APPENDIX. I.

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A general court-martial was held at Chelsea Hospital, on Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, on January 28, 1808. Its members included the conqueror of Agra and Lasswarree, and the future hero of CoruÑa. They were General the Right Hon. Sir W. Medows, General the Hon. Chapel Norton, General Viscount Lake, General Hulse, General Ogilvie, General Cuyler, Lieutenant-General the Right Hon. H. E. Fox, Lieutenant-General Sir James Duff, Knight; Lieutenant-General Harris, Lieutenant-General Viscount Cathcart, Lieutenant-General Dundas, Lieutenant-General Ross, Lieutenant-General Pigot, Lieutenant-General Sir George Nugent, Bart.; Lieutenant-General Loftus, Lieutenant-General Wilford, Lieutenant-General Garth, Lieutenant-General Lloyd, Lieutenant-General Stavely, Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B.

First Charge.—That Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, having received instructions from his Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State to proceed for the reduction of the province of Buenos Ayres, pursued measures ill calculated to facilitate that conquest; that when the Spanish Commander had shown such symptoms of a disposition to treat, as to express a desire to communicate with Major-General Gower, the second in command, upon the subject of terms, the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke did return a message, in which he demanded, amongst other articles, the surrender of all persons holding civil offices in the government of Buenos Ayres, as prisoners of war: that the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, in making such an offensive and unusual demand, tending to exasperate the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, to produce and encourage a spirit of resistance to his Majesty’s arms, to exclude the hope of amicable accommodation, and to increase the difficulties of the service with which he was intrusted, acted in a manner unbecoming his duty as an officer, prejudicial to military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

Second Charge.—That the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, after the landing of the troops at EnseÑada, and during the march from thence to the town of Buenos Ayres, did not make the military arrangements best calculated to ensure the success of his operations against the town, and that having known, previously to his attack upon the town of Buenos Ayres upon the 5th July 1807, as appears from his public despatch of the 10th of July, that the enemy meant to occupy the flat roofs of the houses, he did nevertheless, in the said attack, divide his forces into several brigades and parts, and ordered the whole to be unloaded, and no firing to be permitted on any account; and, under this order, to march into the principal streets of the town unprovided with proper and sufficient means for forcing the barricadoes, whereby the troops were unnecessarily exposed to destruction, without the possibility of making effectual opposition such conduct betraying great professional incapacity on the part of the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, tending to lessen the confidence of the troops in the judgment of their officers, being derogatory to the honour of His Majesty’s arms, contrary to his duty as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

Third Charge.—That the said Lieutenant-General did not make, although it was in his power, any effectual attempt by his own personal exertion or otherwise, to co-operate with, or support, the different divisions of the army under his command, when engaged with the enemy in the streets of Buenos Ayres on the 5th of July 1807; whereby those troops, after having encountered and surmounted a constant and well-directed fire, and having effected the purport of their orders, were left without aid and support, or further orders, and considerable detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel Duff and Brigadier-General Craufurd were thereby compelled to surrender; such conduct on the part of the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke tending to the defeat and dishonour of his Majesty’s arms, to lessen the confidence of the troops in the skill and courage of their officers, being unbecoming and disgraceful to his character as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.

Fourth Charge.—That the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, subsequent to the attack upon the town of Buenos Ayres, and at a time when the troops under his command were in possession of posts on each flank of the town, and of the principal arsenal, with a communication open to the fleet, and having an effective force of upwards of 5000 men, did enter into, and finally conclude a treaty with the enemy, whereby he acknowledges in the public despatch of the 10th of July 1807—“That he resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of his troops had obtained, and which advantages had cost him about 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners;” and by such treaty he unnecessarily and shamefully surrendered all such advantages, totally evacuated the town of Buenos Ayres, and consented to deliver, and did shamefully abandon and deliver up to the enemy the strong fortress of Monte Video, which had been committed to his charge, and which, at the period of the treaty and abandonment, was well and sufficiently garrisoned and provided against attack, and which was not, at such period, in a state of blockade or siege; such conduct on the part of the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke tending to the dishonour of his Majesty’s arms, and being contrary to his duty as an officer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war.


The proceedings of the court-martial on Lieutenant-General Whitelocke fill a volume of 671 pages, from which I give the following extracts:—

In opening the case the Judge-Advocate described it as being “the most important occasion, in the military history of the country, that ever called for inquiry of a nature like the present.” The expedition, he said, had not only totally failed, with the lamentable loss of a great proportion of the gallant army engaged in it, but it ended in the absolute surrender of those valuable advantages which the valour of British troops under another commander had previously acquired in the important post of Monte Video. “By this most unfortunate event,” he said, “all the hopes have been defeated which had been justly and generally entertained, of discovering new markets for our manufactures, of giving a wider scope to the spirit and enterprise of our merchants, of opening new sources of treasure, and new fields for exertion in supplying either the rude wants of countries emerging from barbarism, or the artificial and increasing demands of luxury and refinement, in those remote quarters of the globe. Important as these objects must be at all times to this country, the state of Europe, and the attempts that have been daily making to exclude us from our accustomed intercourse with the Continent, have added to the importance of these objects, and to the disappointment of these hopes.

