Trenches can only be considered as devices for affording temporary protection during the time that preparations are being made for delivering an attack. No one wants to remain in trenches for ever. At the best it is a miserable kind of life, and from a military point of view, it gets nowhere. Nor is it capable of being maintained without great loss in men. So costly did it become to us, and so great was the monotony and the feeling of helplessness, that we welcomed the word when it came to us to deliver an attack. At least that would bring us action, and give a variety to life.

During the first year of the war, attacks had almost always to be made without sufficient artillery preparation. Even at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, where we assembled over 480 guns on a little more than a mile of front—a greater collection than had ever been got together in history—we had not sufficient artillery preparation for the attack that was to be made. There were enough guns but not enough shells to fire from them. The result was that much of the enemy's wire was still intact when the infantry rushed over, and the advance was held up in certain important points where we could be enfiladed.

We have learnt that the only method of delivering an infantry attack against prepared positions is to give them a thorough hammering with shells. Every particle of wire should be destroyed, so as to eliminate the risk of men being shot down as they attempt to pass through it. At the Battle of Loos our guns bombarded their lines from Monday morning to Saturday morning, and kept hammering at them so as not to give them a chance to repair either their wire or their parapets. An effective curtain of fire was established at the same time to render it impossible for them to bring food and supplies up to the line that we were about to attack. For the last ten minutes before the men actually went over the parapet, there was a perfect tornado of shells falling upon and behind their lines. Any one who remained at his post alive during the previous days would find it almost impossible to continue there during this deluge.

If the artillery preparation is adequate, the battle is half over. General Haig's successes on the Somme, and the consequent German retreat on a large scale, have been due, in the first place to the excellent work of the gunners. Of course the gunners themselves have been dependent on many other branches of the service pre-eminent among which is the aeroplane corps. Targets are seldom seen by the gunners who have to depend for their information on the men who can fly ahead and come back with actual photographs of the positions to be bombarded. Too great emphasis cannot be placed upon the work of these gallant flying men. During the battles of the Somme, they have not only been doing this reconnaissance work for the gunners, but they have been flying very low after they reached the enemy territory and using their machine guns on the advancing or retreating infantry. So low did they fly, indeed, that the enemy did not risk firing upon them with their guns for fear of hitting their own men. They were fairly safe as far as the opposing infantry was concerned for the man in the machine is well protected from below and at the sides from rifle bullets.

While the artillery is active, the junior artillery, the bomb gunners must also get to work to throw over as much H. E. as possible to break down the resistance of the enemy.

Then again there is the gas, which has now come to be used as a definite part of an offensive. Gas is conveyed to the trenches in large drums, under pressure, and at the proper moment is liberated in waves against the enemy. It should be in the hands of trained men who can be trusted not to liberate it a moment before the time comes.

While gas has proved very effective under certain circumstances—and almost decided the fate of Calais early in 1915—yet it is obviously dependent upon the weather and especially the wind. Even if the direction of the wind is correct for the use of gas, the kind of wind may not be suitable at the moment. The wind must not be high nor squally, but needs to be low and gentle, just sufficient to carry the gas across to the opposing trenches without dissipating it on the journey. Then again it must be remembered that it can seldom reach the gunners who may open up intensive fire on the trenches from which it is being liberated, burst the drums and make the place untenable. Of course all the men who are employed in liberating gas should be warned to have their helmets in position to guard against these emergencies, and also against leaks in the drums. Gas masks must be tested daily to see that they do not admit any of this deadly poison.

In addition to these preparations, a good many reconnaissance parties must be sent night after night out into No Man's Land to map it thoroughly, place directing boards there, dig small saps to facilitate an advance, and learn the condition of what remains of the enemy wire. This work is difficult and dangerous, and must be given to trustworthy, brave, resourceful men. For it must be remembered that the enemy will probably come out into this neutral territory at night to try and learn the plans of the opposing side, just as they are trying to learn his plans. Many bloody conflicts have taken place out there under cover of darkness when the patrol from one side has entered into conflict with the patrol from the other.

Those in charge of the attack will arrange that at a specified time the bombardment will cease, and the men leap over the parapets. This time is usually arranged for, say, one minute after six, or thirteen minutes after eight—some time which the enemy cannot guess accurately. During the final awful ten minutes, the finishing touches are given to rifles and bombs and revolvers. Then exactly at the appointed time the electric buzzers in the trenches sound the signal to advance. The first man over the parapet is always an officer. Unlike the Germans, we do not drive our men but expect them to follow us, and this accounts in part for the very severe casualties that have been suffered by British officers.

Where the distance between trenches is short, say, a couple of hundred yards, it is covered as fast as men can run. It is a veritable race with death; for the enemy must not be allowed to recover from the bombardment in time to get his machine guns up into position again before the infantry arrives before his trenches. The attacking infantry must throw themselves down into the trenches and begin work at once with bomb and bayonet. Since the enemy has adopted the plan of having his dugouts deep down in the earth, it is a little easier to reach him before he is able to emerge. In this work bombs are most effective. All of the enemy communicating trenches must be effectively barricaded or protected by bombers and riflemen to keep him from bringing up any reserves and thus taking the attacking force from a flank. In an attack of this kind the ground cannot be covered too rapidly, and no thought must be given to cover.

