Amabel Williams-Ellis

THE FRENCH TANK CORPS—AMERICAN TANKS AND BRITISH TANKS IN EGYPT

It is said that there is something in the Anglo-Saxon mind which has a special affinity for committees.

“Enough,” said the logical Asiatic when the doctrine of the Trinity was being explained to him by the English missionary, “I understand you perfectly. It is a Committee of three.”

At least, there is no doubt that the British Tank sprang from committees, and was matured and licked into shape entirely by a large assortment of these excellent bodies.

So with the American Tank Corps. Three or four names are equally illustrious in its early annals.

But with the French, one man, and one man only, stands out as the Father and Mother of Tanks. He was the General Swinton, the Sir Albert Stern, and the General Elles of the French Tanks. That is to say, he was first the principal independent inventor, deriving his inspiration (in early 1915) from Holt Tractors which he saw at work with the British. Then he was for long the principal “propellant” of the Tank idea in official quarters, and was the Commander-in-Chief’s delegate to the Ministry of Munitions in the matter of Tanks. Finally, on September 30, 1916, he was gazetted “Commandant de l’Artillerie d’Assaut49 aux ArmÉes.”

So much did the personality of this remarkable man permeate and vitalise the French Tank Corps that we offer no apology to the reader in setting forth the following delightful miniature biography of General Estienne by the hand of Major Robert Spencer, the British Liaison Officer to the French Tank Corps:

On December 1, 1915, Colonel Estienne wrote an official letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in which he outlined the idea of a new engine of war exactly as Colonel Swinton had done earlier in the year to our own War Office. A few days later he was given an interview at French General Headquarters, when he was able to enlarge upon his theories as to the new arm. Here he must, one conjectures, have received some encouragement, for about a week afterwards he visited the Schneider Engineering Works in Paris and discussed mechanical details with the management.

But the good seed which Colonel Estienne had sown at Headquarters would, he knew, take some time to germinate. He returned to his command, now the artillery of the 3rd Corps, at that time before Verdun. All the while he kept unofficially in touch with the Schneider Works.

At last, about February 25, 1916, he learned that the Under-Secretary’s Department for Artillery had decided to place an order for 400 armoured vehicles with Schneider’s.

But about two months later, at the end of April, he heard a more surprising piece of news.

The Under-Secretary’s Department had, without the approval of the Commander-in-Chief or any notice to him, Estienne, placed an order for a further 400 vehicles of a different and heavier type, driven by a petrol-electric motor.

Curious as was their parentage, these 400 machines were actually made and were known as the St. Chamond Tanks. It is said to have been upon stolen drawings of this type that the Germans afterwards based their still heavier, “Hagens” and “Schultzes.”

In the course of the summer, the new French Ministry of Munitions formed an experimental and instructional area at Marly-le-Roi, and in the early autumn, Colonel Estienne was gazetted to the command of the French Tanks, and, as we have said, to be delegate, as far as this arm was concerned, from the Commander-in-Chief to the Ministry of Munitions.

Like the British, the French were beginning to need a name for their new engine of war.

But more logical than we, instead of an absurd, if pleasant, nickname, they chose “Artillerie d’Assaut,” which they contracted into the letters “A.S.,” as being more agreeable to the ear than “A.A.”

Apparently Colonel Estienne had no preliminary inkling of what our activities had been in the “Land Cruiser” direction.

It is interesting to conjecture how eagerly he must have read of what was happening on the Somme during the fortnight before he was finally gazetted to his new post. His “heart” must, indeed, have been “at our festival” when the British Tanks were everywhere acclaimed by the public, and when even the most conservative soldiers had to admit that the new weapon had at least earned a right to further trial.

In October 1916 a training centre for personnel was established at Champlieu, on the southern edge of the Forest of CompiÈgne, and here in December the first lot of sixteen Schneider Tanks were delivered, other batches both of Schneiders and St. Chamonds following them during the succeeding months, until, in April 1917, nine Schneider Companies and one St. Chamond Company and their crews were ready for action.

On April 16, 1917, French Tanks took part in their first battle, fighting with the 5th French Army in the attempted penetration of the Chemin des Dames.

Of the eight Schneider Companies employed, five succeeded in reaching their third and final objectives, but owing to lack of previous training with the infantry, the attack as a whole was not very successful, and the Tanks, though they played an exceedingly gallant part, suffered severely.

