H. Noel Williams

Question of the Huguenot War the principal subject of contention between the two parties—CondÉ and the Ministers demand its continuance—Marie de’ Medici, prompted by Richelieu, advocates peace—Secret negotiations of Louis XIII with the Huguenot leaders—Soubise’s offensive in the West obliges the King to continue the war—Louis XIII advances against the Huguenot chief, who has established himself in the Île de RiÉ—CondÉ accuses Bassompierre of “desiring to prevent him from acquiring glory”—Courage of the King—Passage of the Royal army from the Île du Perrier to the Île de RiÉ—Total defeat of Soubise—Siege of Royan—The King in the trenches—His remarkable coolness and intrepidity under fire—Capitulation of Royan—The Marquis de la Force created a marshal of France—Conversation between Louis XIII and Bassompierre—Diplomatic speech of the latter.

Meantime, the struggle between the two parties, which had begun on the journey from Bordeaux to Paris, continued at the Louvre. CondÉ and his allies were unable to prevent the Queen-Mother from entering the Council, but they succeeded in excluding the man who possessed her mind. Richelieu spoke through her mouth, however, and those who remembered her regency were astonished at the prudence, address, and firmness which she now displayed.

The war against the Huguenots was the principal subject of contention. Marie de’ Medici, under the influence of Richelieu, the old Ministers the Chancellor Sillery and Jeannin, Puisieux, and the generals, wished for peace; CondÉ and the new Ministers demanded the continuance of the war. CondÉ saw in the war the means of separating the King from his mother, and commanding the army in the name of Louis XIII. A superstitious hope made him particularly anxious to have large military forces at his disposal. An astrologer had predicted to him that he would become King at the age of thirty-four, and he was now in his thirty-fourth year. He desired, therefore, to prove his devotion to the Catholic religion, and to be in a position to seize the crown at the date when Louis XIII and his younger brother were apparently destined to die.

Marie brought to the Council the arguments with which Richelieu had furnished her on the grave situation of external affairs. The House of Austria, she pointed out, was everywhere aggressive and everywhere successful. In Germany, the Empire had reduced Bohemia to submission. The unfortunate Elector Palatine, deprived of the Upper Palatinate by Maximilian of Bavaria, and of the Lower Palatinate by Tilly, General of the Catholic League, and Gonzalvo de Cordoba, commander of the Spanish forces, had been obliged to take refuge in Holland. Philip IV, on the expiration of the twelve years’ truce with Holland in 1621, had called upon the Dutch to acknowledge his supremacy, and, on their refusal, had attacked them. The Spaniards mocked at the Treaty of Madrid, and, so far from evacuating the Valtellina, as they had engaged to do, had invaded the country of the Grisons, in concert with the Archduke Leopold, and obliged them to submit to a humiliating treaty which deprived them of the suzerainty of the Valtellina.

Prompted by Richelieu, Marie urged upon the Council the imperative necessity of pacifying France, in order to be in a position to intervene in the affairs of Europe and arrest the alarming progress which the House of Austria was making. “To enter into a civil war,” said she, “is not the road to arrive at it, as was manifest during the siege of Montauban, when, in place of executing the Treaty of Madrid, they [the Spaniards] pushed their armies further and advanced by much their design to arrive at the monarchy of Europe. Although assuredly it is better to perish rather than abate anything of the royal dignity, it seems that it [the dignity] is preserved, if peace and the pardon of their crimes is given to them [the Huguenots], without restoring to them any of the places of which they have been deprived.”

CondÉ and his allies pretended, on the contrary, that it was necessary before everything, and at all costs, to subdue the internal enemy and to check the audacity of the Huguenots, immensely encouraged by the successful resistance of Montauban. La Force and his sons had resumed hostilities in Guienne, and many places in that province which had submitted to the King had revolted anew. In Lower Languedoc, masters of NÎmes, Montpellier, UzÈs, Privas, and a number of smaller towns, the assembly of the “circle,” had ordered or, at any rate, authorised, the most disgraceful excesses, and between thirty and forty churches, amongst which were some of the finest monuments of the Middle Ages, had been ruined. In the West, the Rochellois were masters of the sea; Saint-Luc, who had vainly endeavoured to make head against them, was blockaded in the port of Brouage; and a multitude of privateers preyed upon the commerce of the Atlantic coast.