“The disappointment has been cruelly embittered by the disgrace which such a failure, under all the circumstances, has attached to the British arms. The diminution of our military fame must be felt at all times as a great national calamity, but at no period so severely as in this crisis of the world, when our military character has become more essential than ever, not merely for our honour or our glory, but for the independence, the liberties, the existence of Great Britain. It is, however, a great consolation, that whatever may have been the stain which our military renown has received, the conduct of the troops has had no share in producing it. I believe, the more this attack of the 5th of July is examined, the more clearly it will be found that no troops ever showed more courage; that no officers (with the exception of whatever may turn out to be connected with the subject of these charges, and I hope the result of this inquiry may prove the exception to be undeserved), but, with that exception, that no officers ever displayed more zeal, more conduct, more devotion of themselves to the common cause in the course of the most triumphant engagement, than was displayed by the British officers through the whole of that destructive day.... But it is not upon reports that these charges are founded; they rest upon better evidence. They are taken, not from idle talk or vain rumour, but the orders and despatches of General Whitelocke himself. There is not a fact alleged against him which is not derived from his authority. The character assigned to these facts does, indeed, invoke imputations of the most grave and serious nature; but the facts themselves are founded upon his own account of his own conduct; so much so, that I might be well warranted in contenting myself, on the part of the public, with laying the orders and the despatches of General Whitelocke before you as documents, of themselves, and without any other evidence, abundantly sufficient to call upon him for his defence. He is his own accuser: he has furnished the strongest testimony against himself.”

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, to the Right Honourable William Windham, dated Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Majesty, that upon being joined at Mount Video, on the 15th of June, by the corps under Brigadier-General Craufurd, not one moment was lost by Rear-Admiral Murray and myself, in making every necessary arrangement for the attack of Buenos Ayres. After many delays, occasioned by foul winds, a landing was effected, without opposition, on the 28th of the same month, at the EnseÑada de Barragon, a small bay about 30 miles to the eastward of the town. The corps employed on this expedition were—three brigades of light artillery, under Captain Fraser; the 5th, 38th, and 87th regiments of foot, under Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty; the 17th light dragoons, 36th and 38th regiments, under Brigadier-General the Honourable William Lumley; eight companies of the 95th regiment, and nine light infantry companies, under Brigadier-General Craufurd; four troops of the 6th dragoon guards; the 9th light dragoons; 40th and 45th regiments of foot, under Colonel the Honourable T. Mahon; all the dragoons being dismounted, except four troops of the 17th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd.

After some fatiguing marches through a country much intersected by swamps and deep muddy rivulets, the army reached Reduction, a village about nine miles distant from the bridge over the Rio Chuello, on the opposite bank of which the enemy had constructed batteries, and established a formidable line of defence. I resolved, therefore, to turn the position, by marching in two columns from my left, and crossing the river higher up, where it was represented fordable, to unite my force in the suburbs of Buenos Ayres. I sent directions at the same time to Colonel Mahon, who was bringing up the greater part of the artillery, under the protection of the 17th light dragoons and 40th regiment, to wait for further orders at Reduction. Major-General Levison Gower having the command of the right column, crossed the river at a pass called the Passo Chico, and falling in with a corps of the enemy, gallantly attacked and defeated it; for the particulars of which action I beg to refer you to the annexed report. Owing to the ignorance of my guide, it was not until next day that I joined with the main body of the army, when I formed my line by placing Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty’s brigade upon the left, extending it towards the convent of the Recolleta, from which it was distant two miles, the 36th and 88th regiments being on its right, Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, occupying the central and principal avenues of the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and fort; and the 6th dragoon guards, 9th light dragoons, and 45th regiment being upon his right, and extending towards the Residencia. The town was thus nearly invested; and this disposition of the army, and the circumstances of the town and suburbs being divided into squares of 140 yards each side, together with the knowledge that the enemy meant to occupy the flat roofs of the houses, gave rise to the following plan of attack:—Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty was directed to detach the 38th regiment to possess itself of the Plaza de Tauros and the adjacent strong ground, and there take post. The 87th, 5th, 36th, and 88th regiments were each divided into wings, and each wing ordered to penetrate into the street directly in its front. The light battalion divided into wings, and each followed by a wing of the 95th regiment and a 3-pounder, was ordered to proceed down the two streets on the right of the central one, and the 45th regiment down the two adjoining, and after clearing the streets of the enemy, this latter regiment was to take post at the Residencia. Two 6-pounders were ordered along the central street, covered by the carabineers and three troops of the 9th light dragoons, the remainder of which was posted as a reserve in the centre. Each division was ordered to proceed along the street directly in its front, till it arrived at the last square of houses next the river Plata, of which it was to possess itself, forming on the flat roofs, and there wait for further orders. The 95th regiment was to occupy two of the most commanding situations, from which it could annoy the enemy. Two corporals, with tools, were ordered to march at the head of each column, for the purpose of breaking open the doors. The whole were unloaded, and no firing was to be permitted until the columns had reached their final points, and formed. A cannonade in the central streets was the signal for the whole to move forward.

