The following iz part of an "Essay on the Dets of the United States," written in 1787, but never before published. The question haz been ably discussed in Congress, and the proposition for a discrimination between original and purchasing holders of certificates, which I had started, without the prospect of support, haz been maintained by very powerful arguments in our federal legislature. Az the question now appeers to my mind, I should vote against the proposition, yet merely on the ground that from the manner in which the certificates were issued, it iz impossible to discriminate, without multiplying the instances of hardship and injustice. But I hav no more dout, that legislatures hav a right to interfere, in certain extreme cases, and suspend or counteract the operation of legal principles, than I hav of any reveeled truth or intuitiv proposition; and were it possible to ascertain the original holders of certificates, I conceev our legislators could not hav neglected a provision for their losses, without violating their oaths, the constitution and public faith. The following extract iz published, because I am desirous my opinion on this subject should be known and recorded.

HARTFORD, MARCH, 1790.

On a DISCRIMINATION between the ORIGINAL HOLDERS and the PURCHASERS of the CERTIFICATES of the UNITED STATES.

Objection 1. It iz said that public faith requires the payment of the certificates, according to contract; that iz, to the bearers. Let me ask the men who contend for promise, what they meen by public faith? Did the public ever promise to do rong? The money waz du to men who erned it; the money waz not paid. The full valu expressed on the certificates waz du, and the certificates were worth but a fourth, or perhaps an eighth part of that valu. The public promised the creditors their full demands; but theze promises, at the time of issuing the certificates, were actually worth but a small part of that demand. Ought the creditors to be dismissed with this part of their money, and then compelled to pay the full valu of the certificates to their nabors, who purchased them at their current price? If this iz right, my ideas of justice are rong. Public faith iz suppozed to be founded on justice. The public engaged to do justice to its creditors; but this justice haz not been done; and it appeers to me az plain az the shining of the sun, that if the certificates should be paid to the bearers, justice wil not be done. The creditors at the time of contract, expected to receev gold and silver, or something equivalent; they hav receeved neether the one nor the other. They receeved articles which were worth but a fourth part of their demands; for the remainder of their money, the public iz stil their detor. Public faith therefore requires, that the full valu of the alienated certificates should not be paid to the bearer. It appeers to me that the principles of equity, rather than of law, should decide this important question. It iz the design of the contract, not the words, which should be pursued; for it must be remembered, that the design of the public haz been counteracted. The intention of the public, expressed on the certificates, haz been defeated by the public exigences; and to pursue the words of the engagement, wil now produce an effect which waz not designed, viz. extensiv injustice.

In this situation the public haz an undouted right to call in the evidences of the det, and form a system that shall be effectual in the distribution of justice. If the public suppoze that any arrangement for this purpoze can be made, they certainly hav a right to attempt it; for the object of the attempt would be public justice. The sticklers for paying the det to the present holders, hav the same object in view, national faith; but their ideas of this faith, seem to be derived from the practice of other nations, the situation of whoze dets bears very little analogy to that of ours. They therefore advance an argument against their own cauze; for the faith of the public iz prezerved by fulfilling the intention, rather than the words, of the contract.

Every dollar of old continental currency, promises a Spanish milled dollar. This promise waz founded on the supposition that the valu would be neerly the same, or waz designed to prezerve the valu. But the depreciation of that currency, by the enormous sums in circulation, rendered the fulfilment of the promise impracticable; and had it been attempted, it would hav thrown the united states into confusion. The redemption of the bills, at their nominal valu, would hav done justice to a few, whoze money had depreciated in their hands, but would hav ruined fifty times the number. Thoze who lost their property by continental bills, ought to be indemnified, if the persons and sums lost could be ascertained; but this iz impossible. The case of the certificates iz different. Theze are promissory notes, expressing the sums du, and the persons names to whom they were given. If in some instances the purchasers hav returned alienated certificates to the office, and taken out new ones in their own names, stil the public books may remedy this inconvenience.

