CONCLUSION.

Notwithstanding its bastioned enclosure and great outwork which was still existing in 1870, exactly as Vauban had planned it, the town of La Roche-Pont could not have held out forty-eight hours before the German artillery. A few batteries to the north, on the plateau, and on the west and east on the sides of the hills placed at nearly two miles distant would have overwhelmed the place with projectiles without a possibility of replying; for in September 1870 the small arsenal of La Roche-Pont contained only six cast iron guns, and four bronze pieces with smooth bore, two thousand pounds of powder and two or three hundred solid balls.

It was not attacked, though bodies of the enemy showed themselves not far from its walls.

Its garrison consisted then of a guard of the engineers and a brigade of gendarmes.

The inhabitants of La Roche-Pont are, however, patriotic, and mention with pride the numerous sieges they have experienced.

They had organized their national guard as early as August, including an artillery corps. It is true they had not been able to supply these National Guards with more than a hundred flint guns which were lying in the citadel, and about thirty muzzle-loading guns. These brave people were not less determined to defend themselves, and began to cast bullets and make cartridges. They had not the pain of seeing the Germans there.

In 1871, a French captain of engineers, having been in General Bourbaki's army, had entered Switzerland with the dÉbris of the corps.

Captain Jean had received a bullet in his breast, not far from the frontier, and had been taken up by some peasants in the environs of Pontarlier, and saved by some Swiss custom house officers who had conveyed him to Lausanne, where he had received the most careful attention. We might give a touching account of that sad period of our disasters; and indeed we must write it if it is to be on record at all, for the Swiss are not the people to make a parade of the zealous kindness they displayed on this occasion in saving our harassed, famished, and frozen soldiers. Peasants and townspeople set out amid the snows of the Jura, to guide and to give shelter to our disbanded and wandering regiments. Some sacrificed their lives in this service of humanity, and emulated each other in offering an asylum and giving assistance to our exhausted soldiers. The behaviour of these excellent people has excited universal admiration.

Captain Jean was living at Lausanne when Monsieur N.... an officer on half pay happened to be there. His medical attendants thought that the climate would contribute to the cure of the wounded man, who had obtained a congÉ in the hope of regaining health under the clement skies of this part of the lake of Geneva. His sister had come to join him and was doing all for his cure that the tenderest affection could suggest. His strength was however not returning and alarming symptoms continued.

Captain Jean was from La Roche-Pont; he was on intimate terms with Monsieur N.... and the conversation often turned on the recent war and the resources which through ignorance or inability had not been employed; and they frequently spoke of this beautiful province of Burgundy, placed on the flank of the invasion, and which was so well adapted to mask and protect an offensive movement, if they had had an army of reserve with its right supported by BesanÇon and its left by Dijon, and abundantly supplied from the basins of the RhÔne and the SaÔne.

The Captain used to employ his leisure in studying the defence of his dear little town whose history he knew so well and which he deemed a strategic position of some importance.

Monsieur N.... spent nearly a month in the company of this amiable and well-informed man, whose feelings were deeply affected by our disasters; but whose active mind sought in these misfortunes themselves a means of instruction, and an opportunity for developing the resources and advantages peculiar to France. This was an inexhaustible subject of conversation for the two friends, and they would continue talking till the sister interposed her authority as nurse to enjoin silence and rest.

In December 1871, Monsieur N.... received the following letter at Paris, accompanied by a bundle of papers.

"Lausanne, December 10th, 1871.
"Sir,

"My dearly loved brother died in my arms the day before yesterday, his death being the result of his wound and also perhaps of grief for our late disasters,—deeply affected as he was by the indelible recollection of the sufferings he had witnessed.

"He retained his consciousness to the last, and I am fulfilling one of his most urgent requests in sending you these papers. It is the only souvenir he can bequeath to you—as he said to me the day before his death—of the hours you so kindly devoted to a poor invalid.

"My brother often spoke to me of you; you were able to appreciate his excellencies and noble character, and will receive his bequest, I doubt not, as a mark of the profound esteem he had for you.

