Dated:
Petrograd,
August 15, 1915.

The giving up of Warsaw marks the end of a definite period in the war, and represents the climax of one of the most remarkable campaigns in the history of the world. Military records do not present anything even approaching the effort which in three months has been made by the enemy. From the moment they began their attack on the Dunajec line in early May, until their entrance into Warsaw, almost exactly three months later, their campaign has represented one continuous attack. Every detail seems to have been arranged, and once the movement started, men and munitions were fed into the maw of war without intermission until their objective, Warsaw, was attained. All of this one must in justice accord the Germans, for it is their due. The determination and bravery of their soldiers in these three months of ghastly sacrifice have never faltered.

Their objective has been attained; but when we have said this, our admiration for a purpose fulfilled stops short. Though obtaining Warsaw they have not secured the results that they believed Warsaw represented; and I believe it perfectly safe to say that the capture of Warsaw, without the inflicting of a crashing blow to the Russian Army, was perhaps the greatest disappointment to the Germans which this war has brought them. I know from conversations with many prisoners, that generally speaking, every soldier in the German Army on this Front felt that with the capture of the great Polish capital, the war with Russia was practically finished. It was because this was so earnestly believed that it was possible to keep driving the soldiers on and on, regardless of life and of their physical exhaustion.

The German plan involved the destruction of the army. They have the husk of victory, while the kernel, as has happened many times before in this war, has slipped from their grasp. Everything that has happened since Warsaw is in the nature of a secondary campaign, and really represents an entirely new programme and probably a new objective or series of objectives. From the wider point of view, the war against Russia has begun all over again, and for the present it seems unwise to discuss or prophesy the outcome of the vast operations which have taken place since August 5. But it is a desperate new undertaking for Germany to enter upon after her incomparable exertions these last three months.

In dealing with such extended operations at this time, it is impossible to write accurately, because the Front has been so great that nine-tenths of the information in regard to details is not yet available. The writer was for the period from July 10 to August 5 in daily contact with this Front, and in that period motored thousands of versts, was in practically all of the armies involved in what may be called the Warsaw movement, and at the positions in innumerable places. Yet he hesitates to attempt to write anything of an authoritative nature for the moment, although he believes the rough outline which follows will prove approximately accurate when the history of the movement is written from the broader perspective which time only can bring.

It was the opinion of many observers early in May, including the writer, that Warsaw was the main objective of the great Galician drive. The Germans intended first to strengthen the moral of the Austrians by returning them Galicia, but probably the greatest value of the capture of Galicia was the position which left the Germans on the flank of Warsaw. Since last Autumn it has been clear that the Germans regarded Warsaw as the most important strategic prize on this Front, and those who have followed the war will recall the constant series of attacks on the Polish capital. First came their direct advance which frittered away the middle of December, and left them sticking in the mud and snow on the Bzura line in Poland, still 50 versts from their prize. Spasmodic fighting continued until January, when their great Bolimov drive was undertaken. Beginning in the last days of January it continued for six consecutive days. We are told that ten divisions backed by 600 guns attacked practically without interruption for six days and six nights. I cannot accurately state what the German losses were, but I know the Russians estimated them to be 100,000.

It was clear that Warsaw was not to be taken from the front, and as the last gun was being fired on the Bolimov position, the new Prussian flanking movement was launched in East Prussia. This, though scoring heavily in its early days, soon dissipated as the Russians adjusted themselves to the shock. That was followed instantly by another series of operations directed against Warsaw from the North. This too went up in smoke, and for several weeks there was a lull, interrupted here and there by preliminary punches in different parts of the line, intended to discover weakness which did not appear. By April it was clear that Warsaw was not vulnerable from the front or North. Then followed the great Galician campaign which ended with the fall of Lemberg, and by the end of June left the Germans in their new position with the southern flank of the armies in Poland prepared for their final drive for Warsaw on the South. From the light which I have on this campaign I will try and give the sketch as it has appeared to me.

