Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Pennsylvania

[From his book, "The War and the Bagdad Railway"]

Germany's project of a railway from Berlin to Bagdad, now rivaled by a new one from Berlin to Bombay via Russia, was one of the chief causes of the war. It dates from 1888, when a syndicate of German and British capital organized the Anatolian Railway, to be built from Haidar Pacha, opposite Constantinople, to Angora—about 360 miles. The German members later bought out the British interests. Further concessions were obtained, but in 1898 a much more ambitious plan was brought forward by the visit of the German Emperor to Sultan Abdul Hamid, and in 1899 the general policy of a line across Asia Minor was announced. This line, however, as a glance at the map will show, did not get beyond Angora; Russia killed that phase of the project. The Bagdad Railway was then organized in 1903, and obtained from Turkey an unprecedented concession running southeastward to the Persian Gulf. Both England and France were offered a minor share in the enterprise, but refused. The Germans thus remained in full control, at the same time obtaining all the French capital they needed through Swiss banks.

The Bagdad Railway has been a nightmare resting heavily on all Europe for eighteen years—ever since the announcement in 1899 of the concession granted to the Anatolian Railway Company. No step ever taken by any European power anywhere has caused so much trouble, given rise to so many complications, and has been such a constant menace to the peace of the world. No European statesman to whom the destinies of his country have been committed has rested easily in the presence of this spectre of the twentieth century. In the last analysis the Bagdad Railway will be found to be the largest single contributing factor in bringing on the war, because through it more than through any other cause the mutual distrust among European powers has been nurtured until the entire atmosphere of international diplomacy became vitiated. The explanation of this remarkable phenomenon, transforming what appeared on the surface to be a magnificent commercial enterprise, with untold possibilities for usefulness, into a veritable curse, an excrescence on the body politic of Europe, is to be sought in the history of the highway through which the railway passes. The control of this highway is the key to the East—the Near and the Farther East as well. Such has been its rÔle in the past—such is its significance today. * * *

The most recent events are merely the repetition on a large scale of such as took place thousands of years ago and at frequent intervals since. The weapons have changed, new contestants have arisen to take the place of civilizations that after serving their day faded out of sight, but the issue has ever remained the same. We are confronted by that issue today—the control of the highway that leads to the East. * * * The decisive battlefields for the triumph of democracy are in the West, but the decision for supremacy among European nations lies in the East. The Bagdad Railway is the most recent act in a drama the beginnings of which lie in the remote past. * * *

The course of events in the Near East since the entering wedge, represented by Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, is to be interpreted as the irresistible onslaught of the West to break down the barrier created in 1453. As we survey the successive steps in this onslaught, the struggle between France and England, culminating in the Convention of 1904, which gave France a dominant position in Morocco in return for allowing England a free hand in Egypt, the attempts of France and Russia to hedge in England in India, followed by England and Russia in dividing up their "spheres of influence" in Persia, the commercial and railway concessions secured by England, France, and Russia from Turkey, sinking ever deeper into a slough of desperate weakness, we see how these struggles, conventions, and partnerships all lead up to the dramatic climax—the struggle for the historic highway which is the key to the Near East. Its possession will mean in the future—as it always has in the past—dominion over Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and probably Arabia; and the Near East points its finger directly toward the Farther East. Under the modern symbol of railway control, Asia Minor, true to the genius of its history, once more looms up as a momentous factor in the world history. * * * The murder at Serajevo was merely the match applied to the pile all ready to be kindled. * * *

Full credit should be given to the German brains in which this project was hatched, and there is no reason to suspect that at the outset the German capitalists who fathered the enterprise were actuated by any other motive than the perfectly legitimate one to create a great avenue of commerce. When, however, the German Government entered the field as the backer and promoter of the scheme the political aspect of the railroad was moved into the foreground, and that aspect has since overshadowed the commercial one.

Had the original plan of the German group to run the Bagdad Railway across Northern Asia Minor from Angora been adhered to, the interior would have been kept free, and it is likely that a favorite English plan (afterward taken up also by the French Government) to run a railway from the Gulf of Alexandretta via Aleppo and the Euphrates to Bagdad might have been carried out. * * * The railway projects of Asia Minor and Syria might have remained purely commercial undertakings of great cultural value. The political aspect of railway plans in the Near East might have been permanently kept in the background.

The stumbling block that prevented the execution of the original plan was—strangely enough—Russia. Her opposition to the northern route brought about the change. Russia had plans of her own in Asia Minor and in the lands to the east beyond. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century Russia, fearing the extension of English power in the Far East, cast her eyes about for securing zones of influence that might bring her into touch with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. She secured the co-operation of France in 1891, and it is both interesting and instructive to note that the Franco-Russian alliance was originally directed against England rather than against Germany. * * * She exacted from Turkey the Black Sea Basin agreement, formally sanctioned in 1900, which reserved to her the right to construct railroads in Northern Asia Minor. * * * At all events, her opposition was strong enough to secure a modification of the plan of the Bagdad Railway in favor of the transverse route, which, as it turned out, gave Germany a tremendous advantage over all rivals, though it also brought on the opposition of England. Russia was not prepared to allow any further advantage to be gained in the East by England. On the whole she still preferred Germany.

[England's opposition to Germany's new railway scheme became acute when it was publicly announced that the road was not to terminate at Bagdad, or even at Basra, but to run on to a point "to be determined" on the Persian Gulf. The Convention of 1902-3 made it evident that Germany had stolen a march on England, and that the prestige of France, too, had suffered. The favor shown to the German syndicate by the Turkish Government was evident. The terms were indeed unprecedented. Says Dr. Jastrow: "No wonder that there were great rejoicings in Germany when they were announced and gnashing of teeth outside of Germany." With the announcement of the 1902-3 concession and the formation of the Bagdad Railway Company as a successor to the old Anatolian Company, the German syndicate did offer English and French capitalists a share in the enterprise, and insisted that the plan was "international." But the "share" thus offered was merely assistance in financing what would remain a German matter—inasmuch as Germany reserved the control in the management's personnel. England and France therefore refused to participate.]