H. Noel Williams

Siege of La Rochelle begins—Immense difficulties of the undertaking—Unwillingness of the great nobles to see the Huguenot party entirely crushed—Remark of Bassompierre—Courage and energy of Richelieu—His measures to provide for the welfare and efficiency of the besieging army—The lines of circumvallation—Erection of the Fort of La Fons by Bassompierre—The construction of the mole is begun and proceeded with in the face of great difficulties—Responsibilities of Bassompierre—The Duc d’AngoulÊme accuses the marshal of a gross piece of negligence, but the latter succeeds in turning the tables upon his accuser—Louis XIII returns to Paris, leaving Richelieu with the title of “Lieutenant-General of the Army”—Critical state of affairs in Italy—Unsuccessful attempts to take La Rochelle by surprise—Intrigues of Marie de’ Medici and the High Catholic party against Richelieu—The King rejoins the army—Guiton elected Mayor of La Rochelle.

The departure of the English left Richelieu face to face with La Rochelle, “like a lion with his prey.” But the Cardinal was well aware that it was a prey which could not be secured without a long and terrible struggle. With its strong walls, covered on two sides by marshes and on a third by the harbour, and its brave and hardy population, largely composed of seafaring men inured to perils and hardships, La Rochelle was one of the most difficult places to subdue which it was possible to imagine. Old men remembered how the Duc d’Anjou (afterwards Henri III) had besieged the town for months after the St. Bartholomew, and had had nothing to show for his trouble but the graves of 20,000 of his soldiers, and predicted that Louis XIII and Richelieu would meet with no better fate. In fact, so long as La Rochelle retained command of the sea, it was deemed impregnable.

Richelieu, appreciating the immense difficulties of the enterprise, would fain have avoided it altogether; but the alliance of the Rochellois with the English had left him no alternative, and, once committed to it, he was resolved to carry it through, cost what it might. For this siege, in which, as he said, “he had to conquer three kings, those of France, England, and Spain,” he set aside all other work, and concentrated upon it all the resources of his genius. For this he closed his eyes momentarily to the death-struggles in Germany, to the Austrian menace on the eastern frontier, and to the intrigues of the Dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, and contented himself with merely holding Rohan’s rebellion in the South in check the while he was preparing to strike his decisive blows elsewhere.

The Cardinal had recognised, in arriving before La Rochelle, that it would be necessary for him to supervise everything himself, and that the obstacles which he would have to overcome were well-nigh as formidable in the Royal camp as in those of the enemy. The majority of the great nobles, by whom the Cardinal was feared and disliked, did not wish to see the Huguenot party completely crushed, foreseeing that, when this was accomplished, Richelieu would assuredly proceed to curtail their own power; and Bassompierre undoubtedly voiced their opinion when he exclaimed one day, laughing: “We shall be very foolish to take La Rochelle.” Bassompierre was too loyal a servant of the Crown not to do his duty as a soldier, whatever opinions he might hold; but there were others who were more logical, and already, during the siege of Saint-Martin-de-RÉ, the conduct of more than one officer and more than one army-contractor had been distinctly suspicious. This ill-will would, unless effective means were taken to frustrate it, undoubtedly manifest itself on a much greater scale as time went on, and would not fail to take advantage of the least checks and the least sufferings to spread discouragement throughout the army.