"As for myself I cannot quit a neighbourhood where I have lived with my brother, and where we have met with so much sympathy."

Extracts from Captain Jean's papers.

Attack implies a shock or onset; defence is a resistance to this onset. Whether a piece of ordnance discharges a ball against a plate of iron, or a casing of masonry, or an earthwork; or an assaulting column climbs a breach, the problem is substantially the same; in either case we have to oppose to the impulsive force a resistance that will neutralise its effect.

When there were no projectile weapons, or their range was inconsiderable, only a normal resistance had to be opposed to the shock—a man to a man—or if the effect was to be rendered certain, two men to one. But when projectile arms acquired a longer range, the position of the attack and defence became a question of importance. Thus were evolved for combatants in open ground the elements of tactics, and for fortification, arrangements of a more and more complicated character.

It is evident, for example, that when it came to a close engagement—a hand-to-hand struggle with an adversary; if the latter found himself placed behind a circular enclosure, the obstacle that protected him would give him a considerable advantage—an advantage that could only be compensated for by renewing the attack.

fortress

Fig. 76.

To make this very simple principle intelligible at a glance, suppose (Fig. 76) a circular enclosure containing forty defenders separated from each other about a yard apart; a hand-to-hand struggle can only be carried on with a number equal to that of the defenders—or nearly so—and these under cover. It is no use for the assailants to assemble as at A, they can only present a front equal to that of the defence, and if this is energetic, the triangle a, b, c, will be effective only at c.

fortress

Fig. 77.

But let us suppose the attacking body to possess projectile arms (Fig. 77), and instead of encountering the circular enclosure, the assailants to set up their engines between A and B within fair range. They will overwhelm the segment d, c, e, of the circle with projectiles, while the defenders will be able to oppose only an inferior number of engines to the convergent fire.

fortress

Fig. 78.

To compensate in part for this inferiority the defending party adds appendages to the enclosure (Fig. 78 A), which allow an almost equal front of defence to be opposed to the attacking front, as regards the number of projectile weapons, and very superior in point of elevation and protection. But the attacking force will thus naturally arrange its engines as seen at B. Thus the projectiles sent from a, b, c, d, e, converge upon the salient C. The defence adds the new appendages D D, and if the engines are well protected, it can make the projectiles g, h, i, converge on the engine K and crush it, secondly the projectiles l, g, h, on engine m and destroy it, and so on.

Besides, these appendages have the further advantage of giving side views over the circumvallation itself and masking its foot.

This principle regulates and will always regulate attack and defence; distances alone modify its applications.

The more eccentric the defence is, the more distant must be the attack, and the wider the perimeter it must occupy; but it should be observed, that the more widely the defence is extended, the more open its flanks are to attack; these flanks therefore must also be capable of being defended, for every obstacle that offers only its own resisting force, without being protected by the action of a neighbouring obstacle, is soon destroyed.

Whether fortifications or plans of battle are in question, the same principle comes into play. "Every part should defend its neighbour and be defended by it." It is clear that the solution of the problem becomes more and more difficult in proportion to the enlargement of the range of projectile weapons, and the extent of fronts of fortification or lines of battle.

Vauban, and most of the engineers who were his rivals and successors, had resolved the problem in view of the range of the artillery of the period.

Suppose a hexagon (Fig. 79), fortified according to Vauban's first method, it is evident that all the parts of the circumference of one thousand, and even one thousand eight hundred yards, are commanded by the curtains, the faces of the bastions and the demi-lunes. If the fortress stands in a level country, the enemy cannot occupy any point in that circumference without being exposed to its fire.

To raise his first parallel and first batteries, he would have to begin his works at the limit of the range of the rampart guns; and, as we saw in Fig. 70, he must erect these batteries sufficiently near the place to enable their fire to tell upon the defences—i.e., at eight or nine hundred yards. At this distance the curtains could be swept, the faces and flanks raked, and the parapets thrown down. As the projectiles reached either point blank, or under an angle of about 10° when the ball rebounded, the besieged could protect himself against it for a very considerable time, and keep his own artillery intact.

fortress

Fig. 79.

