CHAPTER XXII

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CAUSES OF DISCONTENT

It looks at this distance as though the Republican party was "going to the dogs"—which, I think, is as it should be. Like all parties that have an undisturbed power for a long time, it has become corrupt, and I believe that it is to-day the [most] corrupt and debauched political party that has ever existed.... I have made up my mind that when I return home I will no longer vote the Republican ticket, whatever else I may do.

So wrote James W. Grimes to Trumbull under date of Heidelberg, July 1, 1870. Grimes had had a stroke of paralysis while the impeachment trial was going on, but had rallied sufficiently to be carried into the Senate to vote not guilty on every article on which a vote was taken, and to give his reasons for doing so. He shortly afterwards resigned his seat, announced his retirement from public life, and went to Europe with his family. He was a native of the Granite State, a man of granite mould, of unblemished character, undaunted courage, keen discernment, and untiring industry. In Newspaper Row he was styled "Grimes the Sturdy"—a title bestowed upon him by Adams Sherman Hill, then on the Washington staff of the New York Tribune, and later Professor of Rhetoric in Harvard University.

Grimes's estimate of the Republican party in 1870 was widely shared. Reconstruction, measured by the results of five years, was a failure, being a confused medley of ignorant negro voters, disfranchised whites, disreputable carpet-baggers, and corrupt legislatures. The civil service was honeycombed with whiskey rings, custom-house frauds, assessments on office-holders, nepotism, and general uncleanness. President Grant had transferred his army headquarters to the White House. When he wanted to have anything done in which he felt a deep interest, he chose an aide-de-camp for the purpose instead of a civilian, and he never dreamed that anybody would be surprised or vexed when he sent Major Babcock to San Domingo to negotiate a treaty for the purchase of that country for the sum of $1,500,000, without the knowledge of the Secretary of State or any member of the Cabinet. He called at Sumner's house to secure his support for the ratification of the treaty, found him dining with John W. Forney and Ben Perley Poore, and had a hasty talk with him about a treaty concerning San Domingo, no details being mentioned. He addressed Sumner as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, to which he supposed it would be referred, and hoped Sumner would approve of the treaty. Sumner replied that he was an Administration man and that he would give very careful and candid consideration to anything which the President desired.

This was the beginning of an Iliad of woes. Grant understood Sumner's answer as a promise to support the treaty, whereas Sumner meant no more than his words signified, that he would consider it on its merits, but in a friendly spirit. It was not his custom to promise to support treaties before seeing them. When he came to consider this one, he found that he could not support it. Not only was Sumner's judgment adverse, but that of the press and other organs of public opinion was decidedly so. The treaty was rejected by a tie vote (two thirds being required to ratify). Grant put all the blame of rejection on Sumner. He thought that the latter had broken a promise and intentionally deceived him. He marked Sumner for destruction, and determined to have the treaty ratified in spite of him, if possible. A commission of investigation had been authorized by Congress, after the rejection of the treaty, to visit San Domingo, and report upon the advisability of the purchase. This was by way of letting the President down easy rather than with any serious purpose of carrying out his wishes. The commission consisted of Benjamin F. Wade, Andrew D. White, and Samuel G. Howe. While it was at work steps were taken to reorganize the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Who prompted that movement was never divulged, but the attempt and its failure were narrated somewhat later by Senator Tipton, of Nebraska, in open Senate, without contradiction. Tipton said that at the beginning of the Third Session of the Forty-first Congress, a motion was made in the Republican Senate Caucus to depose Sumner from the chairmanship of the committee and to remove Schurz, of Missouri, and Patterson, of New Hampshire, from membership altogether.[114] All three had voted against San Domingo. The motion had been negatived at that time, but the purpose had not been abandoned.

The second vote on deposing Sumner took place in the Senate March 10, 1871, on a report made by Senator Howe, of Wisconsin, from the Republican Caucus, for the assignment of committees for the First Session of the Forty-second Congress. The Committee on Foreign Relations, as reported, had the name of Cameron as Chairman, and Sumner was not even a member of it. Then a debate began on the unusual step taken by the caucus committee in deposing Sumner, without his own consent, from a place which he had held acceptably during all the time that the Republicans had controlled the Senate. Wilson, Schurz, Logan, Tipton, and Trumbull spoke against the action of the Caucus Committee. Trumbull said:

I am not the special friend of the Senator from Massachusetts. He and I, during our long course of service here, have had occasion to differ, and differ, I am sorry to say, unpleasantly. But, sir, that will not prevent me from trying to do justice to the Senator from Massachusetts. I stood by him when he was stricken down in his seat by a hostile party, by the powers of slavery. I stand by him to-day when the blow comes, not from those who would perpetuate slavery and make a slave of every man that was for freedom, but comes from those who have been brought into power as much through the instrumentality of the Senator from Massachusetts as of any other individual in the country.