There is no question that the German strategy aimed not merely at the capture of Warsaw, but at the destruction or capture of the greater part of the army defending the Polish capital. The German programme was carefully prepared, and this time they had no isolated movements, but two great movements developing simultaneously; one aimed to cut the Warsaw-Petrograd lines from the North, and the other aimed at Warsaw from the South. The time which has elapsed is not sufficient, nor is the information available, to enable one to judge at this time whether the Northern or Southern movement was the main German objective. I was in the Cholm-Lublin Army head-quarters just before the heavy fighting began, and was then of the opinion that the most important German activity was contemplated on this sector. It is apparent by a glance at the map, that an overwhelming success here would have been of incredible importance to the enemy. Had they been able to destroy this army as they did the one bearing the same number on the Dunajec in May, they could have moved directly on Brest-Litowsk by Wlodava and cut the Warsaw line of communications to the direct rear 180 versts away. A rapid success here would have certainly resulted in just the disaster that the Germans were hoping would be the outcome of their programme.

The movement on the North from the direction of Mlawa toward Przasnys-Ciechanow was of course a direct threat on the Warsaw-Petrograd line of communications. Success here would have forced the evacuation of the city and a general change of the Russian line; but even had it been a sweeping one, it had not the potentialities of the calamity which a similar success on the Cholm line would have had. Perhaps the Germans estimated both to be of approximately equal importance, and a double success, occurring simultaneously, would have undoubtedly repeated the Moukden fiasco on an infinitely larger scale. It must be remembered that when this movement started, the Russians in the South were at the end of a gruelling campaign of nearly two months’ continuous warfare, in which, through lack of munitions, they were obliged to withdraw under difficult and extremely delicate circumstances. The army defending the Cholm-Lublin line was in name the same that had been so very badly cut up six weeks earlier, and the Germans no doubt believed that every one of the Russian Armies engaged from the Bukowina to the Vistula had been so badly shaken up that any effective resistance would be impossible. It was because their estimate was so far out that their programme was doomed to disappointment.

My own observation of the Russian Armies is that if they are given a fortnight, or even a week, in which to recuperate, they are good for a month of continuous fighting. With almost any other army in the world, after such an experience as the Russians had had for six weeks in Galicia, the defence on the Cholm-Lublin line would have failed, and the Germans might well have driven through to Brest in two or three weeks, as they no doubt firmly believed that they would. But the Russians on the Cholm-Lublin line had the benefit of interior lines of communications, and had also the brief breathing space which enabled them to pull themselves together. Besides this, a new General, General Loesche, was in command, and with him were an important number of the best corps in the Russian Army. Excellent field works had been prepared, and personally, after visiting the positions I felt sure that whatever the outcome of the German move against him might be, it would not result in anything like the Dunajec enterprise, nor would the enemy be able to drive through to Brest with sufficient rapidity to cut off the retreat of the Warsaw army or those lying south of it. The movement in the South started with such terrific impetus, that for several days it seemed possible that in spite of the stamina and leadership of the Russians the enemy would have their way; but after ten days of fighting it became clear that though the enemy were advancing, their progress was going to be of so slow and arduous a nature that they would never be able to inflict a smashing disaster on the Russian Armies.

The details of the battles that raged here for weeks would fill a volume. Although I visited this army several times during this stage, and was in four different corps on this Front, I have still but the vaguest outline in my own mind of the fighting except as a whole. Every day there was something raging on some part of the line, first in one place and then in another. The Germans used the same practice that was so successful in Galicia and massed their batteries heavily. This method, backed by the Prussian Guards, enabled them to take Krasnystav. The best trenches that I have ever seen in field operations were washed away in a day by a torrent of big shells. The Russians did not retreat. They remained and died, and the Germans simply marched through the hole in the line, making a change of front necessary.

But this time there was no disorganization of the line as a whole. The moment the Germans were beyond their supporting artillery, the Russian infantry were at their throats with the bayonet and drove them back. The fighting from day to day for weeks was a great zig-zag, with German advances and retreats before Russian counter-attacks. But each advance left the enemy a little nearer their objective, and it was clear that slowly but surely they were, by superior forces, vastly superior supplies of ammunition and a constant flow of reserves, forcing the Russians back toward the Lublin-Cholm-Kovel line of railroad. It became equally obvious however after ten days that they would never reach Brest in time to menace seriously the future of the Warsaw army, even if they could and would spare the men to turn the trick.

