INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

A large number of the citizens of Boston being desirous to offer to Mr. Webster some enduring testimony of their gratitude for his services in Congress, and more especially for his defence of the Constitution during the crisis of Nullification, a committee was raised, in the spring of 1835, to procure a piece of plate which should be worthy of such an object. By their direction, and more particularly under the superintendence of one of their number, the late Mr. George W. Brimmer, to whose taste and skill the committee were deeply indebted for the selection of the model and the arrangement of the devices, the beautiful vase, now well known throughout the country as the Webster Vase, was prepared at the manufactory of Messrs. Jones, Lows, & Ball, in Boston. After it was finished, the committee found it impossible to withstand the wish, both of the numerous subscribers and of the public generally, to witness the ceremonies and hear the remarks by which its presentation might be accompanied. It was accordingly presented to Mr. Webster in the presence of three or four thousand spectators, assembled at the Odeon, on the evening of the 12th of October. The Vase was placed on a pedestal covered with the American flag, and contained on its front the following inscription:—

PRESENTED TO
DANIEL WEBSTER
THE DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION,
BY THE CITIZENS OF BOSTON,
Oct. 12, 1835.

The chairman of the committee (Mr. Z. Jellison) opened the meeting with the following remarks:—

“Fellow-Citizens:—The friends of the Hon. Daniel Webster in this city, conceiving the propriety of giving that gentleman an expression of the high estimation in which they hold his public services, and wishing 320 also to tender him a testimonial of their regard for his moral worth and social virtues, called a meeting of consultation on the subject, some months since, at which a committee was appointed, with instructions to procure a suitable piece of plate, to be presented to him in their behalf, before his official duty should again require his departure hence for the seat of government. In obedience to their instructions, that committee have procured, from the hands of the most skilful artists in this country, the piece of plate I now have the honor to exhibit to you.

“They have now called their constituents together, for the purpose of presenting this Vase in their presence. Had the committee consulted the wishes only of the gentleman for whom it is intended, this presentation might, perhaps, have taken place in a more private or less imposing manner; but, in the course they have adopted, they have been governed by the wishes of the citizens at large. They now respectfully ask your kind indulgence while they proceed in the discharge of this part of their duty.

“The committee have appointed, as their organ of communication, the Hon. Francis C. Gray, with whom I now have the pleasure to leave the subject.”

Mr. Gray then rose, and spoke as follows:—

“Mr. Webster:—By direction of the committee, and in behalf of your fellow-citizens, who have caused this Vase to be made, I now request your acceptance of it. They offer it in token of their high sense of your public character and services. But on these it were not becoming to dwell in addressing yourself. Nor is a regard for these the only, or the principal, motive of those for whom I speak. They offer it mainly to evince the high estimation in which they hold the political sentiments and principles which you have professed and maintained. There may undoubtedly be differences of opinion among them with regard to this or that particular measure; and a blind, indiscriminate, wholesale adhesion to the life and opinions of any one would not be worth offering, nor worth accepting, among freemen. We are not man-worshippers here in Massachusetts. But the great political principles, the leading views of policy, which you have been forward to assert and vindicate, these they all unite to honor; and in rendering public homage to these, they feel that they are not so much paying a compliment to you, as performing a duty to their country.

“In a free republic, where all men exercise political power, the prevalence of correct views and principles on political subjects is essential to the safety of the state. It is not enough that their truth should be recognized. Their operation and tendency must be understood and appreciated; they must be made familiar to the mass of the people, become closely interwoven with their whole habits of thought and feeling, objects of attachment to which they may cling instantly and instinctively in all time of doubt or peril, so as not to be swept away by any sudden flood of prejudice or passion. Hence it is the duty of every man to embrace all fit occasions, nay, to seek fit occasions, for declaring his adherence to such principles, and giving them the support of his influence, however high or however humble that influence may be. There is no justice, therefore, in the complaint often made against the members of our legislative 321 assemblies, that they sometimes speak not for their audience merely, but for their constituents; seeking not simply to affect the decision of the question then pending, but to influence the public sentiment with regard to the principles involved in it. This affords no ground of censure against them, so they speak well and wisely. The practice may be abused, no doubt; but, in itself, it is a natural, inevitable right. So it should be in relation to all important principles in a free country. Nothing else but the excitement, kindled by the conflict of debate, will ever make those great principles subjects of general attention and interest. Nothing else but the observation of their application in practice can make them generally understood and appreciated. We all recollect questions (and among them that on Mr. Foot’s resolutions, not likely soon to be forgotten), the vote on which was as certainly known before the discussion as after it, and known to be unalterable by any argument or persuasion; and yet the discussion of which was so far from being uninteresting and unprofitable, that it was echoed and reËchoed through the land, making a deep and lasting impression on the public mind, establishing incontrovertibly vital principles before disputed, and thus giving new strength and stability to our free institutions, and forming, I may almost say, an epoch in our political history.

