NEW YORK, 1788.

On GOVERNMENT.

The constitution of Virginia, like that of Connecticut, stands on the true principles of a Republican Representativ Government. It is not shackled with a Bill of Rights, and every part of it, is at any time, alterable by an ordinary Legislature. When I say every part of the constitution is alterable, I would except the right of elections, for the Representativs have not power to prolong the period of their own delegation. This is not numbered among the rights of legislation, and deserves a separate consideration. This right is not vested in the Legislature; it is in the people at large; it cannot be alienated without changing the form of government. Nay the right of election is not only the basis, but the whole frame or essence of a republican constitution; it is not merely one, but it is the only legislativ or constitutional act, which the people at large can with propriety exercise.

The simple principle for which I contend is this, "That in a representativ democracy, the delegates chosen for Legislators ought, at all times, to be competent to every possible act of legislation under that form of government; but not to change that form." Besides it is contrary to all our ideas of deputation or agency for others, that the person acting should have the power of extending the period of agency beyond the time specified in his commission. The Representativ of a people is, as to his powers, in the situation of an Attorney, whose letters commission him to do every thing which his constituent would do, where he on the spot; but for a limited time only. At the expiration of that time his powers cease; and a Representativ has no more right to extend that period, than a plenipotentiary has to renew his commission. The British Parliament, by prolonging the period of their existence from one to three, and from three to seven years, committed an unjust act; an act however which has been confirmed by the acquiescence of the nation, and thus received the highest constitutional sanction. I am sensible that the Americans are much concerned for the liberties of the British nation; and the act for making Parliaments septennial is often mentioned as an arbitrary, oppressiv act, destructiv of English liberty.[24] The English are doubtless obliged to us for our tender concern for their happiness; yet for myself I entertain no such ideas: The English have generally understood and advocated their rights as well as any nation, and I am confident that the nation enjoys as much happiness and freedom, and much more tranquillity, under septennial Parliaments, than they would with annual elections. Corruption to obtain offices will ever attend wealth; it is generated with it, grows up with it, and will always fill a country with violent factions and illegal practices. Such are the habits of the people, that money will have a principal influence in carrying elections; and such vast sums are necessary for the purpose, that if elections were annual, none but a few of the wealthiest men could defray the expense; the landholders of moderate estates would not offer themselves as candidates; and thus in fact annual elections, with the present habits of the people, would actually diminish the influence of the Commons, by throwing the advantage into the hands of a corrupt ministry, and a few overgrown nabobs. Before annual elections would be a blessing to the English, their habits must be changed; but this cannot be effected by human force. I wish my countrymen would believe that other nations understand and can guard their privileges, without any lamentable outcries from this side of the Atlantic. Government will always take its complexion from the habits of the people; habits are continually changing from age to age; a body of Legislators taken from the people, will generally represent these habits at the time when they are chosen: Hence these two important conclusions, 1st, That a legislativ body should be frequently renewed and always taken from the people: 2d, That a government which is perpetual, or incapable of being accommodated to every change of national habits, must in time become a bad government.

With this view of the subject, I cannot suppress my surprise at the reasoning of Mr. Jefferson on this very point.[25] He considers it as a defect in the constitution of Virginia, that it can be altered by an ordinary Legislature. He observes that the Convention which framed the present constitution of that State, "received no powers in their creation which were not given to every Legislature before and since. So far and no farther authorised, they organized the government by the ordinance entitled a Constitution or form of government. It pretends to no higher authority than the other ordinances of the same session; it does not say, that it shall be perpetual; that it shall be unalterable by other Legislatures; that it shall be transcendant above the powers of those, who they knew would have equal powers with themselves."