But as the range of siege pieces in the present day extends to eight or nine thousand yards, the conditions both for the besieged and the besieger are very different. Hence (Fig. 80) the enemy raises his batteries on two or three fronts of the circumference, taking advantage of the rise in the ground, a wall, or a wood to protect his works, and when all is ready, he unmasks these batteries, and covers a segment of the fortress with a quantity of explosive projectiles, which, reaching it at an angle of 25° to 30° burst, no matter where—dans le tas, to use a common expression—the distance not allowing an aim at flanks or faces in particular—the besieger being in fact unable to distinguish them. Supposing the besieged able to maintain his artillery and reply, exposed as he is to the deluge of iron on his face and flanks, he has to aim at eccentric points which may vary, to whose position he has no clue but the smoke of the guns, and at an enemy, who, taking advantage of an indefinite amount of space to make his arrangements and shelter his men, is completely free. But to maintain his artillery and preserve his men and munitions, the besieged has only a space relatively limited to move in; he is soon encumbered with dÉbris of all kinds, every movement is difficult for him, and he has not even room to repair damages. He tires himself out to no great purpose. If the attack has maintained its fire at a long range for several days, it has introduced such confusion into a great part of the defences, that in two or three nights afterwards the first parallel may be commenced at about one thousand yards, it may be well armed and protected by batteries en retraite and trench-shelters, so as to discourage sorties and allow of an advance to crown the covered ways. In what state are the works of the besieged by this time? The flanks of the bastions are as much damaged as their faces, the demi-lunes are untenable, and the ditches partly filled up; disorder and confusion prevail on all sides. No breach is practicable, certainly; but all the works are seriously injured on three or four fronts, and at one thousand yards distance, a breach may be made, and that a wide one. The garrison may sustain the assault to the last, and sell the possession of the dÉbris of its work dearly; but in this case the final result is not doubtful.

fortress

Fig. 80.

In proportion to the length of the trajectory, therefore, the defence must remove its defensive arrangement from the centre of the place.

fortress

Fig. 81.

If each front of Vauban's defence was about four hundred yards in length, it ought to be from thirteen to fourteen thousand yards now (Fig. 81). That is to say, the side of the hexagon which was four hundred yards—i.e., from one salient of a bastion to another—should be fourteen hundred yards. Let A be the main body of the fortress—on a plain suppose; forts will be erected at B and C, the zone of action of each of these works being eight thousand yards, they will protect each other and cross their fires without the possibility of their projectiles falling into the fortress if any of them should be in the power of the enemy.

fortress

Fig. 82.

Fig. 82 presents the block plan of each of those forts B and C, to whose interior arrangements we shall return. But by this excessive lengthening of the capitals, the forts B (Fig. 81), may be swept along the whole extent of the arc of a circle a b (more than the third of the circumference); they occupy the points of a triangle, and if one of them were taken the enemy would be able to batter two of the forts C. It is therefore necessary, with an extended radius, to multiply the defences, and to enable them to protect each other in a more effective manner. This is the method indicated in Fig. 83.

Here we have a dodecagon. The forts of the outer zone are seven thousand yards apart, and the works, A, flank each other; a second zone of forts B commands the latter, if required, and the zone of action of these second works extends beyond the outer line of forts. Railways are required to connect the forts of each zone, and to put them in communication with the body of the place.

This extension of the fields of defence may, according to the nature of the ground, be divided into two zones with a central nucleus.

fortress

Fig. 83.

The interior zone would consist of permanent works, forming an enceinte de prÉservation; a line of forts at intervals sufficiently strengthened, in case of war, by field works.

The exterior zone would be fixed by occupying strategic points well chosen and considered beforehand, forming small camps protected by temporary works, and affording security to a numerous army, whose manoeuvres the enemy could not espy.