Richelieu faced the situation boldly and resolved to attack the evil at its root. He secured the good-will and confidence of the people of the surrounding country, and assured the provisioning of the camp, by an ordinance which forbade the soldiers, under pain of death, to take away the cattle of the peasants or to interfere with the work in the fields, and instituted a special commission to receive the complaints of the peasants against the military. He gained, at the same time, the affection of the soldiers by the solicitude which he showed for their welfare, arranging with the neighbouring towns for the supply of winter clothing for the whole army and directing that the men should receive their pay each week from the commissaries of the Treasury, instead of allowing the money to pass, as had hitherto been the custom, through the hands of the captains of companies, in which a good proportion of it invariably remained. Thus, the company-officers were no longer able to defraud the soldier of his pay or to deceive the Ministers or the generals as to the number of effectives who were serving under them; and, thanks to this precaution and the rigorous surveillance exercised over the treasurers and contractors, the army employed at the siege of La Rochelle, though larger than that which had besieged Montauban five years before, did not cost the State even half as much. Never had a French army taken the field in which the soldiers were better cared for or better disciplined; never had the country surrounding a beleaguered town been less harried and annoyed. The camp, in fact, was a pattern of all the military virtues, which Richelieu afterwards himself compared to a “well-ordered convent.” The comparison seems to have been justified by the swarm of Capuchins who descended upon the Royal army in the train of Richelieu’s confidant, the celebrated PÈre Joseph—“Son Eminence grise”—to catechise the soldiers, and by the group of warlike prelates—the Bishops of Maillezais, Mende, NÎmes, and others—whom the Cardinal gathered round him to aid him in the surveillance of the officers and contractors.

While the welfare and efficiency of the army was thus being provided for, the siege was being busily pressed on. Lines of circumvallation three leagues in extent, flanked by eleven forts and eighteen redoubts, were undertaken, with the object of cutting off all approach to La Rochelle on the land side. One of the most important was the Fort of La Fons, to the north of the town, which was intended to intercept the supply of pure water. On November 18 Louis XIII sent for Bassompierre and informed him that he and the Cardinal were most anxious that a fort should be constructed at La Fons. So soon as possible Monsieur had charged himself with this task, but, as he had left the army and returned to Paris, the King had requested AngoulÊme to undertake it. That prince, however, was unwilling to do so, unless he could have a force of 500 horse and 5,000 foot at his disposal, as he felt certain that the besieged would make the most determined efforts to prevent the construction of the fort. It would be very difficult to spare so many troops, and the King had therefore sent for Bassompierre to ascertain whether he would undertake the work and what reinforcements he would require for the purpose. The marshal replied that he would not require any, and that he would engage that the approach to La Rochelle on that side should be effectually closed within a fortnight. The King appeared to think that Bassompierre was jesting, and asked if three more regiments and three companies of light cavalry would be enough. The marshal answered that, if his Majesty insisted on reinforcing him, he must decline to undertake the affair; that on the morrow he would survey the ground and trace out the fort, on the following day make his preparations, and on the next take up his quarters there and begin the work. Louis inquired what force he proposed to employ, and, on being told that 400 infantry and 40 horse were all that he should take, “told him that he was making game of him and that he would not suffer him to do it.” The marshal said that, in that case, the King had better entrust the work to someone else, as he declined to employ another man beyond the number he had mentioned. Finally, the King allowed him to have his way, recommending him, however, to take every precaution.

It is probable that Bassompierre would not have been nearly so ready to offer to undertake under the protection of a few hundred men a dangerous and important duty, for which ordinary prudence would have enjoined the employment of a very considerable force, had not AngoulÊme been present at the Council and the temptation to humiliate that prince proved too great to resist. He had reckoned, however, on his long experience of war to enable him to deceive an enemy who could possess little or no knowledge of the ruses of the battlefield, and he judged rightly. The spot where he proposed to construct his fort was flanked by two sunken roads, and at the head of each of these roads he erected a barricade, which he lined with troops, while the rest of his force he disposed in the space between them. The Rochellois sallied out to the number of 1,000 or 1,200 men, but, finding themselves confronted by several hundred soldiers, concluded that they formed but the advance-guard of a large force which lay concealed in the sunken roads behind the barricades, and did not venture to attack, contenting themselves with a cannonade, which did but little damage. Thus the resourceful Bassompierre was able to carry out the work entrusted to him with the loss of very few men, and was highly complimented by the King on his success.

