The prevailing sickness at Chickamauga was diarrhoea, dysentery and typhoid. During the spring and summer about 80,000 men passed through the park, but there were probably never over 50,000 encamped there at any one time. The board which investigated the sanitary conditions of 44,803 men at Camp Thomas, reported 9,960 probable cases of typhoid, and 713 fatal results from this disease. One man in every five suffered from this fever, and almost every man was afflicted with some intestinal disorder. Much has been said as to whether this suffering was preventable, and was due to ignorance and neglect, or was paid as the necessary price of war.

In the first call for troops the War Department expressed a desire that the States should give preference among volunteers to National Guard organizations, in the expectation that they were equipped and had been prepared for war by a previous training.

Massachusetts perhaps, satisfied this expectation as fully as any state. Her regiments were at least uniformed, armed, and equipped with means for preparing food, but they had no experience in caring for themselves in the field. The Government ration consisted of bread, coffee, potatoes, onions, canned tomatoes, fresh beef seven days, and bacon three days out of ten. One hundred rations were sufficient in quantity to feed one hundred men one day, but this required careful management on the part of company commanders, and proper preparation by company cooks. Any system of training men for the field should make provision for accustoming men to live, and live comfortably upon this ration.

It is not an answer to say that the United States Army in time of peace, does not live upon this ration, but supplements it by purchases from their company funds. A volunteer regiment going into the United States service, will have no company funds, and must live on the ration until companies accumulate funds, which ordinarily would be impossible in the field. Any system of training which fails to recognize this fact is false in theory and practice.

Previous to the Spanish War, the Massachusetts Militia were fed by caterers at their summer outings. There was a Commissary Department, but its officers were appointed for other reasons than efficiency and experience in handling supplies. Some states had commissary departments which furnished rations, and required the companies to prepare the food, but there was no where any systematic attempt to train men to manage and support life upon the Government ration.

Resulting from a lack of previous experience, the Massachusetts regiments suffered during the first six months of their field service. Men were starving in the regiments, because unable to assimilate the Government ration, which, through a lack of experience in handling and preparing, was served to them in a form which did not properly nourish, and aggravated and perpetuated the ordinary intestinal troubles which recruits usually experience when first taking the field. Many men were improperly nourished, their vitality lowered, and their power of resisting disease impaired. So far as this resulted from a defect in their militia training, the State of Massachusetts was responsible.

For a number of years the Massachusetts Militia had been equipped for eye service. The men were supplied with the equipments they could carry on their person, and which contributed to the success of a parade, by giving it a ready-for-war appearance. Not much attention was paid to other equipments.

There was a limited supply of blankets, ponchos, buzzacotts and tentage, but not enough for all the troops. These were held at the Framingham Arsenal, and did duty for a mysterious field equipment, ready for instant use. There were no shelter tents or wagons. Some of the supplies were of a stage property kind. The shovels carried by an improvised pioneer corps in one of the Boston street parades, lasted two hours when used for digging by a detachment of the Eighth. The Militia of Massachusetts had never been properly equipped for field service.

The appropriation of $500,000 by the Legislature in April, enabled them to take the field better supplied than the Guard Regiments from many states, but they were never fully equipped by the State, or instructed in the A B C of a soldier's duty.

They had been assembled for years in brigade camps, and taught ceremonies and parades, but no attempt had been made to teach company commanders the important lesson of how to meet the requirements of the field, and care for their men under service conditions. The increasing sick list reported in all the camps, accentuated this absence of individual experience and trained company officers.

The War Department was as unprepared as the Militia of Massachusetts. The machinery for handling an army of 26,000 men in peace, was called upon to mobilize 275,000 men of war. It was altogether inadequate to meet the emergency. There were practically no reserve supplies. On April 23rd the Government had enough Springfield rifles to equip the volunteers, but that was all. The cloth of the uniforms first issued to some regiments at Chickamauga, was not manufactured when the regiments were mustered into service.

Large quantities of commissary supplies were purchased in the market, and rushed to the large camps for concentration. These supplies were uniformly of standard quality, and were accumulated in sufficient quantities at the depots, but were often delayed in distribution to the troops. Volunteer officers were at first unacquainted with the use of requisition blanks, and the red tape of Government issue, and the Commissary Department lacked facilities to make prompt and full deliveries. This was the earliest department, however, to get into working order, and subsequent complaints at Chickamauga were due to the inexperience of officers and men in handling the rations.

The Quartermaster's Department also made large purchases in the market, but were handicapped by having to wait for articles to be manufactured to fill orders. This department at Chickamauga was further handicapped by inefficiency and failure to appreciate the situation, and the necessary requirements of the troops.

As soon as wagon transportation was issued to the Eighth, they began to bring the water from the Blue Spring. This was a long haul, and required many barrels for transportation and storage in camp. The supply of barrels issued by the Quartermaster's Department to the regiment was inadequate. The Chief Quartermaster was repeatedly requested to furnish sufficient barrels for this purpose, and refused. The regiment subsequently purchased, at its own expense, at Chattanooga, sufficient receptacles.