The expenditure entailed by such a system of defence is unquestionably enormous. But as respects this question there is to all appearance an unwillingness to realize exactly the new state of things produced by artillery of long range.

The expenditure involved in the successive systems of defence from ancient times downwards has been a continually increasing one. The wall built round Paris by Philippe-Augustus, would not cost, the running yard, as much as that of Charles V.; the latter, again, must have been less expensive than the bastioned fronts of Louis XIII., and these again would be far from necessitating the outlay (i.e. estimated by the running yard, and reckoning detached forts) occasioned by the fortification of Paris under Louis Philippe. Similarly the mounting of four or five trebuchets, and the movable towers required for attacking a fortified place before fire artillery was employed, cost less than the manufacture of the artillery used at the siege of Turin in 1535. The latter again would be far less costly than the French and English artillery at the siege of Sebastopol. Whereas at the time when smooth-bore guns were used a place might be attacked with about sixty pieces, five times the quantity are needed now; since it is necessary to operate over a much more extensive area.

War is therefore a game which tends to become more and more costly, and especially siege warfare. Are we then to conclude that nations will become disgusted with warfare on account of the frightful expense it involves? This is not probable.

At the present day, as in times past, that which costs most is defeat. With forty millions well laid out in France, before the war of 1870, and from forty to eighty millions spent in the war itself, we probably should not have had to pay the four hundred millions which this war cost us, and we should not have lost two provinces which are certainly worth still more than that sum.

Parsimony in military preparations, in times of serious change, such as ours, is ruinous.

The principles to be followed may be summed up as follows: Commit yourself to no superfluous outlay, but spend all that is necessary. Besides, is it after all certain that a good system of territorial defence is so costly as some allege?

Is it a question of building something like a Chinese Wall on our eastern frontier? Is it likely that if a few strong positions rendered impregnable without unnecessary works enabled us to keep an army of observation two hundred thousand strong, secure from any surprise in the elevated valleys bounded by the ranges of hills which stretch from the Jura along Belfort, Remiremont, Epinal, Langres and Dijon, and border the right bank of the SaÔne as far as Lyons, the Germans would be in a hurry to make their way a second time to Paris? If they experienced the slightest check on such a route, if they were obliged even to halt, what would become of them?

The essential consideration therefore is a good choice of positions; shelter from the approach of an invasion on the flanks, and the avoidance of enormous expenditure in the attempt to defend all points. Let us suppose that Metz had been rendered impregnable, or at least so provided with defences that it could have held out for six months; and certainly the thing was possible. In the first place we should not have lost that town, and secondly the war, notwithstanding our deficiencies in soldiers and in artillery, might have taken quite another turn. Greater sacrifices on the part of the enemy, more prudence, and a still greater loss of men, would have been required to constrain us to a peace accepted before the cannon's mouth.

War is made now a-days with armies a million strong; this is all very well while the invading force meets no very serious obstacle, either in front of it or on its flanks; when the combinations which such a vast display of forces necessitates are not disturbed at any point, and when the strategic operations upon the ground succeed each other with perfect precision, as one might trace them on a map in our studies. But these enormous agglomerations of men could give rise in a single day to appalling perils, after a grave check on one of their flanks. Such masses can be advanced, fed, and manoeuvred only by means of a very complicated, and therefore delicate and easily deranged machinery. The Germans asserted that by the possession of Alsace and a part of Lorraine we had a hold upon Germany. Now their country is almost dove-tailed into France. The future will show whether that will greatly benefit them.

In 1870 and 1871 we saw what could be accomplished by the little fortress of Belfort; which was perhaps the only one among our strong places possessing guns of long range, and a garrison well commanded and determined to defend itself.

It persisted in maintaining the offensive over a circle of from twelve to sixteen miles, thanks to a few rifled cannon with which the ramparts were furnished, and which protected sorties through a radius of three to four miles. For a month it hindered the planting of siege batteries; and, in spite of a bombardment of seventy-three days, the town had only four of its houses burned. This defence is instructive, and shows that the old defensive system has had its day.

