The lack of Allied cohesion produced by the defection of American policy from that of the European Powers may change completely the status and future of American enterprise in Siberia. America has transformed a friendly population into at least a suspicious, if not a hostile, one. Japan, on the other hand, has steadily pursued her special interests and taken full advantage of every American mistake, until she is now looked upon as the more important of the two.

The attitude of Japan to the Russian problem made a complete somersault in the course of the year August, 1918, to August, 1919. When Japan sent her 12th Division, under General Oie, to the Ussurie in 1918, she did so with a definite policy. Her ambitions were entirely territorial in character; they doubtless remain so. The line of her advance has, however, completely changed. In 1918 she had made up her mind that Germany was bound to win the war; that Russia was a conquered country; that any day she might be called upon to repudiate her English alliance and her Entente engagements, and assist Germany and her Bolshevik Allies in driving the Entente Powers from the eastern end of the Tsar's dominions. Provided Germany defeated the Allies on the Western front, as she confidently anticipated, this task was well within her power. So insignificant was the task assigned to her in this eventuality that she confidently expected the immediate surrender of such scattered Allied and American forces as would find themselves marooned in this back end of the world. Believing this to be the position, she acted accordingly, treating the Russians and the other Allied forces in the stupidly arrogant manner I have already described. With the naÏvetÉ of a young Eastern prodigy she not only made demands upon her Allies, but at the same time made definite proposals to such Russian authorities as retained a precarious control over the territory she had already assigned to herself. On landing her troops at Vladivostok she presented, through her proper diplomatic agents, to the commander of that province a set of proposals which would have placed her in control of the Russian maritime provinces. The Russian commander asked that these demands should be put in writing, and the Japanese agent, after some demur, agreed, on the understanding that the first demands should not be considered as final but only as an instalment of others to come. The first proposal was that Japan should advance the commander 150,000,000 roubles (old value) and the commander should sign an agreement giving Japan possession of the foreshore and fishing rights up to Kamchatka, a perpetual lease of the Engilsky mines, and the whole of the iron (less that belonging to the Allies) to be found in Vladivostok.

The Town Commander appears to have been quite honest about the business, for in correspondence he pointed out that he was not the Government of Russia, neither could he sign the property or rights of Russia away in the manner suggested. The Japanese reply was simple and to the point: "Take our money and sign the agreement, and we will take the risks about the validity." The old Directorate, with Avkzentieff, Bolderoff & Co. standing sponsors for the Russian Convention, were supposed to control Russian affairs at this time. Directly the commandant refused to agree to the Japanese demands they transferred their claims to the old Directorate. The Directorate sent Evanoff Renoff to "Vlady" to conduct the negotiations, and I suppose to collect the money. When I was at "Vlady," in June, 1919, huge stores of iron were being collected, and some of it had already been shipped to Japan. Avkzentieff was exiled and Bolderoff was living in comfort and safety in Japan. These were the things that were above and could be seen; what happened to the other part of the first instalment of Japanese proposals for "helping" Russia will doubtless be known later.

At the end of August, 1918, it was decided that until some sort of central authority to act as the organ of Government was set up, it was futile to hope for the return of orderly government. For this purpose the British went forward to Omsk and asked the Japanese to do likewise. The Japanese would not move, first because they wished to consolidate their power in the provinces nearest Japan, and secondly secure as many concessions as possible before America arrived on the scene. When America did arrive she still tarried to watch American operations. The British moved off into the unknown with a 5,000-mile line of unguarded communications; the Japanese, true to type, opened negotiations with the Directorate for the absolute possession of the railway to the Urals, and also asked what concessions she could expect to receive, territorial and mineral, as compensation for the use of her army for the Directorate's protection. A convention had just been signed, or was on the point of signature, between the Japanese and the Directorate, placing the entire railway under Japanese hands, when the Directorate fell. The first act of the Supreme Governor, Admiral Koltchak, was to inform the Japanese that the change in the Government involved a change in policy with regard to the advance of Japanese troops and the occupation of the railway. The Japanese protested, but the admiral stood firm.

This attitude of the Supreme Governor was a serious setback to Japanese policy, and they became alarmed for their position in the Far East should his authority extend in that direction; but it is not difficult as a rule to find tools for any kind of work in Russia. Ataman Semianoff had for some time been kept by the Japanese in reserve for such an occasion. His forces were ranged around Chita, and his influence and authority extended from the Manchurian border to Lake Baikal. On receiving intimation of the change in policy from Admiral Koltchak, the Japanese ordered Semianoff to repudiate the Supreme Governor's authority; they gave the same instructions to Kalmakoff, who occupied a similar position on the Ussurie Railway and so placed an effective barrier between themselves, their Eastern concessions, and the Supreme Governor. The Supreme Governor ordered his Staff to clear these two mutineers off the line, but the Japanese Staff informed the Supreme Governor that these two Russian patriots and their forces were under the protection of Japan, and if necessary they would move the Japanese Army forward to their succour.