“On this and similar occasions, not to dwell on your steadfast adherence to those more general principles of civil liberty, which are equally important in every age and country,—on such occasions the fundamental principles peculiar to our system of government have always had in you a decided advocate, ever ready to develop and illustrate their nature and operation, and to enforce the obligations which they impose. Among the most prominent peculiarities of our system is the fact that the United States are not a confederacy of independent sovereigns, the subjects of each of whom are responsible to him alone for their compliance with the obligations of the compact, but that, for certain specified purposes, they form one nation, every citizen of which is responsible, directly, immediately, exclusively, to the whole nation for the performance of his duties to the whole; that the Constitution is not a treaty, nor any thing like a treaty, but a frame of government, resting on the same foundations, and supported by the same sanctions, as any other government, to be subverted only by the same means, by revolution,—revolution to be brought about by the same authority which would warrant a revolution in any government, and by none other,—to be justified, when justifiable, by the same paramount necessity, and by nothing less. This government is not the government of the States, but that of the people; and it behooves the people, every one of the people, to do his utmost to preserve it; not in form merely, but in its full efficiency, as a practical system; to maintain the Union as it is, in all its integrity,—the Constitution as it is, in all its purity, and in all its strength; and when they are in danger, to hasten to their support promptly, frankly, fearlessly, undeterred, and unencumbered by any political combination, let who will be his companions in the good cause, and let who will hang back from it.

“The other great peculiarity of our political system—and on these two hang all the liberty and hopes of America—is this: that the supreme power or sovereignty is divided between the State and national governments, 322 and the portion allotted to each distributed—among several independent departments; and this, notwithstanding the maxim of European politicians, too hastily adopted by some of our own statesmen, that sovereignty is, in its nature, indivisible. By sovereignty, I do not mean, and they do not mean, the ultimate right of the people to establish and subvert governments, the right of revolution, as it has been called; for, thus understood, it would be absurd to inquire, as they constantly do, where the sovereignty resides in any particular government, since this ultimate sovereignty never can reside anywhere but in the people themselves. It is inherent in them and inalienable, existing equally as a right, however its exercise may be impeded, in free and despotic governments. But by sovereignty must be understood the supreme power of the government, the highest power which can lawfully be exercised by any constituted authority. Now, let the politicians of Europe say what they will of the indivisibility of this power, we know that, among us, it is in point of fact divided; that in relation to some objects, the supreme power is in the national government, subject to no earthly control but that of the people, exercising their right of revolution; and that in relation to others, it is in the State governments, subject to the same and to no other control; and that in each of these governments the power conferred is divided among the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, each of which is entirely independent in the performance of its appropriate duties.

“This system of practical cheeks and balances, altogether peculiar to us, is designed to operate, and does operate, for the restraint of power and the protection of liberty. But, like every earthly good, it brings with it its attendant evil in the danger of encroachment and collision. To guard against these dangers is one of the most important, most difficult, most delicate of our public duties; to see that the national government shall not encroach upon the power of the States, nor the States on that of the nation; that no State shall interfere with the domestic legislation of another, nor lightly nor unjustly suspect another of seeking to interfere with its own; but that each of these several governments, and every department in each, shall be strictly confined to its proper sphere; that no one shall evade any responsibility which is imposed on him by the Constitution and the laws, and no one assume any responsibility which is not so.

