At 11 A.M. on November 18 I was officially informed that the Council of Ministers had met at 9 A.M., and were now in session, having met to consider the situation produced by the arrest of the Directorate. They had already asked Admiral Koltchak to accept supreme authority, that he had refused, but the Ministers had great hope that for the sake of Russia the admiral could be prevailed upon to take the burden of Government upon himself, as it appeared to be the only means of getting the country out of her desperate situation. The wildest rumours were in circulation: that my carriage would be attacked by bombs, that the British would at any time be obliged to fight for their lives. I told my informants that they need not worry about us; we were well able to take care of ourselves. They could not understand our indifference. The fact was that not a man or officer in my battalion had the slightest inkling of the position. Then the tune changed. Would I defend the Ministers who were still in session if they were attacked? My answer was that any political refugee who sought asylum in my lines would be protected, but he must give up every idea of again taking any part in Russian affairs. "But what would you do if the Russian troops revolted and sought to murder those who had come into your lines. Would you give them up?" "Never!" "What if the Czech commanders made the demand?" "Still never; besides which the Czechs are too honourable ever to make a demand such as no soldier could accept." The last question was the most important of all, and was doubtless the kernel of the whole series, the others being mere camouflage.

The Czechs had just inaugurated their National Republican Government, and were naturally obsessed with the usual "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" business, and could not be expected to view the establishment of a Dictatorship within their sphere of operations with entire unconcern or without serious misgivings. The hostile attitude of the Russian branch of their National Council at Ekaterinburg and Chilliyabinsk, directly they heard of Koltchak's acceptance of the supreme authority, is proof of the danger which might evolve from that quarter.

The Council of Ministers, and perhaps Koltchak himself, were unable to take the final plunge until they had a thorough understanding of the British attitude. The position of the Czech forces at Omsk made it impossible for them to approach the place where the Ministers were in session without passing the British, and my machine guns commanded every avenue leading to or from the Russian Headquarters.

Things were now in such a state of tension that for the safety of my command I informed both the Russian and Czech authorities that I should not allow bodies of troops or citizens either to approach or collect near my cantonment; that such approach or collection would be treated as hostile, and dealt with accordingly. That these arrangements gave the Ministers greater confidence to proceed with their policy I have no doubt. That was one of the inevitable consequences of the preparations for our own defence, but not the inspiration of their policy, which was entirely their own; but it did steady the situation.

I place these facts on record that those who are interested may be able to give them their proper order of value and importance. I afterwards learnt that more than one highly-placed official's wife had all preparations made for a rapid descent upon the Middlesex quarters.

About 2.30 P.M., November 18, I was informed that Admiral Koltchak had assumed absolute power under the title of "Supreme Governor," with a Council of Ministers who would be responsible to him for the proper performance of their duties; that he proposed to call on the French representative, Monsieur Renault, to present himself in the evening; that he would then call on me, as the senior British officer in Omsk, and in my case he would answer any questions I chose to put to him. He called, and it is as well to place here the report I made upon the subject at the time:

From Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward, M.P., C.M.G., Omsk, Siberia.

To G.O.C. China Command. Through B.M.M. H.Q.

Headquarters B.M.M., Vladivostok.

SIR,—For State reasons I deem it necessary to give the following information that it may be forwarded home to the proper authorities.

About 2.30 P.M. on November 18, 1918, my liaison officer (Colonel Frank, of the Russian Army) informed me that at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, just held, the Council had offered to place supreme sovereign power in the hands of Admiral Alexander Koltchak. The admiral had first refused to accept, but that such pressure had been applied to force him to accept that he had at last reluctantly consented.

Further, that Admiral Koltchak had assumed the title of "Supreme Governor of all Russia," and was calling upon the French Ambassador in the evening, after which he would call on me as the Senior British Officer holding official position in Omsk.

About 9 P.M. Admiral Koltchak called at my headquarters. The following gentlemen were present to receive him: Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Neilson, Captain Stephani, Colonel R. Frank (Russian Army), and Mr. Frazer (Times correspondent). He wore the full dress of a Russian admiral.