In conformity to this arrangement, at half-past six o’clock of the morning of the 5th instant, the 38th regiment moving towards its left, and the 87th straight to its front, approached the strong post of the Retiro and Plaza de Tauros; and, after a most vigorous and spirited attack, in which these regiments suffered much from grape-shot and musketry, their gallant commander, Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty, possessed himself of the post, taking 32 pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and 600 prisoners. The 5th regiment, meeting with but little opposition, proceeded to the river, and took possession of the church and convent of Saint Catalina. The 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-General Lumley, moving in the appointed order, were soon opposed by a heavy and continued fire of musketry from the tops and windows of the houses, the doors of which were barricaded in so strong a manner as to render them almost impossible to force: the streets were intersected by deep ditches, on the inside of which were planted cannon, pouring showers of grape on the advancing columns. In defiance, however, of this opposition, the 36th regiment, headed by the gallant general, reached its final destination; but the 88th, being nearer to the fort and principal defences of the enemy, were so weakened by his fire as to be totally overpowered and taken. The flank of the 36th being thus exposed, this regiment, together with the 5th, retired upon Sir Samuel Achmuty’s post, at the Plaza de Tauros, not, however, before Lieutenant-Colonel Burne, and the grenadier company of the 36th regiment, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, by charging about 500 of the enemy, and taking and spiking two guns. The two 6-pounders moving up the central streets, meeting with a very superior fire, the four troops of the carabineers, led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Kington, advanced to take the battery opposed to them; but this gallant officer being unfortunately wounded, as well as Captain Burrell, next in command, and the fire, both from the battery and houses, proving very destructive, they retreated to a short distance, but continued to occupy a position in the front of the enemy’s principal defences, and considerably in advance of that which they had taken in the morning.

The left division of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pack, passed on nearly to the river, and, turning to the left, approached the great square, with the intention of possessing itself of the Jesuits’ college, a situation which commanded the enemy’s principal line of defence; but, from the very destructive nature of his fire, this was found impracticable; and after sustaining a heavy loss, one part of the division throwing itself into a house, which was afterwards not found tenable, was shortly obliged to surrender, whilst the remaining part, after enduring a dreadful fire with the greatest intrepidity, Lieutenant-Colonel Pack, its commander, being wounded, retired upon the right division, commanded by Brigadier-General Craufurd himself. This division having passed quite through to the river Plata, turned also to the left, to approach the great square and fort, from the north-east bastion of which it was distant about 400 yards, when Brigadier-General Craufurd, learning the fate of his left division, thought it most advisable to take possession of the convent of Saint Domingo, near which he then was, intending to proceed onwards to the Franciscan church, which lay still nearer the fort, if the attack or success of any other of our columns should free him, in some measure, from the host of enemies which surrounded him. The 45th regiment, being further from the enemy’s centre, had gained the Residencia without much opposition; and Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, leaving it in possession of his battalion companies, moved down with the grenadier company towards the centre of the town, and joined Brigadier-General Craufurd. The enemy, who now surrounded the convent on all sides, attempting to take a 3-pounder which lay in the street, the Lieutenant-Colonel with his company, and a few light infantry under Major Trotter, charged them with great spirit: in an instant the greater part of his company and Major Trotter were killed, but the gun was saved. The Brigadier-General was now obliged to confine himself to the defence of the convent, from which the riflemen kept up a well-directed fire upon such of the enemy as approached the post; but the quantity of round shot, grape, and musketry to which they were exposed, at last obliged them to quit the top of the building; and the enemy, to the number of 6000, bringing up cannon to force the wooden gates which fronted the fort, the Brigadier-General having no communication with any other columns, and judging from the cessation of firing that those next him had not been successful, surrendered at four o’clock in the afternoon. The result of this day’s action had left me in possession of the Plaza de Tauros, a strong post on the enemy’s right, and the Residencia, another strong post, on his left, whilst I occupied an advanced position opposite his centre. But these advantages had cost about 2500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The nature of the fire to which the troops were exposed was violent in the extreme. Grape-shot at the corners of all the streets, musketry, hand-grenades, bricks and stones from the tops of all the houses. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his dwelling, each of which was in itself a fortress: and it is perhaps not too much to say, that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence. This was the situation of the army on the morning of the 6th instant, when General Liniers addressed a letter to me, offering to give up all his prisoners taken in the late affair, together with the 71st regiment, and others taken with Brigadier-General Beresford, if I desisted from any further attack on the town, and withdraw his Majesty’s forces from the river Plata; intimating at the same time, that from the exasperated state of the populace, he could not answer for the safety of the prisoners, if I persisted in offensive measures. Influenced by this consideration (which I knew, from better authority, to be founded in fact), and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of a country, the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to the annexed treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of his Majesty.

I have nothing further to add, except to mention, in terms of the highest praise, the conduct of Rear-Admiral Murray, whose cordial co-operation has never been wanting whenever the army could be benefited by his exertions; Captain Rowley, of the royal navy, commanding the seamen on shore; Captain Bayntun, of his Majesty’s ship “Africa,” who superintended the disembarkation; and Captain Thomson, of the “Fly,” who had the direction of the gun-boats, and had previously rendered me much service, by reconnoitering the river, are all entitled to my best thanks.

As his character already stands so high, it is almost unnecessary to state, that from my second in command, Major-General Levison Gower, I have experienced every zealous and useful assistance. My thanks are likewise due to Brigadier-Generals Sir Samuel Achmuty and Lumley, and to Colonel Mahon, and to Brigadier-General Craufurd, commanding brigades. I cannot sufficiently bring to notice the uncommon exertions of Captain Fraser, commanding the royal artillery, the fertility of whose mind, zeal and animation in all cases, left difficulties behind. Captain Squire, of the royal engineers, is also entitled to my best thanks. Nor should I omit the gallant conduct of Major Nichols, of the 45th regiment, who, on the morning of the 6th instant, being pressed by the enemy, near the Residencia, charged them with great spirit, and took two howitzers and many prisoners. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, Deputy Adjutant-General, has likewise a great claim to my approbation, as a gallant and promising officer. The officers of my personal staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens, military secretary, Captains Brown, Foster, Douglas, and Whittingham, aides-de-camp, must also be mentioned by me in terms of just regard. The knowledge which the latter possesses of the Spanish language has been eminently useful to me.

