Before we decide our policy as to withdrawal or otherwise from Russia it is necessary to know whether we have contracted any obligations to the Russian people, and what is the nature of such obligations, if any. Are they moral, military, or political?

Towards the end of 1914, when our army had been driven back behind the Marne and the future of Europe and our Empire was in the balance, frantic appeals were made by British statesmen, and even by still more august authority, asking Russia to rush to our aid and save us from destruction. This appeal was backed by British public and Labour opinion, and through our Press made a profound impression upon the Russian people. The Russian Government, regardless of their best military advice, forced their partially mobilised legions to make a rapid flying raid into East Prussia, which immediately reduced the pressure upon our own armies and made the victory of the Marne possible. Hurriedly mobilised, imperfectly equipped, not too brilliantly led, these legions, constituting the chivalry of Russia, became the prey of Prussia's perfect military machine. The Russian Government never dared to tell the Russian peasant the number of Russian souls who were mutilated by high explosives and smothered in the cold Masurian marshes in that sublime effort to save her friends. Russia lost as many men in saving Paris during that raid as did all the other Allies in the first year of the war.

Russia continued to fight and mobilise until 1917, by which time she had collected a huge army of over twelve million men. The Hohenzollern dynasty and its military advisers came to the conclusion that it would soon be impossible to stem this human tide by ordinary military means, and having a complete understanding of Russian psychology through its dynastic and administrative agents, decided to undermine the moral of the Russian people. German "Black Books" were not employed against British leaders exclusively. We need not wonder at the rapid spread among Russians of suspicion against their civil and military leaders when we remember that the same sort of propaganda admittedly influenced the administration of justice in England. The people of Russia were true to their friends, demoralisation and decomposition began at the head, rapidly filtering down to the lowest strata of society.

If the Allied cause was deserted, it was the desertion of a ruling class, not of a people or its army. German treachery wormed its way in at the top, and so destroyed a great race it never could have conquered.

Having disorganised the Russian military machine, Germany sent her agents to continue the disorder and prevent recovery. She secured the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and made a levy of several hundred millions sterling upon her bailiffs, whom she put in possession of her neighbour's property. Lenin and Trotsky found anarchy the most effective weapon to further the interest of their masters and protect their Eastern flank. A peace which virtually extended German conquest to the hinterland of Tsing-Tchau was dangerous to every civilising influence in the Far East.

The Bolshevik treaty was not less dangerous to Europe herself, since it brought a war-like population of one hundred and eighty millions within the sphere of German military influence.

The British Expeditionary Force was ordered to Siberia in June, 1918, to assist the orderly elements of Russian society to reorganise themselves under a national Government and to resurrect and reconstruct the Russian front. Firstly, to enable Russia to resist German aggression; secondly, to weaken German military power on the Western front, where at that time she was again delivering hammer-blows at the gates of Paris. This expedition was approved by every party and patriot in Britain, and the only criticism offered at the time was that it should have been so long delayed. Soviet power under German and Austrian direction had released the German and Austrian prisoners of war, armed and organised them into formidable armies to perform the double task of maintaining their creatures in power at Moscow and extending their domination over a helpless friendly Allied Power.

There was every reason for treating the Dictatorship of Lenin and Trotsky as a mere side-show of the German military party; they were, in fact, a branch of the military problem with which the Allies were bound to deal. Under Entente direction anti-Bolshevik Governments were established, and were promised the unstinted help of the Allies to recover their territory and expel the agents of the enemy who had so foully polluted their own home. It was on this understanding that Admiral Koltchak, by herculean efforts, hurled the German hirelings over the Urals, and awaited near Vatka the advance of the Allies from Archangel preparatory to a march on Petrograd. Alas! he waited for seven long months in vain; the Allies never came! After expending his last ounce of energy and getting so near to final victory, we failed him at the post. Why?

The menace to our own armies in France had disappeared; there was, I suppose, no longer an urgent necessity to re-establish the Russian front, though the possibility of such re-establishment had kept huge German forces practically demobilised near the Russian and Ukrainian frontiers. Koltchak and his gallant comrade Denikin had served the Entente purpose. Lenin and Trotsky, by wholesale intimidation and murder, had aroused the enthusiasm of similarly disposed compatriots in Allied countries. These compatriots were becoming noisy in the constituencies. The establishment of order to enable the Russian people to establish a clean democratic Government, and arise from their nightmare of unbridled anarchy, while very desirable in itself, was not a good party cry in any of the Western democracies. I grant all these things; but what about honour? Has this no longer any place in the political curriculum of the Allied Powers?

These are only some of the things it is necessary to remember before we finally decide to desert a temporarily sick friend. If I were the ruler of a state I should pray the gods to preserve me from half-hearted Allies and over-cautious friends. If I wished to help a fallen state or lend an honest hand in a great cause, whether it were to eradicate a hideous and fatal national malady or assert a principle of right and justice, first shield me from the palsy of Allied diplomacy! One clear-sighted, honest helper is worth a dozen powerful aiders whose main business is to put obstacles in each other's way.

If we were discussing the question of Allied interference before the fact, I could give many reasons for remaining neutral; but we have to recognise that for their own purposes they have interfered, that their Military Missions and forces have been operating in the country for over a year, during which time they have made commitments and given pledges of a more or less binding character. That these commitments and pledges are not the irresponsible acts of subordinates on the spot, but have been made by Allied statesmen, both in and out of their several Parliaments; and in this respect our national leaders are no exception to the rule. Without filling my pages with quotations, readers will be able to find and tabulate such for themselves. So categorical are the nature of these that it is impossible to imagine them to have been made without fully understanding their import and significance to the orderly section of the Russian people who, on the faith of these pledges, gave us their trust.

It cannot, therefore, be a discussion upon interference or non-interference; that has long since been disposed of by our words and acts. It is now a question whether we shall withdraw from Russia because we have thought fit to change our attitude to the Russian problem. It is certain that our decision to-day upon this subject will decide our future relations with this great people. If you desert a friend in his hour of need, you cannot expect that he will be particularly anxious to help you when he has thrown off his ill-health and is in a position to give valuable help to those who gave succour in his distress.

If our desertion turns this people from us, they will become the prey of our recent enemies, and if that happens we can prate about the Treaty of Paris as much as we like. The Teuton will have more than balanced the account.