But suppose the framers of this ordinance had said, that it should be perpetual and unalterable; such a declaration would have been void. Nay, altho the people themselves had individually and unanimously declared the ordinance perpetual, the declaration would have been invalid. One Assembly cannot pass an act, binding upon a subsequent Assembly of equal authority;[26] and the people in 1776, had no authority, and consequently could delegate none, to pass a single act which the people in 1777, could not repeal and annul. And Mr. Jefferson himself, in the very next sentence, assigns a reason, which is an unanswerable argument in favor of my position, and a complete refutation of his own. These are his words. "Not only the silence of the instrument is a proof they thought it would be alterable, but their own practice also: For this very Convention, meeting as a House of Delegates in General Assembly with the new Senate in the autumn of that year, passed acts of Assembly in contradiction to their ordinance of government; and every Assembly from that time to this, has done the same."

Did Mr. Jefferson reflect upon the inference that would be justly drawn from these facts? Did he not consider that he was furnishing his opponents with the most effectual weapons against himself? The acts passed by every subsequent Assembly in contradiction to the first ordinance, prove that all the Assemblies were fallible men; and consequently not competent to make perpetual Constitutions for future generations. To give Mr. Jefferson, and the other advocates for unchangeable Constitutions, the fullest latitude in their argument, I will suppose every freeman of Virginia, could have been assembled to deliberate upon a form of government, and that the present form, or even one more perfect, had been the result of their Councils; and that they had declared it unalterable. What would have been the consequence? Experience would probably have discovered, what is the fact; and what forever will be the case; that Conventions are not possessed of infinite wisdom; that the wisest men cannot devise a perfect system of government. After all this solemn national transaction, and a formal declaration that their proceedings should be unalterable, suppose a single article of the Constitution should be found to interfere with some national benefit, some material advantage; where would be the power to change or reform that article? In the same general Assembly of all the people, and in no other body. But must a State be put to this inconvenience, to find a remedy for every defect of constitution?

Suppose, however, the Convention had been empowered to declare the form of government unalterable: What would have been the consequence? Mr. Jefferson himself has related the consequence. Every succeeding Assembly has found errors or defects in that frame of government, and has happily applied a remedy. But had not every Legislature had power to make these alterations, Virginia must have gone thro the farce, and the trouble of calling an extraordinary Legislature, to do that which an ordinary Legislature could do just as well, in their annual session; or those errors must have remained in the constitution, to the injury of the State.

The whole argument for Bills of Rights and unalterable Constitutions rests on two suppositions, viz. that the Convention which frames the government, is infallible; and that future Legislatures will be less honest, less wise, and less attentiv to the interest of the State, than a present Convention: The first supposition is always false, and the last is generally so. A declaration of perpetuity, annexed to a form of government, implies a supposition of perfect wisdom and probity in the framers; which is both arrogant and impudent; and it implies a supposed power in them, to abridge the power of a succeeding Convention, and of the future state or body of people. The last supposition is, in every possible instance of legislation, false; and an attempt to exercise such a power, a high handed act of tyranny. But setting aside the argument, grounded on a want of power in one Assembly to abridge the power of another, what occasion have we to be so jealous of future Legislatures? Why should we be so anxious to guard the future rights of a nation? Why should we not distrust the people and the Representativs of the present age, as well as those of future ages, in whose acts we have not the smallest interest? For my part, I believe that the peeple and their Representativs, two or three centuries hence, will be as honest, as wise, as faithful to themselves, and will understand their rights as well, and be as able to defend them, as the people are at this period. The contrary supposition is absurd.

I know it is said, that other nations have lost their liberties by the ambitious designs of their rulers, and we may do the same. The experience of other nations, furnishes the ground of all the arguments used in favor of an unalterable constitution. The advocates seem determined that posterity shall not lose their liberty, even if they should be willing and desirous to surrender it. If a few declarations on parchment, will secure a single blessing to posterity, which they would otherwise lose, I resign the argument, and will receive a thousand declarations. Yet so thoroughly convinced am I of the opposite tendency and effect of such unalterable declarations, that, were it possible to render them valid, I should deem every article an infringement of civil and political liberty. I should consider every article as a restriction which might impose some duty which in time might cease to be useful and necessary, while the obligation of performing it might remain; or which in its operation might prove pernicious, by producing effects which were not expected, and could not be foreseen. There is no one single right, no privilege, which is commonly deemed fundamental, which may not, by an unalterable establishment, preclude some amendment, some improvement in future administration of government. And unless the advocates for unalterable constitutions of government, can prevent all changes in the wants, the inclinations, the habits, and the circumstances of people, they will find it difficult, even with all their declarations of unalterable rights, to prevent changes in government. A paper declaration is a very feeble barrier against the force of national habits, and inclinations.