The admiral, who speaks fair English, informed me of the circumstances and reasons for his assumption of supreme authority in all Russia.

An attempt had been made to combine all parties in the Government of the country to reduce it to a state of order, so that the people might be able to decide the future Government of Russia. The Council chosen by the Ufa Assembly had tried to work together for this purpose, but had failed. The final dissolution had been brought about by a proclamation issued by the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionary party, which was intended to produce in the new army the same conditions that had destroyed the old army. The proclamation had been signed by the Social Revolutionary President, Chernoff, and when it was proposed to take action against those who were destroying the discipline of the army, two Social Revolutionary members of the Council, Avkzentieff and Zenzinoff, could see nothing wrong in Chernoff's subversive propaganda. It later transpired that both were members of the Social Revolutionary Committee which had issued the literature in question, and refused to either leave the Social Revolutionary Committee or repudiate the anti-discipline propaganda of their friends.

This brought the new Government to a complete standstill, and, faced with absolute anarchy, the Council of Ministers had no alternative but to dissolve the old Directorate of Five and centre the supreme power in one person, to whom the Council of Ministers would be responsible for the administration of their several departments.

I answered that the reasons, coupled with my own knowledge, appeared to justify the action, but I had heard that the Social Revolutionary members of the Directorate and others had been arrested, and that if this action supposed their execution it would make the whole proceeding look like an attempt on the part of the old army officers to destroy the present arrangements in favour of a return to the old rÉgime. Further, if the people of England thought this was the policy of the admiral and his friends, they would not only lose the friendly sympathy of the English people but also of America and France.

Admiral Koltchak replied that at the moment he did not know the whereabouts of the prisoners, but he would make inquiries and inform me later. That his sole object in burdening himself with the overwhelming responsibilities of Supreme Governor of Russia in this sad hour of her history was to prevent the extremists on either side continuing the anarchy which made the establishment of a free constitution impossible. That if his action at any future time was not in harmony with the establishment of free political institutions as understood by the Democracy of England, he would be convinced that he had failed.

I thanked him for his good opinion of my country, and called his attention to the letter of His Majesty the King to President Wilson, received at Omsk on November 14, 1918, in which the principles of democracy and freedom were exalted, and warned him that the free peoples of the world would resist any attempt to force the Russian people back under a system of tyranny and despair.

Admiral Koltchak replied that he had read the letter of His Majesty the King of England, and his one hope was that soon Russia might enjoy the blessing of equally free institutions.

Omsk, Siberia, November, 20, 1918.

From Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward, M.P., C.M.G., Omsk, Siberia.

To G.O.C. China Command. Through B.M.M.

Headquarters B.M.M., Vladivostok.

Further Report on Political Crisis in Russia.

Following my report of the assumption by Admiral Koltchak of the supreme Governorship of Russia, I wish to add:

As I was unable to secure any official information relative to the whereabouts of the members of the Directorate who had been made prisoners during the night of November 17, I wrote to the Russian authorities (through Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Neilson) on the night of the 18th requesting information upon the subject. On November 19, in the absence of information, I sent the following letter direct to Admiral Koltchak, the Supreme Governor:

OMSK, 19.11.18. 3 P.M.

From Colonel Ward.
To Admiral Koltchak.

After our interview last evening I sent you a note (through Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Neilson) asking for information and some guarantee for the imprisoned members of the Council.

So far I have received no information upon the subject.

I have already told you that I am sure my country would look with grave concern upon any injury inflicted without proper trial upon these prisoners of State, and I should esteem it as a favour if you can supply me with information upon this subject.— Yours sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN WARD (Lt.-Col.).

Colonel Frank, my liaison officer, took the letter to Russian Headquarters, and on his return informed me that the admiral thanked me for my letter and that he was pleased to be able to allay my fears.