During the siege the batteries of the besieged hardly suffered at all, and had recourse to indirect firing—that is, they fired over the barracks from the gorge of the castle without seeing the mark, but regulating by observation. This indirect firing, which took no account of the plan of the crests of the defence, and which thus enabled a powerful fire to be directed to any point, without regarding the faces, produced a great effect on the batteries of the enemy, who, on his side, could not see these guns, and did not know how to regulate his fire.

The question, therefore, remains undecided; and, though a long range enables the attack to envelope each work more decidedly with its fires, each battery of the besieger may be subjected to the fire of a greater number of guns by the defence. At Paris, the forts which are by no means planned in view of the present long range, enabled a weak and inexperienced garrison, whose morale was none of the firmest, to execute sorties with success to a distance of two miles and a half.[25]

With good troops, then, we might have raised in one night, works which would have enabled us to resume the offensive, and to push further on, to break the line of contravallation, and seriously to embarrass the besieger. It is not therefore proved that long ranges give a greater advantage to the attack than to the defence, while, on the other hand, the long range of rifled cannon may be affirmed to be favourable to the defence; but it would be so only on the condition of the works being planned in view of the new action of artillery, and not according to old traditions, however glorious. The destructive power of explosive projectiles puts obstacles in the way of the besieger's approaches; and, in fact, during the late war we never saw employed that old mode of approach with a view to attacking by breach and crossing the ditch.

The Germans were not so stupid as to employ these classical methods. They took up their position on favourable and often commanding points, at three thousand eight hundred to four thousand two hundred yards around our fortresses, which adhered to the old defensive system adapted to ranges of two thousand two hundred yards at most; and covered with shells our works and the towns they were supposed to protect, without risk to a single sapper. We thought that odious and unreasonable; like those nobles of the fifteenth century, who thought it an abominable shame that their feudal nests should be breached with bombards, and declared that the trade of war was thereby damaged. But suppose we should some day condescend to practical consideration, when these old flanked fronts fall into disesteem, and the new generation of military engineers determine to admit that we have to do with artillery of long range, and to take advantage of the fact, a certain degree of superiority might be doubtless given to defence over attack.

How ought these isolated forts, which are destined to replace the salients of our old fortresses, to be planned? They should afford ample space for a large number of fires—even indirect fires—in case of need; consequently extended faces and short flankings—that is, as shallow as possible, and perfectly open gorges. They should efficiently protect the works of counter-approach, and consider defence at close quarters as a question of only secondary importance; for very seldom would there be occasion for it, if indeed the case ever presented itself, which is doubtful.

fortress

Fig. 84.

Referring to the general defensive system shown in Fig. 83, and required the plan of one of the forts, A, the result will be Fig. 84, giving the work at the lower level at C, and at the level of the batteries at D. The counterscarp should be cased up to at least sixteen or seventeen feet above the bottom of the ditch.

The escarp should be made with tipped earth. The masonry works should all be covered and secured from being enfiladed; they form casemates inside E. Beneath the terracings, powder magazines, F, and the passages communicating with the oiseaux or lower orillons, G, protected by the counterscarp and the covered way, and which are used only if the enemy attempts to pass the ditch. The faces and flanks on the outside are planned on angles sufficiently obtuse to cross their fires. The two faces in the plan (Fig. 84) may be armed with eight guns and the flanks with six guns. This work is separated from that of the gorge by a traverse that efficiently protects this gorge, which possesses its flanks, armed with four guns and its orillons.

From the work of the gorge is a communication into the fort by a covered caponniÈre, forming traverse in the direction of the capital or centre line. The gorge is defended by a curtain for the riflemen, and, at need, for small pieces of artillery. At need also, on the terre-plein of the work of the gorge may be mounted guns of long range, affording an indirect fire in the circumference of a semi-circle, over the great traverse H, if the parapets of the faces are damaged by the fire of the enemy.

