The causes that led to Germany's adoption of the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare on Feb. 1, 1917, were revealed a year later by the Handelsblad, an Amsterdam newspaper, whose correspondent had secured secret access to "a number of highly interesting and important documents" long enough to read them and make notes of their contents. The Dutch paper vouched for the accuracy of the following information:

At the close of the year 1915 the German Admiralty Staff prepared a semi-official memorandum to prove that an unrestricted submarine campaign would compel Great Britain to sue for peace "in six months at the most." The character of the argument conveys the impression that the chiefs of the German Admiralty Staff had already made up their minds to adopt the most drastic measures in regard to submarine warfare, but that they wished to convince the Kaiser, the Imperial Chancellor, and the German diplomatists of the certainty of good results on economic and general, rather than merely military, grounds. To this end the memorandum based its arguments on statistics of food prices, freight, and insurance rates in Great Britain. It pointed out that the effects on the prices of essential commodities, on the balance of trade, and, above all, on the morale of the chief enemy, had been such, even with the restricted submarine campaign of 1915, that, if an unrestricted submarine war were decided upon, England could not possibly hold out for more than a short period.

The memorandum was submitted to the Imperial Chancellor, who passed it on to Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary of State for Finance. He, however, rejected the document on the ground that, in the absence of authentic estimates of stocks, it was impossible to set a time-limit to England's staying power, and also that he was exceedingly doubtful as to what line would be taken by neutrals, especially the United States. Dr. Helfferich maintained that so desperate a remedy should only be employed as a last resource. The authors of the memorandum then sent a reply, in which they developed their former arguments, and pointed to the gravity of the internal situation in Germany. They emphasized the importance of using the nearest and sharpest weapons of offense if a national collapse was to be avoided. They reinforced their argument by adducing the evidence of ten experts, representing finance, commerce, the mining industry, and agriculture. They were Herr Waldemar MÜller, the President of the Dresdner Bank; Dr. Salomonsohn of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Dr. Paul Reusch of Oberhausen, Royal Prussian Councilor of Commerce; Dr. Springorum of Dortmund, Chancellor of Commerce, member of the Prussian Upper House, (Herren Haus,) General Director of Railways and Tramways at Hoesch, an ironmaster, and a great expert in railways; Herr Max Schinkel of Hamburg, President of the Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg and of the Disconto Gesellschaft in Berlin; Herr Zuckschwerdt of Madgeburg, Councilor of Commerce, late member of the Prussian Upper House; Herr Wilhelm von Finck of Munich, Privy Councilor, chief of the banking house of Merck, Finck & Co., Munich; Councilor of Economics R. Schmidt of Platzhof, member of the WÜrttemberg Upper Chamber and of the German Agricultural Council; Herr Engelhard of Mannheim, Councilor of Commerce, President of the Chamber of Commerce and member of the Baden Upper Chamber.

These experts were invited to send answers in writing to the three following questions: (1) What would be the effect on England of unrestricted submarine warfare? (2) What would be its effect on Germany's relations with the United States and other neutrals? (3) To what extent does the internal situation in Germany demand the use of this drastic weapon?

The reader will do well to remember that the replies were written in February, 1916—nearly two years ago. All agreed on the first point—the effect on Great Britain. The effect of unrestricted submarine warfare on England would be that she would have to sue for peace in six months at the most. Herr MÜller, who seemed to be in a position to confirm the statistics given in the memorandum, pointed out that the supply of indispensable foodstuffs was, at the time of writing, less than the normal supply in peace time. He held that the submarine war, if relentlessly and vigorously pursued, would accomplish its purpose in less time than calculated in the memorandum—in fact, three months should do it. Dr. Salomonsohn also thought that six months was an excessive estimate, and that less time would suffice.

On the question of the effect on neutrals the experts were divided. Dr. Reusch suggested that the neutrals despised the restricted submarine warfare of 1915, and held that every ship in British waters, whether enemy or neutral, should be torpedoed without warning. According to him, the world only respects those who, in a great crisis, know how to make the most unscrupulous use of their power.

Herr MÜller predicted that ruthless submarine war would cause a wholesale flight of neutrals from the war zone. Their newspapers might abuse Germany at first, but they would soon get tired. The danger was from the United States, but that would become less in proportion as Germany operated more decisively and ruthlessly. Dr. Salomonsohn adopted the same attitude. He recognized the possibility of war with the United States, but was loath to throw away so desirable a weapon on that account.

As to the third point, all the experts agreed that the internal situation in Germany demanded that the most drastic methods of submarine warfare should be employed. Herr Zuckschwerdt urged the advisability of the most drastic measures owing to the feeling of the nation. The nation would stand by the Government, but not if it yielded to threats from America. Such weakness would lead to serious consequences. Herr Schmidt admitted the possibility of Germany not being able to hold out, and emphasized the importance of taking drastic steps before disorder and unrest arose in the agricultural districts.