At the beginning of 1622, the Rochellois and the predatory nobles who made common cause with them conceived the bold project of occupying the mouths of the Loire and the Gironde, in order to hold all the commerce of those two rivers to ransom. The revolt of Royan, on the right bank of the Gironde, and the occupation of two other strong points had already resulted in the virtual blockade of that river; while Soubise, violating the oath which he had taken at the capitulation of Saint-Jean-d’AngÉly not to bear arms again against his sovereign, charged himself with the Loire, descended with a considerable force on Sables d’Olonne, in order to raise the Protestants of Poitou, and overran all the country up to the suburbs of Nantes.

Thus tricked by the Spaniards and braved by the Protestants, Louis XIII had to choose between his enemies. For a time he appeared inclined to listen to the advice of his mother—or rather of Richelieu—and, unknown to CondÉ and his supporters, authorised LesdiguiÈres to negotiate with Rohan. “And that nothing might be revealed,” says Bassompierre, “save to M. de Puisieux and myself, whom he commanded to keep the affair very secret, he wished that M. des LesdiguiÈres sent duplicate despatches; one copy to be read and deliberated upon in the Council; the other, which was private and addressed to M. de Puisieux, to be communicated only to the King, who informed me of its contents.” The negotiations progressed so far that Louis promised to receive a deputation from the Reformed churches, and threatened the Spanish Ambassador to go to Lyons and organise an army to march to the assistance of the Grisons, if Spain did not forthwith withdraw from their country and the Valtellina. But the progress of Soubise and the disobedience of d’Épernon, who declined to send troops from his governments of Saintonge and the Angoumois to the assistance of the hard-pressed Royalists of Poitou, gave the victory to CondÉ and his adherents; the King decided to march in person against Soubise, and, on March 20, without waiting for the arrival of the Protestant deputies, he left Paris for OrlÉans, accompanied by the Queen-Mother, who was determined to keep within reach of him so long as she could.

From OrlÉans, the King, still accompanied by Marie, proceeded to Blois, and thence by water to Nantes, where the army was to assemble, and where on the 11th he was joined by Bassompierre, who had been summoned by courier from Paris.

On his arrival at Nantes, Louis XIII learned that Soubise was endeavouring to establish himself in the Île de RiÉ, a maritime district of Lower Poitou, separated from the mainland by vast salt marshes and small rivers, which at high tide the sea rendered impassable. If the Huguenot leader were permitted to entrench himself there, it was a position from which it would be exceedingly difficult to dislodge him; but this the King resolved not to allow him time to do; and, leaving the Queen-Mother, who had fallen ill, at Nantes, like a true son of Henri IV, he marched at once upon the enemy.

The Royal army consisted of from 10,000 to 12,000 men; that of Soubise from 6,000 to 7,000; but the latter had the advantage of position and seven pieces of cannon; while the attacking force was, of course, unable to transport its artillery across the marshes. The enterprise would therefore have been a hazardous one, with a watchful and resolute enemy to contend with. On this occasion, however, Soubise showed neither the vigilance of a general nor the courage of a soldier. The approach of the enemy much sooner than he had foreseen appears to have disconcerted his plans altogether, and, instead of attempting to defend the approaches to the Île de RiÉ, he thought only of re-embarking his troops in a squadron of vessels which he had at his disposal, and making his escape with the plunder he had collected to La Rochelle.

In the afternoon of April 14, Marillac, with a small force of infantry, occupied the Île du Perrier, adjoining the Île de RiÉ, and early on the following morning Bassompierre was ordered by CondÉ to follow with the rest of the infantry. CondÉ then proposed that they should ford an arm of the sea “wide as the Marne,” which separated the islands of Perrier and RiÉ, and where at low tide, which would be at midday, the peasants had told him, the water would be only waist-deep. Bassompierre, however, protested against this, pointing out that, if the enemy offered the least opposition to their passage, the tide would rise before half the troops had crossed, and even if they were allowed to cross unopposed, they would find themselves at a great disadvantage without cavalry or cannon. He added that, apart from these considerations, he ought certainly to await the arrival of the King. “For if you defeat M. de Soubise,” said he, “he [the King] will take it ill that you have not shared the honour of the victory with him; and, if some reverse befalls you, he will blame your precipitation, and will accuse you of not having wished or deigned to wait for him.”

