  I take the opportunity of a second edition of this little sketch to point out a rather curious fact in connection with the numerous comments which were made in the press on the evidence presented against the heroine. My object in writing the story was, naturally, to so balance the evidence as to leave it open to my jury to return either verdict, and thus keep the reader in a state of mild suspense during the progress of the trial. How far I succeeded may be gathered from the following extracts: ‘A jury that required to deliberate at all in such a case ought to have been hanged.’—Brief. ‘The way in which the feeblest of cases is worked up to a verdict of guilty is a trifle ridiculous, and a slander on judge, bar, and even jury.’—Leeds Mercury. ‘It is absurd to suppose that upon such evidence any judge and jury could have convicted her of murder.’—Vanity Fair. ‘A tangle of circumstantial evidence which is supposed to be conclusive, but on which we feel confident that no English jury would convict.’—New Zealand Mail. ‘The prisoner is found guilty on what seems to us most insufficient evidence.’—Daily Chronicle. ‘It is difficult to believe that the jury on the evidence could have brought in a verdict of guilty.’—Daily News. ‘The evidence being purely circumstantial, as well as flimsy.’—Academy. [N.B.—Several of the above reviewers were friendly to the book on other points.] ‘In Scotland the verdict would certainly have been “Not Proven.”’—Glasgow Herald. ‘Though the evidence is purely circumstantial, it seems at first sight so strong that no magistrate could fail to commit.’—Saturday Review. ‘The evidence of guilt is very strong.’—Monmouthshire Beacon. ‘Certainly the evidence, purely circumstantial, is very strong.’—Publisher’s Circular. ‘A case of circumstantial evidence which all seemed to point one way, and to fix a horrible crime upon a young girl.’—Weekly Sun. ‘The evidence against her is damning, though purely circumstantial.’—Literary World. These extracts, taken together, seem to me to throw a most interesting light upon the subject of trial by jury—the object of a sneer in one of the above quotations. When it is possible for a number of educated minds, engaged in highly intellectual pursuits, to take such opposite views of the same set of facts, it may surely be urged that, if miscarriages of justice occasionally take place, they are due, not so much to any defects in our judicial system, as to those native diversities of the human mind which no legislation can remove. A change is fast coming over our legal procedure in the direction of dispensing with juries, and leaving everything to the decision of a single trained lawyer. Whether this change is certain to ensure greater correctness of decision is, perhaps, more open to argument than is generally supposed. In conclusion, I have only to express my thanks for the many cordial notices—some of them, I fear, hardly deserved—which this rather slight work received on its first appearance. The kindness of his reviewers has at all events encouraged the author to strive that his future work may be a little better worth their attention. A. U. May, 1895. |
|