“But by what power can this be accomplished? There is only one. Physical force will not do it. The system of our government has been compared to that of the heavenly bodies, which move on, orb within orb cycle within cycle, in apparent confusion, but in real, uninterrupted, unalterable harmony. And the harmony of our system can only be maintained by a power, which, like that regulating their movements, is unseen, unfelt, yet irresistible,—Public Opinion.

“This is the precise circumstance which renders the prevalence of just political views and principles peculiarly important among us, and secures to him, who labors faithfully and successfully to promote their diffusion, the praise of having deserved well of his country.

“The opinions of men, however, are invariably and inevitably affected by their interests and their feelings. This consideration opens a wide field of duty to the American statesman, requiring him to prevent, by 323 every means in his power, all collisions of interest and all exasperations of feeling; to correct and rebuke the misrepresentations which tend to array one part of the country against another, or one portion of society against another, as if their interests were adverse, whereas in truth they are one; and, avoiding the paltry cunning which plays off the different parts of the country against each other, sacrificing the interests of the whole to this part to-day, on condition that they shall be sacrificed to another to-morrow, by which means they are always sacrificed, to be governed by that liberal, enlightened, far-sighted policy, which in all questions of expediency looks invariably and exclusively to the permanent interests of the whole nation, considered as one,—which aims to impress on the minds and the hearts of this people, deeply, indelibly, the great truth, that the prosperity and the glory of the United States, their improvement and happiness at home, their rank among the nations of the earth, must be proportioned to the strength and cordiality of their union, and can only be carried to their highest pitch by the universal conviction, the deep-seated and overruling sentiment, that, for the purposes set forth in the Constitution, we are one people, one and indivisible; and that for us to break the bond that makes us one, and resolve this glorious Union into its original elements, would be as mad and as fatal as for England to go back again to her Heptarchy.

“The statesman who is governed by these principles and this policy, whose great object is not to win the spoils of victory, nor even its laurels, but to fight the good fight and render faithful service to his country, will never want opportunity to merit the public gratitude, whatever may be his political position. If in the majority, considering that the duration of any administration is only a day in the existence of the government, and yet a day which must affect all that are to follow it, he will never be tempted to swerve from these great principles by any temporary advantage, even to the whole community, still less by any local or partial benefit, and least of all by any party or personal consideration. He will not make it the chief object of government to extend and perpetuate the power of his party. He will not regard his political opponents as enemies, over whom he has triumphed and whom he is to despoil. He will not seek to throw off or evade the restraints imposed by the Constitution on all power, nor will he bestow public offices as the reward or the motive for adherence to his party or his person. If in the minority, he will find inducement enough and reward enough for the most strenuous exertion, in the conviction, that an intelligent, resolute, vigilant minority is not utterly powerless in our government, but may often control, modify, or even arrest the most pernicious schemes of reckless rulers, and diminish, if not prevent, the evils of misrule. He will consider also, that in political science, as in the other moral sciences, truth must always force its way slowly against general opposition, and that although the great principles for which he contends should not triumph in the debate of the day, they may yet, if ably sustained, ultimately triumph in the hearts of the people, and come at last to rule the land; and that thenceforward, so long as their beneficent influence shall endure, so long as they shall be remembered upon earth, so long will his name and his praise endure who shall have watched over them in their weakness, and struggled for them in their adversity.

“But I must not be tempted beyond the tone which befits the part assigned me, which is simply to state the motives and feelings of those for whom I speak on this occasion; and I am sure, Gentlemen, that I am the faithful interpreter of your sentiments, when I say, that it is from attachment to the great principles of civil liberty and constitutional government, that you offer this token of respect to one who has always maintained them and been governed by them; to one whom this people, because he has been guided by those principles, and for the sake of those principles, delight to honor; whom they honor with their confidence, whom they honor by cherishing the memory of his past services, and by their best hopes and wishes for the future, and whom they will honor, let who else may shrink and falter, by their cordial efforts to raise him to that high station for which so many patriotic citizens, in various parts of the country, are now holding him up as a candidate; and they will do this on the full conviction, that he will always be true to those principles, wherever his country may call him.”

To this address Mr. Webster made the following reply.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:—I accept, with grateful respect, the present which it is your pleasure to make. I value it. It bears an expression of your regard for those political principles which I have endeavored to maintain; and though the material were less costly, or the workmanship less elegant, any durable evidence of your approbation could not but give me high satisfaction.

