and were about to attack Avigliana, a town situated only four leagues from Turin, when they received orders to halt, as negotiations for peace had begun.

On the 11th Charles Emmanuel sent the Prince of Piedmont to Susa, where he signed with the Cardinal a treaty whereby the Duke of Savoy engaged to revictual Casale and promised, in the name of the governor of the Milanese, to evacuate Montferrato and cease all hostile operations against the Duke of Mantua. The ratification of Philip IV was to be obtained within six weeks, and his Catholic Majesty was to undertake to secure for the Duke of Mantua the Imperial investiture. In case of the contravention of this treaty by Spain, the Duke of Savoy was to join his forces to those of France. On March 18 the Spaniards raised the siege of Casale; and thus at a single blow France triumphantly reasserted her position in Italy.

Richelieu subsequently proposed a defensive league between France, Venice, Savoy, and Mantua against the House of Austria. It was hoped to secure the adhesion of the Papacy, as Urban VIII had been much displeased by the invasion of Mantua and Montferrato.

Charles Emmanuel, eager to compensate himself on one side for what he had failed to gain on the other, pressed Louis XIII to invade the Milanese, and Venice warmly seconded his efforts. But, though the moment certainly appeared favourable for such an enterprise, Richelieu resisted the temptation and did not alter his plans. He was resolved to put an end to the civil strife in France before embarking on any further foreign enterprise.

The Duke of Savoy, irritated by this refusal, determined to violate the new treaty so soon as he could do so without danger. On one pretext or another, he delayed the evacuation of Montferrato by his troops, and the Spaniards followed his example. The King and the Cardinal, however, did not allow themselves to be tricked by the Duke; they sent Toiras with between 3,000 and 4,000 men to relieve the Spanish garrisons of Montferrato, and Louis XIII announced his intention of remaining at Susa until the treaty was fully executed.

Towards the end of April the Republic of Genoa sent an Embassy Extraordinary to Louis XIII, and the momentous question arose as to whether the Genoese ambassadors were or were not to be permitted to present themselves covered before his Majesty. The privilege of the hat was accorded by the King of France to the representatives of all the princes and republics of Italy, though until recent years those of Ferrara, Mantua, and Urbino had been excepted. But the later Valois kings had claimed sovereignty over Genoa, and this claim had never been formally renounced. Consequently, if Louis XIII were to allow the Genoese ambassadors to come into his presence covered, it would be tantamount to an admission that France had abandoned her pretensions in regard to the republic.

The King, much exercised in his mind over this matter, sent for Bassompierre and demanded his advice. The marshal replied that, as his Majesty now accorded the privilege of the hat to the ambassadors of Ferrara, Mantua, and Urbino, he ought certainly to accord it to the representatives of Genoa, a republic which yielded little or nothing in importance to Venice, and that, in point of fact, an ambassador whom Genoa had sent to his Court some years before had been covered during his audience. At that moment, the Secretary of State ChÂteauneuf, whom the King had also sent for, came in and Louis asked for his opinion. ChÂteauneuf took a different view of the matter from Bassompierre, and strongly advised the King not to admit the Genoese to his presence covered, declaring that they were his subjects and that, by this concession, he “would destroy the right which he had over this republic.” Thereupon, Louis, always very tenacious of his prerogatives, declared that he should refuse to receive the ambassadors unless they were uncovered, and directed that they should be informed of his decision.

Next day Bassompierre received a visit from the Nuncio, Cardinal Bagni, who came to invoke his good offices on behalf of the Genoese ambassadors. The Nuncio told him that he had been charged by the Pope to take particular care that they were well received; that it was against all equity and reason that they should be denied the privilege which had been accorded to the last ambassador whom the republic had sent to the King of France; that, at the Papal Court, Genoa, together with Venice, took precedence of all the princes of Italy; and that he could assure the marshal that he would be performing an action very pleasing to the Holy Father if he were able to persuade the King to receive them covered.

Bassompierre replied that he should esteem it a great honour to render this trifling service to his Holiness and the Republic of Genoa, but that the King had already refused to follow his advice, and that his Majesty was very obstinate when he had once taken a thing into his head and easily irritated against those who opposed him. However, he would go and consult the Cardinal de Richelieu and see what could be done.

Richelieu, who was naturally very anxious to oblige the Pope, told Bassompierre that he would propose to the King that he should take the advice of the Council on the matter, and promised that he would warmly support the marshal’s opinion and would arrange that the other members should do the same, with the exception of ChÂteauneuf, whom he would instruct to offer some half-hearted objections, for form’s sake.

The Council met, but the King, who had been informed that the Genoese ambassadors had decided to return whence they came without demanding audience of him, if they were to be refused the right of being covered, was in a particularly obstinate mood, and after demanding Bassompierre’s advice, he added: “I ask you for it, but I shall not follow it, for I know beforehand that it will be in favour of their being covered, and that what you are doing is on the recommendation of Don Augustine Fiesco, who is staying with you.” Don Augustino Fiesco, it should be mentioned, was a Genoese noble and an old friend of Bassompierre. Bassompierre, indignant at such an insinuation, protested that he had no relations with the Republic of Genoa and was under no obligations to Don Augustine Fiesco, who, in point of fact, was under considerable obligations to him; and that, even if such had been the case, it would not prevent him from discharging his duty to his sovereign.