The lines of circumvallation were, however, of but secondary importance, for there was no serious attack to be feared from the Huguenots of the South. It was not the land but the sea which it was necessary to close at any price, for it was impossible to believe that the English, more exasperated than dejected by the reverse they had sustained, would not sooner or later make a vigorous effort to succour the metropolis of French Protestantism. They were, indeed, in honour bound to come to the assistance of the Rochellois, since it was they who had drawn them into revolt.

In 1621 an Italian engineer had conceived a project of blocking the canal of La Rochelle; but the means which he proposed—an elaborated floating bar, an iron chain laid across vessels and rafts, and stretching from shore to shore—was found insufficient.

However, at the end of November, another scheme was mooted.

It was accordingly decided to undertake the gigantic task of blocking up the canal with solid masonry. From the point of Coreilles, which was beyond the range of the cannon of La Rochelle, a mole was to be thrown out some seven hundred paces towards the opposite shore, where Bassompierre commanded; whence, to meet it, another mole of four hundred paces was to be constructed. The whole breadth of the canal is here seventeen hundred paces, so that there would be, after all, a distance of some six hundred still open, for here the water was so deep as to render it impossible to carry the mole across it. It was therefore decided that in this opening a number of vessels should be sunk; while others, with their bows outward, were to be lashed together, and made fast to the ends of the mole, so as to close the passage with a kind of floating and armed bridge. A small squadron of the Royal fleet was to be stationed between the mole and the inner harbour, to prevent the vessels of the Rochellois from sallying out to burn the moored ships, while the main part of the fleet would cruise between the canal and the islands of RÉ and OlÉron to watch for the coming of the English.

The construction of the mole was begun forthwith, but it was a heartbreaking task, and it is probable that with anyone less inflexible than Richelieu to supervise it it would soon have been abandoned. For more than once the stormy sea destroyed in an hour the work of a week; and, on one occasion, the result of three months’ labour was entirely lost, through the fault of Louis de Marillac, who had caused the mole to be made upright, instead of slanting. But the patience of man eventually triumphed over the fury of the elements, and little by little the gigantic work advanced towards completion, despite the winds and the waves.

Bassompierre, although, for political reasons, he may, like most of the great nobles, have wished to spare the great stronghold of the Huguenot party, carried out the duties entrusted to him with his customary zeal and efficiency. Never probably had so much responsibility rested upon him. He had to see that the soldiers and labourers engaged upon the mole upon his side of the canal were promptly supplied with all they required, so that the work might not be interrupted even for an hour. He was responsible for the construction of all the forts and redoubts on the western and north-western side of La Rochelle, which appear to have been made from plans which he himself drew. He had constantly to be on the alert, by day and night, to repel the sallies which the garrison directed against the unfinished works, and to prevent the attempts which, until the lines of circumvallation had been completed, were constantly being made under cover of darkness to revictual the town.

One morning in January, 1628, the marshal received a visit from the Marquis de Grimault, who informed him that he had been sent by the King, who had gone to spend a few days at a chÂteau near Nantes, to express to him his Majesty’s displeasure to learn that he had been so negligent as to allow a large herd of cattle to be driven through his lines into the town. In great astonishment, Bassompierre inquired who had accused him of this, and was told that it was the Duc d’AngoulÊme, from whom the King had received a letter that morning. The marshal at once despatched one of his officers, named Lisle-Rouet, who was a noted huntsman and could be trusted to identify the track of any animal, to investigate the affair; but Lisle-Rouet could find no sign of a herd of cattle having passed through their lines. He then proceeded to examine the country on the other side of La Rochelle, where the main part of the Royal army under AngoulÊme and Schomberg lay, and, by good fortune, came upon the track of the cattle near the village of PÉrigny, to the south-east of the town. He returned and reported his discovery to Bassompierre, who at once despatched him to the King, to whom, says the marshal, “he expressed just resentment that I had been blamed for the faults of others, and that without having heard me or had the matter confirmed, the King should have not only judged but condemned me on the mere statement of my enemy”; and he offered to prove, if his Majesty would send someone who was a huntsman with him, that the cattle had entered the town through AngoulÊme’s and Schomberg’s lines.