A week or two later, one St. Chamond and two Schneider Companies took part in a hurriedly prepared operation with the 6th Army.

The Schneiders did extremely well, but of sixteen St. Chamond machines, only one managed to cross the German trenches. All through the summer months, the 6th French Army was preparing another attack on the west of the Chemin des Dames, and for this battle, warned by their previous experiences, infantry and Tanks trained diligently together, special detachments known as troupes d’accompagnement being taught how to help the Tanks over trenches.

But the agile mind of Colonel Estienne was not content. He had had another idea. This time his mind had worked at the idea of the armoured attacking force from a slightly different standpoint.

He envisaged waves of armoured skirmishers attacking in open order, each man possessing besides his armour a quick-firing weapon with which he could shoot as he advanced.

Now, armour which will protect from machine-gun and rifle fire is too heavy for human legs. The armour must be independently propelled. More, if its occupant is to fire as he advances, it must carry him as well as itself. This postulates an engine, and if there is an engine, there must be a second man to look after it. This set of propositions he laid before the RÉnault firm in July 1916, and the design of the famous RÉnault Tank was evolved.

But the Ministry would have none of it.

However, the designs were worked out in greater detail, and at the end of November 1916 Colonel Estienne proposed to the Commander-in-Chief that a number of such machines should be constructed. A few, he explained, had already been ordered to act as “Command” Tanks for the heavy Battalions. The Commander-in-Chief consented to a trial.

This, however, was not held until March 1917, and when it had been held, the Ministry were still not convinced.

Therefore, still further demonstrations were arranged in May, when at last they ceased to doubt, and finally, in June 1917, ordered 3500 of the new machines.

In October the five Companies of heavy Tanks, which had been in training all summer, were launched when the 6th Army delivered its blow at Malmaison.

As before, the Schneider Companies were successful, and again the St. Chamond Tanks were nearly all unable so much as to get into action.

Still, at the end of October the general verdict was that the French heavies had justified themselves, though many soldiers of the old school still doubted their utility.

But in November the British Tanks fought the Battle of Cambrai, and all doubts were finally dispelled from the French mind.

It is to be imagined that Colonel Estienne did not fail to rub in the facts proved by that engagement.

They were facts which it was impossible to deny or to overlook. The Ministry removed its hold from the brakes, and from that moment life behind the scenes of the French Tank Corps became happy. It was decided to form thirty light Tank Battalions, each Battalion to consist of seventy-five machines, and the firms of Schneider, RÉnault and Berliet were all set to work upon their manufacture, while over a thousand machines were ordered in America.

All the winter of 1917–18, the French Tank Corps, like the British, continued to train and to organise.

For the future of the French Tanks was to be a brilliant one.

Those matchless givers of “unsolicited testimonials,” the German General Staff, attributed the great victories which the late summer of 1918 brought to the French arms, chiefly to the employment of “masses of Tanks.”

Naturally the annals of the French Tank Corps are full of stories of individual deeds of gallantry.

Colonel Estienne was promoted to the rank of General of Division and received the Cravat de la LÉgion d’Honneur, and the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies issued the following special Order of the Day to the French Tank Corps:

“Vous avez bien mÉrite (de) la Patrie.”

American Tanks

By the time the United States of America declared War (April 1917) the value of Tanks had already been demonstrated in battle by the British in the Somme Offensive, and by the end of October 1916 the French were already training with their first machines. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Americans, with their great experience of Tractors (it was, the reader will remember, an American Tractor that was the chief ingredient in the make-up of the Mark I.) had a strong desire to include this new arm in their Expeditionary Force.

Colonel Rockenbach, who was later to command the American Tank Corps in the field, was detailed to initiate preliminaries. He arrived in France in June 1917, and followed General Pershing to Chaumont, the United States General Headquarters, where he immediately occupied himself with the future organisation of the Corps.

By September 23, 1917, the provisional American Tank Corps establishment had been approved. It was to be of a size to match the original Expeditionary Force, which was to be limited to twenty Divisions and ten replacement Divisions—that is to say, to one Army. The American Tank Corps in France was to consist of five Heavy and twenty Light Battalions, with the usual complement of Headquarters Units, Depot Companies, instructors and Workshops; and, in the United States, a Training Centre, accommodating two Heavy and two Light Battalions, was to be maintained. When the American Expeditionary Force was increased to three Armies, a new Tank Establishment was authorised to match it. There were to be five Brigades per Army. These Brigades were to consist of one Heavy and two Light Battalions. The Light Tanks were to be of the French RÉnault type, and the Heavy were to be of the British pattern. The first Tanks with which the Americans were equipped were, in fact, actually of French or British manufacture, but as soon as an establishment was sanctioned, Tank manufacture was pushed forward in America, and by the time the Armistice was signed, there were several thousand American-made machines ready for shipment.