As a fact it became apparent here for almost the first time, that the Germans in spite of their anxiety to attain their objective, were endeavouring to spare their troops. For the first time I heard the general comment among officers, that the artillery was now the main arm in modern warfare, and the infantry its support. I think this potential failure of their programme dawned on the Germans even before it did on the Russians; for while all eyes were still on the Southern Front, the Germans were reinforcing and pushing their Northern attack which aimed to hit through Pultusk and Wyszkow to the Petrograd-Warsaw line at Lochow. Perhaps after the first two weeks in the South this really was their greatest aim. Personally I think their chance for inflicting a disaster slipped when they failed to defeat definitely, or destroy the army of Loesche. To him and to the left flanking corps of Evert, must be accorded the credit of saving this sector with all its menaces to the future of the campaign and perhaps the whole European situation. For the last two weeks before the abandonment of Warsaw, these two great battles, one in the North and one in the South, were raging simultaneously.

I left Cholm for the last time on July 22, feeling that the fate of Warsaw would not be decided from that quarter, and, for the balance of the campaign, divided my time between the South Vistula armies and those defending the Narew line. It now became clear that the great menace lay from the Northern blow, and here we have a very similar story to that of the Southern army. With terrific drives the enemy took Przasnys, Ciechanow, Makow and at last Pultusk, and finally succeeded in getting across the Narew with ten divisions of excellent troops. On this Front, to the best of my judgment, the Germans at this time had 131 battalions of their very best available troops and perhaps fifteen reserve battalions with their usual heavy artillery support. When the crossing of the Narew was accomplished it seemed inevitable that Warsaw must fall and immediately the civil evacuation of the city began.

It seemed then that the Germans might in a few days drive through to the railroad, and to save the army in Warsaw an immediate evacuation in hot haste would prove imperative. But the Russian Army defending this sector rallied just as their brothers did in the South. The German drive on Wyszkow took them within 4 versts of the town, while the Russian counter-attack threw them back fifteen, with heavy losses in casualties and prisoners. Then there began here the same sort of slow stubborn fighting that for weeks had been progressing in the South; only here the German advances were slower, and the attainment of their objective less certain. About the same time (July 25-26) the Germans made a try on the Warsaw line itself, but failed miserably, and abandoned any serious effort against the new Blonie line to which the Russians, in order to get the most out of their men and to shorten their line, had withdrawn. It must never be forgotten that the Russian Front was 1,200 miles long, and the inability to supply it with men and munitions had made it necessary to shorten their Front to get the best results from their numbers. It is hard to say what numbers both belligerents had, and even if I knew exactly our strength the censor would not pass my statement. I think it safe to say however, that during these days the Austro-German forces outnumbered the Russians by at least 50 per cent., counting effectives only. This shortening left simply Warsaw itself with its Blonie line from Novo-Georgievsk to Gorakalwara in Russian hands west of the Vistula.

By the 27th-28th of July there came a wave of hope, and those who had lost all optimism picked up their courage once more. I know from the very best authority that up to August 1 it was hoped that Warsaw might still be saved, though every preparation was being made for its evacuation. The cause of this burst of optimism was due to the fact that the terrific German blows both North and South were not gaining the headway that had been expected. Besides, the Russians were getting more and more ammunition, and it seemed more than possible that the Germans might fail of their objective if only they did not receive increasing reinforcements. These two great battles North and South, each seeming equally important, had drawn everything that could be spared to either one point or the other. It was clear then that there must be some link in the chain weaker than the others, and the Germans set out to find this.