Louis thereupon sent for the two commanders, before whom Lisle-Rouet repeated what he had told the King. They, of course, declared that the thing was impossible, upon which his Majesty suggested that they had better go and examine the ground over which the cattle were said to have passed themselves, and sent with them one of his gentlemen named Croysilles, who, like Lisle-Rouet, was an experienced huntsman. Croysilles confirmed the opinion of the other, and AngoulÊme and Schomberg were reluctantly obliged to acknowledge that it was with themselves, and not with Bassompierre, that the blame for a particularly gross piece of negligence lay.

It seems probable, however, that the admission of the cattle into La Rochelle was due to something worse than negligence, at least so far as AngoulÊme was concerned. Anyway, he was most severely reprimanded both by the King and the Cardinal, the latter being furiously indignant that the success of operations involving so much labour and such enormous expense should be compromised in this fashion. As for Bassompierre, the King, “satisfied him by many words of his esteem and affection for his person”; but it must, nevertheless, have been very galling to the marshal to find how ready his Majesty was to credit the most unfounded accusations against even his most intimate friends.

It was this very same unfortunate trait in Louis XIII’s character which was just then causing his great Minister the keenest anxiety. To assure his influence with the King it was necessary to be with him constantly, so as to be in a position to disabuse his gloomy and fickle mind of the suspicions which the enemies of the Cardinal were perpetually endeavouring to implant there. Well, Louis had grown weary of the monotony of the siege and had announced his intention of returning to Paris. The Cardinal was profoundly alarmed. To follow the King was to renounce La Rochelle, for no other than Richelieu was capable of finishing the work of Richelieu; to remain, to separate from the King, was to risk his political existence, for in Paris were his most dangerous enemies, who would not fail to take the fullest advantage of this opportunity his absence afforded them. How could he tell whether some malign influence might not succeed in undermining the inconstant monarch’s trust in him, and bringing the whole fabric of his ambition, upon which alone it was reared, crashing to the ground? For a moment he had almost determined to go with the King; but PÈre Joseph is said to have persuaded him to stay, pointing out that, if he went, the operations would almost certainly fail, and be followed by an outcry which would ruin him. Anyway, he decided to remain, and Louis, who appears to have recognised that his Minister’s resolution had something magnanimous about it, took his departure for Paris on February 10 with the promise that he would soon return, and left him with the title of “Lieutenant-General of the Army,” the marshals, Bassompierre and Schomberg, themselves being directed to take their orders from him.

“It was a singular spectacle,” says Henri Martin, “this general in the red hat, with his staff in mitre and cowl. But the Cardinal knew how to render terrible what so nearly touched the grotesque. He had acted up to then in the shadow of the King; he was henceforth general, admiral, engineer, munitioner, intendant, paymaster. He communicated the fire of his soul to all who surrounded him. The Bishop of Mende, who was directing under him the construction of the mole, died meanwhile, giving orders that his body was to be interred in La Rochelle. The spirit of the soldiery and of the lesser nobility, who did not share the mental reservations of the grandees, rose to the same pitch.”

Meantime, however, storms were gathering on various parts of the horizon, and all the enemies of France appeared to be striving to prevent her achieving her political unity. Threatening preparations for the relief of La Rochelle were going forward in the English ports; Wallenstein was carrying all before him in Germany, and the fainting princes of the North were sending despairing appeals for assistance; while, worst of all, the Spaniards from the Milanese and the Duke of Savoy had invaded the duchy of Mantua and the marquisate of Montferrato, to which Charles of Gonzaga, Duc de Nevers, had succeeded on the death of Vincenzo I, Duke of Mantua, in 1627, and were threatening Casale, on the Po, a fortress which it was of the most vital importance to France to save from falling into unfriendly hands.[112]