But when attacks have to be made over long distances, the plan is either to dig out saps that will reach to within a reasonable charging distance of the enemy, or else have the infantry proceed at a moderate and steady pace, so as not to arrive at their objective winded and useless for bayonet work. The principle of having sectional rushes while neighbouring sections open rapid fire will be found useful.

The German method of advance is characterised by the close order formation, the British by the open order formation. The German training is such that he cannot act independently to any very great degree, but needs to feel the support of another strong arm near him, if possible touching him. They attack in waves of men packed so closely together that it is impossible to miss them if you get a shot at them at all, and of course they are ideal marks for machine guns. But in the British and French armies men are trained to be self-reliant and to advance even when they seem to be alone. An interval of three paces is usually maintained between individuals, and that renders them less of a target for marksmen. They are also trained to take command of other men should their officers or non-commissioned officers be put out of action.

Should any of the enemy wires be still intact, they must be cut by the first comers so as not to hold up the main attack. This is done by ordinary wire cutters—which every man is supposed to carry as part of his equipment—or else by a new device that is attached to certain rifles. By means of this a number of the wires are caught together and then when the rifle is fired the bullet cuts them and a passage through is made.

If the trench should be successfully taken and all the enemy disposed of, the first work to be done is to "reverse" it, and connect it up by communicating trenches with the old position. For this work engineers are sent immediately behind the infantry, and they carry with them quantities of sand bags and shovels and picks and wire, etc., with which to complete this task. Of course the infantry must also help, and for this purpose it will be as well for each man to take with him a few sandbags on his back—not enough to encumber him, but sufficient to be of service in putting up hasty defences.

The test of the success of the action will come as soon as the enemy is able to organise a counter-attack. He will know the range of the trench to a nicety and will not be slow to hurl the weight of his shells against it. Then, too, he will try to bring up reserves, who with bayonet and bomb will attack their old position. For many weary hours the infantry may be busy on this task of repelling counter attacks, and consolidating their new position.

So many details have to be cared for in an attack that it is well to rehearse it thoroughly beforehand and to see that every individual knows just exactly where he is supposed to be and what he is to do. Only in that way will confusion be avoided. It will be necessary also for the attackers to wear distinguishing marks in the form of a white band on the arm or a white piece of cloth on the back if the attack is to be made in the darkness or with poor light.

The question of prisoners inevitably comes up. What is to be done with them? How are they to be taken care of? It will be seen that this is a big problem in an attack where men cannot be disengaged from their tasks of taking trenches without greatly weakening the operation. To tell off men to look after prisoners when every man is needed to break down the resistance that is still being offered by others of the enemy, is a procedure obviously surrounded with dangers. And yet, in the interests of humanity it has to be done, for the only other alternative is to take no prisoners. At the battle of Loos many of the German prisoners that we took came to us in embarrassing mobs. They were weak and hungry and required little persuasion to lay down their arms. Under these conditions we could manage a great many prisoners with a few armed men. Where they surrendered in ones and twos we found there was a disposition on the part of some of our troops to disengage themselves from the battle to lead them back. A man is naturally proud of the fact that he has taken a prisoner and wants to deliver him himself. But we insisted that they be turned over at the earliest opportunity to others who were in charge of small numbers of prisoners, and that as soon as possible they be given into the charge of men who were slightly wounded, but who could still be relied on to give a good account of themselves if trouble arose. It is also a good thing to have a quantity of loose telephone wire about—as almost always happens in a battle—and wind this round the prisoners, making sure that they keep their hands in the air. Even barbed wire will do, though it is not so comfortable for the prisoners concerned, and it may be necessary to relax the rule about keeping both hands up!

Raids are attacks on a small scale, and on a definite portion of the enemy's line. They are usually carried out by parties varying in number from twenty to a hundred commanded by one or more officers. Almost the same preparation as for an attack is necessary in most cases to break down the barbed wire before the lines. But in some cases they are carried out as surprises and then other means must be relied on to overcome the difficulties of the barbed wire. As in the case of attacks, rehearsals must precede the operation itself so that every man will know exactly what he is supposed to do and where he is supposed to be. In a recent raid during the time that the snow was on the ground, the Canadians secured a number of women's nightgowns and put them on over their uniforms. In this remarkable garb they proceeded over No Man's Land to visit the German lines.

If artillery preparation has been given, that must be depended on to have broken the wires and the thing to be done then is to reach the enemy parapets before they have time to recover and bring the machine guns into action. But by far the greater number of raids come as surprises to the enemy. They do not hear the men beyond their parapets lying on their stomachs and busily cutting the wires with their snips. The first they know of it is when a bomb lands in the trench or else the body of one of the attacking infantrymen, as he enters their stronghold to begin his work of destruction. In raiding parties, more than at any other time it is well to remember the adage that "silence is golden," and that the best results can only be obtained if every man is determined to follow his instructions to the very letter. If the party is cut off by superior forces it must make up its mind as to what it is going to do, though most men, I am sure, will prefer to fight to the death rather than surrender.