This approbation is the more gratifying, as it is not bestowed for services connected with local questions, or local interests, or which are supposed to have been peculiarly beneficial to yourselves, but for efforts which had the interests of the whole country for their object, and which were useful, if useful at all, to all who live under the blessings of the Constitution and government of the United States.

It is twelve or thirteen years, Gentlemen, since I was honored with a seat in Congress, by the choice of the citizens of Boston. They saw fit to repeat that choice more than once; and I embrace, with pleasure, this opportunity of expressing to them my sincere and profound sense of obligation for these manifestations of confidence. At a later period, the Legislature of the State saw fit to transfer me to another place;[105] and have again renewed the trust, under circumstances which I have felt to impose upon me new obligations of duty, and an increased devotion to the political welfare of the country. These twelve or thirteen years, Gentlemen, have been years of labor, and not without sacrifices; but both have been more than compensated 326 by the kindness, the good-will, and the favorable interpretation with which my discharge of official duties has been received. In this changing world, we can hardly say that we possess what is present, and the future is all unknown. But the past is ours. Its acquisitions, and its enjoyments, are safe. And among these acquisitions, among the treasures of the past most to be cherished and preserved, I shall ever reckon the proofs of esteem and confidence which I have received from the citizens of Boston and the Legislature of Massachusetts.

In one respect, Gentlemen, your present oppresses me. It overcomes me by its tone of commendation. It assigns to me a character of which I feel I am not worthy. “The Defender of the Constitution” is a title quite too high for me. He who shall prove himself the ablest among the able men of the country, he who shall serve it longest among those who may serve it long, he on whose labors all the stars of benignant fortune shall shed their selectest influence, will have praise enough, and reward enough, if, at the end of his political and earthly career, though that career may have been as bright as the track of the sun across the sky, the marble under which he sleeps, and that much better record, the grateful breasts of his living countrymen, shall pronounce him “the Defender of the Constitution.” It is enough for me, Gentlemen, to be connected, in the most humble manner, with the defence and maintenance of this great wonder of modern times, and this certain wonder of all future times. It is enough for me to stand in the ranks, and only to be counted as one of its defenders.

The Constitution of the United States, I am confident, will protect the name and the memory both of its founders and of its friends, even of its humblest friends. It will impart to both something of its own ever memorable and enduring distinction; I had almost said, something of its own everlasting remembrance. Centuries hence, when the vicissitudes of human affairs shall have broken it, if ever they shall break it, into fragments, these very fragments, every shattered column, every displaced foundation-stone, shall yet be sure to bring them all into recollection, and attract to them the respect and gratitude of mankind.

Gentlemen, it is to pay respect to this Constitution, it is to manifest your attachment to it, your sense of its value, and your 327 devotion to its true principles, that you have sought this occasion. It is not to pay an ostentatious personal compliment. If it were, it would be unworthy both of you and of me. It is not to manifest attachment to individuals, independent of all considerations of principles; if it were, I should feel it my duty to tell you, friends as you are, that you were doing that which, at this very moment, constitutes one of the most threatening dangers to the Constitution itself. Your gift would have no value in my eyes, this occasion would be regarded by me as an idle pageant, if I did not know that they are both but modes, chosen by you, to signify your attachment to the true principles of the Constitution; your fixed purpose, so far as in you lies, to maintain those principles; and your resolution to support public men, and stand by them, so long as they shall support and stand by the Constitution of the country, and no longer.

“The Constitution of the country!” Gentlemen, often as I am called to contemplate this subject, its importance always rises, and magnifies itself more and more, before me. I cannot view its preservation as a concern of narrow extent, or temporary duration. On the contrary, I see in it a vast interest, which is to run down with the generations of men, and to spread over a great portion of the earth with a direct, and over the rest with an indirect, but a most powerful influence. When I speak of it here, in this thick crowd of fellow-citizens and friends, I yet behold, thronging about me, a much larger and more imposing crowd. I see a united rush of the present and the future. I see all the patriotic of our own land, and our own time. I see also the many millions of their posterity, and I see, too, the lovers of human liberty from every part of the earth, from beneath the oppressions of thrones, and hierarchies, and dynasties, from amidst the darkness of ignorance, degradation, and despotism, into which any ray of political light has penetrated; I see all those countless multitudes gather about us, and I hear their united and earnest voices, conjuring us, in whose charge the treasure now is, to hold on, and hold on to the last, by that which is our own highest enjoyment and their best hope.