Three officers, named Lieutenant-Colonel Krasilnikoff, Colonel Volkov, and Lieutenant-Colonel Katanaev, had presented themselves at Headquarters and reported that they took upon themselves the entire responsibility for the arrest of the members of the old Russian Government, that they had not injured them in any way, that they were prepared to hand their prisoners over to the authorities, together with several millions of roubles, believed to be loot, and papers which they had found in their possession. That the admiral had placed the prisoners under a strong guard of his own, and had placed the three officers under arrest to be tried by court-martial.

He further promised that no harm should come to them, and that he proposed to convey them out of the country at the earliest opportunity.

November 20. 1 P.M.

Admiral Koltchak, hearing that a supply guard of my battalion was returning to Vladivostok, has made request that I would allow the railway cars conveying the State prisoners to some unknown point on the Chinese frontier to be attached to my train for purposes of secrecy and additional safety. I have consented, and have strengthened the guard for this purpose.

Omsk, Siberia, November, 21, 1918.

[COPY.]

From Second-Lieutenant P.C. Cornish-Bowden, 25th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.

To The Adjutant, 25th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.

Sir,—I have the honour to report for the information of the Commanding Officer:

1. The train conveying the four Russian political exiles (Messrs. Avkzentieff, Argunoff, Rogovsky, and Zenzinoff) and the Russian guard, together with a detachment of British troops under my command, left Omsk about 2 A.M. on November 21, and arrived at Harbin on November 27. The journey was quiet. Most of the larger towns, where trouble was anticipated, were passed at night.

2. I have since been informed by the officer commanding the Russian guard that all traffic between Irkutsk and Chita was stopped by order of General Semianoff, and that the trains were searched for the exiles after we had passed, but I have no evidence in support of this.

3. The exiles expressed the greatest possible gratitude for the presence of British troops, and said that they mistrusted their own Russian guard, though I saw nothing whatever at any time to lead me to believe their suspicions were well founded.

4. On arrival at Harbin the exiles strongly petitioned me to accompany the train to Chang-Chun, and the officers in charge of the Russian guard being quite willing, I decided to accompany the train to the Chinese-Manchurian frontier. We reached Chang-Chun about 2 A.M. on November 28, and the exiles left that place by themselves by train on the evening of the same day.

5. We reached Harbin again on the 29th inst., where I parted company with the Russian guard. We reached Vladivostok on the morning of December 2. I immediately reported to the O.C. Detachment, and I reported the before-mentioned facts verbally to General Knox.

6. The conduct of the N.C.O. and men of my detachment on the journey was very good, and no increase of sickness took place amongst them.—I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed) P.C. CORNISH-BOWDEN (Second-Lieutenant).

Vladivostok, Siberia, December 2, 1918.

I had already gained enough experience of revolutions to know that if I did not press my point vigorously Avkzentieff and Co. were as dead as mutton. I also knew that my countrymen have a rooted dread of dictatorships, and that if Admiral Koltchak's assumption of power was either connected with or promoted by the execution of his opponents without trial, assistance or eventual recognition by the British Government would be made almost impossible. My own agents had discovered the place where the prisoners were detained, also that they were to be quietly bayoneted in the night, as shooting would attract attention. I was also certain that Koltchak knew nothing about this. The whole business was in the hands of an Officers' Revenge Society, a body who had sworn an oath to kill just the number of Bolshevik Revolutionaries as there had been officers murdered by Trotsky's and Avkzentieff's people. Both parties had similar combinations which left the marks of their foul deeds on the streets every night.

The state of affairs was such that only by a dictatorship could the most rudimentary order be maintained. I, a democrat, believing in government of the people by the people, thought I saw in the dictator the one hope of saving the remnants of Russian civilisation and culture. Words and names have never frightened me. If circumstances force on me a problem for solution, I never allow preconceived notions and ideas formed in the abstract, without the experience of the actual then existing facts, to warp my judgment in deciding the issue; and I am vain enough to believe that, had the same situation presented itself to Englishmen generally, nine out of ten would act as I did. I merely "carried on." The traditions of our race and country did the rest.

