Dated:
Petrograd,
September 2, 1915.

A great deal has happened since the Fall of Warsaw which one must regret, but at the same time the incidents or disasters must be viewed in their proper perspective. The loss of Kovno, Novo-Georgievsk and many other positions are all unfortunate, but must I think be taken as by-products of the loss of Warsaw. With these enormous extended fronts which modern war presents for the same time, there always develop certain points on the line which may be called keystones. In the Galician campaign, the Dunajec line and Gorlice was the keystone. Once this was pulled out and a number of corps eliminated, the whole vast line from the Vistula to the Bukovina was thrown into a state of oscillation. Once the withdrawal of one army started, the whole line, even to the Warsaw Front, was affected. Armies such as the Bukovina army, which was actually advancing for ten days after the first attack began hundreds of miles away, first halted and finally had to come back to maintain the symmetry of the whole. A great Front, changing over hundreds of versts, means that the whole line can stop only when the weakest unit can stop. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link and the same is roughly true of a Front.

We saw this clearly in Galicia. It has been apparent to every one that Warsaw was the keystone of the campaign in Poland. Once Warsaw was given up under the conditions which then existed, everything that has happened could have been foreseen. It was clear to all on this Front who had followed these movements closely, that the next line would be far in the rear, and that when the general change of Front came, many places would have to be sacrificed. Novo-Georgievsh as a matter of course was doomed. Its function was to protect the flank of the Warsaw defences. It actually held out for two weeks after Warsaw was abandoned, and this delay to the Germans enabled the Russians to get their army clear of a dangerously active pursuit. Fortresses in modern war must, as many believe, be regarded as checks to the mobility of an enemy, rather than as permanent blocks to his progress. Noro-Georgievsh was this, and certainly justified the loss of the garrison and the cost of its construction. LiÉge is a still better example. Certainly no fortress can withstand modern big guns, and if by their sacrifice they play their part in the game, they have more than served their ends. To hold on to a fortress with a large garrison only magnifies its importance, creates a bad moral effect when it falls, and entails the loss of a field army. Perhaps the Austrian conduct of Przemysl will become the historic warning in future wars as what not to do with fortresses. From an extremely intimate contact of the terrain, I felt certain that the next jump from Warsaw would be Brest-Litowsk. I had visited that place five or six times and felt equally sure that if the Germans made a definite bid for it, it would not be defended. The Russians knew this, and in the army there was no keen disappointment at its loss; for I think no one who knew conditions expected that there would be a big battle there, though many believed that the enemy would never try seriously to go further. That they have done so is looked upon by many as a mistake of the Germans. Time only can tell. The Russians are now on the move to another line. The enemy may continue to follow, but in this district one does not see any point the capture of which can have any great benefit which they could ensure before winter sets in. The only result which can seriously assist them is the capture of Petrograd, and even this would not, I believe, insure a peace with Russia.

As a matter of fact it seems to the writer pretty certain that the enemy will not reach half way to Petrograd before the winter sets in, and after that its capture is increasingly unlikely. Once one has left the Front one obtains more accurate news as to the situation on this line of battle from the foreign papers than from any other source. In Petrograd, in civilian circles, there is great pessimism as to the military situation, but this is not shared by those who are in the confidence of the highest authorities. The only danger that seriously and immediately menaces the Russians is rapidly passing away. It was dangerous because it was insidious. It is certainly worth discussion.

It was of course to be expected that the moment the Russian Armies left Warsaw and the entire line began to retire on new positions, there should be a period of great ambiguity. For several weeks the armies were in constant movement, and from day to day their exact positions were uncertain. As they went back, they obviously left many towns and positions behind them, with the result that for weeks the Germans have been having a continuous celebration over their advances. During this period very little news was available in Petrograd, which at the best is pessimistic and quick to jump at conclusions of disaster. There is here, as all the world knows, an enormous German influence, and whenever the military situation is in the least ambiguous, there start immediately in a thousand different quarters reports of disaster which in an hour are all over Petrograd. That these reports originate from German sympathizers is hardly questioned, and that the whole propaganda is well organized is equally certain.

The past two weeks has found Petrograd in a receptive mood for gloomy news, and inasmuch as nothing of a favourable nature has come from the Russian Army, the German propaganda of insidious and subtle rumours and reports has run through the city like a prairie fire after a drought. Three main themes have been worked up and circulated for all that they would stand. It was said first that there was lack of harmony among the Allies, and that the Russian high authorities were not satisfied with the conduct of the war in the West. The corollary of this of course was that without harmony the cause was lost. Next came the assertion that the army was demoralized, and had lost hope and therefore wanted peace. Then the shortage of ammunition was magnified until half the gullible population were almost willing to believe that the army were fighting with pitchforks and shotguns. Out of all this came the assertion that peace was inevitable and that the Germans would take Petrograd. For a week or more these topics circulated and grew with such alarming rapidity that at last the Government was obliged to take notice of the propaganda, which was finally squelched by a statement issued to The Times and the Russian Press by M. Serge Sazonov, the distinguished and clever minister of Foreign Affairs.