This despatch will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke, Deputy-Quartermaster-General, who has afforded me that assistance which might be looked for from an officer of his military talents and attachment to the service; to whom I beg to refer you for any further particulars respecting the military operations in this part of the world.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitelocke,
Lieutenant-General.

The Right Hon. W. Windham,
&c. &c. &c.

Copy of Letter from Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, to the Right Honourable William Windham, dated July 10th, 1807.—Private.

Buenos Ayres, July 10th, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that immediately after my arrival at Monte Video, on the 10th of May, I began to make every possible preparation for the attack of this place, as the first and most essential step towards the reduction of the province. For this purpose sloops of war and other light vessels were sent to reconnoitre the southern bank of the river, in order to fix upon the precise point of debarkation. It was found that the water was too shallow to admit of a landing, under cover of the ships of war, anywhere to the westward of the town of Buenos Ayres, nor nearer to it on the eastward than the EnseÑada of Barragon. This bay was, therefore, fixed upon as the point of debarkation, and every arrangement that could previously be made was pressed forward with expedition, whilst I waited anxiously for the arrival of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s corps, and the fleet with which I had sailed from England.

On the 27th of May, Rear-Admiral Murray and Brigadier-General Craufurd arrived at the mouth of the river; but owing to a prevalence of contrary winds, the expedition did not reach Monte Video until the 14th of June. I immediately determined not to wait the arrival of the convoy from England, as by the general voice of the inhabitants, and of those officers who had passed the winter in the province, the months of July and August were represented as most unfavourable to military operations, on account of the heavy and continual rains which prevail at that season. Having fixed upon Colonia as the place of assembly from which the expedition was to proceed, I sent the troops upwards, in small divisions, on account of the intricate navigation, leaving at Monte Video the 47th regiment, the detachments of the 20th and 21st light dragoons, two companies of the 38th regiment, and a corps of militia, formed by the British merchants, in all composing a garrison of about 1300 men, under the command of Colonel Browne, of the 40th regiment; and after much delay, caused by contrary winds, Rear-Admiral Murray and myself arrived opposite the point of debarkation on the 28th ultimo.

In the morning the fleet stood into the bay, and before night the whole army, consisting as per margin,[16] was landed, without opposition, on the enemy’s coast. The greater part of the next day was occupied in landing artillery, horses, and stores. Immediately on the landing of Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade, and the 38th and 87th regiments, I detached Major-General L. Gower with this force and two 3-pounders, to occupy the heights in my front, about five miles distant; and the next morning I proceeded to join him with the rest of the army, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounders, the remainder of the artillery not being landed. The same day I directed Major-General L. Gower to precede my march with his advanced corps, substituting the 36th and 88th regiments, under Brigadier-General Lumley, for the 38th and 87th regiments; and I left Colonel Mahon, with four troops of the 17th light dragoons, and the 40th regiment, to protect the guns when they should come up, and cover the rear of the army, being principally induced to break my force into these divisions, for the purpose of more readily procuring cover and fuel. On the 1st of July the advanced corps drove a small party of the enemy from the village of Reduction, and took post about two miles beyond it, whilst I occupied the village with the main body. I was now distant about nine miles from the bridge over the Rio Chuello, on the opposite bank of which I understood the enemy had constructed batteries, and intended to make a stand. I determined, therefore, instead of forcing the bridge, to turn the enemy’s line of defence, by marching from our left, and crossing the river in two columns higher up, where it was represented fordable, and continuing to march until I should have got completely to the westward and northward of the town, appuyed my left on the river La Plata, and opened a communication with the fleet. On the 2nd instant, at nine o’clock, Major-General L. Gower marched with his corps, which should now be considered as the right column, and I marched myself at ten, with the intention of uniting our forces that evening in the suburbs of the town. Major-General L. Gower having crossed the river, his leading brigade fell in with a considerable corps of the enemy, under General Liniers himself, which he attacked with great vivacity, completely overthrew it, taking ten pieces of cannon and some prisoners. The Major-General halted on the ground from which he had driven the enemy, waiting my arrival, and sending, at the same time, a summons to General Liniers (No. 1), which was refused on this occasion, as well as the following day, when I sent to him myself (as per No. 2). Owing to the ignorance of my guide, who conducted me by a considerable detour, I did not reach the Major-General until the next day, when I formed my line by placing one of my brigades under Sir Samuel Achmuty, on the left of Brigadier-General Lumley’s, extending it towards the convent of the Recolleta, distant about two miles; and another under Lieutenant-Colonel Guard, on the right, towards the Residencia, whilst Brigadier-General Craufurd’s brigade occupied the central and principal avenues into the town, being distant about three miles from the great square and the fort of Buenos Ayres. In pursuance of my original design, I intended to march the next morning by my left to the convent of Recolleta, which standing on high ground immediately over the river, I could have communicated with the fleet, and landed heavy guns for a vigorous attack of the town, should General Liniers obstinately refuse to surrender it. Upon consulting, however, with Major-General L. Gower, he submitted to me another plan of attack, which as it promised a more expeditious issue, inasmuch as it obviated the necessity of marching to the left, and the delay which would be occasioned by landing heavy guns and erecting batteries, a delay which I the more dreaded on account of the rains having, to all appearance, set in, and the men being in a great degree exposed to the severity of the weather, from the impossibility of conveying camp equipage. I consented, for these reasons, to change my plan, and adopt what seemed to be generally approved by the general officers under me. Besides, the measure of bombardment, or any other measure which might occasion an indiscriminate loss of life, ruin the town, and irritate the people, appeared to me, upon reflection, contrary both to the letter and spirit of my instructions. I hoped also, by this plan, to be able to dislodge those who opposed the progress of his Majesty’s arms, and by driving them to the bottom of the town, there make a number of prisoners, which might be, in our hands, so many pledges for the return of the 71st regiment and the other troops captured with Brigadier-General Beresford, whilst the peaceable inhabitants, and those best disposed towards us, by remaining quietly in their houses, might escape the danger of the attack. The nature of this attack can be best explained by annexing the General Order (No. 3). The result was successful in the principal points, as I obtained possession of the Plaza de Tauros, a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, 32 pieces of ordnance, and a large depÔt of ammunition and provisions, as well as the Residencia, another strong post on the enemy’s left, and four pieces of cannon which defended it. But these conquests were purchased with the loss of 2500 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and amongst the latter Brigadier-General Craufurd and other officers of rank. The conduct of both officers and men in this action has been gallant in the highest degree, and the severity of the loss occasioned solely by the obstinacy of the defence. The enemy had dug ditches across the principal streets, and placed cannon within them: he occupied the flat roofs of all the houses in commanding situations, and from thence, and the windows, poured a destructive fire of musketry, hand-grenades, fire-pots, &c. upon the columns as they advanced; having likewise had the precaution to barricade the doors in so strong a manner as to render them very difficult to force, though the troops had been provided with instruments for that purpose. Every householder, with his negroes, defended his dwelling; and it is, perhaps, not too much to say, that the whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence, which very population in the field would probably not have withstood the attack of two British regiments.