Fausse-braies consisting of palings are fixed in the ditch at ten feet from the base of the escarp, to hinder the fallen dÉbris of the escarp from filling up the ditch, and to enable its passage to be defended. The well-covered internal masonry works prevent the accumulation of earth on the interior platforms, and afford casemates, which enable the garrison to take rest in perfect security; at any rate along the two faces and the great traverse. Blindages can be set up on the traverses of the batteries, and can be easily repaired every night, as well as the escarp of tipped earth.

It would be difficult to say how many projectiles it would require to render such a work untenable; since we have seen in the siege of Paris, that a marine battery erected on tipped earth on the military road between the forts of Rosny and de Noisy, armed with three guns, had been a mark for the German shells during twenty-four days, without any of its guns having been dismounted, or its escarp suffering more than could be made good each night.

Permanent works should, however, only be established with the utmost circumspection:—1. Because they require a very considerable outlay. 2. Because they are necessarily familiar to, and for a long while studied by the enemy, who takes his measures accordingly.

The important point is to possess an accurate acquaintance with the ground to be defended, and only to establish permanent works in second line, and on points incontestably favourable for defence, supposing an artillery of even a still longer range than the present.

Every centre to be defended should therefore possess works sufficient to prevent a surprise; and in addition at a distance of six to eight thousand yards, a line of forts, crossing their fires if possible, or at any rate connected by strong batteries; and lastly, at a distance of about four thousand yards, positions previously examined and known, suitable for placing very simple works of field fortification, but which at a given moment may offer a resistance sufficient to permit movements on a grand scale—and delay the formation of an enemy's batteries.

fortress

Fig. 85.—Defensive System of the Great Intrenched Camp.

In applying these principles to the defence of the town of La Roche-Pont, whose strategical position is one of major importance, since it connects BesanÇon with Dijon, and forms a salient on the flanks of an army which manoeuvres from Epinal and from Vesoul upon Langres and Chaumont, it would be necessary to construct around this place, whose old fortifications are no longer of any value (Fig. 85) eight forts, A, on the brows of the plateaus which surround the town, and thirteen batteries or redoubts, B, a little behind or to command the meeting of the river Abonne with the SaÔne and enfilade the valleys. Thus the group of roads which from the point C lead to Langres and Champlitte, from D to Dijon and Beaune, from E to BesanÇon and DÔle, from F to Gray and from G to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, would be occupied. A tÊte du pont H, protected by batteries which would dominate the SaÔne, would enable an army to manoeuvre on both banks.

This passive defence would occupy a perimeter of forty miles, and the zone of action of the permanent works, a perimeter of sixty miles.

The purely passive defence would require, for the eight forts, four thousand eight hundred men; for the thirteen batteries two thousand men; for the guard of the intermediary trenches and the service of the enceinte de prÉservation, not including the forts and batteries, eighteen thousand men; reserve in the fortress, two thousand five hundred men; total, twenty-seven thousand three hundred men, whilst the effective investment would require an army of one hundred thousand men. But if this great intrenched camp contained an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men in addition to the troops necessary for the passive defence, this army could besides, on a very extended perimeter or on some advantageous points, occupy within the zone of action of the forts, an enceinte de combat defended by field works, which would enable it to assume the offensive at the opportune moment.

The armament of the forts would consist of a hundred and sixty guns of large calibre, and that of the batteries of forty-five guns of long range. With the reserve park this would give a total of two hundred and thirty pieces of ordnance.

Harnessed guns would be also necessary to support the trenches of the passive defence.

To make head against an invasion at all points at once has always been a difficult problem to solve; and it is still more so if we confine ourselves to the defensive, for the enemy starts from a base of operation with a view to concentrating himself upon a point unknown to the defenders. The latter has therefore only a line to oppose to the apex of a triangle of action. He must limit himself to preserving the heart of the country and certain districts that are already naturally protected, and which allow him to operate on the flanks of the invading forces; regions behind which lie extensive tracts of country from which supplies may be drawn.