So keen on the Tanks were Americans, that private enterprise was not idle, and early in October 1918 a three-and-a-half-ton Ford Tank arrived in France. This tank, indeed, had the honour to be the first American-made Tank to appear in France. But though it was extremely agile and handy, its designers had not quite succeeded in producing a genuine fighting machine. It could, however, be turned out quickly and in great quantities, and in spite of its defects, it was thought in America that it would be worth while to continue its construction, and tradition has it that no less than 10,000 of these little Ford Tanks were ordered.

In the autumn of 1917, a number of American officers who were later on to have charge of the organising and training of the new Tank Corps were sent on visits to the British and French Brigades, to learn as much as they could, both from the mistakes and successes of the two older Corps. By February 1918, there were a large number of volunteers for the American Tank Corps, some in England at Wool, who were to form the American Heavy Section, and others (about 500) at Burg in France, where a Training Centre was being formed for instruction in the Light French RÉnault machines. At Burg were ten French Tanks which were used for training purposes, and in the course of the summer, as the personnel to be trained increased, this number was added to, and at the end of August 124 RÉnault Tanks were delivered to the Training Centre for impending operations.

Two Light Battalions were formed into a Brigade under Colonel G.S. Patton, Junr., and they proceeded to the St. Mihiel Salient. Here they went into action with the First American Army on September 12, the first occasion on which United States Forces fought independently.

But, alas, it was our First Battle of the Somme over again! Nobody quite understood the habits of the new beasts, and unfortunately both Battalions were called upon to trek over twenty kilometres to their lying-up places from the railhead, and, the ground in the back area being very difficult, they did not succeed in catching up the infantry at all on the first day. The enemy resistance was, however, very feeble, as they had already decided to give up the Salient, but misfortune still dogged the unhappy Tanks. They had run out of petrol, and no supplies being immediately available, they were not able to get into action on the second day.

On the third day, however, they did get into the fight, but by this time the enemy had been thoroughly demoralised by the American infantry, and there was little more for them to do than to receive the surrender of a number of prisoners. The two Battalions suffered hardly at all in casualties and were withdrawn practically intact.

The American Light Tanks next appeared at the beginning of October in the Argonne, in operations where they fought side by side with French Tank Units. This time the two Battalions had much better luck, and though they must have been a good deal handicapped by the fact that they and the infantry with whom they were to co-operate had had no opportunity of training together, the Tanks rendered good service. All the machines were launched on the first day, although in the original plan of the battle, it had been proposed to hold back a reserve for the second day; but the infantry had been held up, and the reserve Tanks had, instead, to go to the rescue in the afternoon of the first day. From this time to October 13 these two Battalions were continuously at the disposal of the infantry. But, as with us in the early days, the infantry do not seem to have had a very clear idea of the uses and limitations of the Tanks, and the Battalions were frequently called upon to traverse many weary miles—much to the detriment of their machines—without finally being ordered into action. On one or two occasions they were used for independent reconnaissance and for unsupported assaults upon positions which the infantry had failed to capture. By the middle of October the long distance covered and losses in battle had caused the numbers of the two Battalions to dwindle exceedingly, and they were formed into a provisional Company, which accompanied the advance of the American Forces right up to the Armistice.

A Third Light Battalion had also been mobilised and supplied by the French with seventy-two Tanks. Recruiting, too, had been continued and there were no less than 7000 officers and men awaiting admission to the Corps at Burg alone.

Meanwhile, on August 24, 1918, the 301st U.S. Heavy Battalion had left Wool for France, and was almost immediately sent to the forward area, where it was attached to begin with to the 1st and later to the 4th and 2nd British Tank Brigades. With the 4th Brigade and still later with the 2nd Tank Brigade the 301st was, as we shall see in Chapters XX and XXI, destined to take part in several successful actions.