On the morning succeeding the attack I received a letter from General Liniers, offering to give up all prisoners taken in the late affair, as well as those taken with Major-General Beresford, if I condescend to relinquish the attack, and withdraw his Majesty’s forces from the province. A correspondence upon this took place, which ended in the treaty I have the honour to transmit.

My reasons for acceding to this negotiation were briefly these:—I had lost in the preceding attack —— men, although I had gained a strong post on the enemy’s right flank, from which I communicated with the fleet, and from which it might be possible to fire heavy cannon on the town, and otherwise annoy it. Yet the enemy’s chief defences were too remote from this point, and too much covered by houses to allow me to hope that I could, in any given time, destroy them by cannon alone, even if the nature of my instructions had not militated against such a measure. General Liniers had likewise acquainted me in his letter, that he could not answer for the lives of his prisoners, if the attack was persisted in; and from everything I have since heard from the officers themselves, I have reason to believe they would all have been sacrificed to the fury of an exasperated rabble. Nothing, therefore, remained to be done offensively, but another attack on the town, conducted in a manner similar to the last; the event of which must have been doubtful, as my force, when collected, did not reach 5000 men; and, if even successful, my loss would probably have rendered that force insufficient to keep the place when taken. If it was deemed fruitless to attempt another attack, there yet remained two modes of retreat, either by treaty, or re-embarking in the face of the enemy. The latter measure would certainly have been attended with additional loss, and the wounded and prisoners of the late affair, as well as the 71st regiment, in all 4000 men, lost for ever to Great Britain. In return for which I should have possessed but a nominal command at Monte Video, a post which can never be considered of any advantage whilst the capital of the province and the great entrepÔt of commerce remained in the hands of the enemy.

I determined, therefore, to accede to this treaty, by which I shall be enabled to bring off my own army almost entire, and recover the 71st regiment, a point which my instructions has taught me to consider as of the first importance; and I shall evacuate a province which the force I was authorised to calculate upon could never maintain, and which, from the very hostile disposition of its inhabitants, was in truth not worth maintaining.

I shall dispose of the army in the manner pointed out in my instructions, the particulars of which I shall detail to you from Monte Video, by another man-of-war that will sail from thence with duplicates of these despatches. Trusting that the conduct I have pursued in this difficult situation may meet with the gracious approval of his Majesty,—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitelocke,
Lieutenant-General.

This will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Bourke, to whom, as well as Sir Samuel Achmuty, I refer you for further particulars.

(A true copy) E. Cooke.

Right Honourable William Windham,
&c. &c. &c.

TREATY.

A Definitive Treaty between the Generals in Chief of his Brittanic Majesty and of his Catholic Majesty, as per the following articles:

1st. There shall be, from this time, a cessation of hostilities on both sides of the river Plate.

2d. The troops of his Brittanic Majesty shall retain, for the period of two months, the fortress and place of Monte Video; and, as a neutral country: there shall be considered a line drawn from San Carlos on the west, to Pando on the east, and there shall not be on any part of that line hostilities committed on any side, the neutrality being understood, only that the individuals of both nations may live freely under their respective laws—the Spanish subjects being judged by theirs, as the English by those of their nation.

3d. There shall be on both sides a mutual restitution of prisoners, including not only those which have been taken since the arrival of the troops under Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, but also all those his Britannic Majesty’s subjects captured in South America since the commencement of the war.

4th. That, for the prompt despatch of the vessels and troops of his Brittanic Majesty, there shall be no impediment thrown in the way of the supplies of provision which may be requested for Monte Video.