Let us suppose that on the zone of defence of which La Roche-Pont forms the centre, an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled, which was able to reach Belfort through BesanÇon or by the road from Vesoul to Langres through Gray or ChÂtillon-sur-Seine through Dijon, these towns of BesanÇon, Vesoul, Langres, and Dijon being themselves in a condition to arrest the enemy's advance: the latter in attempting to make his way to Paris would be obliged either to watch this zone with an army of three hundred thousand men, or to move, and that with extreme caution, along the LunÉville and Nancy routes.

If a defensive zone of the same importance is disposed on the north, a point becomes very dangerous, especially if the capital is provided with an enceinte de prÉservation, and an enceinte de combat allowing an army to manoeuvre.

Three hundred thousand men therefore would be required to watch the defensive zone of Burgundy and the same number that of the north, and four hundred thousand men to invest Paris; total, one million, without reckoning the troops required for keeping open the communication between the three armies and guarding the base of operations.

It follows that the slightest check might entail a serious disaster.

As the army of Metz under the ramparts of the town was not able to manoeuvre, the two hundred thousand men employed in blockading it were rendered inactive for two months.

If the French army had been able to move within a perimeter of 60 miles, with a good supply of provisions, it would have reduced three hundred thousand men to inaction; since the Germans, who leave nothing to chance, reckon—and not unreasonably—that on the field it is desirable to be at least two to one. It would seem then that the art of war now-a-days—as far as resistance to an invader is concerned—consists not in endeavouring to defend any extensive lines which may be taken or outflanked, but in establishing a small number of centres of defence, sufficiently remote from each other and connected by a system of railways in the rear; which are capable of holding out long, and which compel the enemy either to divide in order to watch them or to take them, or to expose his flanks to an attack if he leaves them alone, or to see himself cut off from his base of operations if he advances en masse against one of them without covering himself against the others....

But we must confess to a limited confidence in fortifications on this immense scale. It is certain that they are ruinous: it is not certain that they are effective in proportion to the enormous expense they occasion.

The men-at-arms of the fifteenth century cased themselves and their horses in iron to resist crossbow bolts, lance-thrusts, and strokes of axe or sword. Fire artillery, which at first aimed at nothing more than substituting powder for the mechanism of engines worked by counterpoise or ropes, and like these discharged only stone balls, becomes improved and uses iron balls and leaden bullets; and instead of being ponderous and fixed as formerly, moves on wheels and is rendered easily manageable, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century places pistols and arquebusses in the hands of foot-soldiers and horsemen. What plan do the men-at-arms adopt? They thicken the plates of their armour and line them so thoroughly that they are no longer fit for a charge. This method lasts about fifty years, until it is perceived that the best way to enable cavalry to face artillery, so as not to be crushed by it, is to allow it to move rapidly.

Cannon are made whose balls pierce through and through the wooden planks of a vessel. Immediately these planks are cased with iron. To-day's balls are resisted by the vessel's sides. The plates of iron are doubled ... and forthwith the penetrating force of the projectiles is increased; but those of the next day pierce them. Steel is made to take the place of iron: but after thousands upon thousands have been spent the projectile has always the best of it. But it happens in a naval engagement that an Admiral steams at full speed right athwart an enemy's ship and sinks it! In fact it is by rapidity of movement and facility in manoeuvring that victories at sea are ensured much more than by increased protective plating.

And in the art of fortification we are exactly at the same point as were the men-at-arms of the end of the fifteenth century, who heaped plates on plates to protect themselves from artillery. It is time the art of fortification should be modified.

It will be objected that a vessel or a horseman can move about, but that a fortress is immovable, and that consequently passive force cannot here be replaced by active force or agility. This is a mistake. Though a fortress cannot be moved, the defensive system of a district can and ought to be studied, in view of various contingencies. In future warfare the plan of temporary fortification ought to play a principal part and may be made to do so. In other terms, an army ought to be able to fortify itself everywhere, and take advantage of every position. It is temporary fortification therefore which it is desirable to render easy, prompt, and efficacious, in order to defeat the combinations studied beforehand by the enemy, to reduce him in certain cases to the defensive, when he was hoping to attack, and to embarrass his movements on the great scale by unforeseen resistance at a point which he expected to pass with ease, and oblige him incessantly to modify his plans by rapidly executed arrangements for defence.