The successful resistance of Semenoff and Kalmakoff to the Omsk Government, backed up by the armed forces of one of the Allies, had a disastrous effect upon the situation throughout Siberia. If Semianoff and Kalmakoff could, with Allied help and encouragement, openly deride the Omsk Government's orders, then it was clear to the uninitiated that the Allies were hostile to the supreme Russian authority. If Semianoff and Kalmakoff can wage successful hired resistance to orderly government at the bidding of a foreign Power, why cannot we do so, to retain the land and property we have stolen and prevent the proper administration of justice for the crimes we have committed? It was intended as a deliberate attack upon authority and an incentive to the disorderly elements to continue the prevailing anarchy. A united, well organised Russia is not the kind of Russia Japan wishes to see established. If Japan is to succeed in her territorial ambitions in the Far East, Russia must be kept in a state of mental disorder and physical paralysis. Germany used the Russian love of conspiracy and intrigue to create disorder and destroy the Muscovite power; Japan intends, if possible, to continue that disorder for her own political reasons.

Directly it became known that Semianoff and Kalmakoff had set the Omsk Government at defiance, numerous other would-be Semenoffs came on the scene until the very residence of the Supreme Governor and his Headquarters Staff scarcely escaped attack, and it became necessary to show the British Tommy on the side of order. This was the position up till the early days of December, 1918.

Just about this time the fact that Germany was beaten began to take shape in the Japanese military mind, and the fact was hammered home by the terms of the Armistice. For some days the Japanese Mission at Omsk flatly refused to believe the cables; their national pride refused to admit that they had so far misunderstood the power of Britain and her Allies. It was a terrible awakening to the self-styled "Lords of the East" that all their schemes should be brought to nought, that British and American squadrons might be expected to cruise in the Sea of Japan, and perhaps hold the scales fair between her and her temporarily helpless neighbour. I do not suppose it will ever come to that, but such was her fear. From this time on, while the objects of Japan in Siberia were still the same, she pursued them by quite different methods.

The first sign of change was that Japanese soldiers were allowed to salute British officers and were no longer allowed to use the butts of their rifles on inoffensive Russian citizens. Their military trains no longer conveyed contraband goods to their compatriots who had acquired the Russian business houses in the main trading centres along the railway. The Staff no longer commandeered the best buildings in the towns for alleged military purposes and immediately sub-let them to private traders. Japan at once re-robed herself with the thin veil of Western morals and conduct which she had rapturously discarded in 1914. While Hun methods were in the ascendancy she adopted the worst of them as her own. She is in everything the imitator par excellence, and therefore apparently could not help herself.

The British and French mildly protested against the attitude of Japan towards Semianoff and Kalmakoff, but it was continued until the anarchy created threatened to frustrate every Allied effort. Not until the Peace Conference had disclosed the situation did a change in policy take place. From this time on the conduct of Japan (both civil and military) became absolutely correct. President Wilson brought forward his famous, but impossible, proposal that the different Russian belligerents should agree to an armistice and hold a conference on the Turkish "Isle of Dogs." If patriotism is the maintenance of such rules of human conduct and national life as will justify one man in killing another, then no Russian patriot could meet in friendly conference those who had destroyed and murdered their own country and people. Russia during the previous two years had shown that there could be no compromise between anarchy and order, or their several adherents. This was, however, the policy of America, and as such received the blessing of every representative, Jew or Gentile, of the U.S.A. in Siberia. Japan saw a kink in the American armour and took full advantage of the chance to damage U.S.A. prestige. She rallied Russian patriotism to her side by advising that no notice be taken of this harebrained suggestion. Japan's advice received the secret blessing of both French and English who knew the situation, though in our case we had to admit that the British Premier had stood sponsor for this international monstrosity. This gave Japanese diplomacy its first clear hold upon Russian patriotism and enabled her to appear as a true friend of orderly government.

American diplomacy in Russia had received its first great shock, but with careful handling it was still possible to recover the lost ground. With the utter failure of the "Isle of Dogs" policy, Russian rage quickly subsided and a normal condition soon returned. The Allies had received a salutary warning, and most of them took the hint, but America continued on her debatable course. Having failed diplomatically to effect a compromise, she tried to force her views by military means. The neutral zone system of her commanders was the natural outcome of President Wilson's proposal. The intention was excellent, that the results would be disastrous was never in doubt. It forced the American command to adopt a sort of local recognition of the Red Army within the zone, and enabled the Japanese to appear as the sole friend of Russian order. The Japanese were attacked by Red forces collected in these zones, with American soldiers standing as idle spectators of some of the most desperate affairs between Red and Allied troops. Japan was entitled to reap the kudos such a situation brought to her side, while America could not expect to escape the severest censure.

Profiting by the blunders of her great antagonist, Japan managed in six months to recover all the ground she had lost while suffering under the illusion of a great Hun victory that was to give her the Lordship of the East. From a blustering bandit she has become a humble helper of her poor, sick, Russian neighbour. In which role she is most dangerous time will show. The world as a rule has little faith in sudden conversions.

This, then, was the situation in the Far East in June, 1919. As I was leaving Vladivostok I heard that the Red forces that had been organised in the American neutral zones had at last boldly attacked their protectors. If this was correct, it may be the reason why Admiral Koltchak was able to report their defeat and rout over the Chinese border and we were back again at the point at which British and Czech co-operation had arrived a year previously.