[Copyrighted]

Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince Lichnowsky, which was printed in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, 1918, follows:

"So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from taking up the statements concerning the policy obtaining before my administration of the Foreign Office.

"I should like to make the following remarks about the individual points in the article:

"When I was named State Secretary in January, 1913, I regarded a German-English rapprochement as desirable and also believed an agreement attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each other. At all events, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A principal point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—the so-called Bagdad policy—as this had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to force us out there it certainly appeared to me that a conflict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate over the Bagdad Railroad. We found a favorable disposition on the part of the English Government, and the result was the agreement that was almost complete when the world war broke out.

Colonial Questions

"At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had been begun by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassador at London,) continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky were under way. I intended to carve the way later for further negotiations regarding other—for example, East Asiatic—problems, when what was in my opinion the most important problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad, should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I also left the naval problem aside, as it would have been difficult to reach an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.

"I can pass over the development of the Albanian problem, as it occurred before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as Prince Lichnowsky proposes does not seem possible to me. It would have contradicted the essential part of the alliance if we had completely ignored really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that Austria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious resentment among us. Russia, although she had no interest at all in Morocco, also stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would render possible a settlement of the divergent interests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them.

"It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a 'triple alliance policy' in matters where the interests of the allied powers touched each other. Then Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the Entente in questions of the Orient, and Austria handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would not have been able to look after our interests in the Orient, if we did not have some support. And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had to represent great economic interests right there. But today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests.

"That the people 'in Petrograd wanted to see the Sultan independent' is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople founded by Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible for us to defend our economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.

Russia and Germany

"When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that we only 'drove Russia, our natural friend and best neighbor, into the arms of France and England through our Oriental and Balkan policy' he is in conflict with the historical facts. Only because Prince Gortschakoff [Russian Premier] was guiding Russian policy toward a rapprochement with a France lusting for revenge was Prince Bismarck induced to enter into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the alliance with Rumania he barred an advance of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces—BjÖrki proves it—or remained ineffective, like the so-called Potsdam agreement. Also, Russia was not always our 'best neighbor.' Under Queen Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for possession of East Prussia to extend her Baltic coasts and to insure her domination of the Baltic. The Petrograd 'window' has gradually widened, so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a field over which to send troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.

"And we did not force Russia to drop 'her policy of Asiatic expansion,' but only tried to defend ourselves against her encroachments in European policy and her encircling of our Austro-Hungarian ally.

Grey Conciliatory

"Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Secretary] did we want war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy experience at Algeciras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an 'attitude of mediation' at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward Grey; but that he 'by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente' is, however, surely saying rather too much. Certainly he often advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in Vienna) and found 'formulas of agreement,' but in dealing with the other side he represented the Entente, because he, no less than ourselves, neither would, nor could, abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, 'without exception, represented the standpoint dictated to us from Vienna' is absolutely false. We, like England, played a mediatory rÔle, and also in Vienna counseled far more yielding and moderation than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know about, or even to suggest. And then Vienna made several far-reaching concessions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lichnowsky, who always wanted to be wiser than the Foreign Office, and who apparently allowed himself to be strongly influenced by the Entente statesmen, did not know this, he surely ought not to make any false assertions now! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was reached in Vienna, we also naturally had to represent the Austrian standpoint at the conference. Ambassador SzÖgyeni himself was not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his attitude. That the Ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every day, constantly sounded the refrain of casus foederis is entirely unknown to me. It certainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for some time past had not been counted as a friend of Austria in Vienna. Still complaints about him came to my ears oftener from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] than from the side of Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister.]

"King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari constituted a mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.

"Russia was by no means obliged 'to give way to us all along the line'; on the contrary, she 'advanced the wishes of Serbia' in several ways, Serbia even receiving some cities and strips of territory that could have been regarded as purely Albanian or preponderatingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that 'the course of the conference was a fresh humiliation for the self-consciousness of Russia' and that there was a feeling of resentment in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task of our policy to satisfy all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated self-consciousness of a power by no means friendly to us, at the cost of our ally. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same stand as Russia, the result would have been a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnowsky seems only anxious that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of Austria is apparently a matter of indifference to him.

The "Wily" Venizelos

"When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 'Austrophilie' was not adapted to 'promote Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly understand what this means. Following a disastrous diversion toward East Asia—in the Japanese war we had favored Russia without even being thanked for it!—Russia again took up her policy directed toward the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with renewed impulse, (the Balkan Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Russian Foreign Minister after Germany forced the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 1909.]

"Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 'Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.