2. But it iz said the creditors of the public parted with their certificates voluntarily. It waz at their own option, whether to keep them or not; and if they choze to alienate them at a discount, the public iz not responsible for the loss. A owes B 100l. he cannot make immediate payment, but haz property to secure B, who takes a promissory note. B wants the money, and rather than wait for A's ability to pay it, he assigns the note to C for 50l. In this case, A cannot refuse to pay the full sum of 100l. because C gave but fifty for the note. This reezoning iz applied to the case of the public det; and yet a skool boy ought to be ashamed of the application. The case iz not parrallel, and the reezoning iz defectiv and inapplicable in every particular. In the first case, it iz not tru that the alienation of the certificates waz a voluntary act; but in most cases, waz an act of necessity. Most of the original creditors were ether rich men who loaned money, or poor men who did personal service. In many instances, thoze who loaned money, loaned all their estates; and when they found no provizion made for paying the interest, or when the interest waz paid in paper of less valu than specie, they were left destitute of the meens of subsistence. Some of theze hav been obliged to part with their certificates at a great loss. But a large number of creditors were poor peeple, who had little or no property, but their certificates, who had performed service, and were under a necessity of negociating them on az good terms az they could. Most of the alienations hav therefore been a necessary consequence of public delinquency. Many of the creditors hav experienced a degree of distress, which, in a court of chancery, would entitle them to a consideration and redress. When a number of losses iz so great az to effect the public, the legislature then becumes a court of equity, where the sufferers must seek reparation. The legal principle must be suspended, and special provision made for this particular case. Thoze creditors who were able to keep their certificates, hav generally done it, and on every principle are entitled to the full nominal valu.

In the second place, the case of an individual assignee of a bond wil not apply; for B, in the suppozition, takes the bond voluntarily. A, the dettor, haz property, and it iz optional with B, whether to bring a suit for the money, recover a judgement, and take A's property, or take a bond on interest. This iz generally the case with individuals, but not with the public creditors. Theze hav no alternativ; they must take promises, which the subject cannot compel the public to fulfil, when the money iz wanted. In another particular, the two cases are widely different. A, B, and C, are three distinct persons. A iz the dettor, and it iz indifferent whether he pays the det to B or C. But when B haz sold the note for half the valu, he cannot be called upon for the money, nor for any part of it. In the other case, the creditors and the public are, in some mezure, the same person. The same persons who looze their property by public delinquency, are afterwards taxed to pay their proportion to the purchasers. But I wil for a moment suppoze the two cases exactly similar; for I am willing to giv my antagonists the fairest field of argument; and what conclusion can be drawn in favor of paying the certificates to the bearers? Can that reezoning be just which draws general consequences from particular propozitions? Such bad logic ought not to impeech a man's heart; but it can do very little honor to hiz head.

Do men, who reezon in this manner, consider that a principle with respect to individuals, may be perfectly just, and yet pursued to a certain degree, it may become entirely false? That the same principle which may be good in a certain degree, may, in the extreme becume criminal, iz tru not only in politics, but in the natural and moral systems. Heet and water, prouduce vegetables; but too large portions of either, destroy plants. Every passion, natural to man, iz good in itself, and the wurk of a perfectly wise being; but any passion indulged to a certain degree, becumes criminal and destructiv to social happiness. Self-love, the spring of all action, and in the tru sense of the word, the most necessary principle in creation, when it becumes excessiv, iz az criminal and pernicious, az the most malignant passion. Eeting and sleeping are essential to helth; but beyond a certain degree, they are hurtful, and may be fatal to the human body.