Filled with these sentiments, Gentlemen, and having through my political life hitherto always acted under the deepest conviction of their truth and importance, it is natural that I should have regarded the preservation of the Constitution as the first 328 great political object to be secured. But I claim no exclusive merit. I should deem it, especially, both unbecoming and unjust in me to separate myself, in this respect, from other public servants of the people of Massachusetts. The distinguished gentlemen who have preceded and followed me in the representation of the city, their associates from other districts of the State, and my late worthy and most highly esteemed colleague, are entitled, one and all, to a full share in the public approbation. If accidental circumstances, or a particular position, have sometimes rendered me more prominent, equal patriotism and equal zeal have yet made them equally deserving. It were invidious to enumerate these fellow-laborers, or to discriminate among them. Long may they live! and I could hardly express a better wish for the interest and honor of the States, than that the public men who may follow them may be as disinterested, as patriotic, and as able as they have proved themselves.

There have been, Gentlemen, it is true, anxious moments. That was an anxious occasion, to which the gentleman who has addressed me in your behalf has alluded; I mean the debate in January, 1830. It seemed to me then that the Constitution was about to be abandoned. Threatened with most serious dangers, it was not only not defended, but attacked, as I thought, and weakened and wounded in its vital powers and faculties, by those to whom the country naturally looks for its defence and protection. It appeared to me that the Union was about to go to pieces, before the people were at all aware of the extent of the danger. The occasion was not sought, but forced upon us; it seemed to me momentous, and I confess that I felt that even the little that I could do, in such a crisis, was called for by every motive which could be addressed to a lover of the Constitution. I took a part in the debate, therefore, with my whole heart already in the subject, and careless for every thing in the result, except the judgment which the people of the United States should form upon the questions involved in the discussion. I believe that judgment has been definitely pronounced; but nothing is due to me, beyond the merit of having made an earnest effort to present the true question to the people, and to invoke for it that attention from them, which its high importance appeared to me to demand.

The Constitution of the United States, Gentlemen, is of a peculiar structure. Our whole system is peculiar. It is fashioned 329 according to no existing model, likened to no precedent, and yet founded on principles which lie at the foundations of all free governments, wherever such governments exist. It is a complicated system. It is elaborate, and in some sense artificial, in its composition. We have twenty-four State sovereignties, all exercising legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Some of the sovereignties, or States, had long existed, and, subject only to the restraint of the power of the parent country, had been accustomed to the forms and to the exercise of the powers of representative republics. Others of them are new creations, coming into existence only under the Constitution itself; but all now standing on an equal footing.

The general government, under which all these States are united, is not, as has been justly remarked by Mr. Gray, a confederation. It is much more than a confederation. It is a popular representative government, with all the departments, and all the functions and organs, of such a government. But it is still a limited, a restrained, a severely-guarded government. It exists under a written constitution, and all that human wisdom could do is done, to define its powers and to prevent their abuse. It is placed in what was supposed to be the safest medium between dangerous authority on the one hand, and debility and inefficiency on the other. I think that happy medium was found, by the exercise of the greatest political sagacity, and the influence of the highest good fortune. We cannot move the system either way, without the probability of hurtful change; and as experience has taught us its safety, and its usefulness, when left where it is, our duty is a plain one.

It cannot be doubted that a system thus complicated must be accompanied by more or less of danger, in every stage of its existence. It has not the simplicity of despotism. It is not a plain column, that stands self-poised and self-supported. Nor is it a loose, irregular, unfixed, and undefined system of rule, which admits of constant and violent changes, without losing its character. But it is a balanced and guarded system; a system of checks and controls; a system in which powers are carefully delegated, and as carefully limited; a system in which the symmetry of the parts is designed to produce an aggregate whole, which shall be favorable to personal liberty, favorable to public prosperity, and favorable to national glory. And who can deny, 330 that, by a trial of fifty years, this American system of government has proved itself capable of conferring all these blessings? These years have been years of great agitation throughout the civilized world. In the course of them the face of Europe has been completely changed. Old and corrupt governments have been destroyed, and new ones, erected in their places, have been destroyed too, sometimes in rapid succession. Yet, through all the extraordinary, the most extraordinary scenes of this half-century, the free, popular, representative government of the United States has stood, and has afforded security for liberty, for property, and for reputation, to all citizens.