5th. A period of ten days, from this time, is given for the re-embarkation of his Britannic Majesty’s troops, to pass to the north side of the river La Plata, with the arms which may actually be in their power, stores and equipage, at the most convenient points which may be selected, and during this time provisions may be sold to them.

6th. That at the time of the delivery of the place and fortress of Monte Video, which shall take place at the end of the two months fixed in the second article, the delivery will be made in the terms it was found, and with the artillery it had when it was taken.

7th. Three officers of rank shall be delivered for and until the fulfilment of the above articles by both parties; being well understood, that his Britannic Majesty’s officers who have been on their parole, cannot serve against South America until their arrival in Europe.

Done at the Fort of Buenos Ayres, the seventh day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seven, signing two of one tenor.

Santiago Liniers
Caser Balbiani,
Bernardo Velascos,
Jn. Whitelocke,
Lieut.-Gen. Commg.
Geo. Murray,
Rear-Admiral Commg.

(A True Copy) E. Cooke.

Major-General Gower to General Liniers, July 3.

Coral de Miserala, before Buenos Ayres,
July 3, 1807.

Sir,—Captain Roache, of the 17th dragoons, whom I had the honour of sending unto you this morning, having informed me that you wished to communicate with me on the subject of terms, I beg to acquaint you, that his Excellency Lieutenant-General Whitelocke has ordered me (from his sincere wish to spare an unnecessary effusion of human blood) to intimate to you, that in the present situation of affairs, if they do not proceed to further hostilities, he will grant terms to the town of Buenos Ayres: that the following must be the basis on which they are to be granted; but that any trifling alteration which may make them more favourable, without altering their original fundamental stipulations, may possibly be agreed to:

1st. All British subjects detained in South America must be delivered up, and sufficient hostages placed in the power of the British Commander till their arrival at Buenos Ayres.

2d. That all persons holding civil offices dependent on the government of Buenos Ayres, and all military officers and soldiers, become prisoners of war.

3d. That all cannon, stores, arms, and ammunition, be delivered up uninjured.

4th. That all public property, of every description, be delivered up to the British Commanders.

5th. That the free and unrestrained exercise of the Roman Catholic religion be granted to the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres.

6th. That all private property on shore shall be respected, and secured to its owners.

Our force is so considerable that I believe, in candour, you cannot doubt of the ultimate result. I trust you will believe me when I assure you that a wish to avoid so dreadful a scene as that which a town taken by assault always presents is the only thing which has induced his Excellency Lieutenant-General Whitelocke to permit me to address you.

(Signed) J. L. Gower,
Major-General.

His Excellency Gen. Liniers,
&c. &c. &c.

(A true Copy) E. Cooke.

Major-General Ellio’s Answer to Major-General Gower.

July 3, 1807.

Sir,—By orders of the Spanish General, Don Santiago Liniers, I answer to the letter brought by your flag of truce respecting the surrender of this capital, by saying that nothing relative to laying down our arms will be attended to—that the Spanish General has a sufficient number of brave troops, commanded by brave chiefs, full of desire to die in defence of their country, and that this is the moment to show their patriotism.—I remain, &c.

(Signed) Major-General Call. Ellio.

Major-Gen. Levison Gower.

Plan of Attack.—Circular.

Headquarters, Camp before Buenos
Ayres
, July 4, 1807.

Sir,—Herewith I have the honour to enclose instructions for the attack of Buenos Ayres. The refusal of the Spanish General to listen to terms, and the state of the army from fatigue and bad weather, leaves but little choice as to the mode of accomplishing our purpose; otherwise I should assuredly be disposed to adopt one equally calculated[17] to secure to us possession of the place without the probable chance of so much blood being spilt.

I therefore have to desire that you will impress upon the minds of all officers acting under your immediate orders, the necessity of preventing, in as great a degree as possible under such circumstances, acts of violence on the persons of those who do not carry arms, as well as women and children.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) John Whitelocke.

To Brigadiers.

COPY OF GENERAL ORDERS,

4th July, 1807.

Sir Samuel Achmuty to detach the 38th regiment, to possess itself of the Plaza de Tauros and the adjacent strong grounds, and there post itself.

The 87th, 5th, 36th, and 88th regiments to be divided into wings, and each wing is to penetrate into the street directly in its front, in a column of sections right in front.

The light battalion to penetrate by wings into the second street, on the right of that leading up from Mr. White’s house, and the next to it, followed by the 95th regiment.

The left division of the 95th is to receive its orders from Colonel Park, the right division from General Craufurd; two 3-pounders to follow these columns, one each. The 45th to advance by wings, left in front, up to the two next streets beyond the light battalion. The carabineers to move up with the cover two 6-pounders, which will be advanced up the street from Mr. White’s, and remain with them.

The 9th light dragoons to move to the left, and take the ground of the light battalion, at five o’clock, where they will receive further orders.

Each officer commanding a division of the left wing, which is from the 88th to 87th inclusively, to take care that he does not incline to his right of the right wing, that is, light brigade and 45th regiment to the left.

The cannonade in the centre to be the signal for the whole to rush forward; and each division to go, if possible, straight down the street before it, till it arrives at the last square of houses near to the river Plate, of which they are to possess themselves, and on the tops of which they are to form: if they find that they suffer by any interior defences, to lodge themselves as far in advance as they can. Two corporals, with tools, to be attached to the head of each column. The whole to be unloaded, and no firing to be allowed on any account.

When the business is over, the utmost exertion to be used to keep the men collected and formed.

The regiments may leave their packs in their present cantonments, with a subaltern’s guard, if they wish.