The 301st had based its methods of training almost entirely upon British lines, and though the American Tank Corps would undoubtedly have struck out improvements and methods of its own had the war gone on, the 301st, being throughout its active service brigaded with British Tanks, very wisely adopted a battle organisation practically uniform with the British. Only in minor details did their habits vary. Their reconnaissance procedure, for instance, was almost exactly like ours, except for one improvement. Special Reconnaissance N.C.O.’s relieved Reconnaissance Officers, Tank Commanders and Section Commanders from the work of guiding the machines on approach marches. From the tankodromes to the lining-up points the Tanks were in charge of these N.C.O.’s, who were directly under the orders of the Battalion Reconnaissance Officer. This system worked out extremely well.

In later chapters we shall see how worthy a representative both of the arms of the United States and of the best traditions of the British Tank Corps the 301st Battalion proved themselves in the supreme test of battle.

In February 1919, to the regret of their British colleagues, the men of the 301st sailed for America, when General Elles expressed the sentiments of all ranks of his Corps in a special order.

Tanks in Palestine
The Second and Third Battles of Gaza, April and November 1917

The Tanks that had fought in the Battle of the Somme, in the autumn of 1916, had proved successful enough for the authorities to consider that a test ought to be made of their capabilities in some other theatre of war.

Accordingly a small—a very small—detachment of Tanks was sent to “assist our troops in the Sinai Peninsula.”

Unfortunately only eight Tanks were ultimately sent, and further,51“through an unfortunate error, old experimental machines were sent out instead of new ones as intended.”

The experiment was thus upon so extremely miniature a scale that it cannot be said to have proved anything save what was already clear, that is, the general proposition that with a few mechanical modifications Tanks are perfectly suitable to desert warfare.

The Tanks were, of course, too few to exert any influence upon the fortunes of war in Palestine, and the two actions in which they fought amid palms and cactuses and lay up in groves of fig trees, form a curious, rather than an important, little incident in their history.

The field on which they fought was like the plain of Flanders, one of those ominous lands which seem predestined for ever to witness the strife of men.

In December 1916 a little company of 22 officers and 226 other ranks, under Major Nutt, embarked with their eight Tanks at Devonport and Avonmouth and landed in Egypt in January.

The first business was to show the Staffs of the various fighting units, with whom they were to co-operate, exactly what Tanks could and could not do.

Demonstrations were therefore given among the sand dunes near Kilban, a village which lies between Port Said and El Kantara on the Suez Canal.

One day in February—the exact date seems uncertain53—the detachment received orders to entrain immediately for the fighting zone, and within three hours of receiving the message, the whole little force with its Tanks and accessories was travelling towards the forward area. A delay occurred half-way, at El Arish, which had only recently been captured, but next morning the Tank Train arrived at its destination, Khan Yunus, an old Crusaders’ stronghold, surrounded by fig groves and lying inland about fifteen miles south-west of Gaza.

Here the detachment remained for about ten days.

During these ten days the First Battle of Gaza had come to an end.

Gaza had not been captured, as, though we had fought in its streets, we had just not been able to keep up the attack long enough to keep what we had gained owing to lack of water.

In his despatch, General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, characterised it as a most successful operation which only the waterless nature of the country had prevented from being “a complete disaster to the enemy.”

We had been obliged to withdraw again to our water supplies, but we immediately began to prepare a second attack in greater force.

This time great cisterns were set up forward, and filled with rail-borne water. Three weeks of careful preparation were allowed for what was to prove one of the most hotly contested actions fought in the Eastern theatre.

We were to attack a Turkish force of about 30,000 men which lay upon a front of some sixteen miles, between Gaza on the north and Hereira and Sheria to the south-east.

Two ridges, Sheikh Abbas and Mansura, run almost at right angles to the coast and command the town of Gaza from the south, and the capture of these heights was allotted to the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Divisions.

On their left flank was the sea, and their right, on the Hereira front, was protected by the Desert Column, consisting of cavalry units and of the Imperial Camel Corps which was manned by Australian, New Zealand, and British personnel.

The eight Tanks were to be widely spaced along the crucial five miles of attack. The 53rd Division nearest to the sea was to have two Tanks, which were to be held in reserve until the infantry had taken their first objective. Next to them the 52nd Division was to have four Tanks, which were to support the infantry in the attack on the Mansura Ridge. With the 54th Division, two Tanks were to support the attack on the Sheikh Abbas Ridge. The battle was to be in two phases; the Turkish outer defences were to be taken in the first phase, and in the second his inner ring was to be broken through and Gaza itself taken.