The loss of liberty, as it is called, in the kingdoms of Europe, has, in several instances, been a mere change of government, effected by a change of habits, and in some instances this change has been favorable to liberty. The government of Denmark, was changed from a mixed form, like that of England, to an absolute monarchy, by a solemn deliberate act of the people or States. Was this a loss of liberty? So far from it, that the change removed the oppressions of faction, restored liberty to the subject and tranquillity to the kingdom. The change was a blessing to the people. It indeed lodged a power in the Prince to dispose of life and property; but at the same time it lodged in him a power to defend both; a power which before was lodged no where; and it is infinitely better that such a power should be vested in a single hand, than that it should not exist at all. The monarchy of France has grown out of a number of petty states and lordships; yet it is a fact, proved by history and experience, that the subjects of that kingdom have acquired liberty, peace and happiness, in proportion to the diminution of the powers of the petty sovereignties, and the extension of the prerogativs of the Monarch. It is said that Spain lost her liberties under the reign of Charles Vth; but I question the truth of the assertion; it is probable that the subject has gained as much by an abridgement of the powers of the nobility, as he lost by an annihilation of the Cortez. The United Netherlands fought with more bravery and perseverance to preserve their rights, than any other people since the days of Leonidas; and yet no sooner established a government, so jealously guarded as to defeat its own designs, and prevent the good effects of government, than they neglected its principles; the freemen resigned the privilege of election, and committed their liberties to a rich aristocracy. There was no compulsion, no external force in producing this revolution; but the form of government, which had been established on paper, and solemnly ratified, was not suited to the genius of the subjects. The burghers had the right of electing their rulers; but they neglected it voluntarily; and a bill of rights, a perpetual constitution on parchment, guaranteeing that right, was a useless form of words, because opposed to the temper of the people. The government assumed a complexion, more correspondent to their habits, and tho in theory no constitution is more cautiously guarded against an infringement of popular privileges, yet in practice it is a real aristocracy.

The progress of government in England has been the reverse: The people have been gaining freedom by intrenching upon the powers of the nobles and the royal prerogativs. These changes in government do not proceed from bills of rights, unalterable forms and perpetual establishments; liberty is never secured by such paper declarations, nor lost for want of them. The truth is, Government originates in necessity, and takes its form and structure from the genius and habits of the people; and if on paper a form is not accommodated to those habits, it will assume a new form, in spite of all the formal sanctions of the supreme authority of a State. Were the monarchy of France to be dissolved, and the wisest system of republican government ever invented, solemnly declared, by the King and his council, to be the constitution of the kingdom; the people with their present habits, would refuse to receive it; and resign their privileges to their beloved sovereign. But so opposite are the habits of the Americans, that an attempt to erect a monarchy or an aristocracy over the United States, would expose the authors to the loss of their heads.[27] The truth is, the people of Europe, since they have become civilized, have, in no kingdom, possessed all the true principles of liberty. They could not therefore lose what they never possessed. There have been, from time immemorial, some rights of government, some prerogativs vested in some man or body of men, independent of the suffrages of the body of the subjects. This circumstance distinguishes the governments of Europe and of all the world, from those of America. There has been in the free nations of Europe an incessant struggle between freedom or national rights, and hereditary prerogativs. The contest has ended variously in different kingdoms; but generally in depressing the power of the nobility; ascertaining and limiting the prerogativs of the crown, and extending the privileges of the people. The Americans have seen the records of their struggles; and without considering that the objects of the contest do not exist in this country; they are laboring to guard rights which there is no party to attack. They are as jealous of their rights, as if there existed here a King's prerogativs, or the powers of nobles, independent of their own will and choice, and ever eager to swallow up their liberties. But there is no man in America, who claims any rights but what are common to every man; there is no man who has an interest in invading popular privileges, because his attempt to curtail another's rights, would expose his own to the same abridgement. The jealousy of people in this country has no proper object against which it can rationally arm them; it is therefore directed against themselves, or against an invasion which they imagine may happen in future ages. The contest for perpetual bills of rights against a future tyranny, resembles Don Quixote's fighting windmills; and I never can reflect on the declamation about an unalterable constitution to guard certain rights, without wishing to add another article, as necessary as those that are generally mentioned, viz. "that no future Convention or Legislature shall cut their own throats, or those of their constituents." While the habits of the Americans remain as they are, the people will choose their Legislature from their own body; that Legislature will have an interest inseparable from that of the people, and therefore an act to restrain their power in any article of legislation, is as unnecessary as an act to prevent them from committing suicide.