Having, in my talk with the admiral and the report I made, accepted his position of Supreme Governor, I did not mean that he should be left to fight his way unaided against the enemies who surrounded him. In other words, while outwardly remaining neutral, I constantly made representations and gave advice, when asked, about everything, both internal and external; and here it may be interesting to our own people to know some of the problems which confronted the Supreme Governor. The Japanese question was the first. General Rosanoff was Bolderoff's Chief of Staff, and it was important to the Supreme Governor that he should get the hang of outstanding matters and also make himself fairly acquainted with the policy of the deposed Directorate. He interviewed General Rosanoff and the Staff generally, and discovered that after the fall of Samara the Bolshevik army moved rapidly towards Ufa, and the Directorate became so alarmed that they demanded some definite policy from the Commander-in-Chief as to how he proposed to deal with this menace. Bolderoff never thought of effectively organising the new Russian army, but suggested that things were so critical, and that England, France, and America were so slow, that the only alternative was to invite the Japanese to push their army forward to the Urals. This was exactly what Japan wanted, but the Japanese Staff demanded as a quid pro quo to their advance to Ekaterinburg and Chilliyabinsk that they should be placed in absolute possession of the railway and telegraph lines to those points. Bolderoff and the Directorate boggled at this for a time, but as the Bolsheviks began to get close to Ufa, and also concentrated an army of about one hundred thousand men for an offensive towards Ekaterinburg, the situation became so pressing that the Directorate gave way, and a few days before the coup d'État Bolderoff had sent word to the Japanese that their terms were accepted.

The Japanese had made all preparations to move when Koltchak took the reins in his own hands. He asked my advice. I advised him to say to the Japanese that the change of Government had also involved a change of policy, and that it would be inadvisable for the Japanese to advance beyond their position at Chita until the subject had been further discussed. They made him many tempting offers of help, both arms and money, but he refused them all, and they were unable to move him from the position he had taken up.

A subject that led to unfortunate bickerings between Admiral Koltchak and the French was the appointment by the Allied Council of Paris of General Ganin as the Commander of the Allied and Russian Forces in Siberia.

It is too important an item in the general failure of Allied policy to pass over without mention. From the very nature of the case the main Allied effort was the formation and organisation of a new Russian army. Our policy was not to prop Russia on her feet, but to enable her to stand by herself. Major-General Knox had been sent out by the War Office to accomplish this purpose, and no more able or competent officer could have been appointed for the task.

General Knox had hardly begun to perform this duty when the French agents in Siberia became alarmed for their own position. Cables were dispatched to Europe pointing out the danger to French prestige which General Knox's mission entailed. If the English were to be made responsible for the reorganisation of the Russian Army, and were successful, this would tend to make New Russia rely more upon the English than the French, as had been the case hitherto; that it would be better to leave Russia without an army than have it organised under such influence. These senseless fears of our French friends found willing listeners in Paris. General Knox had already made some selections of officers and the business was well under way when a message from the Allied Council in Paris put an extinguisher on all his work. His orders were cancelled, and he was told to do nothing until a French commander had been appointed, whose name would be forwarded later.

By this uninformed Allied interference a well-thought-out scheme of army reorganisation was hung up for four of the most precious months to Russia. By the time General Ganin arrived the time for the project had passed and the whole business had been taken out of Allied hands.

The Russian situation at that time was such that four days' delay would have been fatal, and if nothing had been done for four months we should have been hunted out of the country.

Finding Allied jealousy so great as to render all their efforts impotent, first General Bolderoff and then his successor, the Supreme Governor, began to organise armies on their own for the protection of the people and their property. These armies were ill-equipped and badly disciplined—not the kind of armies which would have been raised had General Knox's plans been allowed to develop—but they performed their duty, they captured Perm, and had increased to over 200,000 before General Ganin appeared on the scene.

When General Ganin reported himself to the Supreme Governor with the Allied Council's orders to take over the command of the Allied and Russian forces in Siberia, he was met with a blank refusal from the Omsk Government.

