[2] See frontispiece map.

[3] It may be of assistance to the reader, in the following pages, to note that the divisions in the Prussian army are numbered consecutively throughout the several army corps. Thus, the Ist Corps consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions; the IId Corps, of the 3d and 4th Divisions; the VIth Corps, of the 11th and 12th Divisions, and so on.

[4] DerrÉcagaix and the Prussian Official History both condemn Von Clausewitz’s delay. Adams, however, finds an excuse for it. He says: “The first question that arises is, should Clausewitz have occupied Trautenau? Mondl was up, in all probability, and he would have been deeply engaged before Grossmann [commanding the right column] came up, against orders. He could not have been acquainted with the situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore, to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann’s delay is said to have been the hilly character of the road. Mondl, on the other hand, reaching HohenbrÜck about 7:30, seems to have halted there to form. The Austrian official account states that he had occupied the heights since 9:15, and before this he had reached HohenbrÜck at 7:45. When he had formed—that is to say, waited to mass his brigade before deploying—the position must have been taken up by him between 8:30 and 9:15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken three-quarters of an hour to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have had to continue his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push forward from Trautenau, contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondl on the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied.

“Probably the latter was informed ... that no immediate danger was impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first duty of the advance, on coming into collision with the enemy, is to occupy rapidly such localities as may prove of use in the impending action.”

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heights were unoccupied when Von Clausewitz arrived at Parschnitz; and it was his duty, as well as that of Mondl, on coming into collision with the enemy, to occupy rapidly such localities as might have proved of use in the impending action. As to engaging Mondl “on the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied,” it is sufficient to state that he had only a brigade, while Von Clausewitz had a division. A subordinate commander assumes a grave responsibility when he violates or exceeds his orders; but it is hardly to be expected that an able division commander will fetter himself by observing the strict letter of an order, when he knows, and his superior does not know, that the condition of affairs in his front is such as to offer an opportunity for a successful and valuable stroke, even though that stroke be not contemplated in the orders of his chief. Von Alvensleben understood matters better when he marched without orders to assist Von Fransecky at KÖniggrÄtz. If a division commander were never expected to act upon his own responsibility when a movement is urged by his own common sense, it is evident that the position of general of division could be filled by a man of very limited abilities.

[5] “While this was going on a staff-officer ... of General Beauregard’s headquarters ... came up to General Bragg and said, ‘The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats.’ General Bragg said, ‘My God! was a victory ever sufficiently complete?’”—Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I., p. 605.

[6] The above criticism on the delay of Frederick Charles is based mainly on the comments of Major Adams, in his “Great Campaigns in Europe.” Hozier, who, in the main, follows the Prussian Staff History of the war, has nothing but praise for the Prince. The absence of adverse criticism on the action of Frederick Charles in the Prussian Official History is, perhaps, explained by the high military and social position of that general. Adams seems to think that a forward movement by Frederick Charles would have caused Clam-Gallas to abandon MÜnchengrÄtz at once, and does not seem to consider that if the Austro-Saxons had not been dislodged, Clam-Gallas would have had the Prussian communications by the throat, while covering his own, and that this advantage might have compensated him for his separation from Von Benedek. It may be urged in objection to these comments, that Frederick Charles did not know the exact condition of affairs in his front at the time. To this it may be replied that ability to appreciate a strategical advantage, and power to form a correct estimate of the enemy’s dispositions, are a test of a general’s merits as a strategist. McClellan is not excused for believing that, when Lee was attacking his right at Gaines’ Mill, the enemy was in strong force between the Federal army and Richmond; and Hamley is not gentle in his comments on Napoleon’s failure to estimate correctly the force and dispositions of the Prussians at Jena; though, being an Englishman, he does not hesitate to adopt another standard of criticism when he finds it necessary to defend Wellington for his error in leaving at Hal 17,000 men so sorely needed at Waterloo.—[See Hamley’s “Operations of War,” p. 94 et seq., and p. 198].

[7] It should be remembered that, in addition to the four corps immediately opposed to the Crown Prince, the IIId and IId Austrian Corps were at Von Benedek’s disposal; the latter being scarcely more than two marches distant from Josephstadt.

[8] At the battle of KÖniggrÄtz, Frederick Charles had 123,918 men. His losses at Gitschin aggregated 2,612 men. It seems, therefore, that 130,000 men is a high estimate of the maximum force which he would have been able to oppose to Von Benedek at Gitschin, had the latter made a junction with Clam-Gallas at that point.