That it has been exposed to many dangers, that it has met critical moments, is certain. That it is now exposed to dangers, and that a crisis is now before it, is equally clear, in my judgment. But it has hitherto been preserved, and vigilance and patriotism may rescue it again.

Our dangers, Gentlemen, are not from without. We have nothing to fear from foreign powers, except those interruptions of the occupations of life which all wars occasion. The dangers to our system, as a system, do not spring from that quarter. On the contrary, the pressure of foreign hostility would be most likely to unite us, and to strengthen our union, by an augmented sense of its utility and necessity. But our dangers are from within. I do not now speak of those dangers which have in all ages beset republican governments, such as luxury among the rich, the corruption of public officers, and the general degradation of public morals. I speak only of those peculiar dangers to which the structure of our government particularly exposes it, in addition to all other ordinary dangers. These arise among ourselves; they spring up at home; and the evil which they threaten is no less than disunion, or the overthrow of the whole system. Local feelings and local parties, a notion sometimes a sedulously cultivated of opposite interests in different portions of the Union, evil prophecies respecting its duration, cool calculations upon the benefits of separation, a narrow feeling that cannot embrace all the States as one country, an unsocial, anti-national, and half-belligerent spirit, which sometimes betrays itself,—all these undoubtedly are causes which affect, more or less, our prospect of holding together. All these are unpropitious influences.

The Constitution, again, is founded on compromise, and the most perfect and absolute good faith, in regard to every stipulation of this kind contained in it is indispensable to its preservation. Every attempt to accomplish even the best purpose, every attempt to grasp that which is regarded as an immediate good, in violation of these stipulations, is full of danger to the whole Constitution. I need not say, also, that possible collision between the general and the State governments always has been, is, and ever must be, a source of danger to be strictly watched by wise men.

But, Gentlemen, as I have spoken of dangers now, in my judgment actually existing, I will state at once my opinions on that point, without fear and without reserve. I reproach no man, I accuse no man; but I speak of things as they appear to me, and I speak of principles and practices which I deem most alarming. I think, then, Gentlemen, that a great practical change is going on in the Constitution, which, if not checked, must completely alter its whole character. This change consists in the diminution of the just powers of Congress on the one hand, and in the vast increase of executive authority on the other. The government of the United States, in the aggregate, or the legislative power of Congress, seems fast losing, one after another, its accustomed powers. One by one, they are practically struck out of the Constitution. What has become of the power of internal improvement? Does it remain in the Constitution, or is it erased by the repeated exercise of the President’s veto, and the acquiescence in that exercise of all who call themselves his friends, whatever their own opinions of the Constitution may be? The power to create a national bank, a power exercised for forty years, approved by all Presidents, and by Congress at all times, and sanctioned by a solemn adjudication of the Supreme Court, is it not true that party has agreed to strike this power, too, from the Constitution, in compliance with what has been openly called the interests of party? Nay, more; that great power, the power of protecting domestic industry, who can tell me whether that power is now regarded as in the Constitution, or out of it?

But, if it be true that the diminution of the just powers of Congress, in these particulars, has been attempted, and attempted with more or less success, it is still more obvious, I think, that the executive power of the government has been dangerously 332 increased. It is spread, in the first place, over all that ground from which the legislative power of Congress is driven. Congress can no longer establish a bank, controlled by the laws of the United States, amenable to the authority, and open, at all times, to the examination and inspection of the legislature. It is no longer constitutional to make such a bank, for the safe custody of the public treasure. But of the thousand State corporations already existing, it is constitutional for the executive government to select such as it pleases, to intrust the public money to their keeping, without responsibility to the laws of the United States, without the duty of exhibiting their concerns, at any time, to the committees of Congress, and with no other guards or securities than such as executive discretion on the one hand, and the banks themselves on the other, may see fit to agree to.