But, sir, this question has been brought before us, and what shall we do? I tried to avoid it. I have appealed to my associates and I have said to them: "We are very much divided;" I say to them now: "We are very much divided." A few votes one way or the other constitute the majority in the Republican party; now is it desirable, is it best, to force such a change with such an opposition as has manifested itself here? What is to be gained by it? I will not undertake to warn the Republican party of the consequences.... I would that this debate had not occurred, that we could have paused at the outset when we saw this difference of opinion, and that there could have been some concession even to those in the minority which would have avoided this state of things.

Senator Sherman deprecated the action of the majority. He regarded the change "unjustifiable, impolitic, and unnecessary," yet he offered Sumner advice, like that of a doctor to a child respecting a dose of castor oil—to throw his head back and take it off quick, because it would do him good, thus:

Therefore, while I feel bound to utter my opinion that this is an unwise proceeding, made without sufficient cause, yet in my judgment it ought not to be debated here. It is settled; and if my honorable friend from Massachusetts, the senior senator in this body, wishes to add another good work in his services to his country, in his services to the Republican party, he cannot do better than rise in his place and say that, if for any reason, whether sufficient or insufficient, a majority of his political associates think it better for him to retire from this position, he yields gracefully to their wish; and I tell him that a new chaplet will crown his brow, and when his memoirs are written this will be regarded as one of the proudest opportunities of his life.[115]

Tipton let the cat out of the bag again by reading from some notes he had made of the proceedings of the caucus of the previous day. He said that Senator Howe in the caucus had defended the action of the committee in displacing Sumner, on the ground that the Committee on Foreign Relations was not in harmony with the Senate on the subject of San Domingo, and that in order to correct this disagreement a change was necessary; whereas Mr. Howe, and all the others who were for displacing Sumner, now contended that San Domingo had nothing to do with it. Tipton begged leave to say also that Howe was wrong in his contention that the Committee on Foreign Relations was not in harmony with the Senate, the vote on the treaty having been 28 to 28 (a tie vote operated as a negative). In other words, the Senate had sustained the committee, and there was no disagreement to be rectified.

Thereupon Sherman called Tipton to order for divulging the secrets of the caucus, and Tipton replied that he had read all the proceedings of the caucus in the morning papers, including the names of the Senators in the call of the yeas and nays, 26 to 21, and that there was only one error in the whole report and that a trifling one. Sherman retorted that perhaps Tipton had furnished the report to the newspapers, but the latter denied it. Sherman then insisted that the newspaper report carried no weight unless confirmed by a Senator. He made the charge also that Tipton had been guilty of divulging the vote on the treaty, taken in executive session. To this charge Tipton could make no defense, but he contended that it had done no harm. The discussion was continued till a late hour, the report of the Caucus Committee being supported in debate chiefly by Edmunds and Morton. The latter affirmed that San Domingo did not enter into the question of displacing Sumner now—implying that it might have been the bone of contention earlier. Morton's statement was technically true. The original disagreement between Sumner and the President had been so overlaid with fresh material that it was now relatively unimportant. Moreover, the Senate had no intention of ratifying the annexation treaty even if the Benjamin Wade Commission should so recommend—as it did. Morton himself had no such intention.

I happened to be in Washington at this juncture and was dining with the late Senator Allison (then a member of the House), on the evening before the report was presented. He informed me of the posture of affairs, said that Sumner was to be deposed, and that Senator Howe had been designated to report a resolution to that effect. He regarded the situation as fraught with peril to the Republican party. I suggested that he and I should call upon Senator Howe and endeavor to prevent or perhaps delay the proposed step. Allison assented. So we went to Howe's apartments, found him at home and alone, and we labored with him till past midnight, seeking in a friendly way to change his purpose, but without avail. He could not be moved. While we were returning, Allison said that Grant must have played his last trump to break the custom of the majority in the Senate, never to displace a member without his own consent. After the deed was done, I called upon Sumner and had a conversation with him on the subject. He said that the most puzzling thing to him was the part taken by Senator Anthony, of Rhode Island, in the affair. Anthony was chairman of the caucus. He appointed the Committee on Committees. Anthony was his friend, a very close friend. He ought to have known beforehand the purposes of the majority, especially since an attempt to displace him had been made at the previous session. Was Anthony himself deceived, or was he a party to the transaction? That was the puzzling question.

When the vote was taken on Howe's report, it was adopted by a large majority. The dissentients withheld their votes, as they did not choose to bolt the decision of the caucus when bolting could accomplish nothing. The result was a fresh grievance added to the growing stock of discontent.