The refusal of the Chief Quartermaster was reported to the Inspector General's Department, and was thus commented upon:—

The Regimental Commander repeatedly asked the Quartermaster's Department for disinfectants and lumber; these requisitions were disallowed. Whatever supplies of this nature the regiment had, were purchased by private contribution, until the spread of disease excited public indignation and demanded liberal issues. After official investigation began, a change was noticed in the policy of the department. By the end of the summer it is probable that porcelain lined bath tubs would have been issued for the mere asking.

During the hot summer months, 75 per cent. of the men at Chickamauga were forced to wear heavy woolen clothing. The Eighth was the only regiment fully equipped with canvas suits. These had been purchased by the State of Massachusetts. If sufficient energy had been displayed by the Quartermaster's Department, the same clothing would have been purchased and issued to all the regiments. What supplies were on hand were held in small storehouses, and their issues blocked by lack of system and necessary labor to handle the goods.

The Medical Department at Chickamauga was inefficient and displayed lack of both professional and executive ability. There was an unnecessary shortage of medical supplies and hospital attendants. No provision was at first made for general hospitals. The sick were cared for in regimental hospitals, and later when these were abolished, in Division Hospitals. Division hospitals are organized to accompany troops in the field, and serve as a collecting station, where the injured receive temporary treatment and are transferred as soon as practicable to general hospitals.

The field hospitals at Chickamauga were swarmed with the sick, and were forced to become general hospitals, as no other provision had been made. The accommodations were inadequate. Hospital tents were insufficient in number, and were not supplied with proper furnishings. There was a lack of medicine and nourishing food. The nurses were enlisted men detailed from the various regiments, and were ignorant of their duties, and without experience.

The quarters and grounds were dirty, and the service was undisciplined, disorganized and demoralized. Until taken firmly in hand by General Sanger and reorganized, the Third Division Hospital was a monument to the ignorance and incapacity of the Medical Department.

This Department was thus described in an inspection report:—

The medical officers of the Eighth were at all times zealous and efficient in instructing officers how to combat disease, and the regimental officers were intelligent and active in carrying out these instructions.

Before typhoid became epidemic, Colonel Pew assembled officers and men after evening parade, and explained to them the nature and cause of this fever. He said this disease had already broken out, and he anticipated it would become a scourge to the troops, because of the unsanitary condition of the various camps. That it was caused by microscopic germs found in the discharges of the sick. That these germs were very tenacious of life, and increased and multiplied rapidly in filth. That when dry they would drift about in the air and lodge on food, clothing or the person. That they were harmless unless taken into the mouth, but as they were too small to be seen, there was always danger of contagion. That they were killed by boiling, and for that reason the men would be required to drink only boiled water, and keep their food protected against dust. That all human excreta must be deposited in the proper place, and covered with a paddle, as Moses taught the children of Israel to care for themselves in the Wilderness. That police regulations would be enforced, and camp conditions made as unfavorable as possible for the growth and development of these germs. He urged the men to appreciate the danger to which they were exposed, and to avoid it by complying strictly with all sanitary regulations.

The Medical Board appointed to examine into the causes of the existence and spread of typhoid in the national camp of 1898, reported that this fever was brought to Camp Thomas by the volunteers, and spread by the neglect of the rules of sanitation and military hygiene. Out of forty-eight regiments whose medical records were examined, nine regiments reached Chickamauga with developed cases of typhoid, twenty-five regiments developed cases within two weeks, and at the expiration of one month only two regiments of the forty-eight were free from this disease. The first case of typhoid in the Eighth Regiment was reported July 13.

The average volunteer at Chickamauga had little discipline, and a slight knowledge of sanitation. He was willing to fight, as he had enlisted for that purpose, but he rather resented as an invasion of personal rights, any attempt to dictate what he should eat or drink. He did not accept in full faith the germ theory of disease, and was skeptical about the existence of bugs he could not see.

If water looked clear and was cool, he was unwilling to believe it was unwholesome, especially when it tasted sweet and satisfied his cravings. He was willing to believe that any water in which fish could swim, was good to drink, or to accept any other absurd test which was current.

The experience of an outpost from the regiment illustrates the chances intelligent college men would take, when it became a question of satisfying the appetite. This outpost was established on the banks of Chickamauga Creek, below the inflow of camp sewerage, and obtained their drinking water from a spring bubbling up in the slope of the bank. A sudden rain caused the creek to rise and submerge the spring. After the water subsided, the outpost discovered the surface of the spring covered with slime.

Someone suggested bad germs floated, and acting upon this theory, they plunged a canteen to the bottom of the spring, with the opening stopped by the thumb against the entrance of bacteria. When the canteen was on the bottom, the thumb was removed until the canteen was filled, the opening was then again plugged with the thumb, and the supply brought to the surface. Every member of this outpost was stricken with typhoid as a result of this experiment.