Mr. Jefferson, in answer to those who maintain that the form of government in Virginia is unalterable, because it is called a constitution, which, ex vi termini, means an act above the power of the ordinary Legislature, asserts that constitution, statute, law and ordinance, are synonymous terms, and convertible as they are used by writers on government. Constitutio dicitur jus quod a principe conditur. Constitutum, quod ab imperatoribus rescriptum statutumve est. Statutum, idem quod lex.[28] Here the words constitution, statute and law, are defined by each other; they were used as convertible terms by all former writers, whether Roman or British; and before the terms of the civil law were introduced, our Saxon ancestors used the correspondent English words, bid and set.[29] From hence he concludes that no inference can be drawn from the meaning of the word, that a constitution has a higher authority than a law or statute. This conclusion of Mr. Jefferson is just.

He quotes Lord Coke also to prove that any parliament can abridge, suspend or qualify the acts of a preceding Parliament. It is a maxim in their laws, that "Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant." After having fully proved that constitution, statute, law and ordinance, are words of similar import, and that the constitution of Virginia is at any time alterable by the ordinary Legislature, he proceeds to prove the danger to which the rights of the people are exposed, for want of an unalterable form of government. The first proof of this danger he mentions, is, the power which the Assembly exercises of determining its own quorum. The British Parliament fixes its own quorum: The former Assemblies of Virginia did the same. During the war the Legislature determined that forty members should be a quorum to proceed to business, altho not a fourth part of the whole house. The danger of delay, it was judged, would warrant the measure. This precedent, our writer supposes, is subversive of the principles of the government, and dangerous to liberty.

It is a dictate of natural law that a majority should govern; and the principle is universally received and established in all societies, where no other mode has been arbitrarily fixed. This natural right cannot be alienated in perpetuum; for altho a Legislature, or even the body of the people, may resign the powers of government to forty, or to four men, when they please, yet they may likewise resume them at pleasure.

The people may, if they please, create a dictator on an emergency in war, but his creation would not destroy, but merely suspend the natural right of the Lex majoris partis. Thus forty members, a minority of the Legislature of Virginia, were empowered during a dangerous invasion, to legislate for the State; but any subsequent Assembly might have divested them of that power. During the operation of the law, vesting them with this power, their acts were binding upon the State; because their power was derived from the general sense of the State; it was actually derived from a legal majority. But that majority could, at any moment, resume the power and practice on their natural right.

It is a standing law of Connecticut, that forty men shall be a quorum of the House of Representativs, which consists of about 170 members. This law, I am confident, never excited a murmur, or a suspicion that the liberties of the people were in danger; yet this law creates an oligarchy; it is an infringement of natural right; it subjects the State to the possibility, and even the probability of being governed at times by a minority. The acquiescence of the State, in the existence of the law, gives validity, and even the sanction of a majority, to the acts of that minority; but the majority may at any time resume their natural right, and make the assent of more than half of the members, necessary to give validity to their determinations.