In this interview the Russian statesman, speaking for the Government, made a categorical denial of the slanders against the Government and the Russian people. He stated without reservation that there was not now, nor had there ever been, a lack of harmony between the military or civil authorities of the Allies, and announced that the Russian Government not only approved of, but had implicit faith in the programme of the Allies in the West. He then discussed the munitions question, and asserted that all steps were being taken to fill depletions in all branches of the army requirements, and lastly he stated once and for ever that there would be no independent peace with Germany while a single German soldier remained on Russian soil and that the war would continue even if the Government were obliged to retire to the heart of Russia and the contest continued for years to come. This statement has had an immediate effect on the local panic-mongers here, and for the moment there is a lull in the German propaganda.

In the meantime it is becoming obvious that the Germans in spite of their following up of the retiring Russians are not likely to achieve any successes which can immediately affect the political situation. If they take Riga and Grodno, and even Vilna, they have done their worst for some months to come, and one cannot see what they can accomplish further before winter sets in. If the campaign at this stage were in June one might feel apprehensive of Petrograd, but under the most favourable conditions it is difficult to see how the Germans can get even halfway here before November. By that time they will be on the verge of the winter with the ground freezing so deeply that intrenching is difficult, if not impossible, and every advance must be made with terrific losses. Their attempts to conduct warfare in Poland (a much milder climate) in winter, are too recent a memory to lead one to believe they will repeat it here. It will be remembered that their advance on the Bzura-Rawka line froze up when winter came, and the sacrifice of thousands did not advance them materially at that point in spite of their most determined efforts. I think one may say, then, that what the Germans cannot accomplish before November they will not attempt until Spring. The pessimism and hopelessness of Petrograd seem to be on the wane, and the reports from the Front now arriving do not indicate either demoralization or despair in the army.

Probably one must expect retirements and rearguard actions for some weeks to come. Ultimately the Russians will settle down on some new line from which it is extremely unlikely that they can be driven before the winter sets in. One hesitates to make any prophecies, as conditions change so rapidly that it is always dangerous to do so, but perhaps it is safe to say that with the coming of the winter and the definite lull in the campaign which will follow, the Russians will have passed their crisis. Given four months of rest and recuperation we shall have an entirely new situation in the beginning of next year which will present an entirely new problem. It will really mean the starting of a new war with new objectives and practically with a new and re-equipped army.

There may be those who are disappointed, but history, I believe, will conclude that this summer campaign of the Russians has been the greatest factor so far in the war making for the ultimate victory of the Allies. For nearly four months Germany has been drained of her best. Men and resources have been poured on this Front since May regardless of cost. Autumn approaches with the armies in being, undemoralized and preparing to do it all over again. In the meantime the Allies are preparing to begin on the West, or at least it is generally so believed. When they do at last start, Germany will for months be occupied in protecting herself, and will probably be unable to act so vigorously here. If Russia gets over the period of the next sixty days, she will be safe until Spring, and by that time she will without doubt be able to take up an offensive in her turn.

After months of observation of the Germans it is folly to speculate on how long they can stand this pace. It may be for six months, and it may be for two years, but with the Allies patiently wearing down the enemy month after month and year after year there can be but one end. That Russia has played her part, and played it heroically, I think no one, even the Germans themselves, can deny. There are some that like to believe that the enemy will try to get Moscow and Kiev before winter sets in. The former objective seems impossible, and the latter even if obtained would, I believe, in no way compensate the enemy for his sacrifices, for the nature of the country is such that all advances could only be at terrific cost. Besides, Kiev, even if taken, would not, I think, have any tangible effect on forcing Russia to make peace, and this end alone can justify the Germans in making further huge sacrifices.

There are many who maintain that Russia will find it difficult to reconquer Galicia and Poland. Probably she will never have to do so. It is perfectly possible that when the end comes, Germany will still be on the territory of France, Belgium, and Russia. Peace will bring back instantly all of these provinces without any fighting at all. It matters not, then, whether Germany is broken while still in the heart of Russia or under the walls of Berlin itself. The task is to break the enemy and that this will be done eventually I think cannot be doubted. It is the stamina, the character and the resources of the Allies that in the end will decide this war, and nothing is more unwise than to judge the situation from the study of pins moved back and forward on the map of Europe.

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