The cannonade will commence at 30 minutes past six o’clock precisely.

(A true copy) E. Cooke.

Major-General Gower’s Orders.

Major-General Levison Gower, as second in command, will be occupied in making the necessary arrangements relative to the executive duties and localities of the situation, aided by Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Achmuty; whose able assistance will also be brought in aid of what may appertain to the many other points to which the attention of the Commander of the forces must of course be directed, in a command in its nature new and intricate.

The other appointments to the Staff will be communicated to the army on the arrival of the additional force.

The 9th light dragoons to march to the left, and take the ground of the light battalion at five o’clock, where they will remain till further orders.

Lieutenant-General Whitelocke to General Liniers.

Headquarters before Buenos Ayres, July 4, 1807.

I beg you will do me the justice to impute to the principles of humanity only, the information I give you of my arrival, having joined the troops under the command of Major-General Levison Gower with the principal column of the army. I dare say it is not unknown to you that another column awaits my orders within little more than a league from your capital.

I beg, therefore, only to be informed, if, after this faithful communication, you still adhere to the answer given to the Major-General in your letter of yesterday, who was authorized to address you on this subject, in the event of his arrival before me.

The bearer, Captain Whittingham, has my orders to deliver this, and to wait half an hour from that time for your answer, yes or no.

J. Whitelocke.

To General Liniers, &c.

General Liniers to Major-General Whitelocke.

Sir,—I have just received your Excellency’s letter of this date, to the contents of which I have the honour to reply, that whilst I have ammunition, and whilst the same spirit which now animates this garrison and people shall continue to exist, I shall never think of delivering up the post which has been confided to me: and I am perfectly convinced, that I have more than sufficient means to resist all the efforts which your Excellency can make to conquer me.

The duties of humanity of which your Excellency speaks, will, I conceive, be more wounded by your Excellency, who is the aggressor, than by me. I merely do that duty which is prescribed to me by honour and the just right of retaliation.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Santiago Liniers.

July 4, 1807.

(A true Copy) E. Cooke.

Coral of Miserala, July 3, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, that the advanced corps under my command, consisting of three companies of the 95th light battalion, 36th and 38th regiments, with two 3 and two 6-pounders, advanced from the position I had taken up in front of the village of Reduction; and, after making a considerable detour from the badness of the roads, I crossed the Chuello at the Chico Pass; from thence I continued my route, though very strongly enclosed, and difficult ground, till the head of the column arrived at the junction of two roads, about 500 yards from the Canal of Miserala. At the same moment that we discovered the enemy, they commenced a heavy, though, after the first round, not well-directed fire of shot and shells, my artillery having been left in the rear, under the protection of three companies of Brigadier-General Lumley’s brigade, owing to the inability of the horses to bring it up at the same rate at which the infantry marched. I directed an immediate attack to be made on their left flank with the bayonet, which was executed by Brigadier-General Craufurd in the most perfect manner, with his brigade, and he was so well seconded by the gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Pack and Major Travers, the officers and men of the 95th, and light battalion, that in five minutes the enemy’s force, though strongly posted behind hedges and embankments, gave way, leaving about 60 killed and 70 prisoners, with all their artillery, consisting of nine guns, one howitzer, three tumbrels with limbers complete.

I beg to state that the conduct of every officer and soldier engaged was admirable; and that I am also under great obligation to Brigadier-General Lumley, for his exertions to take a share in the action, but which alone the very exhausted state of his regiments, from the severity of the march, prevented. Immediately after I formed, I found that he had taken a good position on the right of the light brigade, to support it in case of re-attack.

I am happy to add our loss has been but trifling, not exceeding 14 rank and file killed, 5 officers, and 25 rank and file wounded. The exact returns I have not been able to obtain.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. Levison Gower,
Major-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens,
Military Secretary.

II.

Extract of a Letter from Sir S. Achmuty to Mr. Wyndham.

The escape of General Beresford, an event as pleasing and important as it was unexpected, has put us in full possession of the views of the leading men, and the real state of the country. He had been ordered, immediately after the fall of Monte Video, to a town 300 leagues inland, and was already between forty and fifty leagues from Buenos Ayres, when two Spanish officers, in the family of the Governor, who had been endeavouring to enter into some political negotiation with him, proposed to assist and accompany him in making his escape, which, with great difficulty, was effected; and the General, after being three successive days secreted in Buenos Ayres, fortunately reached the ship with our despatches.

Letter from General Liniers to Admiral Stirling and Sir Samuel Achmuty.

Buenos Ayres, March 2d, 1807.

Sirs,—I am very sorry that the first time I have the honour to write to your Excellencies, is on the unpleasant subject of complaining of proceedings of officers of your nation. Major-General Beresford and Lieutenant-Colonel Pack, of the 71st regiment, forgetting every sentiment of honour, and in violation of their word, and the oath which they had taken on the 6th of September last, have absconded, and the first with the infamy of having fomented an insurrection in this county, where the greatest part of his vile accomplices, now under the lash of the law, will soon pay for their horrid crime.

This violation of public faith and the law of nations, has, however, only increased the enthusiasm of all the inhabitants of this city, ever ready and disposed to bury themselves under the ruins of their edifices sooner than give themselves up to any other dominion than that of their lawful sovereign.

