The Attack in Trench Warfare

The objectives which must be dealt with in the attack of an intrenched position such as will be found on the western front are:

1. The trenches of the first line.

2. The supporting points.

3. The trenches of the second line.

By a study of the text preceding this you must realize that in the defense of these objectives there will be employed artillery, rifles, grenades and machine guns.

The first phase of the attack is the artillery preparation. In order that the infantry may make the attack with a minimum of losses, the artillery must have destroyed the wire entanglements and obstacles that obstruct the advance, or at least have sufficiently breached them to permit their being negotiated. The destruction of these obstacles is never complete. It would require too great an expenditure of ammunition. The infantry occupying the hostile trenches must be simply overwhelmed with artillery fire so that they will be unable to man the parapets when the assault is launched. During the artillery preparation the hostile infantry does not occupy their firing positions in the trenches but remain in their dugouts, which are fully protected from all but the heaviest shells. Only a few observers are left in the trenches.

When the bombardment against this particular part of the line ceases the infantry leave their dugouts and man the firing positions. To prevent this is one of the most important as well as most difficult tasks of the artillery. This may be effected by a well-directed fire on the exits to the dugouts with a view to caving them in and thus preventing the egress of the occupants The enemy may sometimes be induced to leave his shelter prematurely by the following ruse:

1. Cease the artillery fire.

2. Open a heavy rifle fire; this causes the enemy to believe that the assault has begun and he will man his parapets in strength.

3. After waiting for several minutes open the artillery again with even increased vigor.

The hostile infantry may be forced out of his dugouts by the use of shells and grenades containing suffocating gases which penetrate the shelters and make them untenable.

The artillery is also charged with putting the enemy's artillery out of action to prevent them from firing upon the attacking infantry.

If the enemy artillery is left free, it will shell our trenches and approaches, causing casualties and confusion and thus interfering with the formation for the attack. The location of hostile batteries is effected by aerial reconnaissance.

Another task of the artillery is to prevent the hostile reserves from coming up to reinforce their firing lines. These reserves will be located back in the second line until their presence is required at the front. As long as the artillery preparation continues they remain in the shelters, but as soon as it ceases they man the trenches. The artillery must therefore extend its fire to the second line and continue it while the first line is being rushed. Back of the second position the enemy holds strong reserves. The entrance of these into action must be prevented. This is accomplished by extending the curtain of fire still further to the rear. The supporting points must receive a lion's share of attention for, bristling with machine guns and trench mortars, they are the really dangerous elements to the infantry attack after it passes the first line trenches.

The weapon which inflicts the greatest losses on the assaulting infantry is the machine gun, which appears suddenly out of the ground and lays low whole units. By a careful reconnaissance these machine-gun positions are ferreted out and every possible means are taken to effect their destruction.

The effectiveness of the artillery preparation depends simply upon superiority of guns and munitions. In this respect we now possess a great advantage, for the state of our munition supply is such that our artillery may fire several shells to one of the enemy. This is what established the superiority.

The organization of the attacking infantry corresponds in a general way to the organization of the position being attacked. A first line of assault is organized. Its mission is the capture of the enemy's first line trenches. A second line follows, having for its mission the assault and capture of the second line trenches. A separate organization of these two lines is necessary for the reason that the first attacking line is generally so disorganized in the fighting that it no longer possesses the cohesion necessary to carry it through to the second line. It has been found necessary to launch a comparatively fresh and intact force against it.

As the first position is organized into several separate lines of defense, so also is the first attacking line organized and launched in two or more waves, those in rear being in the nature of reinforcements to those in front.

Each unit of the attacking line is assigned a distinct objective. Certain units are given the mission of attacking the supporting points to prevent their enfilading the units advancing through the intervals between them.

The main efforts are made along the lines between the supporting points, as to assault the latter would entail a casualty list not commensurate with the results. The effort against them is made with a view to neutralizing their effect. If the attack is successful in the intervals, the supporting points will fall as a result.

The waves of the first line are directed against the first position, the second against the second position. The reserves held under the orders of the division commander are employed where the development of the situation dictates.

Further to the rear, and under orders of the supreme commander, large bodies of reinforcements are held ready to be moved rapidly to points where progress has been made to such an extent that maneuver operations are practicable.

Preparatory to the assault, numerous saps (trenches) are run out to the front from the main firing trenches. The night before the attack, a parallel is broken out connecting the sap heads. This parallel is amply supplied with short ladders and is occupied by the companies composing the first wave of the attack. The saps and the main trenches are also filled with men assigned to the following waves, who will move into the parallel as soon as the first wave leaves it. As the artillery preparation ceases, the first waves rush up the ladders in succession and move out to the assault.