In politices, the greatest possible good iz the end of guvernment. Any principle, which may be tru, in particular instances, but which, when extended to the public, does not produce the greatest good to society, iz certainly false in legislation. A law which may be good and necessary in a community, may stil bear hard upon individuals. This iz generally tru of all laws. If a man takes a note of another, and sells it for half its valu, he haz no remedy in law, nor ought the law to make provision for hiz case; for laws are, in their nature and use, general; they do not desend to particular cases. The reezon iz obvious. Were laws to notice every inconvenience, which may flow from their operation, they would produce confusion rather than order, and occasion greater injuries to the public, than would result from the losses of individuals. But when such particular losses becume general, the principle loozes its force. Sufferings, multiplied to a certain number, becume public, and then require the interference of the legislature. If a man iz in det, and cannot pay, he iz at the disposal of the law; the law cannot be suspended nor relaxed for hiz particular benefit. But when the body of a peeple becume involved, the public safety requires a suspension or relaxation of law. If an individual settles upon land of another man, he iz considered az a trespasser, and iz liable to an ejectment. But let thirty thousand men settle thus upon land that iz not their own, and a wize legislature wil confirm them in their possessions. Necessity or general good, in such cases, suspends the operation of legal right, or rather changes private rongs into public right. Or to express the idea differently; when evils are increesed and extended to a certain degree, it iz better to let them remain, than to risk the application of a violent remedy. Instances of this kind occur so frequently, that it iz needless to multiply examples. Nothing betrays greater weekness, than the reezoning of peeple, who say, if a principle iz just, it extends to all cases. I should however be very unhappy to hav such men for my legislators. It may be asked, where iz the line of distinction? I answer, it may be impossible to determin. Where the right ends, and the rong begins; where the legal principle should ceese to operate, and special legislativ interference becumes necessary, it may be difficult to discuver; but the extreme iz always obvious. Whenever the operation of a receeved maxim or principle givs general uneasiness, it iz a demonstrativ proof that it iz rong: that it produces public evil; and a wize legislator wil restrain the operation, or establish a different principle: On the suppozition therefore that the present holders of the public det, are precisely in the situation of the assignees of bonds, stil the principle wil not apply nor warrant the same conclusion in both cases; becauze we cannot reezon from particulars to generals, especially on political subjects.

Suppoze the original creditors to be five, and the present holders two; more than half the number of creditors hav lost the money which waz due to them; the loss affects them in the first instance, and the hevy taxes which are necessary to appreciate the certificates in other hands, double their injuries and complaints. Theze loozing creditors hav an idea that they are really cheeted, and their murmurs foment that popular jealousy which iz ever bizzy to check large and sudden revolutions of property. The certificates fall into the hands of rich men, at a great discount, and the body of the peeple say, "we wil not suffer our own losses to enrich our welthy nabors."

This outcry, it iz said, proceeds from a levelling principle, which aims to destroy all distinction of rank and property. But in the present case, the popular complaints proceed from equitable principles; nor do I know of any instance of public jelousy, excited by an acquizition of property in the course of honest industry. Fortunes may be suddenly raized in private business, by commercial speculations, and no notice taken of the event; but when public delinquency haz thrown numberless advantages into the hands of a particular class of men, which the peeple know are made at their own expense, it iz impossible that they should behold such a change of property, without questioning the propriety of it, and the justness of the principle by which it iz defended. When the common sense of mankind iz oppozed to such a change, it ought to be considered az a good proof that it iz not just.

Whatever conclusions therefore may be drawn from a principle, established in courts of law, or among nations in different circumstances, the public sense of justice must, after all, decide the question. A lawyer may wurk himself up to convictions, in wire-drawing principles; but hiz reezoning iz oppozed to the sense of mankind. Peeple may not be able to discuver the fallacy of the reezoning, but they can feel it. They may be silenced, but cannot be convinced.

One grain of common sense iz worth a thousand cobweb theories; and however peeple may be abuzed for refining upon justice, we rarely find them generally dispozed to do rong.

The domestic det of America furnishes a new era in the history of finance. We hav no examples to follow; we must pursu some practicable system, with our eyes invariably fixed on public justice. I know it iz said that the original creditors can purchase certificates now, at the same or a less price than they took for them. But this iz not strictly tru. Individuals might purchase at a low rate; but a general demand for them would raize their valu much abuv their current valu at any past period: For it should be considered that hitherto the sellers hav been numerous, and the purchasers, few; that iz, a full market, with little demand for the articles. Reverse the case. Let the sellers becume the purchasers; the demand would at once raize the valu of the certificates neerly to the face of them.

But if the certificates were to pass at their present low valu, few of thoze who hav alienated them, could re-purchase; for the same necessity which obliged them to sell at a loss, now prevents their repurchasing. Peeple hav not grown rich since the revolution; especially thoze who were faithful in the service of their country. At any rate it iz to be wished that the certificates might ceese to circulate az objects of speculation. They are a Pandora's box to this country.

Almost the whole activ specie of the country iz employed in speculation. Laws prohibiting usury, restrain the loan of money, while the certain profits of speculation amount to five or ten times the legal interest. No money can be borrowed; no capitals can be raized to encurage agriculture and manufactures: Lucrativ industry iz checked; land iz sunk to two thirds of its real valu, and multitudes of industrious peeple are embarrassed. From such evils, good Lord deliver us.