Amabel Williams-Ellis

WITH THE FRENCH—THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL

The 5th Brigade and the Australians had sworn eternal friendship with a refreshing enthusiasm.

They were like two schoolgirl friends, not to be separated, and at Vaux, whither they had retired for combined training, metaphorically went about all day with their arms round each other’s waists.

Therefore, when on July 17 orders reached the 5th Tank Brigade that they were to send a Battalion south to fight with the French, consternation reigned.

If anybody went it would have to be the 2nd Battalion, which had not fought at Hamel at all.

But surely some way out could be found by which the Australians’ own Brigade of Tanks should not be thus cruelly dismembered?

And the authorities, with positively avuncular benevolence—after a little humming and hahing—were actually induced to make another arrangement; as the friends firmly believed, solely upon their representations. There were, however, other more military considerations.

The attack was still to be under Brigadier-General Courage, but an extra Battalion, the 9th, should be added to the Brigade for the occasion.

This apparently whimsical outcry of the new-found affinities, and the yielding of the authorities, were to be justified thrice over in the events of the next few months.

For at this early period a little thing might upset the forging of a weapon which was to prove the two-edged sword with which we were to “smite Amalek hip and thigh.”

As soon as it had been decided that the 9th Battalion was to go, preparations were at once begun.

The French plans were already well advanced before the Tanks came upon the scene at all. The attacking troops had indeed been in the area since April, but the Tanks felt that they would be eternally disgraced if they were obliged so much as to hint that they would like even a day’s postponement of this, their first battle with the French.

Indeed in this battle we see the first instance of the wonderful “speeding up” which the Allied Army underwent almost as soon as the joint command was concentrated in the hands of Marshal Foch.

An officer who was present throughout the battle and its preliminaries writes:

Practice makes perfect, and we gradually discovered that the kind of full-dress attacks for which we had always, as a matter of course, allowed a month of preparation, could, in fact, be staged in half that time.

We see in the huge Battle of Amiens, of which only ten days’ notice was given to the troops who took part, how great a reform we managed to accomplish.

II

The attack was to be at dawn on July 23, and was to be—like Hamel—a more or less limited and experimental battle.

Its immediate object was to seize St. Ribert Wood in order to outflank Mailly Raineval from the south, to abolish certain highly objectionable German batteries which lay near St. Ribert, and to advance the French field guns eastward in such a way that they would bear upon the high ridges which dominate the right bank of the river Avre.

The country here was undulating and the soil well drained, and, except for a number of large and very dense woods, there were very few Tank obstacles.

There were to be three objectives. The first was a line which ran through the Bois des Sauvillers, Adelpare Farm, and Les-Trois-Boqueleaux. Twelve Tanks and four Battalions of French infantry were detailed for its capture.

The second objective included the clearing of the plateau to the north of the Bois des Sauvillers, and the capture of a corner of the Bois de Harpan. Twenty-four Tanks were allotted to this objective and four infantry Battalions.

The third was a line of German posts, known as the “Blue Line,” covering the second objective, and was to be attacked by a strong force of infantry and all the surviving Tanks. The whole attack was to be preceded by a short intense bombardment, including heavy counter-battery work, and the creeping barrage was to consist of a mixture of high explosive and smoke. The Tanks were to attack in sections of three, two in front and one in immediate support, the infantry advancing in small groups close behind the Tanks.

Three days before the battle the officers of the 9th Battalion and some of the Staff of the 5th Brigade came down to the battle site, and, helped by the Staff of the French 3rd Division, made a pretty thorough reconnaissance of the ground. That same evening the Tanks detrained at Contay.

The 9th Battalion had been busy doing such tactical training as was possible with its new colleagues on the 5th Brigade training ground. The time was short and the difficulties of language great, but in spite of this a very friendly understanding had been come to.

Besides this, it had had an unusual amount of trekking to do.

It had had over eight miles to travel across country to its place of entrainment. From Contay, the rail terminus, the Tanks moved in all over another eight miles before they got into action.

At ten o’clock on the night before the battle the Tanks were informed that the attack, which was to have been at dawn, was postponed until 5.30. By this time it would, the Tank crews somewhat ruefully reflected, be broad daylight.

However, there was nothing to be done but to hope that the wind would help our smoke screens.

The weather had for some time been fine, but on the morning of attack heavy rain began to fall, driven up by a south wind.

The prospect of a really effective smoke cloud did not seem very great.