I was consulted upon the question, and I am therefore able to give the reasons for their objection. The Omsk Government's position was a very simple one: "Had General Knox or any other Allied commander organised, paid, and equipped the new Russian army he would have naturally controlled it until such time as a Russian Government could have been established strong enough to have taken over the responsibility. The French would not allow this to be done, and we ourselves therefore undertook the duty. Having formed our own army in our own country, it is an unheard of proposal that we should be forced to place it under the command of a non-Russian officer. It would be derogatory to the influence and dignity of the Russian Government and lower the Government in the estimation of the people."

From this position they never retreated, but Allied bungling had landed General Ganin, who is himself an able and excellent officer, in a not very dignified position.

Bolderoff, as I have stated, was at the Ufa front when Koltchak assumed supreme power. He remained there in consultation with the Czech National Council and the members of the old Constituent Assembly for five or six days without a word as to his intentions. It was a critical position for Koltchak, who did not know what he was doing or intended to do. Hot-heads advised immediate action, but I suggested caution. The subject-matter of Bolderoff's conferences or whether he had any we do not know, but we do know this: General Dutoff, who commanded the Russian armies south of Ufa, had some proposals from Ufa put before him, and replied advising caution, as he had it on unimpeachable authority that the English were behind Admiral Koltchak. This statement, I was told, fell like a bombshell among the conspirators at Ufa, and soon after General Bolderoff returned to Omsk. There he interviewed Koltchak as Supreme Governor, and made satisfactory statement relative to his absence. He was offered a post, which he refused, stating that he wished to leave the country, as he did not believe that a dictatorship could help Russia out of her difficulties. His request was granted, and so ended a very different interview between these two men from that at Petropalovsk a few days before.

Some time after this the Japanese representative at Omsk made a request to be informed whether General Bolderoff had been forced to leave the country, or had left voluntarily. This was answered in a definite way in accordance with the facts. In the same note the Japanese also demanded to be informed whether the British Army had supplied the train and guard which had taken the exiled Social Revolutionary Members of the Directorate to Chang-Chun, on the Chinese frontier. This question was not answered quite so definitely, but the interest of the Japanese in these men shows how far the coup d'État had upset their plans relative to the occupation of the Urals.

The Supreme Governor issued definite orders to the different isolated sections of the Russian forces. All commanders obeyed these orders more or less except one, General Semianoff, whose headquarters were alongside that of the Japanese at Chita, from which he sent insolent refusals to recognise Koltchak's authority. Koltchak prepared to deal with this mutinous and buccaneering officer. The Japanese at once plainly informed the Omsk Government that General Semianoff was under their protection, and they would not allow the Russian Government to interfere with him.

Under Japanese protection this fellow continued to carry out indiscriminate executions and flogging of workmen until the whole district became depopulated, and the Allies were forced to demand an explanation from Japan for their extraordinary conduct. So fearful were they that their tool was about to be dealt with, that when the 1/9th Battalion of the Hampshire Territorial Regiment started from Vladivostok, the Japanese asked the Omsk Government whether these British troops were coming forward to attack General Semianoff. The answer we gave was that all movements of British troops were conducted by the British Military Mission, to whom they must apply for information. I never heard any more of their inquiries.

About this time a party of Cossacks, with a high officer at their head, called at the prison one night and produced to the governor an alleged order for the release of nine political prisoners. The [perhaps] unsuspecting governor handed his prisoners over; they were taken away, and next morning their friends found them shot. Someone ought to have been hanged, but Koltchak could find no one to hang. His Chief of Staff must have discovered some facts about the crime, but he refused to act. In fact, he did not acquaint the admiral about the crime until four days later when it had become public property. Koltchak was quite overcome, first with rage at the crime itself, and secondly at his impotence in being unable to prevent it. But Omsk went on the even tenor of its way: it is remarkable what horrors people can face without a tremor when they get used to them, as they must in revolutions.