A day or two afterwards the King had repented of this childish display of temper, and, by way of making his peace with Bassompierre, sent him nine boxes of Italian sweetmeats.

On April 4 peace with England was signed at Paris. Charles I had vainly endeavoured in the negotiations which preceded it to exercise in favour of Rohan and the Huguenots the intervention which Richelieu had refused to permit at La Rochelle. But the French Government was inexorable, and he was constrained to abandon the Protestants, notwithstanding their complaints and imprecations.

On the side of Italy matters were less satisfactory. The defensive league against Spain which Richelieu had planned did not materialise; while Philip IV’s ratification of the treaty for the evacuation of Mantua and Montferrato did not arrive; and it was evident that he and Charles Emmanuel intended to evade its stipulations. The King and Richelieu therefore determined to crush the Huguenot rebellion by a single vigorous blow, and then to resume, if need be, the offensive in Italy. On April 28 the King left Susa to return to France; and on May 11 the Cardinal followed, accompanied by Bassompierre, leaving CrÉquy at Susa with 6,000 men. The Duke of Savoy was warned that the French would remain in occupation until the treaty had been formally ratified by Philip IV.

The bulk of the Royal army had already crossed the RhÔne, and 50,000 men were overrunning Languedoc and Upper Guienne. Richelieu’s plan of campaign was to send four corps to lay waste the country around Montauban, Castries, NÎmes and UzÈs, the principal towns which the Protestants still held, so as to render these places incapable of sustaining a siege, while the King in person, with the rest of the army, was to march from the RhÔne to the Tarn across the CÉvennes, reducing on their way the smaller Huguenot strongholds in that part of the country.

To this powerful combined attack Rohan was only able to oppose forces weakened by a war which had already lasted eighteen months and disheartened by the news that England had abandoned them. Not knowing where else to turn for assistance, the successor of Coligny applied to the successor of Philip II, and on May 3, 1629, a treaty was signed at Madrid by which Spain promised the Huguenots a yearly subsidy of 300,000 ducats, and Rohan undertook “to continue the war so long as it might please his Catholic Majesty.” The duke further undertook, in the event of his being successful in establishing a Protestant republic in the South of France, to permit liberty of worship to all Catholics within its boundaries. “This strange compact, however, came too late; probably, before the first instalment of the subsidy had reached Rohan’s hands, his dreams of a Huguenot republic had been rudely dissipated.”

On May 19 the Cardinal and Bassompierre rejoined Louis XIII in the Royal camp before Privas, the capital of the Protestant Vivarais. On their arrival the King proposed to hold a meeting of the Council, but as the Duc de Montmorency, who was with the army, claimed to take precedence of the marshals of France, and Bassompierre declared that he refused to suffer him to do so, his Majesty was obliged to postpone it until the dispute between these great personages could be adjudicated upon.

Privas was garrisoned by 500 picked soldiers, commanded by a brave Huguenot noble, the Marquis de Saint-AndrÉ de Montbrun, supported by a regiment of the Vivarais militia and a population animated by fierce religious zeal. The resistance at first was very stubborn, but by May 27 the outworks had been captured, and during the following night the garrison and the majority of the inhabitants evacuated the town and retired into the Fort de Toulon, situated on a hill to the south-east of Privas. The rest of the townsfolk endeavoured to escape into the woods and mountains, but most of them were either killed or captured. The prisoners were hanged or sent to the galleys. While the greater part of the Royal army was engaged in the congenial task of pillaging the town, which they afterwards set on fire, Bassompierre, with 1,200 Swiss, invested the fort, and at midday the garrison offered to capitulate. Louis XIII, however, was greatly incensed against the people of Privas, who had treated the Catholics of the surrounding country with much cruelty, and he insisted that they should surrender at discretion.[124] This they refused to do, but, a little later, Saint-AndrÉ came out alone and surrendered at discretion to Bassompierre.[125] At the request of the King, Saint-AndrÉ then wrote to those in the fort urging them to follow his example; but, fearful of the fate which awaited them, they could not bring themselves to do so. Towards evening a terrific storm came on and continued most of the night, and had the Huguenots endeavoured to effect their escape under cover of it, they would probably have succeeded. Unhappily for themselves, they made no attempt.

“On Tuesday, the 29th, our soldiers who had invested the Fort of Toulon cried out to the besieged that Saint-AndrÉ had been hanged, which threw them into despair. The King sent me to show him to them, and they were content to surrender at discretion. But, at the same time, our soldiers, without orders, came from all parts to the assault, and took the fort, killing all whom they encountered. Some fifty of those who were made prisoners were hanged and two hundred others were sent to the galleys. The fort was also set on fire. Some two hundred escaped, but were met by the Swiss who were escorting the cannon to Vivas, by whom some of them were killed.”[126]