HARTFORD, OCTOBER, 1789.

On ALLEGIANCE.

Writers on law divide allegiance into two kinds, natural and local. "Natural allegiance iz such az iz du from all men born within the kings dominions, immediately upon their berth. For immediately upon their berth, they are under the kings protection; at a time too when (during their infancy) they are incapable of protecting themselves. Natural allegiance iz therefore a det of gratitude, which cannot be forfeited, cancelled or altered, by any change of time, place or circumstances; nor by any thing but the united concurrence of the legislature. An Englishman who remoovs to France or to China, owes the same allegiance to the king of England there az at home, and twenty years hence az wel az now. For it iz a principle of universal law, that the natural born subject of one prince cannot by any act of hiz own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge hiz natural allegiance to the former; for hiz natural allegiance waz intrinsic and primitiv and antecedent to the other, and cannot be devested, without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it waz first du. Indeed the natural born subject of one prince, to whom he owes allegiance, may be entangled by subjecting himself absolutely to another; but it iz hiz own act that brings him into theze straits and difficulties, of owing service to two masters; and it iz unreezonable that, by such voluntary act of hiz own, he should be able at plezure to unloose thoze bands by which he iz connected to hiz natural prince."[147]

I mistake much, however, if the natural born subject would be so much entangled with hiz straits and difficulties, az lord Coke, Hale and Blackstone, would be, to support their assertions and obviate the absurdities of their reezoning.

It iz astonishing to observe how slowly men get rid of old prejudices and opinions. The feudal ideas of allegiance, which make fidelity in the subject an obligation or grateful return for the protection of the prince, stil prevail, and are made the basis of all modern reezoning on the subject. Such ideas in the dark ages, and in the days of feudal despotism, are not to be wondered at. Every baron waz a tyrant on hiz manor, and az hiz only safety consisted in hiz castle and hiz vassals, it waz necessary to bind hiz subjects to him by oaths and superstition, az wel az by a demand upon their gratitude. But wil our sage writers on government and law, forever think by tradition? Wil they never examin the grounds of receeved opinions? Let me enquire.

What iz the real ground of allegiance? Iz it not protection? Not at all. We may just az wel invert the proposition, and say, that allegiance iz the ground of protection. A prince iz the representativ of a nation or state, so that allegiance to him, iz merely allegiance to a state or body politic.[148] According to our ideas, allegiance to a king, and fidelity to a state, are the same thing; for detach a king from all connection with a nation or state, and he becumes a private man, and entitled only to the rights of such. This at leest iz the opinion of an American, whose mind iz not biassed by personal attachments to a sovereign.

What then iz the ground of fidelity to a state? The answer iz eezy; the moral law, which haz for its object the good of society. This iz the basis of all obligations in a state, whether express or implied; yet writers on this subject hav hardly mentioned it. Blackstone indeed takes notice of an implied, original allegiance, antecedent to any express promis; but seems rather to consider it az a return for the duties of the sovereign, which he owes before coronation, than az an obligation arising from the very constitution of society.

Taking the moral law or the good of society for the ground of all allegiance, we discuver two species of duties to be performed by every man; the moral duties, which exist at all times and in all places; and certain political duties, required by the municipal laws of eech state. The first are the basis of natural or perpetual allegiance; the last, of local allegiance. The first or moral duties create an obligation upon every man, the moment he iz born, which cannot be cancelled or discharged by any act of an individual, or by any agreement between prince and subject; the last, or political duties, impoze an obligation upon every member of a state or body politic, the moment he steps within its jurisdiction, to submit peaceably to such positiv injunctions of that state, az hav been judged necessary for its welfare.

Now to maintain that an oath of allegiance wil bind a man to perform all the last class of duties, or the positiv duties enjoined by a particular state, and not required by the general laws of society, when the man haz perhaps become a member of another state, three thousand miles distant, iz to defend the wildest notions that can possess any man's brain. Every man iz bound always and in all places to do right, and avoid doing rong; and this with, or without taking an oath of fidelity to any state. This iz implied allegiance, universal and perpetual; and I deny that there iz any other ground of this allegiance, except the universal principles of right and rong.

Should it be said, that a man may bind himself by oath to perform the positiv or political duties required by a state, altho he may remoov and become a citizen of another state; I answer, this wil involv him in the straits and difficulties mentioned by Blackstone; for the political duties of the two states may interfere with eech other. The truth iz, a man haz no right to take such an oath, nor haz a state any right to require it. He may swear, when he enters into any kingdom or state, that he wil be a good citizen, and submit to all the laws of the state, while he iz a member of it; and further, that he wil observe the moral law in hiz conduct towards that society, after he haz ceesed to be a member of it. Further than this, he haz no right to swear. Az to every duty, not required by the laws of society in general, but only by the municipal laws of a state, a man's allegiance commences when he enters that state; and ceeses the moment he leeves it.[149] The doctrin of a perpetual allegiance iz wholly a feudal idea; inculcated, when every lord waz at war with hiz nabor; and waz compelled by self preservation to attach hiz vassals to himself by oaths, the penalties of perjury and the forfeitures of treezon.

Blackstone says, in the passage already quoted, "that natural allegiance iz a det of gratitude," because the subject iz under the kings protection while an infant. He might just az wel say, protection iz a det of gratitude du from the prince, because the subject iz born in hiz dominions. On this principle of gratitude, a child iz obliged to obey and serve hiz parent, after he haz left hiz family, and while he livs. This det, according to the same author, cannot be cancelled, but by "concurrence of the legislature." How in the name of reezon, can an act of the legislature dissolv a natural tie? How can it cancel a det of gratitude? Common sense looks with disdain on such week and futile reezoning. But if there iz such a thing az natural and perpetual allegiance, an Englishman, who remoovs to France, cannot take arms to defend France against an invasion from England. Is this agreeable to the laws of nature and society, that a man should not protect himself and hiz property? It wil be said that the man iz within the English king's liegeance, and entitled to hiz protection. But the king cannot protect him; it iz beyond hiz power, and the Englishman iz not obliged to leev France and seek protection in England. Hiz estate and hiz family may be in France, and if he chooses to reside there, it iz hiz unalienable right and duty to defend both against any invasion whatever. Every war, except a defensiv one, iz a breech of the moral law; but when a natural born subject of England, haz become a citizen of France, he iz subject to the laws of France, and bound to assist, if required, in defending the kingdom against hiz natural prince.