[9] Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., who accompanied the Austrian headquarters during the campaign, says that on one occasion he heard Von Benedek say, hotly, to his disputing staff, “For God’s sake do something!” and mentions the following incident: “After the battles of Nachod and Trautenau the second officer of the Intelligence Department examined all the prisoners, and obtained clear information of the whereabouts of all the columns of the Crown Prince, then struggling through the mountain passes. He wrote his report and took it to the officer who had been sent to Benedek to decide the strategy of the campaign. At that time several Austrian corps were close by. The General looked at the paper and had all the facts explained to him. He then dismissed the Captain, who, however, remained and said, probably in that tone of distrust which prevailed, ‘Now, Herr General, I have shown you that the Crown Prince can be beaten in detail if attacked by our great force within half a day’s march; may I ask what you propose to do with the Austrian army?’ The General replied, ‘I shall send it against Prince Frederick Charles.’ The Captain put his hands together in an attitude of supplication and said, ‘For God’s sake, sir, do not,’ but was ordered out of the room. I did not know this fact when Benedek said, the day after the defeat of KÖniggrÄtz, ‘Did you ever see such a fine army so thrown away?’”—“Field Works,” by Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., p. 205 and note.

[10] Gitschin, Jung Buntzlau, and Libau are shown on Map No. 6. The positions of the other places here mentioned are, in reference to Gitschin, as follows: Aulibitz, nearly 4 miles east; Chotec, about 7 1/2 miles east; Konetzchlum, about 6 1/2 miles east-south-east; Milicowes, about 4 1/2 miles south-south-east; Podhrad, about 2 miles south-west; Robaus, about 2 miles east; Dworetz, near, and north of, Robaus.

[11] It is interesting to note the growth of great generals under the influence of their actual experience in war. The Frederick of Rossbach and Leuthen was very different from the Frederick of Mollwitz. In 1796 we find Napoleon calling a council of war before hazarding a second attempt upon Colli’s position at St. Michel, and showing, even in that vigorous and brilliant campaign, a hesitation never shown by the Napoleon of Ulm and Austerlitz. The Grant of Vicksburg was not the Grant of Shiloh; and Lee at Chancellorsville and Petersburg does not seem like the same commander who conducted the impotent campaign of 1861 in West Virginia. The old saying, “Great generals are born, not made,” is not altogether true. It would be more correct to say, “Great generals are born, and then made.”

[12] The author’s own observations of the topography of the field correspond, in the main, with the description given above. The Bistritz, however, is not such a formidable obstacle as one might infer from the description quoted. At the village of Sadowa it is a mere ditch, not much larger than some of the acequias in Colorado or Utah. It is perhaps eight feet wide and three feet in depth. It could hardly have been an obstacle to infantry. Its muddy bottom and marshy banks doubtless rendered it a considerable obstacle for artillery, but the eight villages through which it flows, within the limits of the battle field, certainly could have furnished abundant material for any number of small bridges required for crossing it. In the vicinity of Nechanitz, the Bistritz, having received the waters of a tributary creek, becomes a true obstacle, as it spreads out to a width of about thirty yards, and the banks are swampy. It should be remarked that at the time of the author’s visit to KÖniggrÄtz, there had been very heavy rains, and the condition of the stream was probably the same as on the day of the battle.

[13] A sketch of these operations is given in the appendices.

[14] The strength of the Union army at Gettysburg was 78,043. The Confederate army numbered about 70,000. The Union army lost 3,072 killed, and 14,497 wounded. The Confederates lost 2,592 killed, and 12,709 wounded. In comparing the losses of Gettysburg with those of KÖniggrÄtz, no account is here taken of the “missing” in either the Union or the Confederate losses; though the missing (exclusive of prisoners) are figured in with the killed and wounded of the Prussian and Austrian armies. The figures in regard to Gettysburg are taken from the tables (compiled from official records) in “Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.” The figures in regard to KÖniggrÄtz are taken from the Prussian Official History.

[15] See page 70.

[16] Although the above comment coincides in its main features with the criticism of Hozier on the same subject, it is based upon the author’s own observation of the views of the field afforded from the church tower of Chlum, and from Von Benedek’s position near Lipa.

[17] For example, the formation of Sedgwick’s division at Antietam, Meade’s at Fredericksburg, Pickett’s at Gettysburg, and Sheridan’s at Chattanooga.

[18] See the interesting comments of General J. D. Cox on the assaults in column at Kenesaw Mountain, p. 129, Vol. IX., (“Atlanta”), Scribner’s “Army and Navy in the Civil War.”

