Lichnowsky's Testimony as to Germany's Long Plotting for Domination By H. Charles Woods, F. R. G. S.

To a Britisher who has followed the trend of events in the Near East, and who has witnessed the gradual development of German intrigues in that area, there has never been published a document so important and so condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky.

On the one hand, the memorandum of the Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London proves from an authoritative enemy pen that, practically ever since the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and particularly from the time of the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888, the Germans have carefully prepared the way for the present war, and that during this period they have consistently turned their attention toward the East and toward the development of the Mitteleuropa scheme. And on the other side it indicates, if indeed any indication were still required, that the so-called rivalry existing between England and Germany prior to the war arose not from any desire on the part of Great Britain to stand in the way of the development of legitimate German interests in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, but from the unwillingness of the Government of Berlin to agree to any reasonable settlement of the many all-important questions connected with these regions.

Although for years the Germans had been intriguing against the Triple Entente, Prince Lichnowsky, a man possessed of personally friendly feelings for England, was sent to London in order to camouflage the real designs of the enemy and to secure representation by a diplomatist who was intended to make good, and who, in fact, did make a high position for himself in British official and social circles. The appointment itself raises two interesting questions. In the first place, while this is not stated in the memorandum, it is clear that, whereas Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was definitely instructed to endeavor to make friends with England and to detach her from France and Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring about war at a convenient time for Germany, Prince Lichnowsky's task was somewhat different. Kept at least more or less in the dark as to German objects, the Ambassador, who arrived in London when the Morocco crisis of 1911 was considered at an end, instead of being intrusted with the dual objects of his predecessor, was clearly told to do, and did in fact do, his utmost to establish friendly relations with England. The Berlin Government, on the other hand, this time maintained in its own hands the larger question of the making of war at what it believed, happily wrongly, to be a convenient time for the Central Empires. In the second place, although this, too, is not explained, various references made by Prince Lichnowsky leave little doubt in the mind of the reader who knows the situation existing at the German Embassy prior to the outbreak of war that the Ambassador himself was aware that von KÜhlmann—the Councilor of Embassy—was, in fact, the representative of Pan-Germanism in England, and that to this very able and expert intriguer was left the work of trying to develop a situation which, in peace or in war, would be favorable to the ruler and to the class whose views he voiced.

Phases of German Policy

To come down to the real subject of this article—the proof provided by Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures of the long existence of the German Mitteleuropa scheme and of the fact that Germany, and not Austria, made this war, largely with the object of pushing through her designs in the East—I propose to divide my remarks in such a way as to show that the development of this scheme passed through three phases and in each case to take what may be called a text from the document under discussion.

The first phase lasted from the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky says that Germany began the Triple Alliance policy, and more definitely from the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888 until the Balkan wars. While in using these expressions the ex-Ambassador does not refer only to this period, he says: "The goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosporus," and "instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors."

These words contain in essence and in tabulated form an explanation (from the pen of a German whose personal and official positions enabled him to know the truth) of the events which were in progress during this period—events the full importance of which has often been refuted and denied by those who refused to see that from the first the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, from the moment of his accession the sentiments and views of the German ruler became markedly apparent, for one year later his Majesty paid the first of his carpet-bagging visits to Constantinople—a visit more or less connected with the then recent grabbing of Haidar Pasha-Ismid railway—now the first section of the Bagdad line—by the Germans, and with the prolongation of that line to Angora as a German concern, concessions secured by Mr. Kaula, acting on behalf of German interests in 1888.

Preparing for Pan-German Project

Before and particularly after the appointment of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal friend of the Kaiser for many years, the enemy had been carefully preparing the way for the realization of his Pan-German dreams in the Near and Middle East. Although so far as the Balkan States were concerned, up to the outbreak of the war the Kaiser endeavored to screen his intentions behind a nominally Austrian program, for years he had really been making ready his ground for the present occasion by military, political, and economic penetration and by diplomatic intrigues destined to bring about a favorable situation for Germany when the propitious moment for action arrived. The power of von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils was gradually increased until the Ottoman Army was finally placed completely under Germanic control.

The Young Turkish revolution of 1908, which at first seemed destined greatly to minimize German power at Constantinople, really resulted in an opposite effect. Thus in spite of the effective support of England for Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian crises of 1908 and 1909, a gradual reaction subsequently set in. This was due in part to the cleverness and regardlessness of von Bieberstein, and in part to the circumstances arising out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For instance, while the Germans ignored the necessity for reforms in the Ottoman Empire so long as the Turks favored a Teutonic program, it was impossible for the British Government or the British public to look with favor upon a rÉgime which worked to maintain the privileged position of Moslems throughout the empire, which did nothing to punish those who instigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909, and which was intent upon disturbing the status quo in the Persian Gulf, and upon changing the status of Egypt to the Turkish advantage.