As the artillery preparation against the first line is completed and the curtain of fire shifted far into the enemy's position, the infantry of the first wave emerges from the parallel and moves out. The formation and gait depend upon the distance to the hostile trench. If the artillery preparation has been effective and the distance is not more than 100 yards, it is expected that the wave will be able to reach the fire trench without firing, except possibly when the wire is reached. If the distance is much greater than 100 yards, it is necessary to cover the advance with rifle fire. This is accomplished by a line of skirmishers deployed at extended intervals, which precedes the wave at about 50 yards. The wave starts out at a walk, carefully aligned. It afterwards takes up the double time and advances by rushes until the wire entanglements are reached.

From this moment the period of the charge and individual combat begins. The men can no longer be kept from firing. Each tries to protect himself with his rifle. Each man locates his opening in the wire through which he is to go and makes for it. The line reforms on the other side. With rifles at the high charge (a position to our old head parry, but slanting slightly upward from right to left) the line rushes upon the enemy. Each man runs straight towards the part of the trench in front of him and jumps upon the parapet. By rifle shots and bayonet thrusts he destroys everything in his way. Men selected in advance take charge of the prisoners. The line is reformed, lying down just beyond the fire trench, and fire is opened against the second line. Men are positively forbidden to enter the communication trenches. They are most inviting for cover, but a man rarely gets out of them.

The grenadier squad proceed to their work of clearing the fire and communication trenches.

The second wave of the first line starts forward at the moment the first wave reaches the hostile trenches. If it starts sooner, it will unite with the first at the entanglement and become involved in the fight for the fire trench. It will be broken up prematurely and will be unable to take advantage of the developments of the fight of the first wave. The reinforcement by the second wave and the disorganization produced by the assault lead to a mixture of units in the trenches of the first position. Before starting out to the assault of the next trench it is necessary that order be restored. When this is accomplished the attack is launched against the second line. In front of the supporting points the combat rages. The men are barely able to hold on the outer edges. In the interval the advance has reached high tide and has expanded like a wave and stopped. This is the limit that can be expected of the first line.

Hasty cover is prepared and advantage taken of such cover as may exist. All elements of the attack open fire on the second position.

Under the cover of these operations the second line has come up in a series of three lines, where it is built up compact at the position of the stopped first line. From this point its attack against the enemy's second line is launched. The lines are worked up to a point from which the assault is to be made, and when the time comes the first wave dashes out to the attack, followed by the second wave in the same manner as the assault against the first position was made.

The action of the two lines of attack may be expected to overwhelm the greater part of the two main hostile positions. At certain points, however, the resistance will hold out, and, if not overcome, will constitute points of support to which the enemy may bring up reinforcements and even turn the tide of battle by a counter attack.

To deal with these points that hold out, as well as with hostile reinforcements which may arrive, the reserve is launched into action, which brings the attack into the open ground beyond the second line of defense, and maneuver operations are begun. The mobile units are rapidly thrown into action, and large forces from the general reserve are hurried to the point where the lines of defense are broken through.

From what has gone before we may deduce that the following conditions must prevail to attain success in an attack on a prepared position:

1. The attack must be planned down to the most minute detail.

2. There must be a greatly superior force of artillery concentrated at the point of attack, and the artillery preparation must be thorough.

3. The infantry must be sufficient in number, training and morale to perform the tasks that will he demanded of them.

4. The arrangements for the supply of ammunition to the firing line must be planned and carried out in all its details.

5. Plans for meeting counter attacks must be thorough and complete. The capture of a position is often less difficult than its retention.

6. Finally, every officer and man must know exactly what he is to do.

Scouting and Patrolling
By
Capt. W. H. WALDRON
29th Infantry
Cloth Bound—Fits the Pocket
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The best, most complete and practical treatment of the subject that has been produced.

What To Do and How To Do It

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Endorsed by Leading Officers of the Army

Published and for sale by
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Tactical Talks
By Capt. W. H. Waldron, 29th Infantry

To the Reader:

The up-to-date method of instruction and training in Minor Tactics is this:

1. Prepare a tactical problem covering the subject under consideration.

2. Take the noncommissioned officers out on a TACTICAL WALK and make a solution of the various situations.

3. Follow this by taking the company out on a tactical exercise for the solving of the identical problem that you solved in the TACTICAL WALK.

This method will bring results that will surprise you. In the Tactical Walk, tactical situations are presented to the noncommissioned officers for practical solution on the ground and they are firmly impressed on the minds of the men. When the same problem is brought up for solution with the troops you will see your noncommissioned officers going about their various tasks in a business-like manner with a knowledge of what to do and how to do it, that they have never had before. This inspires the confidence of the men in their noncommissioned officers and as a result the entire organization is lifted to a much higher "tactical level" than they have been able to attain heretofore.

TACTICAL WALKS is an entirely original work. It was written with a view to inaugurating this system of instruction and training throughout the Army. The subjects included are:

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Copies of the book may be had from any one of the agencies enumerated on page v of this book.

W. H. Waldron,
Captain, Twenty-ninth Infantry.