The President's first blow at Sumner had been the removal of his friend Motley from the position of Minister to England. A request for Motley's resignation was sent on July 1, 1870, but he did not comply with it. In the mean time the position was offered to Trumbull in the following letter:[116]

Department of State, Washington,
Confidential.
Garrisons, August 5th, 1870.
My dear Judge,

The President desires me to ask if it will be agreeable to you to accept the Mission to London; if so, he is desirous of securing to the country the value of your important service and your experience and ability. I hope most sincerely that it will meet your views to accept this Mission, now more than before important. The events now happening and threatening in Europe require the presence in London of a representative of ability, of firmness, of learning, and of calm self-possession—and your exceptional possession of these requisites has led to the very strong desire of the President and myself that you would undertake the duties of the position. I do not know that we are on the eve of the settlement of our questions with Great Britain, but there are reasons to justify the hope that very important questions may be adjusted within the term of whoever may succeed Mr. Motley. The complications of European politics are favorable and add to the evident desire of the British Ministry to dispose of all questions between the two countries. Can you come here and pass a day with me? I can tell more than I can write. I sincerely hope that you can give a favorable answer; for reasons which you will understand the President desires that this communication be considered confidential, at least for the present. Please let me have your answer as soon as you conveniently can.

Very faithfully yours,
Hon. Lyman Trumbull, Hamilton Fish.
U.S. Senator,
Kingston, Ulster Co., N. Y.

No written answer to this letter has been found. A verbal one was given at the interview which Mr. Fish invited. Trumbull declined the appointment because he preferred to remain a Senator rather than to be a diplomat. Probably he became acquainted at this time with Secretary Fish's intention to move for a settlement of our differences with Great Britain: for in a speech made at Chicago on the 2d of November following, on "Coming Issues," he discussed the subject of our claims against that country at considerable length. In this speech he maintained that we could justly ask for payment of the losses sustained by the depredations of the Alabama and other British-built cruisers, and that we had a still deeper grievance, although one not computable in dollars and cents, growing out of the demand made upon us for the surrender of the rebel envoys, Mason and Slidell, who were captured on board the steamship Trent at the beginning of the Civil War. He showed by the established rules of international law, affirmed by British precedents and practice, that persons, papers, and materials in the enemy's service were alike contraband and subject to capture in neutral vessels on the high seas.[117]

Another "coming issue" referred to in this speech was the endeavor to break up and abolish the iniquitous system by which the appointment of thirty-five thousand officers and clerks of the National Government was made part of the patronage of politicians; and to carry out the principles of civil service reform in which these appointments should be made after competitive examinations so as to secure officers of "the highest fitness, honesty, and capacity." In his argument in favor of this reform he instanced the experience of General J. D. Cox, Secretary of the Interior, who had found it necessary to resign his office because he could not purge his own department of spoilsmen and incompetents foisted upon him by Senators and Representatives. Cox's resignation had caused intense indignation when the reasons for it leaked out. President Grant had pledged himself to the reform of the civil service and had appointed a competent commission to carry on the work, and was really desirous that it should succeed, but he was not willing to fight for it. So when Congressmen fought against it he yielded and put the blame upon them. And the last state of it was worse than the first. "No point in Trumbull's speech," says the newspaper account of it, "was more significant than his endorsement of Secretary Cox's civil service reform, and the enthusiastic cheering with which the large audience unanimously greeted this endorsement."

Attorney-General Hoar had retired from public life some months earlier and for much the same reason. He had made several selections to fill vacancies on the bench of the Circuit Court with an eye single to the character and legal attainments of the judges, and had thereby incurred the enmity of most of the Republican Senators, who wanted to dictate the appointments. It happened at this time that the President was trying to win support for the San Domingo Treaty, and he found, or supposed, that the votes of certain carpet-bag Senators could be obtained if he would give them a member of the Cabinet. In order to create a vacancy he nominated Attorney-General Hoar as a justice of the Supreme Court. The nomination was referred to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, consisting of Trumbull, Edmunds, Conkling, Carpenter, Stewart, Rice (of Arkansas), and Thurman. Six of these voted against Hoar. The only affirmative vote was that of Trumbull.[118]

After Hoar was rejected, the President asked for his resignation as Attorney-General without assigning any reason therefor, and when it was handed to him he appointed an obscure but respectable lawyer from Georgia of the name of Akerman as Attorney-General, to please the carpet-baggers; but this move did not secure a sufficient number of votes to ratify the treaty, nor was it ever ratified.

FOOTNOTES:

[114] Cong. Globe, March 10, 1871, p. 48.

[115] Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 51.

[116] E. L. Pierce, in his Life of Sumner, says that the position was first offered to Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, and that he was confirmed by the Senate on the last day of the session. Evidently he did not accept it.

[117] Mr. Charles F. Adams has shown in a recent essay that the British Ministry were perfectly aware that the capture of Mason and Slidell was justifiable by British custom and precedent, but that public opinion was so inflamed on the subject that they were swept off their feet, and could not have faced Parliament an hour if they had not demanded the surrender of the prisoners. On the other hand, our practice and precedents were directly opposite. The American doctrine was "free ships make free goods" and a fortiori free persons, but so inflamed was public opinion on this side of the water that the British demand for the surrender of the prisoners would have been refused even at the risk of war, if we had not had one war on hand already. Both nations "flopped" simultaneously. The Trent Affair—an Historical Retrospect. By Charles Francis Adams. Boston, 1912.

[118] Washington letter in the Nation, January 6, 1870.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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