The danger therefore arising from a power in the Assembly to determine their own quorum, is merely ideal, for no law can be perpetual; the authority of a majority of the people, or of their Representativs, is always competent to repeal any act that is found unjust or inconvenient. The acquiescence however of the people of the States mentioned, and that in one of them for a long course of years, under an oligarchy; or their submission to the power of a minority, is an incontestible proof of what I have before observed, that theories and forms of government are empty things; that the spirit of a government springs immediately from the temper of the people, and the exercise of it will generally take its tone from their feelings. It proves likewise that a union of interests between the rulers and the people, which union will always coexist with free elections, is not only the best, but the only security for their liberties which they can wish for and demand. The Government of Connecticut is a solid proof of these truths. The Assembly of that State, have always had power to abolish trial by jury, to restrain the liberty of the press, to suspend the habeas corpus act, to maintain a standing army, in short to command every engine of despotism; yet by some means or other, it happens that the rights of the people are not invaded, and the subjects have generally been better satisfied with the laws, than the people of any other State. The reason is, the Legislature is a part of the people, and has the same interest. If a law should prove bad, the Legislature can repeal it; but in the unalterable bills of rights in some of the States, if an article should prove wrong and oppressiv, an ordinary Legislature cannot repeal or amend it; and the State will hardly think of calling a special Convention for so trifling a purpose. There are some articles, in several of the State Constitutions, which are glaring infractions of the first rights of freemen; yet they affect not a majority of the community; and centuries may elapse before the evil can be redressed, and a respectable class of men restored to the enjoyment of their rights.[30]

To prove the want of an unalterable Constitution in Virginia, Mr. Jefferson informs us that in 1776, during the distressed circumstances of the State, a proposition was made in the House of Delegates to create a Dictator, invested with every power, legislativ, executiv and judicial, civil and military. In June, 1781, under a great calamity, the proposition was repeated, and was near being passed. By the warmth he discovers in reprobating this proposal, one must suppose that the creation of a Dictator even for a few months, would have buried every remain of freedom. Yet he seems to allow that the step would have been justified, had there existed an irresistible necessity. Altho it is possible that a case may happen, in which the creation of a Dictator might be the only resort to save life, liberty, property and the State, as it happened in Rome more than once; yet I should dread his power as much as any man, were I not convinced that the same men that appointed him, could, in a moment, strip him of his tremendous authority. A Dictator, with an army superior to the strength of the State, would be a despot; but Mr. Jefferson's fears seem grounded on the authority derived from the Legislature. A concession of power from the Legislature, or the people, is a voluntary suspension of a natural unalienable right; and is resumeable at the expiration of the period specified, or the moment it is abused. A State can never alienate a natural right; for it cannot legislate for those who are not in existence. It may consent to suspend that right for great and temporary purposes; but were every freeman in Virginia to assent to the creation of a perpetual Dictator, the act in itself would be void. The expedient of creating a Dictator is dangerous, and no free people would willingly resort to it; but there may be times when this expedient is necessary to save a State from ruin, and when every man in a State would cheerfully give his suffrage for adopting it. At the same time, a temporary investiture of unlimited powers in one man, may be abused; it may be an influential precedent; and the continuance of it, may furnish the Dictator with the means of perpetuating his office. The distress of a people must be extreme, before a serious thought of a Dictator can be justifiable. But the people who create, can annihilate a Dictator; their right to govern themselves cannot be resigned by any act whatever, altho extreme cases may vindicate them in suspending the exercise of it. Even prescription cannot exist against this right; and every nation in Europe has a natural right to depose its King, and take the government into its own hands; altho it may forever be inexpedient for any of them to exercise the right.