Without weakening for a moment their attacks on their main objectives, they began (with new reinforcements) to spear about for a point against which to launch still a third attack. Several attempts disclosed the Russians in strength, but at last the enemy discovered that the weakest spot was on the Vistula south of Warsaw. As this was the easiest to defend on account of the river being approximately the line, the Russians had fewer troops and thus the Germans were able to effect a crossing of the river. I am not able to state absolutely the day or the place of crossing, but I am inclined to place it about July 27-28, and I think the first crossing was near the mouth of the Radomika, while I believe another was made about the same date somewhere near the mouth of the Pilica river. The enemy gained an initial advantage at first, but as usual was driven back by a counter-attack, though he still held his position on the East bank of the river.

At this time, as nearly as I can estimate, there were four Russian army corps defending the Blonie line from Novo-Georgievsk to Gorakalwara. With this strength the few sporadic attacks of the Germans were futile. When the first crossing of the Vistula developed, the corps which stood near Gorakalwara crossed the river and countered the northerly crossing, while troops from the neighbouring army to the South, covered the menace on that portion of the line, and it was believed that the enemy had failed here in his objective which it was thought was the Warsaw-Brest line at Nova Minsk. It was believed and probably rightly, that even the three remaining corps on the Blonie line could hold that front, and that the balance had been re-established, for the Russians hoped that the Germans had in their fighting line all the loose formations which were immediately available. About July 30-August 1, the Germans developed three new divisions (believed to have come from France), and these crossed the river, giving them practically two whole corps against half the strength of Russians. It is possible that even these odds might have been overcome by the stubbornness of the Russian soldier, but the Russians learned that three Austrian divisions, said to have come from the Serbian Front were available in immediate support.

From this moment it was evident that Warsaw was doomed. To weaken the Front on the Blonie line meant a break there, and re-inforcements could not be sent either from the Narew line or the Southern Front where actions still raged. It was then clearly a mate in a few moves, if the Russians waited for it. But they did not. Instantly began their military evacuation, the cleverness of which must I think be credited to Alexieff and his brilliant Chief of Staff Goulevitch. Those of us who have been studying the Warsaw situation for ten months, imagined that when the evacuation came, if it ever did, it would be through the city. What happened was entirely unexpected. The corps at Gorakalwara slipped over the river on pontoon bridges in the night, supporting the first corps that was already there, effecting the double purpose of getting out of the Warsaw zone, and simultaneously coming in between the Germans and the line of retreat toward Brest. About the same time the corps that lay next to the Vistula, on the Northern end of the Blonie line, slipped out over pontoon bridges and went to support the Narew defenders, thus making impossible the immediate breaking of that line. On August 4, by noon, there was probably not over one corps on the West side of the Vistula. Half of that crossed south of Warsaw before six, and probably the last division left about midnight, and at three a.m. the bridges were blown up. The Germans arrived at six in the morning, which seemed to indicate that they were not even in touch with the Russian rearguard at the end.

What I have written above is to the best of my information the outline of the Warsaw situation, but it may be in details somewhat inaccurate, though I think the main points are correct. In any case there is no question that the whole withdrawal was cleverly accomplished, and in perfect order, and that when the Germans finally closed in, they found an abandoned city. Their reports of having carried Warsaw by storm are undoubtedly true to the extent that they were in contact with some of the last troops to leave. Probably the trenches that they carried by storm were held by a battalion or two of soldiers protecting the rearguard. That the great body had gone long before the Germans know perfectly well, and their claims of having carried the city by assault would, I dare say, bring a smile even to the stolid face of the German soldier.

During all these operations the Germans had at least five shells to the Russians, one, and but for this great superiority they never would have pushed back either the line of the Narew or the Cholm-Lublin line. Russia could not convert her resources into ammunition, and Germany, who for forty years has lived for this day, could. To this fact she owes her capture of Warsaw. The Allies may be assured that Russia stayed until the last minute and the last shell, and then extricated herself from an extremely dangerous position, leaving the enemy to pounce on the empty husk of a city from which had been taken every movable thing of military value. The defence of and final escape from Warsaw is one of the most spectacular and courageous bits of warfare that history presents, and undoubtedly the fair-minded German admits it in his own heart regardless of the published statements of the Staff.

CONCLUSION