Practically coincident with the giving out for publication on March 19, through the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau, of an account of a discussion in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of the memorandum of the former Ambassador at London, together with substantial excerpts from the main chapters of his work, the German Government got in touch with Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the war began, and asked him to write an article calculated to counteract the effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. Herr von Jagow hastened to accede to this request, but he merely made matters worse for the German Government by practically admitting the correctness of Prince Lichnowsky's assertion that England did not want war and that Berlin was aware of this.

Copies of German newspapers received here show that, while the journals of all factions were practically of one mind in reproaching the German Foreign Office for its lack of diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and militarist organs laid special stress upon the implication in the von Jagow article that Germany might have been willing to drop its alliance with Austria if it could have been sure of contracting one with England, and the Liberal and Socialist papers declared that it was no use insisting any longer that Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale bloodshed of the world war, and that now nothing really stood in the way of moving for a peace by agreement.

These comments were so sharp on both sides that Herr von Jagow was soon moved to write another article defending his reply to Prince Lichnowsky and arguing that his statements regarding the Triple Alliance could by no means be interpreted as meaning that he would have been willing to abandon Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. In this article, which was first printed in the MÜnchener Neueste Nachrichten, von Jagow says he cannot understand how these statements can be taken to mean that he was an opponent of the alliance with Austria and was considering a choice between Austria and England. He proceeds to defend his own policy by reference to the fact that Bismarck was not content with the Triple Alliance on the one hand, and the famous "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia on the other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted agreements between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and England, with the object of "bringing England into a closer relationship to the Central European league and making her share its burdens." Bismarck's policy relieved Germany of some of her obligations, because "Austria-Hungary, supported by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."

Then, as The London Times points out, carefully avoiding the history of the present Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and abandonment of the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, von Jagow defends his attempts to make British policy serve Germany's purposes. It was "because of the isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had come about in the course of years," that von Jagow "pursued a rapprochement with England." He did so, "not with any idea of putting England in the place of Austria-Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the Anglo-German antagonism, to move England to a different orientation of her policy." Germany "could not count upon Italy," and wanted other assistance in upholding Austria-Hungary in the Balkans against Russia. Herr von Jagow proceeds:

"The combination of England would have relieved us of the necessity of taking: our stand alone, when the case arose, for Austria-Hungary against Russia. As was effected by the agreements of 1887, a part of our obligations would have been laid upon other shoulders. It is in this sense that I spoke of the possibility of the loosening and the dissolution of old unions which no longer satisfy all the conditions.

"The alliance with Austria-Hungary was the cornerstone of Bismarckian policy, and that it had to remain. The expansion of the alliance into the Triple Alliance, by taking in Italy, was a means of supplementing the Central European grouping of the powers; it was an 'auxiliary structure,' by means of which Bismarck aimed at a further guarantee of peace, especially as he intended thereby to check Italy's Irredentist policy. Threads then ran to England via Italy. These threads gave way later, and this caused a considerable change in the attitude of Italy.

Friendly to England

"A friendly attitude on the part of England toward the Triple Alliance—what Professor Hermann Oncken calls the moral extension of the Triple Alliance over the Channel—was the aim of our policy, and in this we were sure of the complete accord of our allies. I never thought that the agreements about Bagdad and the colonies would mean an immediate alteration of England's course in European policy. These agreements were to prepare the way for this change of course. I was under no illusions about the difficulties which would still have to be overcome. But difficulties, and even resistance on the part of public opinion in one's own country, cannot prevent us from following a road that is seen to be right. The league between Germany and Austria-Hungary, supported by friendship with England, would have created a peace bloc of unassailable strength. The increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction with Austria on the Adriatic, and the Russophile and also Irredentist tendencies of Rumania, would have lost their importance. Then, in given circumstances, the Triple Alliance treaty might have been modified. The union with England would also have secured us against Russian aggression, and the obligations imposed upon us by our alliance would thereby have been diminished.

"The road to this goal was long. The calm development was crossed by the Serajevo murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 1914, the English Government—instead of keeping peace—preferred to join in the war against us. The English Government has probably since then been assailed by serious doubts as to whether its choice was right. In any case, it assumed a considerable share of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe."

Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme was inevitably doomed to failure, saying that the policy of England is more liable to adaptation and alteration than the policy of any other country, and that "more far-seeing statesmen than those who were intrusted with the fortunes of the Island Empire in 1914—think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and Salisburys—held other views about the orientation of England toward Germany and Russia."

"As matters stand today, attempts to arrive at clearness about the respective parts played by our enemies at the outbreak of the war, and about the greater or less degrees of guilt belonging to each of them, can have only a historical value. England has made the cause of our enemies her own, and so she also shall be made to feel how Germany defends herself against her enemies."