However, it was in the best of fighting spirits that the Tanks and their infantry went forward at zero hour—indeed, though it was no walk-over and all arms suffered fairly heavily, high spirits seem to have particularly characterised both French and British in this battle.

A member of the Tank Corps testifies naÏvely to the way in which the Tanks had got their tails up.

As the first wave Tanks and infantry advanced, they found that the enemy was putting down a fairly heavy barrage in many places. However, moving ahead of the infantry, the Tanks cleared Arrachis Wood, destroying a number of machine-guns, and after a slight resistance, captured the first objective—Sauvillers Village, Adelpare Farm and Les-Trois-Boqueleaux—fifteen minutes before the infantry arrived. Two Tanks were knocked out by shells.

In the second phase, the Tanks of “B” and “C” Companies moved forward in support of their infantry on either side of Sauvillers Wood. As they swept forward, they outstripped the French patrols, but after a while turned back to maintain touch. It was by now about 9.30 a.m. The Tanks could not immediately find their partners, and unfortunately, as they were thus cruising about, no less than six Tanks were put out of action, one after another, by a single battery, apparently one of those lurking to the south of St. Ribert Wood, and whose destruction was one of the objects of the attack.

In another sector a Battalion Commander in the 51st Regiment of French Infantry, which was moving up in support, determined that if possible he would attack Harpon Wood, and asked the officer commanding “B” Company of Tanks for assistance. The Company Commander immediately entered into the scheme with alacrity and between them a plan of attack for the French infantry and the seven Tanks was rapidly arranged. This little improvised action was a great success, Tanks and infantry duly capturing the Wood and at least one hostile battery. Only two Tanks were damaged.

It was not far from Harpon that Captain Dalton’s Tank, in the confusion due to the smoke, got some distance ahead of its infantry. Near the Wood, Captain Dalton located an enemy battery. After a little manoeuvring he managed to get a direct hit upon one of the guns and drove off the crews of the other pieces with machine-gun fire, thus silencing the whole battery. He then manoeuvred his Tank into position to tow back one of the enemy guns, but at this moment his machine received a direct hit, and shortly after, a second shell added to the damage. Captain Dalton evacuated his crew, and, having done so, made every effort to get back to the derelict Tank, for it must be remembered that as yet no Mark V. had ever fallen into German hands. He was under intense machine-gun fire and in direct view of the enemy, but, realising the importance of blowing up the remains of his Tank, he still attempted the adventure. But it was in vain, for as he was thus trying to crawl up, he was severely wounded in the thigh. He managed, however, to drag himself back into the French lines.

Nor was Second Lieutenant C. Mecredy, a Section Commander, less anxious that his knocked-out Tank should be completely destroyed rather than fall into the hands of the enemy.

He had been advancing ahead of his infantry, when a shell from a concealed field gun hit the Tank in which he was leading the attack. At once seizing up a number of smoke bombs, he got out of his machine, went back, and, throwing down his bombs, put up a smoke curtain to cover the Tanks that were following him, lest they should share the fate of his own machine. His manoeuvre was perfectly successful, for under cover of the smoke the other Tanks changed their direction and escaped the guns. With some difficulty Mr. Mecredy managed to dodge his way back to his Tank, under heavy hostile shelling and machine-gun fire, successfully blew it up, and was preparing to go back when he discovered that one of his crew was lying wounded in the leg in a very exposed place. This man he managed to bring back with him to safety.

By the evening all the three objectives had been gained, and the French Command were very well satisfied with the success of the action.

Especially delighted was the General Commanding the 3rd Division—General Bourgon—who was a great friend of the British Tank Corps, and who had been as anxious as we that no hitch should mar this first combined battle.

Both French and British had suffered rather heavy casualties, the French 3rd Division, with whom we had acted, losing over seven hundred officers and men.

Fifteen Tanks out of thirty-six had been knocked out by direct hits, and of the fifteen rather a large proportion were beyond salving.

However, the enemy’s losses were also heavy. The prisoners totalled over eighteen hundred, and we took 5 field guns, 45 trench mortars and 275 machine-guns.

Before the 9th Battalion went back to the training area it had the honour of being inspected by General Debeney, commanding the 1st French Army.

He was kind enough to express extreme pleasure at the way in which the Tanks fought, and in his special Order of the Day gave the Battalion praise of which they will ever be proud.

Finally, as a token of comradeship between the French troops of the 3rd Division and the 9th Tank Battalion, this Battalion had the honour of being presented with the badge of the 3rd French Division. Since that day they have worn it proudly on their left sleeve.