It was a country of sand dunes, deep nullahs, and criss-cross ridges, a labyrinth admirably adapted to defence and containing endless natural machine-gun positions. Between Gaza and the sea the enemy had built a double line of trenches and redoubts54“strongly held by infantry and machine-guns well placed and concealed in impenetrable cactus hedges built on high mud banks and enclosing orchards and gardens on the outskirts of the town.”

The Tank Detachment had been able to do little or no reconnaissance; routes had been arranged to the starting-places, and petrol and ammunition dumps had been formed in convenient places, but no forward preparations had been possible.

All eight Tanks reached their assembly places before daybreak on April 17, and at zero hour, the dawn of what promised to be a day of scorching heat, the first phase of the attack was successfully launched.

The advance of the 53rd and 52nd Divisions came as a complete surprise to the Turks, and the six Tanks did not come into action at all on the first day, as the enemy fled from his trenches and strongholds in complete confusion, and the slow Mark I.’s and Mark II.’s had no chance of getting in at him. The outer defence line had fallen by seven that morning. The two Tanks, however, on the 54th Division’s front saw a good deal of fighting. One received a direct hit and was destroyed, but the other did admirable work in clearing the enemy out of his trenches, north-west of the Abbas Ridge. The Tank inflicted heavy casualties, and our infantry had only to come up and occupy the defences which the Turks had abandoned.

By the evening the three attacking Divisions found themselves in satisfactory positions on high ground, and proceeded to entrench themselves and to prepare for the second phase.

On the morning of April 19 we again attacked, this time upon a wider front, a French man-of-war and two British monitors supporting on the left, and the Australians on the right. The three original Divisions were, however, once more to deliver the main blow.

A very stiff programme was outlined for the seven surviving Tanks.

The four with the 52nd in the centre had finally four lines of defence to attack, and their orders were changed during the night before the action.

With the 53rd Division two Tanks were to work separately, each having a succession of objectives, while with the 54th the single Tank had only one redoubt allotted to it.

This time the Turks were ready for us.

One of the Tanks with the 53rd Division, the “Tiger,” led the infantry advance on its sector. The enemy was quickly driven from our first objective, Samson Ridge. The Tank went on to the second objective, the El Arish redoubt, but the infantry being unable to follow, after being in action for six hours and having fired 27,000 rounds from its machine-guns, the Tank withdrew, all its crew being wounded.

On the front of the 52nd Division, our advance was hotly contested.

The Turks had massed hundreds of machine-guns along their entire front, but on this sector their fire was particularly intense. One tank was able to do good service at Outpost Hill, which it helped to clear before receiving a direct hit.

Of the other three Tanks, one fell into a gully, the sides of which unexpectedly crumbled under its weight; another was put out of action by a direct hit, while the third eventually rallied.

The objective of the Tank fighting with the 54th Division was a particularly strong redoubt. The work was held in force, but the garrison soon surrendered on the advance of the Tank. Our infantry immediately took over the position, which the Turks forthwith proceeded to shell.

It was not long before the Tank was hit and one of its tracks broken, and the Turks, counter-attacking, eventually captured Tank, infantry and redoubt.

By nightfall our position all along the line was unfavourable. The left of the 54th Division was more or less in the air. We had, in several parts of the line, been forced off the lately won main ridges. We had lost 7000 men, and our troops were worn out by the dust and heat, and were once more short of water. The battle had to be admitted as a failure. The Tanks had been too few and of too old a type for the work they had been given.

Their co-operation was, however, much appreciated, and they were considered to have given a good deal of protection to the infantry.

It is interesting to note that by the time the battle was over these antiquated machines are said, on an average, each to have covered forty miles of country.

The Third Battle of Gaza

The Second Battle of Gaza had been so completely unsuccessful that the troops who had been engaged in it had to be withdrawn from their advanced positions.

The Tanks were concentrated in a fig grove to the rear. Here, no work being found for them, they stayed till October, being reinforced by three Mark IV. machines.

General Allenby had now succeeded to the command, and there was to be another attack upon Gaza, for the town and its defences effectually barred our further advance along the coast or towards Jerusalem.

We were this time to operate upon a still wider front. The usual shock troops, the same three Divisions and their eight Tanks, were to attack nearest the coast.

Next to them, a mixed force of French, Italian and West Indian troops were to make feint raids near Outpost Hill.

Opposite Gaza itself several cavalry Divisions, mounted and dismounted, were to attack, and from Hereira to Beersheba a synchronised assault was to be made by the Australians. The position was, in fact, to be turned by an extensive flanking movement.

