Extending the British Line
Of course, the Field Marshal was not anxious to extend his line. No one would be, having regard to the great accumulation of strength against him, and the War Cabinet were just as reluctant.
There was not a single meeting between the French Generals and ourselves when we did not state facts against the extension, but the pressure from the French Government and French Army was enormous, and what was done was not done in response to pressure from the War Cabinet. It was done in response to very great pressure which Sir Douglas Haig could not resist and which we could not resist. We are not suggesting that our French allies are asking unfairly. That is certainly not my intention.
There was a considerable ferment in France on the subject of the length of the line held by the French Army as compared with our army. The French losses had been enormous. They had practically borne the brunt of the fighting for three years. There was a larger proportion of their young manhood put into the line than in any belligerent country in the world. They held 336 miles. We held a front of 100 miles.
That is not the whole statement, because the Germans were much more densely massed in front of ourselves. Not only that, but the line we held was much more vulnerable. Practically the defense of Paris was left to us, and the defense of some of the most important centres, but there was the fact that you had this enormous front held by the French Army, as compared with what looked like the comparatively small front of ours.
Shortage of Farm Labor
In addition to that, the French Army at that time was holding, I think, a two-division front on our line in order to enable us to accumulate the necessary reserves for the purposes of the attack in Flanders. That was part of the line which, I believe, was held before by the British and French.
The French were pressing in order to withdraw men from the army for purposes of agriculture. I ought to explain that their agricultural output had fallen enormously, owing to the fact that they had withdrawn a very large proportion of their men from the cultivation of the fields, and they felt it essential that they should withdraw part of their army for the purpose of cultivating the soil, and they were pressing us upon these topics.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, and the Cabinet felt that it was inevitable that during the Winter months there should be some extension, and we acknowledged that something had to be done to meet the French demands, and to that extent we accepted the principle that there must be some extension of the line.
At that time the Field Marshal was under the impression that the Cabinet had taken a decision without his consent. The Chief of the Imperial Staff upon that sent the following memorandum to the War Cabinet. I will read it, but first, with reference to the Boulogne Conference, I may, perhaps, say that that was the first time we had a discussion with the French Ministers. The subject of discussion was a rather important foreign office. It was not summoned in the least to discuss an extension of the lines. We never knew that was to be raised. Sir William Robertson and I represented the British Government, and M. PainlevÉ, the Prime Minister, and General Foch represented the French Government.
When Sir William Robertson discovered that the Field Marshal was under the impression that we had come to a decision without his consent he sent the War Cabinet a memorandum, in which he says:
"At the recent Boulogne Conference the question of extending our front was raised by the French representatives. The reply given was that, while in principle we were, of course, ready to do whatever could be done, the matter was one which could not be discussed in the absence of Sir Douglas Haig, or during the continuance of the present operations, and that due regard must also be had to the plan of operations for next year.
"It was suggested that it would be best for the Field Marshal to come to an arrangement with General PÉtain, when this could be done. So far as I am aware no formal discussion has taken place, and the matter cannot be regarded as decided. Further, I feel sure that the War Cabinet would not think of deciding such a question without first obtaining Sir Douglas Haig's views. I am replying to him in the above sense."
That, I think, was on the 19th of October. The War Cabinet fully approved of the communication. Sir Douglas Haig communicated, and said that it threw a new light on the Boulogne position. I think that we have a right to complain of the way in which it has been rumored about that Sir Douglas Haig protested.
The War Cabinet's Decision
The fact that Sir William Robertson had explained and Sir Douglas Haig had stated that the explanation threw new light has never been repeated. That is how mischief is done.
On Oct. 24 this question was first formally discussed by the War Cabinet. There was further pressure from the French Government, and Sir William Robertson gave his views as to the time which the British Government ought to take, and this conclusion is recorded in the minutes of the War Cabinet as follows:
"The War Cabinet approve of the suggestion of the Chief of the Imperial Staff that he should reply to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in the following sense: The War Cabinet are of the opinion that in deciding to what extent the British troops can take over the line from the French regard must be had to the necessity of giving them a reasonable opportunity for leave, rest, and training during the Winter months and to the plan of operations for the next year, and, further, while the present offensive continues it will not be possible to commence taking over more line.
"Under these circumstances the War Cabinet fear that until this policy is settled it will be premature to decide finally whether the British front is to be extended by four divisions or to greater or lesser extent."
The resolution was communicated to Sir Douglas Haig by Sir William Robertson, and we never departed from it. After that came the Cambrai incident and the Italian disaster, which necessitated our sending troops to Italy. That made it difficult for the Field Marshal to carry out the promise he made to General PÉtain for a certain extension of the front. Then the present French Prime Minister came in, and he is not a very easy gentleman to refuse. He was very insistent that the British Army should take over the line.
Clemenceau Suggested Versailles
We stood by the position that that was a matter to be discussed by the two Commanders in Chief. We never swerved from that position. At last M. Clemenceau suggested that the question should be discussed by the military representatives at Versailles, and that the Versailles Council should decide if there was any difference of opinion. The military representatives discussed the question, and the only interference of the War Cabinet was to this extent. We communicated with the Chief of Staff, who was then in France, and with Sir Douglas Haig to urge on them the importance of preparing their case for the other side so as to make the strongest possible case for the British view.
The military representatives at Versailles suggested a compromise, but coupled with it recommendations as to steps which ought to be taken by the French Army to assist the British if they were attacked, and by the British to assist the French if they were attacked, which was even a more important question than the extension of the front.
That recommendation came up for discussion at the Versailles Council of Feb. 1. Before that meeting Sir Douglas Haig and General PÉtain met and entered into an agreement as to the extension of the front to Brissy, and Sir Douglas Haig reported that to the Versailles Council. When the discussion took place there no further extension of the line was taken at all as a result of the discussion.
That is the whole story. I was to make it perfectly clear that in the action Sir Douglas Haig took for the extension of the line he had the full approval of the British Cabinet, having regard to the pressure of the French Government and military authorities. Sir Douglas Haig had no option except to make the extension. He was in our judgment absolutely right in the course he took. Naturally, he would have preferred not to have done it, but the British Government fully approved of the action he took.
The real lesson of the discussion is the importance of unity of command. It would never have arisen if you had had that. Instead of one army and one commander responsible for one part of the line, and another army and another commander responsible for another part of the line, we have one united command responsible for the whole and every part. It was the only method of safety, and I am glad we have it at last.
It was not so much a question of the length of the line held by one force or the length held by another. It was a question of reserves massed behind.