"That Count Berchtold displayed certain inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its differences with Rumania is true; that we 'naturally went with him' is, however, entirely false. With our support, King Carol had the satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the case of the Bucharest peace, in which we favored the wishes and interests of Rumania, which was allied to us, our policy deviated somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe—as Prince Lichnowsky asserts—that it 'could count upon our support in case of its revision.' That Marquis San Giuliano 'is said to have warned us already in the Summer of 1913 from becoming involved in a world war,' because at that time in Austria 'the thought of a campaign against Serbia' had found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tschirschky—who certainly was rather pessimistic by nature—is said to have declared in the Spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant of the 'important happenings' that Prince Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to Paris—Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent—surely must have been known to the Ambassador, and we informed him about the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he did not want to believe it!

"In the matter of Liman von Sander, [German reorganizer of the Turkish Army,] we made a far-reaching concession to Russia by renouncing the General's power of command over Constantinople. I will admit that this point of the agreement over the military mission was not opportune politically.

"When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the treaty a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit must not be denied him, although it certainly required strong pressure on several occasions to induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.

"When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received the authorization definitely to conclude the treaty, after he previously asserts that 'the treaty was consequently dropped,' this contains a contradiction which we may let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that we delayed publication because the treaty would have been 'a public success' for him that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can only be explained through his self-centred conception of things. The treaty would have lost its practical and moral effect—one of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and England—if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks upon 'perfidious Albion' in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. And there is no doubt that, in view of our internal position at that time, this is what the simultaneous publication of the so-called Windsor Treaty would have caused. And the howl about English perfidy that the internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have called forth would hardly have been stilled in the minds of our public through the assurance of English bona fides.

"With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be made only at the proper moment, when the danger of disapproving criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been concluded between us and England would doubtless have materially favored their reception and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was consideration for the effect of the agreement—with which we wanted to improve our relations with England, not to generate more trouble—that caused our hesitation.

"It is correct that—although in a secondary degree—consideration was also taken of the efforts just then being made to obtain economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which the publication of the agreement would naturally have made more difficult to realize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully from London, but he should have trusted in our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with suspicions and the interjection of personal motives. He certainly would have found our arguments understood by the English statesmen themselves.

"The Ambassador's speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread also among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the 'most important things,' in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising of our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard.

Defense of Archduke

"It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.

"At Knopischt, on the occasion of the visit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Archduke heir apparent, no plan of an active policy against Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the champion of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken. During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of war.

"Prince Lichnowsky's 'optimism' was hardly justified, as he has probably convinced himself since through the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the Under Secretary of State was well grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count PourtalÈs that 'Russia would not move under any circumstances,' had not thought of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count PourtalÈs [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports.

Blame for Russia

"That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant provocations stirred up by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which reached their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio of the war in general, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations, (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years, were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion.

"I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand—it was a matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I also wrote that 'Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German' and that we must 'just risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there would probably be some 'bluster'; that 'the more firmly we stood by Austria the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.

"We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria. The 'intimacy of the Russo-Italian relations' is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We worked toward that end with all our energy. That we 'insisted upon' the war is an unheard-of assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Czar and to King George, published in the White Books—Prince Lichnowsky only cares to tell about 'the really humble telegram of the Czar'—as well as the instruction we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is formed by the sentence:

"'When Count Berchtold finally decided to come around we answered the Russian mobilization, after Russia had vainly negotiated and waited a whole week, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.'

[In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow omits the former's statement that Count Berchtold "hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin."]

"Wrong" Conclusions

"Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian Army was streaming over our borders? The reading of the Sukhomlinov trial has probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of 'Oh si tacuisses!' On July 5 I was absent from Berlin. The declaration that I was 'shortly thereafter in Vienna' 'in order to talk everything over with Count Berchtold' is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from my honeymoon trip and did not leave there until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the shifting of the Great Headquarters. As Secretary of State I was only once in Vienna before the war, in the Spring of 1913.

"Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over the matter of the confusing dispatch that he sent us on Aug. 1—at present I am not in possession of the exact wording—as a 'misunderstanding' and even seems to want to reproach us because 'in Berlin the news, without first waiting for the conversation, was made the basis of a far-reaching action.' The question of war with England was a matter of minutes, and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to avoid war with France and England. His Majesty sent the well-known telegram to King George. The contents of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood any other way than we understood it.

"Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization of Russia and on July 31 declared war upon the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding, the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our enemies.

"When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself 'with Turks and Austro-Magyars' and 'subjected itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,' he may be suitably answered that he saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of view of his desired rapprochement with England À tout prix. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria.

"I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened—hic Rhodus, hic salta. But England, that was not allied in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword.

"In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the world war—something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battle cry.

"'Political marriages for life and death' are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old guarantees—even with their obligations.

"The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, the same as at the London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.

"The personal attacks contained in the work, the unheard-of calumnies and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.

"In closing, let us draw attention here to what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in his work, 'The Old and New Central Europe,' the memorandum of Prince Bismarck of the year 1879, in which the idea is developed that the German Empire must never dare allow a situation in which it would remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been left in the lurch by Germany."