[19] The following remarks of Captain F. N. Maude, R. E., on “The Tactics of the American War” sustain the views expressed above, and are interesting as showing an able English military critic’s appreciation of the advanced tactical development of the American armies:

“It is curious to note how little attention has been devoted to the study of the fighting of this most bloody of modern wars; and yet it would seem that the records of these campaigns fought out to the bitter end by men of our own Anglo-Saxon races, would be a far more likely source of information, from which to deduce the theory of an attack formation specially designed to meet our needs, than the histories of struggles between French and Germans, or Russians and Turks. Von Moltke is reported to have said that ‘nothing was to be learnt from the struggle of two armed mobs.’ If that is really the case, which we venture to doubt exceedingly, the great strategist must ere this have been sorry he ever spoke, for, armed mobs or not, both Southern and Northern troops bore, and bore victoriously, a per centage of loss before which even the best disciplined troops in Germany, the Prussian Guard Corps, failed to make headway. It is of no relevance to the argument to say that the breech-loader was not then in use. When a man is hard hit himself, or sees his comrade rolled over, it never enters his head to consider whether the hit was scored by muzzle-loader or breech-loader; the fact itself, that he or the other man is down, is the only one he concerns himself with, and when the percentage of hits in a given time rises high enough, the attack collapses equally, no matter against what weapon it may be delivered.

“Actually, though the armament was inferior, the per centage of hits was frequently far higher than in breech-loading campaigns. There is no action on record during recent years in which the losses rose so high, and in so short a time, as in the American fights.”

After a brief description of Meagher’s attack at Fredericksburg, and Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg, Captain Maude continues:

“Surely, Moltke never spoke of such gallant soldiers as an armed mob, seeing that they succeeded in driving an attack home against four times the per centage of loss that stopped the Prussian guard at St. Privat.... And assuming, for the moment, that the saying attributed to him is really true, we cannot help fancying that he must have often bitterly regretted it when watching his own men in the manoeuvers of late years, attacking in what is really, practically the same formation which the armed mobs worked out for themselves.

“The points of contrast between ourselves and the Americans are far too numerous to be dismissed without comment. They began the war with a drill book and system modeled on our own, and they carried it out to its conclusion, with only a few modifications of detail, but none of principle. The normal prescribed idea of an attack appears to have been as follows: A line of scouts, thickened to skirmishers according to the requirements of the ground; from 2 to 300 paces in rear, the 1st line, two deep, precisely like our own, then in rear a 2d line and reserve. Of course, their lines did not advance with the steady precision of our old peninsula battalions. Their level of instruction was altogether too low, and besides, the extent of fire-swept ground had greatly increased. Eye witnesses say that after the first few yards, the line practically dissolved itself into a dense line of skirmishers, who threw themselves forward generally at a run as far as their momentum would carry them; sometimes, if the distance was short, carrying the position at the first rush, but more generally the heavy losses brought them to a halt and a standing fire fight ensued. They knew nothing of Scherff’s great principle, on which the ‘Treffen Abstande’ or distances between the lines are based, but they generally worked it out in practice pretty successfully. The second line came up in the best order they could and carried the wreck of the first on with them; if they were stopped, the reserve did the same for them, and either broke too, or succeeded.

“It will be seen that except in its being more scientifically put together, this German attack is, practically, precisely similar to that employed by the Americans, with the sole difference that the breech-loader has conferred on the assailants the advantage of being able to make a more extended use of their weapons, and has reduced to a certain extent the disadvantage of having to halt.

“Had we, in 1871, been thoroughly well informed as to the methods employed across the Atlantic, we should have seen at once that the new weapons did not necessarily entail any alteration in principle in our drill book, and with a little alteration in detail, have attained at one bound to a point of efficiency not reached even in Germany till several years after the war.”—“Tactics and Organization,” by Capt. F. N. Maude, R. E., p. 299, et seq.

[20] See pp. 42 and 78.

[21] In Clery’s “Minor Tactics” occurs the following astonishing passage: “The use made of entrenchments by the Turks was not the least remarkable feature of the war of 1877. Field works, as aids in defense, had been used with advantage in previous wars, but no similar instance exists of an impregnable system of earthworks being improvised under the very noses of the enemy.” Col. Clery’s book is an evidence of his intelligent study and thorough knowledge of European military history; yet, as late as 1885, this professor of tactics at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst seems not to have heard of Johnston’s works at Kenesaw Mountain, or the fortifications constructed at Spottsylvania and Petersburg.

[22] May’s “Tactical Retrospect.”

[23] For a description of the American military telegraph, see Grant’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 205, et seq. See also the comments on the military telegraph, in Sherman’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 398.

[24] A brief sketch of the operations in Italy is given in Appendix III.

[25] RossbrÜnn is not marked on the map. It is about 7 miles due west of WÜrzburg.