Vauban's fortresses have had their day; who can conjecture what may be accomplished in a future war by the system of defence of which an example has just been presented?

Still the most reliable fortress for a country is a good and well-commanded army, and a well-educated, brave, and intelligent population, resolved to make every sacrifice rather than undergo the humiliation of a foreign occupation.

Captain Jean's papers contained many other critical remarks which cannot be recorded here. These documents sufficiently indicate that, whatever may have been said about the matter, there were among our officers some who worked, and many who had anticipated the dangers to which we were exposed by a blind confidence in our valour and an utter ignorance of the progress made by our enemies. Indeed among these papers of Captain Jean's, numerous notes, dated 1866, 1867, 1868, show the inefficiency of the defensive system then recognised in France, and the necessity of providing our strong places with works adapted to the recent progress in artillery.

Will the town of La Roche-Pont witness the realisation of Captain Jean's projects, or is its military history closed for ever? The future will show.

In the meantime it is engaged in cultivating its vineyards, and its suburbs are invading once more the slopes of the plateau on the south and the west. The lower part of its donjon of the 12th century is still visible above the escarpment of the little citadel, and antiquaries can discover Roman basements at some points in its wall. When cellars are excavated, Gallo-Roman coins are sometimes found with broken pieces of red and black pottery, charred wood, and even flint hatchets.

These evidences of the antiquity of the citÉ are deposited in a small museum which also contains sculptures taken from the abbey and the castle.

If you go to La Roche-Pont, ascend the ruins of the donjon. From this elevated point the view on a clear spring morning is very fine; towards the south it extends as far as the SaÔne, showing the little river Abonne, winding along the vale through meadows and orchards. On the north spreads the plateau covered with clumps of trees, and bounded only by the blue outlines of the hills of the Haute-Marne. At your feet the town with its ramparts looks like a vessel moored at the extremity of a promontory. We are reminded then of all the events which this little nook of ground has witnessed, of the ruins that have been accumulated by human passion, and the blood that has been so lavishly shed. We fancy we hear the shouts with which these walls have so often echoed.

Nature however remains the same; the meadows continue to be enamelled with flowers, and clothe with a mantle of beauty the ruins that have been heaped up by the fury of men. A feeling of deep sadness comes over us, and we say to ourselves: "What use is it all?" "What use!" replies at once a voice in the depth of our our soul. "What is the use of independence? What good is the love of our country? What use is the memory of self-sacrifice?" Do not blaspheme, Egoistic Philosophy; be silent before centuries of struggle—before that layer upon layer of the bones of the dead, and those heaps of successive ruins which have formed our country's soil. Though often ravaged, this hill has never been abandoned by its inhabitants; the more affronts it has had to sustain, the more its children have become attached to its side, the more they hold to the soil that has been impregnated with the blood of their ancestors, and the more hatred they feel towards those who would attempt to detach them from this ancestral tomb. This is patriotism; and it is the only human passion that can be dignified with the title of holy. War makes nations, and war raises them again when they sink down under the influence of material interests. War is struggle, and we find struggle everywhere in nature; it secures greatness and duration to the best educated, the most capable, the noblest, the most worthy to survive. And in the present day more than ever, success in war is the result of intelligence and of that which develops intelligence—Work.

Whenever what is called fraternity between nations shall become a reality, the reign of senile barbarism and of shameful decay will not be far distant.

Before this rock on which so many generations have fought to defend their independence, to resist aggression and to keep the rapacious foreigner at a distance, it is not an expression of regret that is called for—it is rather of homage to the dead which hearts full of gratitude cannot withhold. They do not ask for tears but for imitation.

[25] The battle of Champigny had extended our lines to four thousand six hundred and twenty yards from the Fort de la Faisanderie.