And so of internal improvement. It is not every thing in the nature of public improvements which is forbidden. It is only that the selection of objects is not with Congress. Whatever appears to the executive discretion to be of a proper nature, or such as comes within certain not very intelligible limits, may be tolerated. And even with respect to the tariff itself, while as a system it is denounced as unconstitutional, it is probable some portion of it might find favor.

But it is not the frequent use of the power of the veto, it is not the readiness with which men yield their own opinions, and see important powers practically obliterated from the Constitution, in order to subserve the interest of the party, it is not even all this which furnishes, at the present moment, the most striking demonstration of the increase of executive authority. It is the use of the power of patronage; it is the universal giving and taking away of all place and office, for reasons no way connected with the public service, or the faithful execution of the laws; it is this which threatens with overthrow all the true principles of the government. Patronage is reduced to a system. It is used as the patrimony, the property of party. Every office is a largess, a bounty, a favor; and it is expected to be compensated by service and fealty. A numerous and well-disciplined corps of office-holders, acting with activity and zeal, and with incredible union of purpose, is attempting to seize on the strong posts, and to control, effectually, the expression of the public will. As has been said of the Turks in Europe, they are not so 333 much mingled with us, as encamped among us. And it is more lamentable, that the apathy which prevails in a time of general prosperity produces, among a great majority of the people, a disregard to the efforts and objects of this well-trained and effective corps. But, Gentlemen, the principle is vicious; it is destructive and ruinous; and whether it produces its work of disunion to-day or to-morrow, it must produce it in the end. It must destroy the balance of the government, and so destroy the government itself. The government of the United States controls the army, the navy, the custom-house, the post-office, the land-offices, and other great sources of patronage. What have the States to oppose to all this? And if the States shall see all this patronage, if they shall see every officer under this government, in all its ramifications, united with every other officer, and all acting steadily in a design to produce political effect, even in State governments, is it possible not to perceive that they will, before long, regard the whole government of the Union with distrust and jealousy, and finally with fear and hatred?

Among other evils, it is the tendency of this system to push party feelings and party spirit to their utmost excess. It involves not only opinions and principles, but the pursuits of life and the means of living, in the contests of party. The executive himself becomes but the mere point of concentration of party power; and when executive power is exercised or is claimed for the supposed benefit of party, party will approve and justify it. When did heated and exasperated party ever complain of its leaders for seizing on new degrees of power?

This system of government has been openly avowed. Offices of trust are declared, from high places, to be the regular spoils of party victory; and all that is furnished out of the public purse, as a reward for labor in the public service, becomes thus a boon, offered to personal devotion and partisan service. The uncontrolled power of removal is the spring which moves all this machinery; and I verily believe the government is, and will be, in serious danger, till some check is placed on that power. To combine and consolidate a great party by the influence of personal hopes, to govern by the patronage of office, to exercise the power of removal at pleasure, in order to render that patronage effectual,—this seems to be the sum and substance of the political systems of the times. I am sorry to say, that the germ of this system had its first being in the Senate.

The policy began in the last year of Mr. Adams’s administration, when nominations made by him to fill vacancies occurring by death or resignation were postponed, by a vote of the majority of the Senate, to a period beyond the ensuing 4th of March; and this was done with no other view than that of giving the patronage of these appointments to the incoming President. The nomination of a judge of the Supreme Court, among others, was thus disposed of. The regular action of the government was, in this manner, deranged, and undue and unjustly obtained patronage came to be received as among the ordinary means of government. Some of the gentlemen who concurred in this vote have since, probably, seen occasion to regret it. But they thereby let loose the lion of executive prerogative, and they have not yet found out how they can drive it back again to its cage. The debates in the Senate on these questions, in the session of 1828-29, are not public; but I take this occasion to say, that the minority of the Senate, as it was then constituted, including, among others, myself and colleague, contended against this innovation upon the Constitution, for days and for weeks; but we contended in vain.

The doctrine of patronage thus got a foothold in the government. A general removal from office followed, exciting, at first, no small share of public attention; but every exercise of the power rendered its exercise in the next case still easier, till removal at will has become the actual system on which the government is administered.