On October 23, 1917, the Tanks moved up to a new station on the beach.

From here, on horseback and by boat, the new area was thoroughly reconnoitred. This was the special country of cactus hedge and strong mud bank, and in it had been dug a veritable labyrinth of trenches. It had been a country of small fig groves and of little irrigated gardens, and its close boundaries afforded unending cover to the enemy. However, it was divided into Tank sectors, and by dint of patient toil, the Tank Commanders at last formed a more or less coherent picture of the intricacies. Tank Officers and N.C.O.’s were attached to each Brigade with which they were to work, for ten days before the battle.

Most of the Tanks were detailed to bring up R.E. stores, such as wire, pickets, shovels and sandbags for their infantry. These things they were to carry on their roofs.

The first phase of the attack, timed in consideration of a full moon for an hour before midnight, was to be independent of Tanks, and was to consist of an infantry attack protected by a creeping barrage. While this attack was going on, six of the Tanks were to move to their starting-points, in order to be ready to advance at 3 a.m. Two Tanks were held in reserve. It will be observed that the plans, preparations and liaison were in general much more complete than for the Second Battle of Gaza, but unfortunately one mistake of that battle was repeated.

The six first-line Tanks were given among them no less than twenty-nine objectives to attack.

At eleven o’clock on the night of November 1–2, the first phase of the battle began.

The 156th Infantry Brigade attacked Umbrella Hill, the first objective. The Turks were taken completely by surprise, there was little resistance, and even their artillery seemed too startled to fire.

Unfortunately, however, the smoke of the battle and a dense haze made so thick an atmosphere that not a ray of the expected moonlight reached the combatants, and the infantry had to fight and the Tanks to manage their approach march in profound darkness.

Also, when the enemy’s artillery at last woke up, it was to open a heavy fire on our back areas, where the second wave was gathering. All the Tanks, however, came safely through and were at their stations half an hour before the second zero at 3 a.m.

The Turkish resistance had by now stiffened, and when the Tanks and the fresh infantry advanced behind a heavy barrage it was to meet with dogged opposition.

The two Tanks detailed to the El Arish redoubt were, after a stiff fight, successful in driving the enemy out of the enclosed stronghold, and were making their way through the maze of trenches, cactus hedges and gardens beyond, when one received a direct hit and the other got ditched in the darkness. Both crews at once joined the infantry. Slowly, scrambling up the mud banks, often fighting hand to hand in the darkness, we advanced. The Turks were fighting stubbornly, but inch by inch we pushed them back. The remaining Tanks lumbered slowly on.

At last all along the coast all the objectives were taken. No. 6 Tank captured Sea Post, and, followed by the infantry, moved along the enemy’s trenches, crushing down the wire as far as Beach Post. It successively attacked three other strong points and deposited its R.E. stores at the appointed place. It was again moving forward to attack a certain isolated Turkish trench when one track broke, so ending a brilliant innings. The crew went on, but the Tank had to be temporarily abandoned.

The two reserve Tanks both caught fire through the empty sandbags with which their roofs were loaded being set ablaze by the heat of their exhaust pipes.

The coastal attack had done its work, and the Turks’ hold upon Gaza had been loosened.

The other attackers, the troops who had advanced from Beersheba, broke through the enemy’s resistance completely, and drove them back for nine miles on an eight-mile front.

The battle was decisive, and after about three days’ fighting our troops at last entered Gaza. Our persistency in attack was well rewarded. The Spectator, commenting on the battle, said, “Samson took away the gates of Gaza, but General Allenby has secured the gates of Palestine.”

On the whole the Tanks had been a success.

All machines except one reached their first objectives; four reached their second, third, and fourth, and one Tank reached its fifth.

All five damaged machines were afterwards salved.

This was the last Tank action fought with the Army of Palestine, for, for some reason or other, the repaired and renovated Tanks were never used again.

Later, however, during the Turkish retreat, we had great trouble in rounding up the tattered and wandering Turkish rearguard.

We felt the need of some sort of sheep-dog, so a mission was sent to France to ask for a number of Whippet Tanks.

By an ironical chance, this mission reached Tank Headquarters in France on March 21, the very day the German offensive was launched. It need not be added that no Whippets were sent.

There seemed no work left for the heavies, and the Tank Detachment, therefore, handed over their machines to the Ordnance Department at Alexandria, and returned to England.