Monsieur le Prince took this remonstrance in very bad part, and declared that he saw plainly that Bassompierre was “of the cabal who desired to prevent him from acquiring glory.” But he sent him to the King to beg him to come at once with the cavalry, and when his Majesty arrived on the scene, it was decided to wait until midnight and to cross to the Île de RiÉ at another spot, where they were informed there would be less water.

In the course of the evening, Louis XIII displayed for the first time that cool courage which he invariably afterwards showed in war, and which, if it had been combined with the same degree of moral resolution, would have made him a really remarkable man:—

All the arrangements for the passage of the army had been entrusted to Bassompierre. The troops assembled at ten o’clock, and a little before midnight the order to advance was given. At the spot where the Guards were to cross, however, the water was so deep that they sent to inform Bassompierre that it was impossible to pass. He went there, and finding that it would be a very difficult undertaking, led them to another ford, by which he crossed himself to the Île de RiÉ, and saw no sign of any enemy. He returned and reported that the ford was practicable and that their passage would be unopposed, and the whole army passed without mishap; though when Bassompierre crossed for the second time, at the head of the rearguard, the tide was beginning to rise, and the water was nearly up to his chin.[5]

On reaching the shore, the troops encamped and lighted a great number of fires to dry their clothes. At daybreak they were formed in order of battle, and, after a march of about two leagues, came in sight of the enemy. Soubise and his cavalry, to the number of five or six hundred, fled at once in the direction of La Rochelle, without striking a blow. Part of the infantry had already embarked in the launches that had arrived to take them off; the rest threw down their arms and demanded quarter. But this was refused to the majority of them, and more than 1,500 were shot or cut down in cold blood; while as many more were taken prisoners and sent to the galleys. The rest fled across the marshes, in which some of them were drowned, while many others were slain by the troops of La Rochefoucauld, governor of Poitou, or by the peasants, furious at the devastation which the Huguenots had committed. Only some four hundred succeeded in effecting their escape and making their way to La Rochelle.

Leaving a force under the Comte de Soissons to watch La Rochelle on the land side, while Guise was directed to blockade it by sea, Louis XIII marched southwards, with the intention of raising the blockade of the Gironde by the reduction of Royan. During the siege, the King gave further proofs of that courage and presence of mind which Bassompierre had admired before the attack on the Île de RiÉ.

It is not the degree, but the kind of courage, which is remarkable at his age. Bassompierre, however, relates an instance of equal coolness in a boy, who had not the same strong motive to self-possession as was furnished by the consciousness of being the object of the whole army’s attention:

Royan capitulated on May 11, and shortly afterwards La Force surrendered the town of Sainte-Foy and returned to his allegiance, in return for the bÂton of Marshal of France. Louis XIII, who had been given to understand that both Bassompierre and Schomberg were deeply mortified that a rebel should have been created a marshal before either of them, sent for the former and said to him: “Bassompierre, I know that you are angry that I am making M. de La Force Marshal of France, and that you and M. de Schomberg complain of it, and with reason; but it is not I who am the cause of it, so much as Monsieur le Prince, who counselled me to do it, for the good of my affairs, and in order to leave nothing behind me in Guienne which might prevent me passing promptly into Languedoc. Nevertheless, be sure that what you desire I shall do for you, whom I love and hold as my good and faithful servant.”

Bassompierre tells us that at that time he had no particular desire for the office of marshal, “since, in his opinion, it was that of an old man, while he wished to play the part of a gallant of the Court for some years longer.” He therefore assured his Majesty that he had been entirely misinformed, and that, so far from being annoyed at La Force’s appointment, he regarded it as a most proper one, since he was an old man and a soldier of great experience, who had been promised the bÂton by the late King and would have received it, if Henri IV had lived another month; that, although he had been a rebel, he was one no longer; and that it was “a signal example of the kindness of the King to forget the faults of his servants, in order to remember and recompense their merits and their services.” And he added that he did not aspire to the office of marshal or any other charge, unless his Majesty “out of pure kindness and desire to recognise his service,” wished to confer it upon him, and that he “very humbly besought him never to allow any consideration for him to prevent him doing what he judged to be for the good of his service.”

This diplomatic speech greatly pleased the King, who thanked Bassompierre and told him that he might rely on him to advance his interests. He then sent for Schomberg, who, much less tactful than his colleague, pressed his Majesty to make him a marshal conjointly with La Force, and proposed that Bassompierre should be created one also, “though this was chiefly in order to strengthen his own request.”