The pretext which Mr. Beresford makes use of, in alleging that there was a pretended capitulation, your Excellencies will see by the enclosed prints is without foundation, and it only remains with me, conformably to the laws of war, to reclaim those two prisoners; and I trust to your integrity that you will order them to be given up: at all events I fulfil my duty in reclaiming them, and the military world will decide on which side justice is.

I do not answer Mr. Beresford, not having anything to add to what I now express to your Excellencies; and I have only further to observe, that the determination of the people, as has been represented by their magistrates, is irrevocable: they are resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity, and prepared to make their defence memorable.

Your Excellencies will, therefore, avoid making any further offers; for be assured, that no answer will be returned, and that nothing but force can decide our fate.

God preserve your Excellencies many years.

(Signed) Santiago Liniers.

To their Excellencies Sir C. Stirling
and Sir S. Achmuty.

Coral de Miserala, July 2, 1807.

Sir,—I had the honour to report to you, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that the advanced corps of the army now occupy a position, the centre of which is across the prolongation of the centre street of Buenos Ayres. I have taken most of the cattle intended for the consumption of the city for this day, and occupy the principal coral. I have secured 20,000 lbs. of biscuit, and my corps is fully supplied with it; spirits I am searching for, and I have hopes that I shall be able to secure some; to what extent I do not yet know. I sent to report to you, yesterday evening, immediately after the action, in which I stated we had taken eight pieces of cannon, I now find it increased to ten, many prisoners, and a great quantity of arms and ammunition. General Liniers and Colonel Ellio were both present. Supposing that a considerable impression may have been made by so complete a defeat as this considerable portion of their force has sustained, I have sent in a summons to General Liniers, at first verbally only, to discover how they appeared to feel in the town. Colonel Ellio met Brigade-Major Roache who went with the flag, and requested that they might receive a written proposal. I have now, therefore, sent one, founded on the instructions I received yesterday by Colonel Bourke.

I believe it will not be difficult to, nearly if not entirely, invest the town by placing about 1000 on my right towards the Chuello, and all the rest on my left towards the Recollata, having that in the rear. The centre of the town makes a salient angle; it appears to me, therefore, that our centre should be a little refused, and our flanks thrown forward, as the right will be rested on the Chuello, and the left secured by the Plata; but this of course must be regulated by the better judgment of the Commander of the forces.—I have the honour to be, &c.

J. Levison Gower,
Major-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Torrens,
&c. &c. &c.

Sentence.

The court-martial having duly considered the evidence given in support of the charges against the prisoner, Lieutenant-General Whitelocke, his defence, and the evidence he has adduced, are of opinion that he is guilty of the whole of the said charges, with the exception of that part of the second charge which relates to the order that “the columns should be unloaded, and that no firing should be permitted on any account.”

The court are anxious that it may be distinctly understood that they attach no censure whatever to the precautions taken to prevent unnecessary firing during the advance of the troops to the proposed points of attack, and do therefore acquit Lieutenant-General Whitelocke of that part of the said charge.

The court adjudge that the said Lieutenant-General Whitelocke be cashiered, and declared totally unfit and unworthy to serve his Majesty in any military capacity whatever.

PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO.
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] About £50,000.

[2] = £240,000.

[3] = £4500.

[4] A cruzado = nearly five shillings.

[5] Under £5.

[6] The boucan was a wooden instrument used by Brazilian cannibals for roasting their victims. Hence the word buccaneer.

[7] £1200.

[8] Vide Humboldt’s Researches.

[9] Frezier.

[10]

“And lo! deep in yon cave Honorius long did dwell,
In hopes to merit heaven by making earth a hell.”
Childe Harold.

[11] Hist. Novi Orbis, lib. III. c. 21.

[12] It is interesting to English readers to know that the high post of Captain-General of Chili was, in November 1787, confided to Don Ambrose Higgins, a native of Ireland, who was, two years later, appointed Field Marshal of the Royal Armies.

[13] A cruzado = nearly five shillings.

[14] Condamine.

[15] The following was told me by a lady now in her eighty-first year, as having been current in her youth:

“My first is an emblem of purity,
My second’s a thing of security;
My whole is a name, which if yours were the same,
You would blush to hand down to futurity.”

[16]

3 brigades artillery.
5th —Brigadier-General Sir S. Achmuty.
38th
87th
17th dragoons.
36th —Brigadier-General Lumley
88th
95th —Brigadier-General Craufurd.
Light battalion
4 troops 6th dragoon guards.
9th light dragoons.
40th —Colonel Mahon.
45th

[17] The Italics are the author’s.

Count Daborre went before the wind=> Count Datorre went before the wind {pg 31}
1776.=> 1676. {pg 98}
Beckham, however, showed=> Beckman, however, showed {pg 102}
also to legislatiou=> also to legislation {pg 111}
CuraÇoa=> CuraÇao {pg 156}
Bogota, 1850=> BogotÁ, 1850 {pg 158}
Don Antonia Gonzaga=> Don Antonio Gonzaga {pg 164}
new governor, Gomes Freyre de Andrada=> new governor, Gomes Freyre de Andrade {pg 188}
and of encourging them=> and of encouraging them {pg 231}
removal of Bishop Gardenas=> removal of Bishop CÁrdenas {pg 247}
durch die Provinzeu von Rio=> durch die Provinzen von Rio {pg 270}
A well-sustained fusilade=> A well-sustained fusillade {pg 278}
up to there middle in water=> up to their middle in water {pg 287}
offensive and unusal demand=> offensive and unusual demand {pg 297}
estimated by Dean FuÑes=> estimated by Dean Funes {pg 210}





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