But, until La Rochelle was taken, France could do little or nothing to aid her hard-pressed ally, for all the troops which could be spared from the defence of the frontiers, save those engaged to hold Rohan and the Huguenots of the South in check, were concentrated before the Protestant stronghold; all the money which could be raised was being thrown into the mud of its canal. Recognising the impossibility of abandoning the siege, but sorely troubled by the news from Italy, Richelieu determined to make an attempt to take La Rochelle by surprise, although he was well aware that his chance of success was of the slightest. On March 11, accordingly, he sent for Bassompierre and informed him that that night he was sending Marillac to endeavour to blow up the Porte des Salines, and instructed the marshal to have 2,000 foot and 300 horse in readiness to support him. Bassompierre assembled his troops with all due secrecy at the place appointed, where he was joined by the Cardinal, with a force about equal to his own. They waited there all night, expecting every moment to hear the sound of the explosion; but nothing happened, and it subsequently transpired that Marillac and the men who were carrying the petard had lost their way in the darkness.

In the early morning of the 13th another attempt was made, this time on the south-eastern side of the town; but it failed completely, and more than forty men were killed and wounded.

After this second fiasco, Richelieu prudently abandoned the idea of taking La Rochelle by a coup de main, and, feeling very uneasy as to what was happening in Paris, wrote to the King pressing him to hasten his return to the army, in order to discuss with him the situation.

The Cardinal did well to be uneasy at Louis’s absence, for his enemies at the Court had been very busy indeed, more so, in fact, even than he appears to have imagined. This time the Queen-Mother was of the plot. Marie, as we have seen, had supported Richelieu warmly so long as she believed him to be her creature, prepared to place France at the mercy of her petty passions; but gradually the unpalatable truth had begun to dawn upon her sluggish mind that the Cardinal had been using her favour merely as a stepping-stone to that of the King, and that it was upon the son, and not upon the mother, that he intended to lean. The discovery exasperated the Queen-Mother, and there were not wanting persons about her to sympathise with her complaints against the neglect and ingratitude of the Cardinal. Chief among these was BÉrulle, recently elevated to the cardinalate, Michel de Marillac, the Keeper of the Seals, and other members of the High Catholic party. Loudly as these pious souls had fulminated against the stubborn heretics of La Rochelle in the past, they were now as little anxious for the fall of the town as were the great nobles, though for a different reason. They knew that with Richelieu religious considerations counted for very little in comparison with political, and foresaw that, once the Huguenot party was overthrown, he would make no attempt to interfere with that liberty of conscience which the dÉvots regarded with such indignation, and would make use of his victory, not to revoke the Edict of Nantes, but to thwart the designs of the House of Austria to crush the Protestant princes of Northern Europe.

Marie and her friends had recourse to all kinds of means to detain the King in Paris, but they did not succeed; and on April 25 he rejoined the army, which he found larger by several thousand men than when he had quitted it at the beginning of February, while all the works were approaching completion.

On the following day a herald was sent to summon La Rochelle to surrender in the name of the King; but the inhabitants refused to receive him.

The most violent party had gained the day in this unhappy town, and the mayoralty had become a dictatorship. On March 3 the famous admiral of the Rochellois, Jean Guiton, had been elected mayor, against his will. “You know not what you are doing in nominating me,” said he. “Remember that with me there must be no talk of surrender. If anyone says a word about that, I will kill him.” And, drawing his poniard, he threw it on to the table of the HÔtel de Ville and gave orders that it should be left there.

The King and the Cardinal thought for a moment of converting the blockade into a regular siege with approaches in form, and endeavouring to take La Rochelle by assault. But the council of war which they called to discuss the matter objected that the only part of the fortifications which was approachable was of immense strength, and that to attempt to storm it would only entail a useless sacrifice of life. If Richelieu had been as sure of the officers as he was of the soldiers, he would perhaps have disregarded this advice, but he could not expose himself to the chance of a serious reverse. He therefore decided that there was nothing to be done but to continue the blockade and starve the place out. As for the Italian situation, it was recognised that it was impossible for France to intervene directly so long as La Rochelle remained untaken, but authority was given to raise a force of volunteers, who were to enter Italy by way of the Valtellina and throw themselves into Casale.