It is hardly a fit occasion, Gentlemen, to go into the history of this power of removal. It was declared to exist in the days of Washington, by a very small majority in each house of Congress. It has been considered as existing to the present time. But no man expected it to be used as a mere arbitrary power; and those who maintained its existence declared, nevertheless, that it would justly become matter of impeachment, if it should be used for purposes such as those to which the most blind among us must admit they have recently seen it habitually applied. I have the highest respect for those who originally concurred in this construction of the Constitution. But, as discreet men of the day were divided on the question, as Madison and other distinguished names were on one side, and Gerry and other distinguished names on the other, one may now differ from either, without incurring the imputation of arrogance, since 335 he must differ from some of them. I confess my judgment would have been, that the power of removal did not belong to the President alone; that it was but a part of the power of appointment, since the power of appointing one man to office implies the power of vacating that office, by removing another out of it; and as the whole power of appointment is granted, not to the President alone, but to the President and Senate, the true interpretation of the Constitution would have carried the power of removal into the same hands. I have, however, so recently expressed my sentiments on this point in another place, that it would be improper to pursue this line of observation further.

In the course of the last session, Gentlemen, several bills passed the Senate, intended to correct abuses, to restrain useless expenditure, to curtail the discretionary authority of public officers, and to control government patronage. The post-office bill, the custom-house bill, and the bill respecting the tenure of office, were all of this class. None of them, however, received the favorable consideration of the other house. I believe, that in all these respects a reform, a real, honest reform, is decidedly necessary to the security of the Constitution; and while I continue in public life, I shall not halt in my endeavors to produce it. It is time to bring back the government to its true character as an agency for the people. It is time to declare that offices, created for the people, are public trusts, not private spoils. It is time to bring each and every department within its true original limits. It is time to assent, on one hand, to the just powers of Congress, in their full extent, and to resist, on the other, the progress and rapid growth of executive authority.

These, Gentlemen, are my opinions. I have spoken them frankly, and without reserve. Under present circumstances, I should wish to avoid any concealment, and to state my political opinions in their full length and breadth. I desire not to stand before the country as a man of no opinions, or of such a mixture of opposite opinions that the result has no character at all. On the contrary, I am desirous of standing as one who is bound to his own consistency by the frankest avowal of his sentiments, on all important and interesting subjects. I am not partly for the Constitution, and partly against it; I am wholly for it, for it altogether, for it as it is, and for the exercise, when occasion requires, of all its just powers, as they have heretofore been exercised 336 by Washington, and the great men who have followed him in its administration.

I disdain, altogether, the character of an uncommitted man. I am committed, fully committed; committed to the full extent of all that I am, and all that I hope, to the Constitution of the country, to its love and reverence, to its defence and maintenance, to its warm commendation to every American heart, and to its vindication and just praise, before all mankind. And I am committed against every thing which, in my judgment, may weaken, endanger, or destroy it. I am committed against the encouragement of local parties and local feelings; I am committed against all fostering of anti-national spirit; I am committed against the slightest infringement of the original compromise on which the Constitution was founded; I am committed against any and every derangement of the powers of the several departments of the government, against any derogation from the constitutional authority of Congress, and especially against all extension of executive power; and I am committed against any attempt to rule the free people of this country by the power and the patronage of the government itself. I am committed, fully and entirely committed, against making the government the people’s master.

These, Gentlemen, are my opinions. I have purposely avowed them with the utmost frankness. They are not the sentiments of the moment, but the result of much reflection, and of some experience in the affairs of the country. I believe them to be such sentiments as are alone compatible with the permanent prosperity of the country, or the long continuance of its union.

And now, Gentlemen, having thus solemnly avowed these sentiments and these convictions, if you should find me hereafter to be false to them, or to falter in their support, I now conjure you, by all the duty you owe your country, by all your hopes of her prosperity and renown, by all your love for the general cause of liberty throughout the world,—I conjure you, that, renouncing me as a recreant, you yourselves go on, right on, straightforward, in maintaining, with your utmost zeal and with all your power, the true principles of the best, the happiest, the most glorious Constitution of a free government, with which it has pleased Providence, in any age, to bless any of the nations of the earth.

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