The Turco-German Entente

Such indeed became the position that even the Turco-Italian war, which might have been expected to shake the confidence of the Ottoman Government in the bona fides of Italy's then ally, did not seriously disturb the intimate relations which were gradually developing between Berlin and Constantinople. Here again enemy intrigues were to the fore, for in addition to Austria's objecting to the inauguration of any Italian operations in the Balkans, the German Government, when the position of its representative in Constantinople had become seriously compromised as a result of the Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he could not prevent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer von Bieberstein to London and to replace him by another, perhaps less able, but certainly none the less successful in retaining a grasp over everything which took place in the Ottoman capital.

Before and particularly after the accession of the Kaiser to the throne, the Germans gradually furthered their program by a system of railway penetration in the East. In the late '60s Baron Hirsch secured a concession for the construction of lines from Constantinople to what was then the north-western frontier of Eastern Rumelia, and from Saloniki to Mitrovitza, with a branch to Ristovatz on the then Serbian frontier. At first these lines were under French influence, but they subsequently became largely an Austrian undertaking, and considerably later the Deutsche Bank secured a predominating proportion of the capital, thus turning them practically into a German concern. In Asia Minor the British, who were originally responsible for the construction of railways, were gradually ousted, until, with the signature of the Bagdad Railway agreement in 1903, the Germans dominated not only that line, but also occupied a position in which, on the one hand, they had secured control of many of its feeders, and, on the other, they had jeopardized the future development and even the actual prosperity of those not already in their possession.

Fruits of the Balkan Wars

This brings us up to the second phase in the development of Pan-Germanism in the East—the period of the Balkan wars—toward two aspects of which, as Prince Lichnowsky says, the Central Powers devoted their attention. "Two possibilities for settling the question remained." Either Germany left the Near Eastern problem to the peoples themselves or she supported her allies "and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rÔle of mediator." Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, "The German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter," and as a result supported Austria on the one hand in her desire for the establishment of an independent Albania, and on the other in her successful attempts to draw Bulgaria into the second war and to prevent that country from providing the concessions which at that time would have satisfied Rumania.

So far as the first of these questions—that connected with Albania—is concerned, while the ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Austria was actuated by the fact that she "would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic," the actual creation of Albania was justified by the existence of the Albanians as a nationality and by their desire for independent government. Indeed, that the rÉgime inaugurated by the great powers on the east of the Adriatic, and particularly the Government of William of Wied, proved an utter failure, was due not so much to what Prince Lichnowsky describes as the "incapacity of existence" of Albania as to the attitude of the Central Powers, and especially to that of Austria, who, having brought the new State into being, at once worked for unrest and for discord in the hope of being able to step in to put the house in order when the propitious moment arrived.

Promoting Balkan Discord

The second direction in which the enemy devoted his energy was an even larger, more German and more far-reaching one. "The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which has been identified with Turkey for many years," says the memorandum. This at one time seemed destined to carry with it results entirely disadvantageous to Germany. Thus, if the four States, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, who fought in the first war had continued on good terms with one another, the whole balance of power in Europe would almost certainly have been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Empire, which prior to the outbreak of these hostilities was held by competent authorities to be able to provide a vast army, then calculated to number approximately 1,225,000 men, there would have sprung up a friendly group of countries which in the near future could easily have placed in the field a combined army approximately amounting to at least 1,000,000, all told. As the interests of such a confederation, which would probably have been joined by Rumania, would have been on the side of the Triple Entente, the Central Powers at once realized that its formation or its continued existence would mean for them not only the loss of the whole of Turkey, but also the gain for their enemies of four or five allies, most of whom had already proved their power in war,

German Power in Turkey

Between the Balkan wars and the outbreak of the European conflagration, but as part of the former period, there occurred two events of far-reaching significance. The first, which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky, was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders practically as Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army—an appointment which Mr. Morgenthau rightly tells us constituted a diplomatic triumph for Germany. When coupled with the fact that Enver Pasha—an out-and-out pro-German—became Minister of War about the same time, the military result of this appointment was an enormous improvement in the efficiency of the Ottoman Army. Its political significance, on the other hand, was due to the fact that it carried with it a far-reaching increase of Pan-German influence at Constantinople.

The second event in progress during the interval of peace was connected with the Aegean Islands question. Germany, having first utilized her diplomatic influence in favor of Turkey, later on encouraged the Government of that country in its continued protests against the decision upon that question arrived at by the great powers. Not content, however, with this, the Kaiser, who has now adopted the policy of deportation in Belgium, in Poland, and in Serbia, definitely encouraged the Turks in a like measure in regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor in order to be rid of a hostile and Christian population when the time for action arrived. That this encouragement was given was always apparent to those who followed the course of events in 1914, but that it was admitted by a German Admiral to Mr. Morgenthau constitutes a condemnation the damning nature of which it is difficult to exaggerate.

---