Although orders had been issued to drink only boiled water, most men in the corps drank what they pleased. Unsatisfactory rations led many men to patronize the various food venders. Near the railroad station a swarm of booths sprung up, where all kinds of food were dispensed. These stands were not subject to medical inspection, and later were denounced by the Medical Department as sources of contagion.

The chief sources of contagion were company sinks. Digging and caring for sinks did not appeal to the men as heroic soldiering. They hated and shirked this duty and as a result the sinks of many regiments were so repulsive that the men refused to use them, and polluted territory surrounding the camp.

The care of the sinks was always a matter of great solicitude to the officers of the Eighth. Their cleanliness was insisted upon at all times with martinet rigidity, and men were punished for not using them, after the formality of a trial and conviction before a summary court.

It was recognized that these pest holes might become breeding grounds of flies which would infest the camp and carry contagion. The following extract from a circular shows to what extent this danger was appreciated.

Although the Eighth prevented flies breeding in its own camp, it could not prevent them swarming from other camps and spreading contagion. Flies increased and multiplied. A roast of beef exposed for a few minutes looked as black as a mass of charcoal, so dense was its surface packed with flies. Netting was purchased, and an attempt was made to keep all food covered. Some of the officers constructed mess quarters of scantlings covered with fly screens.

For two months the Eighth Regiment, fully realizing the danger to which it was exposed, fought against typhoid and combated it with intelligence and energy. During the last two months of its stay at Chickamauga, it was smitten with a heavy hand, and became the victims of a system which failed to furnish sanitary safeguards against the spread of communicable disease.

Digging was at all times difficult in the territory of the Eighth, as the soil was a hard clay and the outcropping ledges caused the abandonment of many sink holes when half dug. When the rainy season began a new danger threatened the regiment. The sinks would fill with water and stay full. Refilling the holes with lumps of clay that had been taken out, would cause an overflow and pollute the surrounding ground. Sinks had to be abandoned after every heavy rain, and new holes dug.

The ground in the rear of the camp was filled with open pits in which polluted water stagnated. It was noticed that this stagnant water became the breeding ground for insects. The ingenuity of the officers was taxed to invent a method of sealing these sinks. A happy suggestion occurred to a group of officers who had been in the habit of dining at an Italian Restaurant in Boston. They had seen flasks of Chianti sealed with a few spoonfuls of olive oil, and the analogy suggested oil to seal the sinks against insect life. A can of kerosene was secured, and the experiment tried.

As the oil spread over the surface of the water, it was noticed that it apparently interfered with the comfort of the wigglers, as they came to the surface. Crude petroleum was suggested as being stickier than refined oil, and a can was procured in Chattanooga and tried. Experiments showed that this oil often imprisoned the mother insect when laying eggs, and was a complete bar through which the wigglers, when grown, could not penetrate and emerge from the pits. Crude petroleum was purchased by the barrel and used in these open sinks.

From the Eighth Regiment the use of petroleum spread through the First and Third Corps, and subsequently became recognized throughout the country as a means of destroying mosquitoes and other insects that breed in stagnant waters.

The efforts which were made by the Eighth Regiment to maintain a sanitary camp, were recognized in the report of Colonel A. A. Woodhull, Deputy Surgeon General, U. S. A., on conditions in Camp George H. Thomas. Under the various sub-headings of his report, he refers to the regiment as follows:—

Under the sub-heading "Water Supply" he says:—

Under sub-heading "Character of Troops" he says:—

Again, under the heading "Third Division, First Corps" he says:—

Some of the volunteers were handicapped by the qualities of their officers. The American soldier responds to sympathetic leadership, but not to the sympathy that expresses itself in exaggeration of his hardships, and in frequent reference to his woes. This kind of talk destroys the back bone of resistance, and makes a company a mob of weaklings.

General Chaffee has said:—

The strength of the Eighth lay in the manhood of her officers and men, who were ready with a determined smile to face any game into which they were called.

A commission appointed by the President to investigate the sanitary conditions of the military camps of 1898 reported early in 1899. The report contains an allusion to the Eighth Massachusetts. It says:—

This was a great compliment to the volunteer regimental commander and his officers.

In some of the camps in the United States, no thoroughly well established rules of sanitation were observed. Little restriction was placed on drunkenness and immorality. Soldiers did not seem to care how they lived, and their officers did not watch or teach them. Frequently the food was poorly cared for, and badly cooked, and the men were permitted to eat and drink anything and everything they could find. Sickness naturally followed in regiments where laxity prevailed.

The Eighth, according to evidence before the commission, followed just the opposite plan. Discipline was strict and impartial, and the health of the troops consequently of the best. They were a source of much admiration to all who saw them, both at Camp Thomas and the other places. No other regiment in the whole American army was similarly favored in the Commissioner's report.